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ABSTRACT 
 
Louis H. Porter: Cold War Internationalisms: The USSR in UNESCO, 1945-1967 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
This dissertation examines the participation of the USSR in the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the Cold War as a case 
study of the role of international organizations in Soviet engagement with the outside world. 
Utilizing archival material tapped in Russia and at UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris, France, I 
provide the first analysis of how a noncommunist international organization integrated the USSR 
into the transnational flow of people, publications, and ideas in the postwar era before the onset 
of détente in the late 1960s. I contextualize Soviet internationalism in the Western 
internationalist movements surrounding UNESCO, reinterpreting the post-Stalinist leadership’s 
policy of “peaceful coexistence” as an acknowledgement that noncommunist international 
organizations were the legitimate venue for multilateral diplomacy. Approaching UNESCO from 
the perspective of Soviet citizens, I historicize the UN system by highlighting how these citizens, 
coming to the organization as outsiders, assessed the “UN idea.” Before the death of I. V. Stalin 
in 1953, the USSR boycotted UNESCO and other noncommunist international organizations 
outside the realm of security, using the internationalism of these organizations as a foil in the 
antiforeign and anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of late Stalinism. Because of the absence of the 
USSR from UNESCO, the West shaped the organization’s culture, politics, and administrative 
practices in its first decade. After Stalin’s death, the USSR under N. S. Khrushchev joined 
UNESCO in 1954. From 1954 to 1967, UNESCO extended to Soviet citizens new ways of  
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thinking internationally and appraising the USSR’s place in the world, involving them in 
international public service, an international public sphere, and an international reading public. 
Members of the Soviet intelligentsia attended UNESCO events; Soviet professionals worked for 
years abroad in UNESCO’s bureaucracy; and a range of citizens read UNESCO publications 
inside the USSR. Once it resolved to permanently stay in UNESCO after 1959, the USSR made 
progress toward rivaling the West in the organization. But as decolonization accelerated in the 
1960s, the pluralizing world order attenuated the impact of this progress. Nevertheless, 
UNESCO’s brand of internationalism offered Soviet citizens an alternative to Soviet 
internationalism once the latter grew hollow in the 1980s.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1957, Stephen Spender, a British writer who had penned an essay for the 1949 
anticommunist manifesto The God That Failed, published Engaged in Writing, a biting satirical 
novel portraying the failure of Western intellectuals to come to terms with the violent “excesses” 
committed by Soviet leader I. V. Stalin and revealed in Soviet First Secretary N. S. 
Khrushchev’s 1956 “Secret Speech.” The novel follows Olim Asphalt, an official of “LITUNO” 
(the “literary and cultural suborgan–some said an operable appendix–of the United Nations”), 
during a trip to Venice, where he serves as a LITUNO observer at the “East-West Conference of 
European Intellectuals.” Sponsored by LITUNO and convened by an associated organization 
called “EUROPLUME,” the conference brings together two famous French existentialists; a pair 
of iconic writers of the Italian Resistance; a Hungarian poet; and three mandarins of the Soviet 
literary world. 
Spender uses the setting of the conference not only to ridicule Western thinkers who 
justified Stalinist atrocities, but also to lampoon the philosophy of the real-life version of 
LITUNO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—a 
United Nations (UN) specialized agency that championed putting the two opposing sides of the 
Cold War in the same room as the best means of realizing peace. LITUNO and its associated 
organization envision the week-long conference as an opportunity for the intellectual elites of the 
capitalist and communist blocs to experiment in “reconciliation” and “engagement” in the 
context of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinizing reforms known as the “Thaw” and after a decade of 
estrangement due to the closing of the “Iron Curtain” in the late 1940s. For LITUNO, the mere 
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act of international communication would lead enemies to “mutual understanding.” Spender, a 
former UNESCO official himself who had attended a conference in Vienna as an observer in the 
spring of 1956, parodies this naïve premise at the core of the mission of LITUNO and its 
associated organization in the opening remarks to the conference delivered by Bonvolio, the 
good-willed head of EUROPLUME: 
‘I wish to make clear very precisely and in the most concrete way,’ he began, ‘that our 
program here is to have no program. Certain of you may have objection to this program–
–or, you may say, this lack of program. But the aim of this meeting is, simply and 
exactly, to arrange another meeting. And for the purpose of that other meeting what we 
have to discuss is whether we can meet and, if so, precisely what discuss [sic]. In order to 
discover this, it seems best that we should examine ideas of a general order, to discover 
what grounds we may have of agreement, or, if I may so put it, of our agreement to 
disagree.’ 
 
The rest of the conference devolves into a self-indulgent, fatuously grandiloquent, and 
circular debate among the Western participants over the possibility of “engaging” their Soviet 
counterparts. Meanwhile, the Soviet representatives to the conference sit silently as objects of a 
solipsistic feud among the Western Left, looking on as spectators with a “remote staring air, like 
a range of mountains viewed from a distance.” Cut off from the conversation by “barriers of 
language, ideology, and imperturbability,” they occasionally utter formulaic regurgitations of 
official Soviet maxims or declarations echoing the conference’s nebulous goals, but seem lost in 
the melee. Because their interpreter has fallen behind in translating, they cannot answer 
questions posed to them about the Thaw and seem oblivious to “the ghosts of the murdered and 
the suicides” of the Stalinist past filling the room. In the end, the conference attendees sign a 
vacuous but meticulously crafted communique boldly announcing their intent to have another 
meeting. On one night, the Russian-language interpreter lays bare to Asphalt the cynicism of 
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youth living in the eastern bloc before the two have sex in a gondola. Otherwise, little “mutual 
understanding” between the two sides comes from the whole affair.1  
Notwithstanding his portrayal of the futility of the proceedings, the fact that Spender 
based the setting of his novel on a real conference sponsored by UNESCO testifies to the 
centrality of events convened by international organizations as major sites of interaction and 
negotiation between the capitalist and communist worlds during the Cold War. In the aftermath 
of the mass destruction of the Second World War, the number of international organizations 
grew exponentially due to a widely held assumption that the world needed to transcend the 
nationalist belligerence that had led to the worldwide conflicts of the first half of the twentieth 
century. The rise of this constellation of international organizations, which revolved around the 
newly created UN and its specialized agencies, heralded the advent of multilateral diplomacy as 
a major tool for solving global issues in every imaginable sphere of human activity.  
UNESCO and these other new organizations represented an institutionalization of liberal, 
or Western, internationalism––the seldom studied but equally influential alternative to the 
socialist internationalism of the Soviet Union. Western and socialist internationalisms have an 
intertwined history dating back at least to the competing visions of international solidarity born 
out of the revolutions of 1848.2 Unlike socialist internationalism, the founding ideology of the 
                                                     
1 Spender first published the novel in the journal Encounter, which he had founded together with the American 
political thinker Irving Kristol and which received funding from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The key 
target of Spender’s ridicule in the novel is Jean Paul Sartre. For the novel, see Stephen Spender, “Engaged in 
Writing (A Short Novel, Part I),” Encounter 9, no. 7 (1957): 36–69; and Stephen Spender, “Engaged in Writing (A 
Short Novel, Part II),” Encounter 9, no. 8 (1957): 42–66. For an overview of Spender’s life during this time, see 
John Sutherland, Stephen Spender: The Authorized Biography (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 349–408. 
 
2 I refer to liberal internationalism as “Western internationalism” throughout the dissertation. While this term 
simplifies the diverse range of political beliefs held by Westerners involved in UNESCO, it is useful when studying 
Soviet involvement in the organization because the USSR perceived this brand of internationalism as a single 
“bourgeois” competitor of socialist internationalism  Although the vast majority of UNESCO supporters can be 
described as liberal internationalists, the term “Western internationalism” better encompasses the range of political 
views among the architects of UNESCO who nevertheless all supported the increased exchange of ideas and 
information across borders for the purpose of achieving peace. From social democrats to more traditional liberals, 
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Soviet Union that preached an upheaval of the present order by a horizontal alliance of “the 
workers of the world,” Western internationalism advocated for reform of the established order 
through varying degrees of world governance and multilateral cooperation among peaceful 
nations––a vision concretized as international organizations in the twentieth century. Far from 
behaving as bystanders to the bipolar conflict that dominated world history from 1945 to 1991, 
these organizations, the historian Akira Iriye writes, “were actors in the Cold War drama.”3 
This dissertation is the first comprehensive history of the deeply rich social, cultural, and 
intellectual experiences of Soviet diplomats, scholars, professionals, and other citizens in this 
international organizational dimension of the “Cold War drama.” Using UNESCO as a case 
study for Soviet relations with the larger network of postwar international organizations from the 
end of the Second World War to the eve of détente in the late 1960s, I go beyond the diplomatic 
theater of the UN Security Council and General Assembly to investigate how the broader Soviet 
population viewed and left its mark on UNESCO as an example of the general Soviet strategy for 
dealing with international organizations founded in the spirit of Western internationalism. 
Instead of approaching UNESCO as neutral grounds for different countries to conduct 
multilateral diplomacy, this dissertation takes the perspective of Soviet nationals who came into 
contact with the organization in order to unearth the hidden social dynamics, culture, and politics 
at work behind the veneer of neutrality at the core of the UN system. It therefore seeks to give 
                                                     
these internationalists all shared a conviction that the liberalization of the intellectual “tariffs” preventing the free 
trade of knowledge would lead to peace. They wanted to knock down anything that prevented this flow of 
information. For a genealogy of these two brands of internationalism, see Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age 
of Nationalism, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 3–5. 
 
3 For an overview of the history of international organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as 
well as this quote, see Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 9–36; 65. 
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subjectivity to, and raise the voices of, the three lifeless Soviet onlookers whom Spender 
caricatures as little more than the objects of an ongoing Western debate. 
 I focus on UNESCO for my case study of Soviet participation in what I call the 
international organizational system––or the vast network of interconnected, specialized 
institutions that came into existence after the Second World War––because it represented the 
maximalist and most idealistic invention of the postwar movement to apply multilateral 
diplomacy beyond the realm of security-related negotiations over war and peace between states. 
While the continued rapid growth in the number of international organizations in the latter half 
of the twentieth century has since marginalized UNESCO as just one of many such institutions, 
the UN specialized agency stood at the vanguard of the new wave of international organizations 
that came of age from the 1940s through the 1960s. “In those days,” Iriye notes, “no 
international organization better exemplified the renewed faith in worldwide cooperation than 
the United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).”4 Founded in 
1946 on the belief that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the 
defenses of peace must be constructed,” UNESCO oversaw multilateral diplomacy in the 
expansive spheres of education, science, and culture. Involved in hosting conferences for 
scholars and other professionals, releasing publications on a variety of subjects, and providing 
educational technical assistance around the globe, it operated as both a force in its own right in 
these fields and as an intergovernmental mentor or benefactor to hundreds of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs).5  
                                                     
4 Ibid., 44. 
 
5 Hundreds of major NGOs held “consultative status” with UNESCO. This meant that they worked in coordination 
with the intergovernmental body in their respective spheres of specialization. Those holding “consultative status” 
included international humanitarian foundations, international professional unions, and international scholarly 
associations. A random selection of such organizations in 1965 illustrates their diversity: The International Council 
for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies; The International Association of Plastic Arts; The International Council of 
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Before Stalin’s death in 1953, the USSR initially refused to join UNESCO and all but a 
few noncommunist international organizations, casting them as symbols of foreign influence and 
“rootless cosmopolitanism” during the anti-Western campaign of xenophobia and isolationism 
inside the Soviet Union that coincided with the ratcheting up of Cold War tensions in the late 
1940s. This boycott fit into a longstanding pattern of Soviet nonengagement with “bourgeois” 
international organizations. From 1919 to 1934, the communist country had sat out of the League 
of Nations (the predecessor to the UN). Although the Soviet Union acceded to the League in 
1934 as part of its strategy of “collective security” against Nazi Germany, it soon left again when 
the world body expelled the communist country following the Soviet invasion of Finland in 
1939.6 While this expulsion had almost no long-term impact on the Soviet Union due to the 
outbreak that same year of the Second World War, Soviet abstention from UN specialized 
agencies proved a much more consequential mistake. As this dissertation will show, the absence 
of the Soviet Union from the formative years of the post-1945 international organizational 
system allowed the West to shape the fundamental architecture, institutional cultures, politics, 
and administrative practices of these organizations. Because they embodied Western 
internationalism, Stalin viewed UNESCO and other components of the international 
organizational system as a threat to the reconsolidation of the ideological hegemony of the Soviet 
                                                     
Scientific Unions; The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; The International Association of 
Universities; The International Council of Museums; The International Federation of Library Associations; The 
International Social Science Council; The World Federation of Trade Unions; The International Association of 
Legal Science; The International Federation of Free Teachers’ Unions; The International Political Science 
Association, etc. “List of International Nongovernmental Organizations Admitted to Category A (Consultative and 
Associate Relations) and to Category B (Information and Consultative Relations)” (UNESCO, July 1965), 1–5, 
WS/0765.139/RIO, UNESDOC Online Database (referred to as “UNESDOC” in later citations), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/resources/online-materials/publications/unesdoc-database/. 
 
6 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 5; 394; and Sarah Davies and James Harris, Stalin’s World: Dictating the Soviet Order (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), 127. 
 7 
state following the brief flourishing of cultural exchange between the capitalist and communist 
worlds during the Second World War. 
Shortly after Stalin’s death, however, the new Soviet leadership decided to join UNESCO 
and a slew of other international organizations in 1954.7 Alarmed by Western domination of 
these institutions, the Soviet foreign-policy establishment recognized the increasing influence of 
these bodies in international affairs and their relevance to the Cold War battle to win over the 
hearts and minds of the world population to either the capitalist or communist ways of life. In 
contrast to Stalin’s rejection of UNESCO and other international organizations, the post-Stalinist 
leadership resolved to confront Western internationalism in the latter’s own institutions. As G. A. 
Mozhaev, a young Soviet diplomat working to facilitate his country’s participation in UNESCO, 
wrote in a 1959 memorandum: “The intensive development of multilateral international 
cooperation began in the twentieth century and particularly in the last decade.” This meant, he 
continued, that “there is now not a single area of knowledge and social practice not engulfed by 
diverse forms of international cooperation.” The USSR, Mozhaev urged, had to “raise [its] work 
in international organizations to the highest level of state policy.” A central node of the 
international organizational system, UNESCO offered the USSR its best entrée into this 
relatively new arena of diplomacy. “UNESCO,” Mozhaev asserted, “is now the key to the whole 
system of international nongovernmental organizations of an ideological nature. Having an 
                                                     
7 The communist country also joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) and rejoined the World Health 
Organization (WHO). The USSR had served as a founding member of the latter organization in 1946 but left it 1949 
as the Cold War escalated. The USSR continued to refuse to join other UN specialized agencies, such as the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Christopher Osakwe, The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal 
International Organizations: A Political and Legal Analysis of Soviet Strategies and Aspirations Inside ILO, 
UNESCO and WHO (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972), 40–41; 110–11; 115. 
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ideological nature, UNESCO since its inception and up to the present represents an arena of 
ideological struggle between progressive and reactionary forces.”8  
Thus the Cold War “struggle” for international organizations was the culmination of the 
entangled histories of Western and socialist internationalisms begun in the nineteenth century. 
The juxtaposition of the symbols of UNESCO and the USSR illustrates the divergent content of 
the two internationalisms in their institutionalized forms. On the one hand, the hammer and 
sickle on the red backdrop of the Soviet flag evokes the militant, divisive struggle born out of the 
French revolutionary tradition and aimed at uniting workers and peasants to upend the 
established order under a star pointing to the five inhabited continents of the world.9 On the 
other hand, the substitution of the “UNESCO” acronym for the columns of the Parthenon on the 
UNESCO logo emblematizes the organization’s self-image as the preserver of the established 
order of Western civilization as well as the pediment of knowledge this civilization built atop its 
foundation. Harkening back to before the genesis of the revolutionary tradition extolled by the 
Soviet Union, the UNESCO logo manifests the organization’s mission to act as the keeper of the 
tradition of the Enlightenment and as the reincarnation of the genteel “Republic of Letters” that 
preceded the upheaval unleashed by the French Revolution. 
                                                     
8 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi federatsii, or the State Archive of the Russian Federation, hereafter GARF, fond 
(f.) 9519, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 2, listy (ll.) 198-203. 
 
9 According to the historian of the Russian Revolution, Orlando Figes, “in Bolshevik ideology, as it was told to the 
soldiers, the star’s five points stood for the five continents, which their revolutionary struggle would one day liberate 
from exploiters.” Orlando Figes, Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2014), 204. 
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Figure 1. The Soviet Flag and the UNESCO Logo. Sources: 
http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2013/08/unesco-united-nations-educational-scientific-and-
cultural-organization/; and https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/tile-
images/soviet-union_tile_745_670.jpg 
 
*                 *                 * 
 
Despite the well-known proliferation of international organizations after 1945, research 
on Soviet participation in these entities has generally focused on high-level diplomacy at the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly, providing only cursory descriptions of Soviet actions in 
the body’s specialized agencies. For example, Ilya Gaiduk’s 2013 book, Divided Together: The 
United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965, which remains the sole 
diplomatic history of Soviet participation in the UN based on Soviet archival sources, spotlights 
only major developments and issues discussed in the security council and general assembly (the 
question of Chinese representation, the Korean War, the Congo Crisis, etc.) and refrains from 
addressing Soviet participation in the UN’s initiatives in the spheres of economic development, 
science, culture, and education.10 While no study exists that homes in exclusively on the mutual 
                                                     
10 Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). While working on his study of the broader development of Soviet 
participation in the UN during the Cold War, Gaiduk took an active part in UNESCO’s History Project, which was 
dedicated to writing about the organization’s past, and published an overview of the Soviet relationship with 
UNESCO in the Khrushchev era. Unfortunately, he passed away in 2011 before expanding his research into a larger 
study. I. V. Gaiduk, “Sovetskii soiuz i IuNESKO v gody ‘kholodnoi voiny,’ 1945-1967,” Novaia i noveishaia 
istoriia, no. 1 (2007): 20–34. In the Russian language, Iu. V. Vanin’s examination of the role of the UN in the 
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influence of the Soviet Union and UNESCO, a number of American political scientists and 
international legal scholars published during the Cold War short analyses that probe the sources 
of Soviet conduct in the various organizations under the UN’s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC).11 Because Western political scientists could not freely access Soviet archives before 
the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, however, these works rely on conjecture and speculation 
derived from the public performances of Soviet diplomats in these agencies. Similarly, Elena 
Aronova, an historian of science, composed a dissertation on the emergence of science studies in 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union that evaluates UNESCO’s 
contribution to the popularization of science studies in the East and West during the Cold War. 
But this work does not consider the cultural and educational ventures of UNESCO nor delve 
deeply into the internal dynamics of the organization.12  
Soviet-era research on UNESCO, which was produced by apparatchiks in the Soviet 
foreign-policy apparatus, manifests a heavy ideological influence and functions in my 
dissertation as an object of study as well as a layer of the existing literature on the topic.13 
Likewise, post-Soviet Russian scholarship lacks systematic and in-depth scrutiny of how the 
                                                     
Korean War draws on archives but concentrates solely on the decision-making of various actors during the conflict. 
Iu. V. Vanin, Koreiskaia voina (1950-1953) i OON (Moskva: Institut vostokovedeniia, 2006). 
 
11 Alexander Dallin provides a journalistic profile of Soviet participation in the international governing body during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Based on firsthand experience and published material, his work offers only a brief 
outline of Soviet involvement in organs such as UNESCO, UNIDO, and UNICEF. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet 
Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Praeger, 1962). Other 
examples of contemporaneous literature are: John A. Armstrong, “The Soviet Attitude Toward UNESCO,” 
International Organization 8, no. 2 (1954): 217-33, and Christopher Osakwe, The Participation of the Soviet Union 
in Universal International Organizations. 
 
12 For a look at the role of Soviet representatives in UNESCO science activities, see Elena Aronova, “Studies of 
Science Before ‘Science Studies’: Cold War and the Politics of Science in the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R., 1950s-
1970s” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2012). 
 
13 Soviet publications include: S. K. Romanovskii, et al., IuNESKO i sovremennost’: k 20-letiiu IuNESKO (Moskva: 
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966), and V. K. Sobakin, UNESCO: Problems and Perspectives (Moscow: Novosti, 
1972). 
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USSR interacted with the institution of UNESCO. For instance, Ol’ga Zolototrubova’s Russian-
language dissertation, “The Soviet Union and the Work of UNESCO in the Field of Training 
National Cadres for the Developing Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 1954-1987,” 
narrowly concentrates on Soviet and UNESCO involvement in UN development projects and 
avoids a thorough assessment of Soviet-UNESCO relations.14       
This dissertation not only fills these lacunae in the field of Soviet history, but also 
introduces to Soviet diplomatic history recent scholarship in the field of global history that 
historicizes the UN in its social, cultural, and ideological milieus.15 I apply social, cultural, and 
intellectual historical methodologies to the history of international relations, going behind the 
scenes of the well-known drama of the security council or general assembly to tell the stories of 
Soviet citizens who contributed to the nuts-and-bolts operations of the UN system. I take my cue 
from scholars from other fields who have crafted works on the impact of UNESCO activity on 
issues dominating the latter half of the twentieth century, including decolonization, race, cultural 
exchange, the environment, and population growth. Owing to the difficulties of writing histories 
that involve regions outside of a historian’s field of specialization, these historians ignore the 
influence of these entities on the Soviet Union, often referring to the communist bloc only in 
passing and as little more than an obstructionist presence within the organization.16  
                                                     
14 Ol’ga Zolototrubova, “Sovetskii soiuz i deiatel’nost’ IuNESKO v oblasti podgotovki natsional’nykh kadrov dlia 
razvivaiushchikhsia stran Azii, Afriki i Latinskoi Ameriki, 1954-1987 gg.” (cand. diss., Rossiiskii universitet 
druzhby narodov, 1996). 
 
15 For an example of the study of the influence of the UN on issues often confined to the framework of the nation, 
see Carol Elaine Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human 
Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an overview of recent studies of the UN 
and its role in global issues, see Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, “New Histories of the United Nations,” Journal of 
World History 19, no. 3 (2008): 251–74; and Glenda Sluga, “The Transnational History of International 
Institutions,” Journal of Global History 6, no. 2 (July 2011): 219–22. 
 
16 Examples are: Anthony Hazard, Postwar Anti-Racism: The United States, UNESCO, and “Race”, 1945-1968 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Laura Elizabeth Wong, “Cultural Agency: UNESCO’s Major Project on 
the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, 1957-1966” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
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Indeed, as historian Glenda Sluga has argued in her groundbreaking work on 
internationalism in the twentieth century, histories of international organizations tend to follow a 
standard narrative: Optimism about the role of international organizations reached its height in 
the brief period between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the commencement of 
the Cold War around 1948. But after the fallout between the US and the USSR (so this narrative 
goes), these multilateral institutions gave way to the realpolitik of the bipolar conflict. Even 
Sluga, who reintroduces internationalism as a major force alongside nationalism in the making of 
the twentieth century, focuses on the “apogee of internationalism” in the immediate wake of the 
Second World War and the resurgence of this ethos in the “global seventies” without zeroing in 
on the importance of international organizations in the context of the Cold War of the 1950s and 
1960s.17 
While this chronology of the evolution of the internationalist spirit aptly characterizes 
Western European and North American societies, it does not apply to the experience of 
internationalism in the communist bloc. Because the USSR had, for most of its existence, stood 
as a pariah outside the international community and resorted to isolationism in the last eight 
years of Stalin’s rule, its “apogee of internationalism” came just as this worldview went out of 
                                                     
University, 2006); Poul Duedahl, “Selling Mankind: UNESCO and The Invention of Global History, 1945-1976,” 
Journal of World History 22, no. 1 (2011): 101–33; and Christopher Pearson, Designing UNESCO: Art, 
Architecture and International Politics at Mid-Century (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). 
Recently, a brief essay on Soviet participation in UNESCO appeared in a volume of collected essays exploring new 
directions in the study of the history of UNESCO and the organization’s impact on various regions. While this essay 
provides a broad, sweeping overview of Soviet involvement in UNESCO similar to Gaiduk’s article, it does not 
delve deeply into the subject. Poul Duedahl, ed., A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); and Christian Ydesen and Aigul Kulnazarova, eds., UNESCO Without Borders: 
Educational Campaigns for International Understanding (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
 
17 For instance, Sluga writes the following on the “ebbs and flows” of internationalism and the interplay between 
nationalism and internationalism in the twentieth century: “Although the Cold War swung the balance toward 
nationalism–as the political objective supported by all sides–in the 1970s, the significance of internationalism in this 
oscillating relationship was restored, its meaning again radically renovated.” Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of 
Nationalism, 6–7. 
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fashion in Western Europe and North America. Keenly aware of the economic strain of perpetual 
military buildup, Khrushchev declared a foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence” in the mid-
1950s. This reversal of the Stalinist strategies of confrontation and isolation led not only to an 
increase in cultural and economic ties with the outside world, but also a campaign to peacefully 
prove Soviet superiority in industry, culture, education, and science.  
I maintain that Soviet entry into the international organizational system in 1954 
represents an overlooked but core facet of this new course in Soviet foreign policy. Intent on 
challenging Western hegemony over the international organizational system, Soviet officials 
mobilized their fellow citizens to go to conferences, work in the administrative apparatuses, and 
contribute to the publications of these organs. In essence, the USSR sought to contest Western 
control of the architecture, culture, politics, and administrative practices governing 
institutionalized international relations. It set out to perform the ideology of socialist 
internationalism within the walls of institutions inspired by the universalist ideology of Western 
internationalism. But because the USSR accepted these international organizations as the 
primary venues for interaction between the community of nations, it also implicitly recognized 
these bodies as the main channels through which countries should engage in multilateral 
diplomacy, thereby unintentionally agreeing to conform to the Western architecture, cultures, 
politics, and administrative practices governing these organizations in the hopes of undermining 
these ingrained elements of Western hegemonic control over the international organizational 
system. Viewed through the lens of Soviet enlistment in international organizations, “peaceful 
coexistence” thus amounted to more than just a relaxation of tensions in the Cold War or, as 
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historian Vladislav Zubok maintains, a realization of the West’s disinclination to start a nuclear 
war.18  
Rather, I argue that it signified the USSR’s unstated recognition of the Western-designed 
international organizational system as the legitimate venue for multilateral diplomacy aimed at 
solving global problems. While both Stalin and Khrushchev envisioned communist international 
organizations (the COMINTERN, COMINFORM, COMECON, etc.) as, in the words of 
historian György Péteri, “the embryo of a future communist world order,” Khrushchev’s decision 
to enter Western international organizations stunted the growth of these communist organs in 
their embryonic state.19 In essence, the post-Stalinist leadership lent credence to the self-
representations of these Western international organizations as universalist bodies bridging the 
capitalist/communist divide and encompassing a diversity of nations, thereby de-universalizing 
these alternative communist institutions and making them little more than regional alliances 
within the Western international organizational system.  
This concession led to the integration of the Soviet Union into a Western world order 
during the formative phase of the postwar period. By stressing peaceful coexistence as the main 
foreign-policy platform of the USSR, Khrushchev signaled a renewed commitment to what legal 
scholars Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have described as the new “world order premised on 
the outlawry of war” that originated in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact but came to full fruition 
                                                     
18 Zubok asserts that “peaceful coexistence” only modified what he calls Stalin’s “revolutionary-imperial paradigm,” 
or the ingrained Soviet belief in the collapse of the West and the need to preserve its empire, Vladislav Zubok, A 
Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), 129. 
 
19 György Péteri, “Introduction,” in Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural 
Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe, ed. György Péteri, Trondheim Studies on East European 
Cultures and Societies 18, 2006, 4. 
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after the Second World War.20 Viewed in this way, the policy of peaceful coexistence 
proclaimed a Soviet promise to work for peace, and peacefully display the superiority of the 
socialist way of life, through the established international organizational system. Once Soviet 
officials had become enmeshed within this system, they found it difficult to extricate themselves. 
Although they complained about the “Western biases” embedded in UNESCO’s architecture, 
culture, politics, and administrative practices, Soviet UNESCO envoys knew that the withdrawal 
of their country from UNESCO or other international organizations would undermine the image 
of the USSR as a beacon of peace and international cooperation. 
The real source of these ingrained, structural Western biases lay in the bureaucracies, or 
secretariats, of the UN and its specialized agencies. While most histories of the UN have focused 
on its representative bodies (the UN Security Council and General Assembly) as the formulators 
of policy, the authority to implement the vague program adopted by member states resided not in 
the governments of these countries but in the secretariats of the UN in New York and its 
specialized agencies in Western Europe. Just as the bureaucracy of a nation state determines the 
implementation of legislation drawn up by elected officials, the secretariats of the UN system 
had considerable latitude to flesh out the specifics of, and elaborate on, the resolutions passed by 
the community of nations. Put simply, the delegations of UN member states showed up for a few 
weeks annually or biennially to vote on proposals and then left. In the intervening period, the 
international civil servants employed by UN secretariats, or what I call the machinery of the 
international organizational system, stayed on to execute these proposals and to keep the 
                                                     
20 Of course, wars have continued up to the present day. But Hathaway and Shapiro argue that the new world order 
was the first founded on this premise and has led to a lessening of conflict throughout the world since its inception. 
Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the 
World (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2017), xvii. 
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organization running from day to day. Their personnel, who had their own ideas of the missions 
of their workplaces, acted as the carriers of the institutional memory and culture of the UN.  
I show that the architecture, culture, politics and built-in practices of the UNESCO 
Secretariat reproduced Western domination, preventing the communist bloc from accruing 
significant power in the formative first thirteen years of Soviet participation in UNESCO from 
1954 to 1967. In the eyes of Soviet diplomats, the UNESCO Secretariat functioned as a Western 
“deep state” not only responsible for putting into practice the “will” of member states, but also 
pursuing Western interests with a thoroughly bourgeois and anti-Soviet esprit de corps. Located 
at the international organization’s headquarters in Paris, France, the UNESCO Secretariat 
perpetuated the West’s advantage in the international organization even as the composition of 
UNESCO representative bodies (the UNESCO General Conference, or UNESCO’s equivalent of 
the UN General Assembly, and the UNESCO Executive Board, its veto-less version of the UN 
Security Council) changed as a consequence of decolonization’s accelerating pace in the early 
1960s. The induction of new countries as UNESCO member states eroded Western hegemony 
over these representative bodies in the process. But contrary to the initial hopes of Soviet 
officials, the diminishment of Western power and the crystallization of a new bloc of nations 
from the “developing world” over the course of the 1960s did not lead to a strengthening of the 
influence of the communist bloc. Instead, the bipolar world gave way to a pluralist one in which 
the concerns of both superpowers took a back seat to the demands of the former colonies. In 
short, the USSR sought to ride the wave of decolonization only to get swept aside.  
In the meantime, the normalization of Soviet relations with UNESCO enabled Soviet 
nationals to engage with the ideas, politics, and culture of the outside world in new ways, 
incorporating them into global discussions on everything from issues concerning their individual 
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professions to worldwide problems. By illustrating the implications of this normalization on the 
worldviews of Soviet citizens, this dissertation complements and expands on recent work on 
post-Stalinist Soviet cultural diplomacy that underscores the impact of transnational contact on 
the Soviet domestic order while contextualizing Soviet cultural diplomacy in an increasingly 
interconnected world.21 I build on new explorations by historians Anne Gorsuch and Diane 
Koenker into the balance the communist bloc struck “between global integration and political 
differentiation” when negotiating “patterns of cultural cross-pollination” that arose as a result of 
novel “transnational flows of information, cultural models, and ideas . . . across the capitalist-
socialist divide.”22 Yet I shift this examination of Soviet cultural diplomacy from bilateral 
episodic instances, such as the 1959 American National Exhibition, or more narrow and sporadic 
multilateral cooperation such as the Olympic Games, to the multilateral and institutionalized 
activities conducted by international organizations that reached broader swaths of the Soviet 
population over time.23 Unlike other investigations into bilateral Soviet exchanges with specific 
                                                     
21 Michael David-Fox has paved the way for a renewed emphasis on the impact of foreign culture and ways on 
Soviet domestic society. See Michael David-Fox, “The Implications of Transnationalism,” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 12, no. 4 (2011): 885–904; and Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great 
Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
 
22 Gorsuch and Koenker’s edited volume tries to understand “the global sixties” from the perspective of the 
communist world. See Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, eds., The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the 
Second World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
 
23 For various examples of studies that either focus exclusively on bilateral relations or one-time events, see Nigel 
Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 2 (April 2003): 193–214; 
Susan E. Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom?: Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 
1959,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, no. 4 (2008): 855–904; Pia Koivunen, “The 1957 
Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union,” in Soviet State and Society Under 
Khrushchev (London: Routledge, 2009), 46-65; Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian 
Intelligentsia (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009); and György Péteri, “Sites of Convergence: The USSR and 
Communist Eastern Europe at International Fairs Abroad and at Home,” Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 1 
(January 1, 2012): 1-8. Jenifer Parks has written the first history of how the Soviet bureaucracy worked to ensure its 
country’s participation in the global institution of the Olympic Games. I add to her study of how the Soviet 
bureaucracy responded to internationalist movements like the Olympics. At the same time, my dissertation covers an 
international organization that included a wider and more diverse portion of the Soviet population in its activities. 
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countries or regions, my research illustrates the gradual inclusion of the Soviet population into 
the emerging internationalization of education, science, and culture occurring during the postwar 
era. For the Soviet professionals, academicians, and other citizens who took part in UNESCO 
conferences, read and contributed to its publications, or went to work for the international 
organization, the UNESCO activities satirized by Spender as pointless attempts at reconciliation 
served as introductions into ongoing conversations about how to be “internationally minded” 
from which the isolationism of Stalinism had cut them off.24 
 UNESCO’s goal of encouraging people to think internationally reflected the underlying 
Western internationalist ethos at the heart of the organization. As the first world government, the 
UN system replicated elements of national governments on an international scale, including 
departments or ministries of labor (the International Labor Organization, or ILO), agriculture 
(the Food and Agricultural Organization, or FAO), health (the World Health Organization, or 
WHO), and others.25 UNESCO, which acted as the ministry of education, served as the 
ideological wing of this world government, aspiring not only to relieve the world of the 
ignorance supposedly at the root of all wars but also to foster a sense of internationalist identity 
through collaboration among the educated classes of different countries.  
This objective mirrored the efforts of nationalists to forge a national identity through the 
assemblage of a shared cultural and scientific heritage as well as the standardization of 
educational systems purveying the myths of the nation. In her work, Sluga argues that Benedict 
                                                     
Jenifer Parks, Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017). 
 
24 I adopt this term from: Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 6. 
 
25 Historian Mark Mazower makes this argument about the internationalization of the agencies of national 
governments. However, my dissertation expands on this in the context of UNESCO. For more on Mazower’s 
analysis of this development, see chapter 1. Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 197. 
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Andersen’s conception of the rise of national “imagined communities” pertains equally to visions 
of an international community in the twentieth century. With the increasing ease of travel and 
communication, Sluga posits that internationalist thinkers behind UNESCO and other 
international organizations viewed the same “simultaneity” enabling nationalist consciousness 
among far flung peoples as an equally useful tool for stimulating, on an international level, 
“sociability” among peoples of different nations. The “narratives of internationalists,” she 
concludes, “share with the constructivist historiography of the nation the concept of simultaneity; 
the new internationalism was imagined as nationalism writ large.”26  
I add to her theory a case study of how UNESCO enabled Soviet citizens to become 
members of this internationalist project. UNESCO’s operations to disseminate publications with 
internationalist messages and gather scholars to confer on international topics instilled Soviet 
participants with a sense of belonging to an international community that did not necessarily 
conflict with their Soviet identity. I further contend that such endeavors constituted three types of 
international publics inspired by the nation state: 1) international public service in the UNESCO 
Secretariat or in the developing world as UNESCO technical experts; 2) an international reading 
public of UNESCO publications; and 3) the international public sphere made up of UNESCO 
conferences, collaborative projects, and other events. Because the original theorist of the public 
sphere, Jürgen Habermas, defined it as an association among liberal subjects carrying out 
“rational-critical discourse” independently of the control of the state, the latter concept, at first 
                                                     
26 As Sluga argues, just as the internationalist project remains incomplete, many nationalisms have failed to 
homogenize parochial affiliations or establish permanent nation states: “Historians of nations and nationalism are 
also able to maintain a double focus on the study of the success and failure of nations as states or social movements, 
on what is popularly forgotten as well as what is remembered,” she points out. “But historians rarely extend the 
same grace to the study of international subjectivities or international imaginaries in nineteenth-or twentieth-century 
history, despite the existence of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and innumerable movements and 
stratagems for rethinking democracy, sovereignty, identity, and governmental internationalism.” Sluga, 
Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,153-56. 
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glance, seems inappropriate in an analysis of Soviet citizens who often received marching orders 
from bureaucrats in the Soviet government on how to comport themselves when dealing with 
foreigners. But given the exclusionary nature of Habermas’s notion of the public as well as the 
socioeconomic influences on public spheres, a number of social theorists have doubted whether 
such a pure model has ever existed even in the West.27  
In this dissertation, the concept serves as a useful analytical category to signify what the 
Western internationalist architects of UNESCO strived to create through its program. The public 
officials who worked for the international organization, as educational experts stationed 
throughout the world or in the UNESCO Secretariat, sought either to lay the foundation for 
enlightened international publics through educational assistance or to organize these publics in 
the form of conferences and readerships. To be sure, Soviet citizens who worked to construct, or 
participated in, these publics received directives from the Soviet state. But they also had to 
creatively elaborate on these general directives when unexpected arguments, ideas, and situations 
arose. Although Soviet ideology molded their opinions and behavior, these citizens nevertheless 
exhibited agency and autonomy as they refashioned Soviet ideology to negotiate contingencies 
and to navigate the foreign world beyond the reaches of the Soviet state. Moreover, they took the 
foreign ideas gleaned from these experiences and assimilated them to their Soviet worldview, 
adapting elements of Western internationalism into proposals to make the USSR a better 
interlocutor in the discourses cultivated by UNESCO. By doing so, they integrated their country 
into an ongoing process of globalization after the isolationism of late Stalinism. 
                                                     
27 Habermas made famous this pure theoretical prototype of the public sphere in his history of its rise in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet even he argued that the public sphere disappeared  in the West with the 
rise of the “social question” in the nineteenth century. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1991). For a thorough summary of some of the more prominent early critiques of Habermas’s theory, see Nancy 
Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text, 
no. 25–26 (1990): 56–80. 
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This dissertation comprises three sections. In section one, I trace the history of the radical 
about-face in Soviet thinking about UNESCO and other Western international organizations 
from the USSR’s boycott of these institutions before 1953 to the point in the late 1950s at which 
the USSR had become fully entangled in the UNESCO node of the international organizational 
system. In section two, I paint a picture of the everyday lives of Soviet professionals who went to 
work as international civil servants in the UNESCO Secretariat in the 1950s and the first half of 
the 1960s. The first archival-based reconstruction of the daily lives of Soviet citizens employed 
in the administration of a noncommunist organization during the Cold War, this section 
chronicles the struggles of these Soviet nationals to retain their loyalty to the Soviet state while 
serving the Western internationalist ideal of UNESCO and experimenting with an unprecedented 
ability to explore the West. Because the secretariat–as the mainframe of UNESCO’s vast and 
ever-changing network of conferences, educational assistance, and publications–enjoyed an 
unrivaled ability to dictate the execution of UNESCO’s program, this section also functions as 
the axis of my dissertation. 
 In the final section, I study the immersion of Soviet academicians, readers, and technical 
personnel in the international publics planned by the secretariat during the formative phase of 
Soviet participation in the international organizational system. In particular, this section 
investigates Soviet conduct in the international public sphere of UNESCO conferences and 
collaborative projects; the reading public of UNESCO publications, which constituted a pre-
internet global network for disseminating information about education, science, and culture; and 
the drive to incorporate the developing world into these publics through technical-assistance 
initiatives. I end the dissertation with a brief look ahead to the evolution of Soviet-UNESCO 
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relations from the onset of détente and through the dissolution of the USSR as well as the role of 
the former communist world in the organization during the twenty-first century.  
I base my picture of the USSR’s experience in the colorful world of UNESCO on 
material that I examined over the course of nine months at the archives of the Soviet state and 
Communist Party in Moscow, Russian Federation, and on documents that I tapped during three 
months spent at the international organization’s archives in Paris, France. To describe the day-to-
day operations of the apparatus set up in the USSR to handle UNESCO affairs, I draw on, among 
others, the records of the Soviet National Commission for UNESCO Affairs (the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission). Housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation 
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiskoi federatsii, or GARF) and divided into nonclassified and 
formerly classified subsets, this voluminous collection of thousands of reports, correspondence, 
and records of conversation gives intricate insight into Soviet relations with the international 
organization and yet has remained almost completely unused by non-Russian researchers.28 
Importantly, this repository also holds the extensive paperwork of the Soviet Permanent 
Delegation to UNESCO (the Soviet UNESCO Delegation), which oversaw the USSR’s 
contingent of Soviet UNESCO intermediaries in Paris. In addition, I integrate into my 
dissertation the records of the trade union of the Soviet embassy in Paris. Rich with information 
on the general state of the “Soviet colony” revolving around the embassy in the French capital, 
this collection, which is also located in GARF, helps me to contextualize the Soviet mission to 
UNESCO in the larger community of the Soviet diplomatic corps serving in France.  
For the decisions of the higher-ups of the USSR concerning UNESCO, I interrogated 
resolutions and minutes of meetings housed in the archives of the Central Committee of the 
                                                     
28 Gaiduk, who published in English and in Russian, uses a few of the documents in this collection in his brief 
overview of Soviet-UNESCO relations. Gaiduk, “Sovetskii soiuz i IuNESKO v gody ‘kholodnoi voiny,’ 1945-1967.” 
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS) at the Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, or RGANI) as well as 
records located in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, or RGASPI). At the Archives of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (Arkhiv rossiiskoi akademii nauk, or ARAN), I also conducted 
research on Soviet scholars who participated in UNESCO activities. On top of these Soviet 
archival holdings, I worked in the Russian State Library (Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia 
biblioteka), which contains UNESCO literature published in the Soviet Union but unavailable 
outside Russia.  
At the UNESCO Archives, I collected documents revealing the internal deliberations of 
UNESCO officials about Soviet participation in the international organization as well as the 
personnel records of Soviet citizens who worked at its headquarters as international civil 
servants. I also make extensive use of the official records and publications of UNESCO stored in 
the international organization’s digital archive, the UNESDOC Online Database. The divergent 
interpretations of Soviet and UNESCO functionaries of the same events manifest the starkly 
different cultures that intermingled within the walls of the international organization. Together 
with other primary and secondary sources, this evidence demonstrates that the Cold War 
represented a clash not only of nation states, blocs, and economic systems, but also of 
internationalisms. 
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In the winter of 1947, Leonard S. Kenworthy, an employee of the UNESCO Secretariat 
in the Education Section, traveled to the Western occupied zones of Germany to give a lecture 
about the new international organization to students enrolled in an American literature class at 
the University of Frankfurt. Seated in a defunct bomb shelter, the audience of German youth 
“listened intently” to the UNESCO official’s talk. “When the period of questioning came,” 
Kenworthy reported back to UNESCO, “they pounced upon this opportunity.” In preparation for 
the lecture, the professor who taught the class had asked the students, who had come of age 
under the tutelage of the Nazis, to read UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, a small 
treatise in which UNESCO’s first director-general, Julian Huxley, cast the international 
organization as a vehicle for fostering international intellectual cooperation that would lay the 
basis for future global integration. Unsurprisingly, a handful of those enrolled in the course 
reacted with skepticism to this internationalist ideology conceived as the antithesis to the 
nationalist “New Order” of Nazism. “You can’t develop world loyalty,” one of the German 
listeners chirped, “with an eclectic philosophy like that!” Kenworthy characterized the response 
of this group, which likely represented “the ‘cream of the crop’ of German youth,” as mixed. As 
he relayed back to his superiors, they “were alert, penetrating, and ready to be shown, but not 
ready to be kidded.”29 
The reluctance of some of these German students to embrace the message delivered by 
Kenworthy brings into sharp relief the worldview informing UNESCO’s architects and the 
historical juncture out of which it emerged. Convinced that the inherent tribalism of nationalist 
allegiance and an ignorance of other peoples had fueled the revanchist regimes of the Second 
World War, UNESCO’s founders envisioned this institution as a means of extending the reach of 
                                                     
29 “Some Quick Impressions of Germany from a Four Day Visit in March, 1947,” n.d., 2, Archive Group (AG) 8: 
X07 (43-15) A 80, Part I, UNESCO Archives. 
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the new United Nations Organization (UNO) by instilling in the world’s population a sense of 
belonging to an international community. This belief in the necessity of transcending the nation 
state as the organizing principle of international relations reflected a larger campaign, hatched in 
Western intellectual circles and government agencies during and after the war, to enhance the 
power of international organizations and, in its more extreme iterations, to forge a single world 
government responsible for a cosmopolitan “world citizenship” that would either coincide with, 
or replace, nationality as the primary political identification across the globe. If the violent 
nationalism of the Axis powers inspired the mission of UNESCO and other attempts to secure 
peace through international organization, however, the new tensions of the postwar era 
challenged and therefore shaped the evolution of this internationalist crusade in its first decade. 
Within months of Kenworthy’s 1947 lecture in Germany, the universalizing project of UNESCO 
and the broader push in the West for “one world” came up against the USSR, a new resistant 
obstacle to this internationalist dream.     
This section of my study traces the tumultuous relationship between UNESCO and the 
communist bloc from the creation of the organization through the 1950s in order to highlight the 
Soviet experience of a highly influential but overlooked dimension of the Cold War–– the world 
of international organizations. In historical scholarship, the fallout between the capitalist and 
communist worlds in the late 1940s has overshadowed the importance Western European and 
American public intellectuals and statesmen assigned to international organizations as a means of 
maintaining contact between East and West in spheres of activity outside of security (education, 
science, culture, health, economic assistance, etc.).30 Far from devolving into an irrelevant 
                                                     
30 In major histories of the origins and first years of the Cold War, international organizations outside the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council often have little presence other than brief discussions of the IMF or World 
Bank as part of the Bretton Woods system or mere references to the dates on which the USSR joined these 
organizations. See, for example, Zubok’s brief summary of the Soviet relationship with the IMF:  Zubok, A Failed 
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bystander to the Cold War, the internationalist movement embodied by UNESCO became a key 
foil in Soviet propaganda to the xenophobic fortification taking place within the USSR after the 
war. By bringing to the forefront the internationalist “moment” that spawned UNESCO, I 
contextualize the antiforeign or “anticosmopolitan” rhetoric of late Stalinism in its international 
context, demonstrating that the movers and shakers of Soviet cultural politics in the last years of 
Stalin’s rule depicted this Western internationalism as a symbol of the threat capitalism posed to 
national sovereignty. Viewed from this perspective, the Soviet decision to reverse course and 
join UNESCO and other international organizations after Stalin’s death in 1953 represents one of 
the most dramatic de-Stalinizing measures taken by the new leadership in foreign policy. 
Moreover, an examination of Soviet deliberations over UNESCO after the country joined the 
organization sheds light on how the international organizational system set up by the West after 
the war played a normative role in compelling the USSR to abide by its rules and cede the power 
to shape the framework for multilateral diplomacy to Western dominated institutions.     
In chapter 1, I draw on recent literature that historicizes the UN, UNESCO and other 
internationalist ventures of the postwar period to explain the initial Soviet refusal to become a 
member state of the organization under Stalin.31 Rather than a “universal” international 
organization encompassing all nations and ideologies, UNESCO had “provincial” roots in the 
internationalist designs of a specific element within the Western elite who imprinted the 
international organization with their own ideas and cultural milieu, all of which stood in direct 
                                                     
Empire, 51. Likewise, histories of Western internationalism in the postwar period mention the Soviet response to 
this trend only in reference to the communist bloc’s disdain for, or obstruction of, blueprints for world governance. 
Glenda Sluga, for instance, offers a short account of Soviet disparagement of UNESCO as a “cosmopolitan” 
organization, but does not explore  the USSR’s view of UNESCO in great detail. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age 
of Nationalism, 113–14. 
 
31 For a discussion of recent literature on the ideological roots of the UN, see citations in the introduction. 
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opposition to the drive for ideological purity of late Stalinism.32 While many of UNESCO’s 
supporters presented the organization as an apolitical arena for international collaboration, the 
Soviet Union interpreted the core values these Western internationalists desired to see fulfilled in 
UNESCO’s program of activities (the “free exchange of ideas,” the reeducation of the subjects of 
ex-enemy nations into democratic citizens, the revision of knowledge and culture so that it 
promoted “international understanding,” etc.) as a smokescreen of virtuous jargon masking 
capitalist imperialism and aggression against the communist world. Owing to pressure placed on 
it to assist in the reconstruction of Western Europe, UNESCO became aligned with the West and 
entangled in a bipolar conflict between capitalism and communism that left little room for 
neutrality. As a result of the Soviet boycott before 1954, the organization, from its founding to 
the death of Stalin eight years later, more closely resembled an instrument for cooperation 
among like-minded North Americans and Western Europeans in education, science, and culture 
than a forum for the reconciliation of different parties for the purpose of attaining world peace. 
In chapter 2, I provide an analysis of the major developments in the first five years of 
Soviet participation in UNESCO. Having entered the organization with a degree of optimism 
about the prospects of challenging the West, the Soviet Union set up two organs unique to the 
post-Stalinist era, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation. These facilitators of Soviet 
activity in UNESCO bore responsibility for mobilizing the country’s intelligentsia to partake in 
UNESCO seminars, conferences, and publications. By 1958, however, the commission and 
delegation had grown disillusioned with the organization because of a feeling of alienation from 
those UNESCO member states with which they expected to find common ground, a suspicion 
                                                     
32 I have in mind here the notion of “provincial” used in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s study of Eurocentrism in academic 
discourse: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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that UNESCO discriminated against communist countries while preserving Western hegemony 
within its halls, and their own inability to muster participation from their domestic agencies. Yet 
those involved with UNESCO matters in the Soviet Union found it much more difficult to 
withdraw from the organization than they had anticipated. As a sign of the power of international 
organizations to bind countries to the increasing global integration that these institutions 
encouraged through the exchange of persons, publications, and ideas, lower-level officials in the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, recognizing the centrality of UNESCO and other 
international organizations in international affairs, successfully prevented the USSR from 
quitting this space of multilateral cooperation. In other words, once the USSR signed on to 
UNESCO, and thereby tacitly conceded the value of noncommunist international organizations 
as an influential force in international relations, it could not easily disengage from this dimension 
of diplomacy without incurring significant damage to its reputation and forfeiting the benefits 
gained from UNESCO membership. Whatever the failures of UNESCO and other international 
organizations to “solve” the Cold War through concrete policies, these bodies therefore 
contributed to the normalization of sustained Soviet interaction with the outside world in the long 
run, assisting in the country’s permanent break with the isolationism of the Stalinist past.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE MISSING MEMBER STATE: SOCIALIST NATIONALISM, BOURGEOIS 
INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1945-
1953 
 
UNESCO originated in a series of wartime brainstorming sessions in London about how 
to reconstruct, in the coming postwar era, the educational and cultural institutions of a Europe 
ravaged and revolutionized by the Nazi imperial project. In October 1942, nine months after the 
United Nations Declaration and eight months after the US Department of State’s “Advisory 
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy” began toying with the idea of a future world 
organization, the president of the British Board of Education, R. A. Butler, invited the ministers 
of education of European governments waiting out the war in Britain to come together in order to 
tackle “educational questions affecting the Allied countries of Europe and the United Kingdom 
both during the war and in the postwar period.”33 On November 16, 1942, ministers from seven 
governments-in-exile (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and 
Yugoslavia) and the British government attended the first official meeting of the Conference of 
                                                     
33  I. V. Gaiduk, Divided Together, 11–15; and “Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: Origin of the 
Conference,” n.d., 1–3, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: London 1942; Vol. 2:1; General 
Document Series; AME/A/21a., UNESCO Archives. For more in-depth and general histories of CAME and the 
founding of UNESCO, see Jan Opocensky’s unpublished manuscript on the history of UNESCO and James Sewell’s 
masterful analysis of the politics animating the international organization during its formative years. Although I use 
my own research in the following paragraphs to outline the origins of UNESCO, I draw on their works to frame my 
discussion of CAME and the early years of UNESCO: Jan Opocensky, “The Beginnings of UNESCO: 1942-1948, 
Vol. 1,” 1950, UNESDOC; and James Patrick Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
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Allied Ministers of Education (CAME).34 By the end of the war in 1945, CAME evolved into a 
multibranched agency with an Executive Bureau that oversaw seven commissions dedicated to 
amassing data on the resources of educational agencies in Europe.35 Early on, the Conference 
also recognized the necessity of creating a permanent international organization to take over its 
mission of overseeing the multifaceted and expensive task of reconstruction.  
Of course, the concept of an international organization devoted to the realm of thought 
preexisted CAME. In the interwar period, the League of Nations’ Organization of Intellectual 
Cooperation (OIC) and associated entities––the International Committee for Intellectual 
Cooperation (ICIC) and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC)––assembled 
leading intellectuals in Paris and Geneva to foster debate among great minds. As historian Jo-
Anne Pemberton notes, “the OIC . . . supplied the nascent UNESCO with an organizational 
                                                     
34 “Draft Report of a Conference held at the Board of Education on Monday, 16th November, 1942 at 3 p.m.,” 1–4, 
AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: London 1942-1945; Vol. 1; Records of Plenary Sessions, 
UNESCO Archives. 
 
35 The Books and Periodicals Commission, for instance, calculated the losses of libraries and universities under Axis 
control; coordinated with book repositories and “salvage drives” in nonoccupied Allied countries to raise a supply of 
books for occupied countries; and appointed a History Subcommittee to enlist scholars for the writing of “history 
textbooks of an objective character.” The Science and Audio-Visual Aids Commission, launched in July 1943, wrote 
reports on the lack of laboratory equipment, educational films, projectors, and slides on the continent, while the 
Basic Scholastic Commission, formed in May 1944, reviewed “the essential material requirements for general 
teaching at the primary and secondary levels during the first six months of liberation.” The Commission on Cultural 
Conventions and the Commission on the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material, inaugurated in January 
1943 and April 1944 respectively, studied agreements between different nations on the exchange of academic or 
cultural delegations and documented stolen or damaged works of art. As Allied forces advanced toward Berlin in the 
winter and spring of 1945, CAME moved beyond examinations of material deficits, taking on, albeit hesitantly, the 
perceived “special” or “psychological” effects wrought by Nazi tactics of ideological indoctrination and total war. In 
February 1945, the Conference initiated a Commission on “Special Educational Problems of Liberated Countries” to 
wrestle with questions of how to provide for displaced children and deal with the fate of the “children of quislings.” 
The next month, CAME organized a committee to consider the proposal, laid out in a memorandum from the 
Belgian minister of education, to “take immediate action” to solve the “international” problem of “denazification” of 
youth through education. In this memorandum, the minister urged the formulation of “teaching methods” designed 
to ensure the “complete reform of the children’s minds and characters” through the removal of the imprint left by 
“Nazi educational principles.” For the memorandum, see “Memorandum Presented by the Belgian Government on 
Pedagogical Aids for Reeducation Problems in Liberated Countries,” n.d., 1–3, AG 2: CAME Box 1, Commission 
of Enquiry on Special Educational Treatment AME/A/95, UNESCO Archives. For general outlines of the 
commissions and their work, see Allied Plan for Education: The Story of the Conference of Allied Ministers of 
Education (London: United Nations Information Organisation, 1945), 16–33. 
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model and ethos: a body comprising state representatives and intellectuals seeking to reduce the 
political temperature of world affairs and ‘create the spiritual conditions of peace in the world.’” 
But because of a perception that these elite conclaves had failed to prevent the outbreak of 
another world war and given the scale of destruction this conflict had wrought in Europe, CAME 
believed that a replacement for the intellectual branches of the League required more resources 
for impacting a wider section of the world’s population.36 As Jan Opocensky, the Czechoslovak 
delegate to CAME who would sit on the UNESCO Executive Board during the organization’s 
formative years in the late 1940s, observed in his unpublished 1949 history of UNESCO, the 
Conference from its inception resolved to “explore plans for the formation of a permanent 
organization for inter-allied and subsequently international cooperation in education matters in 
the postwar period.”37 On January 18, 1943, these preliminary discussions about setting up an 
intergovernmental organ took on a new intensity when the London International Assembly––a 
congress of statesmen and intellectual figures (Lord Cecil, Jan Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, René 
Cassin, etc.)––called for a “United Nations Bureau for Educational Reconstruction.”38 After 
CAME decided at its eighth meeting on February 4, 1944, to explore the creation of such an 
organ, the Conference ordered the examination of plans for an “international educational office,” 
reviewing blueprints prepared by the American Liaison Committee for International Educational 
                                                     
36 Jo-Anne Pemberton provides a concise but cogent outline of the evolving intellectual perspective on international 
intellectual cooperation from the League to UNESCO. For the quote used above, see Jo-Anne Pemberton, “The 
Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO,” Australian Journal of 
Politics & History 58, (March 2012): 42. 
 
37 Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 20. 
 
38 Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics, 37. Cassin attended and played a significant role in CAME as the 
representative of the French Committee of National Liberation. He also took on an active part in the creation of 
UNESCO and the organization’s early years. For a list of the abovementioned contributors to the London 
International Assembly, see Kirsten Sellars, “Crimes against Peace” and International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53. 
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Reconstruction in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, as well as a joint proposal from the London 
International Assembly and the Welsh Council for Education in World Citizenship.39 
Despite these aspirational ruminations, serious deliberations over the form and mandate 
of an international organization in the sphere of education accelerated only after the Conference 
decided to extend its membership beyond European countries by bringing the rest of the United 
Nations coalition into the fold. Within the first four months of CAME’s existence, the 
Conference sought to open channels of communication with the US and the USSR, but refrained 
from inviting them to officially take part in a project that they considered a European affair.40 By 
the spring of 1943, however, Conference delegates realized the financial benefits of welcoming 
larger countries, especially a prosperous US relatively untouched by war, into the club.41 In the 
fall of 1943, at the same time that CAME formally resolved to work toward a “United Nations 
Bureau of Reconstruction,” the Conference requested that the USSR, US, China, and other 
friendly governments send emissaries to its gatherings.42 On April 6, 1944, the US sent a 
delegation to the ninth meeting of the Conference. As historian Charles Dorn has argued, the 
American delegation, led by the famous pioneer of the educational component of American 
liberal internationalist “soft power” in the postwar era, Senator J. William Fulbright, not only 
                                                     
39 Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 22-23. 
 
40 “Draft Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and 
French National Committee under the Chairmanship of the President of the Board of Education, Held on Tuesday, 
16th March, 1943, at 3.00 p.m.,” n.d., 3–4, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, 
Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives. 
 
41 As one CAME report put it, “the material needs of the occupied territories were so great as to call for the help of 
all those Allied countries which were in a position to give assistance; and, moreover, that the needs of the Allied 
countries extended beyond occupied Europe.” “Conference of Allied Ministers of Education: Origin of the 
Conference,” 1. See also Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 20–21. 
 
42 “Draft Report of the 6th Meeting of the Conference of the Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and 
French National Committee of Liberation, under the Chairmanship of the President of the Board of Education, held 
on Tuesday, 5th October, 1943 at 3 p.m.,” n.d., 1–5, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 
1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives; and Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 22-23. 
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ensured that CAME supported the incorporation of the envisioned organization into what would 
become the UN, but also helped shift the conversation of the Conference from plotting a 
reconstruction agency to designing an international organization that would promote 
“development” and “cooperation” on a long-term basis. The considerable influence of the US on 
the work of CAME broadened the scope of the Conference’s mandate from a narrow focus on 
reconstruction to a conceptualization of how an international organization in education could 
work toward preserving peace. By 1945, CAME had initiated preparations for a constitutional 
assembly to establish UNESCO.43 
Although the Soviet embassy in London dispatched its first secretary as an observer to 
CAME from March 1943 onward, it kept a cautious distance from the proceedings of the 
Conference. The Soviet Union declined to send representatives to work on multiple commissions 
set up by CAME from 1943 to 1945, replying tersely to some of these requests for its attendance 
with the explanation that it did “not have anybody here qualified for this purpose.”44 Once the 
                                                     
43 The American team consisted of the Librarian of Congress, poet Archibald Macleish; the dean of Stanford’s 
School of Education, Grayson Kefauver; State Department official and future contributor to UNESCO’s History of 
Mankind (see chapter 7), Ralph Turner; President Roosevelt’s Commissioner of Education, J. W. Studebaker; and 
Richard Johnson, the third secretary of the American embassy in London. “Draft Report of the 9th Meeting of the 
Conference of the Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments and French National Committee of Liberation, 
held on Thursday, 6th April 1944 at 2.30 p.m.,” n.d., 1, AG 2: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, London 
1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives. The American detachment successfully lobbied CAME––
and, subsequently, the Preparatory Commission set up to design the future organization––to substantially curtail the 
ability of the new world educational body to actively intervene in the educational reconstruction of liberated 
countries, circumscribing its duties to surveying “war-torn countries’ needs,” functioning as “a clearinghouse for 
these reports,” and disseminating “information on public and private relief sources.” This push on the part of the 
Americans derived from their disinclination to cede the fiduciary power for reconstruction to a multilateral 
organization and a desire to preserve control of whatever territory fell under the jurisdiction of the American 
military in Europe. Consequently, initial drafts of the new organization’s constitution, circulated to governments as 
the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) took place in San Francisco in the spring of 
1945, reflected an emphasis on long-term cultural and educational interaction rather than a unitary mission to 
rejuvenate societies devastated by war. For a discussion of the American role in turning the envisioned 
reconstruction organization into a permanent international organization, see: Charles Dorn, “‘The World’s 
Schoolmaster’: Educational Reconstruction, Grayson Kefauver, and the Founding of UNESCO, 1942-46,” History 
of Education 35, (May 2006): 297–320. 
 
44 The Soviet embassy, however, did obtain copies of “all relevant papers” from these commissions. For examples of 
UNESCO invitations and Soviet responses see: P. I. Hearoum, “Re: Conference of Allied Ministers of Education,” 
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Soviet first secretary started to show up at sessions of the Conference’s Executive Bureau in 
1943, he remained aloof and asked only brief clarifying questions a few times over two years.45 
In December 1943, three months after CAME agreed to appeal to nations outside of Europe for 
official delegations and three months before the US ordered the so-called “Fulbright 
Commission” to travel to London, the Soviet observer approached his American counterpart at 
the conference to learn whether the US intended to join CAME without demanding 
“organizational changes.” In the course of their conversation, the Soviet ambassadorial 
functionary furnished several explanations for his government’s wariness with respect to the 
nature and objectives of the gathering. According to the American foreign officer, his Soviet 
interlocutor expressed anxiety over the possibility that any international “cultural conference” 
would grant all states equal voting rights no matter their size or raw power from a realpolitik 
point of view. When the American speculated that “the principles followed in the UNRRA 
[United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] and Food conferences might be 
applicable” (i.e., one country, one vote), the Soviet official worried that “such a basis would give 
undue and perhaps dangerous influence to small states.” The Soviet emissary also revealed his 
government’s doubts about the likelihood that the USSR would enroll in any future international 
educational organization, suggesting that the USSR “might not feel great hesitancy” about an 
“International Education Office” so long as “its activities were confined to the exchange of 
purely technical information.” But if this organization “undertook to deal with the subject matter 
introduced in the curricula of national schools,” he warned, “the USSR would be extremely 
                                                     
August 25, 1943, AG 2: CAME Box 1, UNESCO Archives; Nancy B. Parkinson, February 28, 1945, AG 2: CAME 
Box 1: CB/H8/281/6, UNESCO Archives; Mr. Van Dyck, June 9, 1944, AG 2: CAME Box 2, 90/48/2815, 
UNESCO Archives; and B. Karavaev, February 23, 1945, AG 2: CAME Box 1, CB/+8/281/6, UNESCO Archives. 
 
45 For an instance of the Soviet observer asking a clarifying question, see: “Draft Report of the 37th Meeting held on 
Wednesday, 12th September, 1945, at 2.30 p.m. at the Ministry of Education,” n.d., 5, AG 2: Conference of Allied 
Ministers of Education, London 1942-45, Vol.1, Plenary Sessions, UNESCO Archives. 
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reluctant to participate.” In general, the American observer characterized the attitude of the 
Soviet envoy toward CAME “as somewhat deprecatory” and surmised that the “USSR would 
prefer to conduct its cultural relations bilaterally.”46 
In the months leading up to the conference for the establishment of UNESCO, which 
commenced on November 1, 1945, at the Institute of Civil Engineers in London, the Soviet 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, F. T. Gusev, justified the USSR’s insistence on spurning 
the inchoate international organization by arguing that only the UN could authorize the 
constitution of multilateral, intergovernmental organizations. Although UNESCO would fall 
under the purview of ECOSOC after 1946, the two bodies had yet to iron out their exact 
relationship. The position of CAME as the architect of UNESCO therefore provided the Soviet 
Union with an opportunity to delegitimize the enterprise on the basis of its origins outside the 
UN. “In the opinion of the Soviet govt [sic],” Gusev wrote to the American embassy in London, 
“measures for the preparation and creation of an organization for matters of enlightenment and 
culture . . . should be taken by the Economic-Social Council of the organization of the United 
Nations after the formation of such council in the forthcoming first session of the General 
Assembly.”47 
Continuing its work without Soviet involvement, the founding conference, over which 
the British Laborite Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson presided, aimed to produce an 
international organization oriented toward impacting “‘the man on the street.’”48 In his opening 
address to the conference, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee made the case for this far-
                                                     
46 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1943, General, vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1943), Document 6797, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v01. 
 
47 Ibid., 1515-16; and F. T. Gusev, September 30, 1945, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives. 
 
48 Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 60-65. 
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reaching “democratic” approach to international educational cooperation, enunciating words that 
would become part of the most famous line of the UNESCO Charter: “All of us hope to educate 
our people for the world we want to build. Our watchword is ‘educate so that the minds of the 
people shall be attuned to peace.’ . . . wars begin in the minds of men. And we are to live in a 
world of democracies, where the mind of the common man will be all important.”49 The 
conference ordered a “technical subcommittee” to review whether UNESCO should take part in 
reconstructing Europe and report to the first session of the UNESCO General Conference its 
findings. True to the desire of the US to limit UNESCO’s undertakings in the area of 
reconstruction, the committee concluded that the organization would serve only as an 
information hub for UNRRA, which would deal with the costly enterprise of acquiring and 
distributing aid.50 While these negotiations continued apace in London, the British and American 
embassies in Moscow unsuccessfully tried to convince the Soviet People’s Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs (NKID) to do its part in the genesis of UNESCO, writing a letter to A. Ia. 
Vyshinskii and following up by sending their employees to urge NKID in person “to reconsider 
their previous decision and to send a delegation to the conference.”51 
A year later, the first session of the UNESCO General Conference opened in the fall of 
1946 under the presidency of former French Prime Minister Léon Blum. The delegates elected 
Julian Huxley as UNESCO’s first director-general and approved a series of programs designed, 
in line with the preamble of its charter, to construct “the defenses of peace” in the “minds of 
                                                     
49 “Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation held at 
the Institute of Civil Engineers, London” (UNESCO, 1945), 21–22, ECO/CONF./29, UNESDOC. 
 
50 Opocensky, The Beginnings of UNESCO, 68-76. 
 
51 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers: 1945, General: The United Nations, vol. I. 
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men.”52 Despite the ratcheting up of tension internationally following the standoff in Iran over 
the continued Soviet presence in the north of the country and Winston Churchill’s “Sinews of 
Peace” or “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, earlier that year, UNESCO still harbored 
hope that the USSR would change its position in light of the suggestions of some Soviet 
emissaries that the country might become part of the international organization. At the founding 
conference of the WHO that summer in New York, the Ukrainian delegate proposed that all 
educational issues concerning public health fall under the purview of UNESCO. Over dinner 
with the UNESCO resident observer to the UN, Valere Darchambeau, Soviet delegates to the 
WHO conference “took great interest” in what the observer told them about UNESCO, telling 
him that the USSR would soon “step in” to the international organization. “We assume,” 
Darchambeau reasoned, “that this indication could not be given to us without something being 
decided on this subject.”53 Two months after the closing of the conference, however, higher-
ranking Soviet officials walked back these statements. In a meeting in February 1947, Director-
General Huxley urged the Permanent Representative to the UN, A. A. Gromyko, to convince his 
government to reconsider its eschewal of the international organization. Gromyko repeated 
Gusev’s assertion that all UN specialized agencies had to result from the deliberations of 
ECOSOC, reiterating the Soviet complaint that “UNESCO was established contrary to the 
stipulations of the [UN] Charter at the initiative of the British and American governments 
without taking into account the protest of the USSR.” When Huxley corrected his assertion that 
all such organizations had to originate in ECOSOC, Gromyko replied that, “in general, the USSR 
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does not participate in the work of specialized institutions that it had not helped to create.” At the 
same time, the Soviet diplomat promised to “reflect” on Huxley’s remarks and requested 
documents about the international organization.54 As an overture to the communist state, 
UNESCO reserved one of the fifteen spots on its executive board for the USSR in the event that 
it had a change of heart. This seat would remain vacant until 1954. 
*                 *                 * 
Thus the United States, the United Kingdom, and European governments exiled in 
London during the war provided the officials and intellectuals who laid the foundation for 
UNESCO with very little input from the USSR. Apart from Yugoslavia and three countries that 
would soon undergo communist takeovers (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), the majority 
of nations involved in CAME and the UNESCO General Conference would either align with the 
West in the escalation in tension between the capitalist and communist worlds in the coming 
years (Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries such as the Republic of China) or 
fell within the imperial domain of Western European states (e.g., India). Conceived of as a more 
expansive institutional successor to the League’s ICIC by many of its European contributors and 
heavily influenced by American proponents of liberal internationalism, UNESCO represented, 
from 1945 to 1953, more of a transatlantic international organization than a worldwide venue 
comprising a politically diverse group of states.  
Whatever the stated reasons Soviet emissaries offered to UNESCO advocates for this 
boycott, the fundamentally antithetical ideologies of the international organization and postwar 
Stalinism explain the deeper reasons the USSR snubbed the organization. These motivating 
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factors include Stalin’s general view of international relations and the de-internationalization of 
Soviet ideology under Stalin initiated in the 1930s but accelerated in the postwar era. 
As indicated by the Soviet observer to CAME, the USSR had deep reservations about the 
power UNESCO gave to “small states.” In the summits from 1942 to 1945 that would culminate 
in the birth of the UN in San Francisco, Soviet dignitaries made clear their preference that any 
world organization narrow its portfolio to security-related matters and the preservation of peace 
between the victorious allies in the spirit of nineteenth-century congresses among the great 
powers of Europe. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the fall of 1944, the USSR relented to 
pressure from the US and the UK on this issue, begrudgingly allowing for the formation of 
ECOSOC, which would oversee a constellation of new specialized agencies.55 But whereas the 
Soviet Union had managed to safeguard its power to veto any resolution in the UN Security 
Council, all of the other constituent organs of the UN system, including UNESCO, operated on 
the basis of majority rule and granted equal suffrage to all states, thereby leaving the USSR with 
no means of quashing undesirable programs.56  
While UNESCO never promulgated legally binding conventions designed to overrule the 
educational and cultural policies of nation states, the prospect of the majority of the international 
                                                     
55 According to Gaiduk, a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), “The Main Principles of the 
Statute of the International Organization on the Safeguarding of Security and Peace” laid out Soviet skepticisms 
about creating an international organization that would engage in questions outside the realm of security. The UK 
had also favored this more traditional form of international interaction but evolved before 1944. Gaiduk, Divided 
Together, 16-24. 
 
56 In the words of a memorandum from the American embassy in London to the secretary of state at the height of 
CAME negotiations in late 1943, “considerable sentiment in favor” of the principle of “equal representation” 
pervaded CAME’s discussions of a future international educational organization. Ralph Turner, a State Department 
educational specialist and later part of the Fulbright team sent to CAME, concurred with this opinion. “In the 
educational and cultural fields,” the American embassy summarized Turner’s point of view in a memorandum, 
“democratic cooperation and international goodwill require the free and equal association of peoples. At least these 
are fields in which power, prestige, and material interests should have least effect upon the relations of nations.” 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1943, General, vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1943), Document 6797, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v01. 
 41 
community exerting pressure on the Soviet Union to allow its intelligentsia to fraternize with 
foreigners ran counter to Stalin’s postwar goal of expunging Western influence from his country 
and fostering a Soviet corpus of knowledge cut off from Western influences. As early as 1946, 
Stalin had started to rebuild the Soviet “fortress,” cutting off cooperation between the Soviet 
intelligentsia and their foreign counterparts that had developed during the war.57 That summer, 
A. A. Zhdanov, a member of Stalin’s “inner circle,” berated Soviet writers for their “servility” 
before the West.58 Historian Ethan Pollock has detailed a series of academic debates on history, 
philosophy, science, and linguistics into which Stalin intervened directly as the “coryphaeus of 
science,” conducting a “chorus” of scholars who served on the “philosophical front” of the Cold 
War. In December 1946, the same month in which UNESCO’s first general conference 
adjourned, Stalin reinforced ideological discipline among Soviet academicians in the USSR 
when he criticized the third volume of G. A. Aleksandrov’s History of Western Philosophy, 
kicking off a series of “open discussions” that would result in the unmooring of Soviet 
scholarship from the rest of the world. Stalin’s endorsement of the spurious theories of Soviet 
geneticist T. D. Lysenko in the late 1940s would only worsen this fissure between Soviet and 
Western scholarship.59 More fundamentally, anthropologist Alexei Yurchak has called Stalin the 
“master” of Soviet ideology, or the sole arbiter reserving the right to shape “ideological 
discourse from a position external to it, publicly commenting on the correctness or incorrectness 
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of ideological statements and evaluating them for precision against an external canon to which he 
has exclusive access.”60  
Because UNESCO threatened to dilute the power Stalin aspired to wield over Soviet 
intellectuals, the organization posed a greater danger to Soviet sovereignty than other UN 
specialized agencies and multilateral institutions involved in matters usually dictated by 
governments (all of which–except the WHO–the Soviet Union would either join belatedly after 
Stalin’s death in 1953 or object to until the disintegration of the USSR in 1991). Zubok offers 
several motives behind the Soviet determination to forgo participation in the multilateral 
organizations of the Bretton Woods system, including a disinclination to become indebted to 
foreign nations as well as “economic and financial penetration” due to what Molotov described 
decades later as the peril of being “drawn into” the “company” of the Americans but in a 
“subordinate role.”61 Similarly, in light of Western domination of UNESCO, Soviet leaders must 
have reacted negatively to the prospect of facing pressures to conform to the dictates of a 
potentially hostile group of member states intent on the “penetration” of Soviet cultural and 
educational institutions. The program adopted by the first session of the UNESCO General 
Conference in 1946––which incorporated measures emphasizing the “free exchange of ideas,” 
the “dissemination of knowledge,” and recommended the “study” of constructing a worldwide 
radio network under UNESCO auspices––likely affirmed these suspicions.62 
The ideological milieu surrounding UNESCO came to represent the polar opposite or 
inversion of the Soviet shift toward an antiforeign isolationism that paralleled the deterioration in 
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relations between East and West after 1946. A champion of intellectual cooperation, UNESCO 
was the product of a moment in which internationalism pervaded Western foreign-policy 
thinking. As mentioned, Sluga has designated this moment that lasted for much of the 1940s as 
the “apogee of internationalism,” during which “‘world government’ was a rhetorical 
commonplace” in Western public discourse. Throughout the decade, she demonstrates,  
surveys of British and American public opinion confirmed that politicians, pamphleteers, 
scholars, and the public alike had come to identify being internationally minded as the 
most realistic alternative to the perils of nationalism and invested their hopes in the 
creation of the . . . [UN]. During the UN’s early existence, cosmopolitanism came to 
favor in its literal translation ‘world citizenship,’ as did the prospect of a world federation 
on the American model.63 
 
Similarly, political scientist Or Rosenboim illustrates how some of the leading 
“American, British, and émigré intellectuals” of the 1940s “had diagnosed the emergence of 
globalism as the defining condition of the postwar era,” showing that “their proposals for 
ordering the postwar world envisaged competing schemes of global orders motivated by 
concerns for the future of democracy, the prospects of liberty and diversity, and the decline of 
the imperial system.”64 The formation of UNESCO, along with the specialized agencies in the 
spheres of labor, health, and food allocation, also amounted to an internationalization of the 
welfare state, or what Mazower characterizes as “a kind of global New Deal” hatched inside 
Roosevelt’s State Department and supported by the left-leaning coalition governments that took 
power in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. Because of a perception that the 
Great Depression had precipitated war in 1939, many left-of-center intellectuals and statesmen 
came to the conclusion that “social and economic problems were not separate watertight 
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compartments in the international any more than in the national sphere. The outlines of a version 
of postwar internationalism premised on a kind of New Deal for the world thus emerged.”65  
Since UNESCO functioned as the primary intergovernmental body engaged in instilling 
in the world’s population “international understanding” and a transcendence of national identity, 
it brimmed with these Western internationalists, who viewed the organization as the crown jewel 
of the world order they sought to construct. Huxley, as the first director-general of UNESCO, 
conceived of the organization as a mechanism to cultivate a “world culture” that would pave the 
way for global consolidation under a single political entity. In UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its 
Philosophy, Huxley declared that the ideological foundation of the international organization 
should “be a Scientific World Humanism, global in extent and evolutionary in background.” 
Depicting world history as on a trajectory toward the unification of knowledge through cultural 
and intellectual exchange, Huxley maintained that UNESCO should help aggregate the world’s 
“cumulative tradition,” particularly in the sphere of science, to show the universal bond of 
mankind and thereby undermine the competing national and philosophical historical narratives 
that served to justify war. In the opinion of the British biologist, “the more united man’s tradition 
becomes, the more rapid will be the possibility of progress: several separate or competing or 
even mutually hostile pools of tradition cannot possibly be so efficient as a single pool common 
to all mankind.” In Huxley’s vision, then, UNESCO’s mission was to reveal this “common pool 
of ideas” through global education and exchange. By doing so, UNESCO would lay the 
foundation for a future global community and “must envisage some form of world political unity 
or otherwise, as the only certain means for avoiding war.”66  
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In response to Huxley’s inclusion of such rhetoric in his philosophy for UNESCO, the 
few communist delegates to the international organization intimated that the USSR’s mistrust of 
UNESCO derived in part from an animosity toward its internationalist ambitions. At the first 
general conference, the Yugoslav delegate, M. V. Ribnikar, expounded on the misgivings of 
Soviet loyalists about these principles when justifying his country’s hesitancy to ratify the 
Charter. “UNESCO,” Ribnikar quipped, “has even elaborated its own philosophy, labeled 
‘World Scientific Humanism,’ which according to the program, will be forcibly disseminated to 
and imposed upon the peoples of the world.” Castigating Scientific Humanism as a “casting of 
the various national cultures in a standard mould,” he described Huxley’s plan for UNESCO as 
“a kind of philosophic Esperanto” that “would amount to subjecting science to metaphysics.”67 
While scholars of late Stalinism have analyzed the dynamics of the antiforeign cultural 
crusade known as the zhdanovshchina and the subsequent anticosmopolitan campaign, they have 
largely overlooked the context of these Soviet offensives in this internationalist spirit. In the 
postwar purges of foreign influence from Soviet academia and culture, the “world-government” 
movement in the West offered a foil for Soviet propagandists eager to consolidate the state’s 
control over its intelligentsia. In his famous “two camps” speech in September 1947 on the 
mounting hostility between the capitalist and communist blocs, for example, Zhdanov portrayed 
disciples of world governance as the manufacturers of a humanistic disguise concealing 
American and British conspiracies for global domination and imperial exploitation. “One of the 
directions taken by the ideological ‘campaign’ which accompanies the plan for enslaving 
Europe,” Zhdanov declared, “is an attack on the principle of national sovereignty, a call to reject 
the sovereign rights of peoples, counterposing to them the idea of ‘world government.’” This 
                                                     
67 “General Conference: First Session” (UNESCO, 1947), 39, UNESCO/C/30, UNESDOC. 
 46 
aspiration, which “bourgeois intellectuals from among the dreamers and pacifists” had “seized 
on,” was “used not only as a means of pressure for the ideological disarmament of peoples who 
are defending their independence from encroachments by American imperialism, but also as a 
slogan specially directed against the Soviet Union.”68 At the height of the anticosmopolitan 
campaign two years later, an article in Pravda, “Cosmopolitanism––the Ideological Weapon of 
American Reaction,” again referred to this movement as the primary enemy of Soviet ideological 
and cultural purity. “The word ‘cosmopolitan’ translated from Greek means world citizen,” the 
author of the article expounded. “Cosmopolitanism is the preaching of so-called ‘world 
citizenship,’ the rejection of affiliation with any nation, the elimination of national traditions and 
cultures of peoples under the pretext of creating a ‘world,’ ‘universal,’ culture.” As an example 
of this “expanding” trend in “the bourgeois states of Europe,” the writer derisively recounted a 
recent meeting in England of “‘scholars and philosophers’” who dismissed “all patriotism” as 
“‘idolatry.’”69  
The campaigns kicked off by these public pronouncements accelerated a process of de-
internationalization of Soviet ideology that paralleled the move toward internationalism among 
liberal statesmen and intellectuals in the West. In practice, the late Stalinist crusades against the 
intelligentsia targeted notions of a “world science” and a “world culture” at the core of 
UNESCO’s philosophy. They did so by persecuting Soviet scholars who cited foreign 
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scholarship, rewriting history into a Russocentric narrative erroneously crediting Russians with 
foreign inventions, and erasing references to the intellectual achievements of Western countries. 
On a deeper level, historian Benjamin Tromly argues that the Soviet state couched recriminations 
of Soviet intellectuals who “kowtowed to the West” or acted as “rootless cosmopolitans” in an 
anti-intellectual populism intended to shore up Soviet patriotism at the onset of the Cold War. 
“For academic elites,” Tromly writes, “a crucial aspect of Stalin’s anti-Western ideological 
agenda was its perceived anti-intellectualism, understood in this context as a stigmatization of 
intellectual endeavors and their practitioners as distant from a mythologized Soviet people.”70 As 
chapter three illustrates, the anticommunist movement in the United States similarly singled out 
the internationalist ethos popular among Western intellectuals and institutionalized in the form of 
UNESCO as a threat to American sovereignty during the postwar Red Scare.  
In short, the usage of the term “cosmopolitan” in denunciations of the Soviet 
intelligentsia did not emerge in a vacuum but had weight because of the intellectual fascination 
in the West with schemes to remake the world into a cosmopolitan society under a single 
government. As the principal intergovernmental organization preaching internationalism in the 
contested areas of education, science, and culture, UNESCO stood out as the ultimate 
achievement of this current of Western political thought popular in Western Europe and North 
America but anathema to the strict ideological line taken by the USSR after the breakdown of 
relations between East and West. 
*                *                 * 
Regardless of how the USSR viewed the ideologies undergirding UNESCO, the 
international organization did its best to ignore the seemingly inexorable march toward a new 
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war between the capitalist and communist blocs, concentrating its resources on projects 
perceived as falling outside or “above” politics and in the supposedly “neutral” or “universal” 
realms of science, culture, and education. As a result of the first three sessions of the general 
conference, UNESCO founded the Hylean-Amazon Institute in Brazil, launched a campaign to 
improve education in Haiti’s Marbial Valley, and hosted numerous scholarly symposia geared 
toward cultivating “international understanding.”71 Yet this posture of refusing to jump into the 
fray of international crises made some UNESCO functionaries and outside observers worry that 
the international organization might repeat the mistakes of the League’s OIC and fade into 
irrelevancy as an ivory tower detached from the pressing problems dominating daily headlines. 
As the optimism about the possibility of a lasting peace degenerated after 1946 into alarm over 
the threat of a new world war, UNESCO resolved to dip its toes into the more contentious issues 
of the time––a decision that in turn dragged it into the epicenter of the Cold War. In particular, 
the international organization became a collaborator with Western governments in the 
reconstruction of the so-called “ex-enemy” nations.   
In the case of Germany, UNESCO proceeded cautiously when entering the former Reich 
due to the raw feelings harbored by many UNESCO member states toward the former Axis 
powers. The first session of the general conference passed a resolution put forward by the Dutch 
delegate that authorized the international organization to tentatively explore measures aimed at 
exposing ex-enemy nations to the democratic traditions of other countries.72 Over the ensuing 
months, UNESCO sent its officials to the Western zones of the defeated power with the mission 
of ascertaining the best ways to reintegrate Germany into the international community and 
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refashion its political culture.73 Encouraged by the favorable assessments transmitted from his 
colleagues on the ground, Director-General Huxley notified the American, British, and French 
governments in a letter on January 28, 1947, that he intended to broach the subject with the 
Allied Control Authority in Germany “by the end of April.”74 While the British and American 
governments welcomed this move to start negotiations, the French expressed apprehension that 
the USSR might respond to this overture negatively. “Their fear,” an assistant to the director-
general wrote in April, “is that agreement on their part to UNESCO’s entry into the French zone 
of occupation, even though accompanied by similar activity in the British and American zones, 
might antagonize the Soviet authorities.” The French government therefore preferred a 
“quadripartite” rather than a “tripartite” process.75 Nevertheless, the Soviet, American, British, 
and French members of the Information Committee of the Political Directorate of the Allied 
Control Authority unanimously approved on April 21 a proposal to advise the directorate to ask 
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UNESCO to “send representatives at an early date to discuss” with the Allied Control Authority 
its possible assistance to Germany.76 
At the same time that the Allied Control Authority adopted this resolution on UNESCO, 
however, Secretary of State George Marshall had drafted an economic plan formulated to 
consolidate Western Europe into a prosperous region immune to the spread of communism. Soon 
after Marshall announced the European Recovery Program (ERP) on June 5, the Soviet Union 
recommended to its allies that they withdraw from economic talks in Paris, having come to the 
view that the “Marshall Plan” represented a plot to “encircle” them with a hostile bloc. In the 
remaining months of 1947, Stalin directed communist parties in Western Europe to abandon 
participation in the legal parliamentary processes of their countries. In September, Zhdanov gave 
his “two camps” speech, putting yet another nail in the coffin of the former Grand Alliance.77 In 
the midst of this steady decomposition of relations between the communist and capitalist worlds, 
UNESCO dispatched in the fall of 1947 another intermediary to Germany for further 
investigation. That November, the second session of the UNESCO General Conference in 
Mexico City voted to endorse the continuation of negotiations between the international 
organization and the Allied Authority.78 But in the first month of 1948, the leadership of 
UNESCO realized that it risked foisting the organization into the middle of the Cold War if it 
persevered in its bid to set up shop on the frontlines of the conflict. “The situation in Germany,” 
Huxley wrote on January 6, “is now so delicate that we are anxious to consider every step 
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carefully.”79 Eighteen days later, the Allied Control Authority notified UNESCO that it had 
“been unable to agree to enter into negotiations” with the international organization, thereby 
breaking off the nearly yearlong diplomatic consultations between the two organs.80 According 
to the political and educational advisers to the British military governor, this negative reply to 
UNESCO from the Authority “was of course the consequence of Soviet obstructive tactics in the 
coordinating committee, where the Soviet representative took the line that UNESCO activity in 
Germany was ‘premature.’” The Western occupying forces, they argued, should react to this 
behavior by advertising themselves as “promoting and encouraging UNESCO in its desire to 
function in Germany (and by contrast that it should be equally well known that it is the Russians 
who are trying to block this).”81  
Undeterred by this rejection, Huxley penned separate letters to the British, French, 
American, and Soviet military governments without alerting the UNESCO Executive Board, 
effectively going around the Allied Control Authority.82 Because the heads of the Western zones 
agreed in their responses to circumvent their Soviet counterpart and correspond with UNESCO 
independently, the executive board held an extraordinary session in April to consider its options. 
In a report prepared for the session, Walter Laves, the American UNESCO deputy director-
general, described his experience meeting with the military chiefs in the three Western zones that 
March, assuring the board that these authorities wanted to team up with UNESCO. “The time has 
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come for UNESCO to move as rapidly, judiciously and circumspectly as possible toward helping 
in reeducating the German people so that they may participate once more in international 
society,” he asserted. “That time,” he warned, “is running short. . . . The potential threat to peace 
continues in Germany unless the United Nations can be successful in this task. The threat is not 
only to the physical peace of the world, but to the institutions of education, science, and culture, 
as we know so well from the Nazi record.”83 In accordance with this call to action, the executive 
board articulated three overarching goals of UNESCO’s Germany program:  
1) to help to direct the minds of the German people towards democracy; 2) to facilitate 
contact and the movement of ideas between the best elements in Germany and those of 
member states which have expressed desire for such contact; and 3) to combat aggressive 
nationalism, religious or racial discrimination and any tendency opposed to the ideal of 
international cooperation through education, science, and culture, set forth in the 
Constitution of UNESCO.84 
 
In the summer of 1948, UNESCO set up shop in an increasingly tense and volatile 
Germany rattled by the imposition of the Berlin blockade that June, opening an office in Stuttgart 
in the American zone and preparing to plant two more offices in the French and British 
jurisdictions.85 The standoff in Germany also cast a pall over the third session of the UNESCO 
General Conference held in Beirut, Lebanon, that November. As the resident historian of 
UNESCO Opocensky wrote, a “climate” existed in which one had to “fight against the obsession 
of the thought that catastrophe is inevitable.”86 Making this atmosphere worse, American 
intelligence and press agencies reported that the Soviet Union and its communist allies in the 
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Middle East had engaged in “anti-UNESCO agitation” among the Lebanese population during 
the conference, which took place during the war between the new state of Israel and the Arab 
countries surrounding it. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) received information that 
“Soviet officials and communists in Damascus” had tried to foster “an anti-UNESCO 
propaganda movement in Syria and Lebanon” that would use “hired agitators” to “make an 
unfavorable impression on UNESCO delegates and discredit Lebanon.”87 An Associated Press 
(AP) dispatch on November 19 reported that “about 40 young Lebanese communists fired on 
police outside the building” housing the general conference. “The UNESCO meeting,” the AP 
claimed, “continued despite the disturbance, and no one was hurt by the flying bullets.”88 
Regardless of this tumult both on the ground and in the broader international situation, the 
international organization persisted, charging the director-general to form a “committee of 
experts” to deal exclusively with Germany.89 
Over the next few years, the UNESCO offices in Germany labored to familiarize German 
citizens with the international organization and forge channels of communication between the 
defeated nation and the outside world. They handed out to libraries, universities, teachers’ 
colleges, schools, and press agencies German translations of UNESCO documents (the 
UNESCO Charter, the pamphlet “UNESCO–What it is,” a “Message to Youth,” etc.); 
information on the activities of UNESCO and news updates on the fields of education, science, 
and culture (the monthly newsletter UNESCO Courier, a booklet on “Work Camps for Peace,” 
the radio program UNESCO World Review); literature intended to educate Germans about the 
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UN (“Suggestions on Teaching about the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies,” “A 
Teacher’s Guide to the Declaration of Human Rights”); and scholarly materials published by 
UNESCO. The organization also teamed up with a German organization to create a book center 
in Bad Godesberg that managed the exchange of academic writings between German institutions 
and willing UNESCO member states.90 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union devised its own version of internationalist cultural 
cooperation at the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace, held in August 1948 in the city of 
Wroclaw, which had been ceded to Poland at the 1945 Potsdam Conference and stood at the 
epicenter of the tensions between the capitalist and communist blocs.91 Just as Western states 
conceived of UNESCO’s brand of internationalism as a means of building the architecture of a 
lasting peace, communist countries embarked on a large-scale initiative in the postwar era to 
rally their peoples to engage in an international “peace movement” led by the USSR as the 
guardian of a communist international order. Kicked off at the Wroclaw Congress, this socialist 
internationalist alternative to the Western internationalism undergirding UNESCO offered, as 
historian Timothy Johnson argues, “a vital platform from which a new, early Cold War vision of 
the world was communicated to the population of the USSR.”92 Attending the Wroclaw 
Congress in his “individual capacity,” Director-General Huxley, who had professed his 
admiration for Soviet state planning in the 1930s and had connections with members of the 
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British Communist Party, wanted to extend an olive branch to the cultural luminaries of the 
communist world.93 But instead of convincing influential figures in the eastern bloc to appeal to 
their governments to join the international organization, Huxley spent his tenure as one of five 
presidents of the congress fending off attacks from the writer and international journalist I. G. 
Erenburg and other Soviet intellectuals on the “bourgeois barbarism” and “savagery” of the 
US.94  
Erenberg’s attacks signaled the final act in the schism between the internationalists of the 
West congregating in UNESCO and the internationally minded wing of the Soviet intelligentsia. 
A cosmopolitan icon who embodied the USSR’s internationalist and antifascist worldview both 
at home and among the cultural elite of the West, Erenberg had agreed in the fall of 1946 to 
allow the US Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, who played an instrumental role in 
the founding of UNESCO and will feature prominently in the next chapter, to lead him and two 
other Soviet visitors on a tour of the United States.95 Just two years later, Erenberg helped set 
into motion a peace movement that would compete with UNESCO, holding the floor at the 
Wroclaw Congress to passionately denounce American militarism. Joshua Rubinstein, a 
biographer of Erenberg, quotes Max Frisch, a playwright from Switzerland who attended the 
congress, to describe the Wroclaw gathering’s dynamics: 
In the discussion each speaker is allowed ten minutes. Ehrenberg speaks for twenty 
minutes before Julian Huxley, the chairman of the day, ventures to remind him of the 
time limit. Frantic applause; Ehrenberg should be allowed to go on speaking. After thirty-
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five minutes an American gets up, wanting to know why Ehrenberg should be allowed to 
go on speaking. He finishes in the fortieth minute. A clever speaker, a Danton, lively and 
aggressive, ironic.96  
  
After the congress, Director-General Huxley released a statement in which he disclosed 
his motivations for refusing to sign the final resolution of the congress, expressing regret over the 
sharp political tone of other speeches and the gathering’s dismissal of UN institutions. “I had 
hoped,” Huxley wrote, “that the World Congress of Intellectuals at Wroclaw would be devoting 
itself on the non-governmental level to the same tasks of international cooperation for peace in 
the fields of science and culture, to which UNESCO is devoting itself on the inter-governmental 
level.” But “the congress from the outset took a political turn,” he lamented. “There was no real 
discussion, and the great majority of the speeches were either strictly Marxist analyses of current 
trends, or else polemical attacks on American or Western policy and culture.”97 The Soviet 
newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Gazette) struck back with an article slamming Huxley 
for the “political nature” of his cultural outlook; his support of eugenics; and his de facto 
“subordination,” as the head of UNESCO, to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his 
deputy, Hector McNeil, who were “instructing him how to behave.”98 Another denunciation of 
Westerners at the congress criticized Huxley and his allies for “talking about ‘world’ 
government, the cosmopolitan indifference to national cultures under the banner of a ‘single 
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language’ and ‘western culture.’”99 Notwithstanding these diatribes against the international 
organization and its executive, the Soviet Union later conspired to use UNESCO as a platform 
for advertising its peace campaign. In a 1950 memorandum to Molotov, the Foreign Policy 
Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (TsK VKP(b)) 
proposed that Eastern European delegates insert into the agenda of the UNESCO General 
Conference an endorsement of the recently issued Stockholm Declaration, one of the most 
prominent “petitions” of the “world peace congresses” against the use of nuclear arms.100 
Over the course of 1949, UNESCO’s reconstruction efforts faced a new wave of 
invective from the Eastern European UNESCO member states. In the wake of the establishment 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on May 23 and the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) five months later, UNESCO weathered heightened criticism from Hungarian, Polish, and 
Czechoslovakian delegations. At the fourth session of the general conference in the fall of 1949, 
The UNESCO Courier chronicled how the speakers from the communist bloc pushed for the 
“postponement” of UNESCO’s Germany program, characterizing it as “‘useless’” in light of 
West Germany’s condition as a “‘pseudo-state’” pervaded by fascist and nationalist fervor. “‘To 
refuse to collaborate with Messrs. Heuss and Adenauer, whose names are associated with the 
memory of aggressions against Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria,” The Courier quoted the 
chief of the Polish delegation, “will indicate to the Germans that only the way of peace will lead 
them to become part of a world community. UNESCO will not be able to work usefully in 
Germany until there is a return to agreement between the four occupying powers.’” When the 
general conference overwhelmingly voted against a cessation of UNESCO operations in West 
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Germany, the three Eastern European contingents walked out of the room. In a subsequent 
meeting, the head of the Polish delegation accused UNESCO of legitimizing the “‘partition of 
Germany’” in contravention of the “‘Yalta and Potsdam agreements.’”101 An article published 
that summer in the RSFSR Ministry of Education’s journal, Narodnoe obrazovaniie (National 
Education), linked the international organization to a longer history of American imperial 
ambitions cloaked in the language of cosmopolitanism. Framing UNESCO as the culmination of 
an American crusade for “pedagogical expansion” dating back to the First World War and the 
writings of the American liberal philosopher John Dewey, the author emphasized UNESCO’s 
American provenance, connecting it to a wider story of “pedagogical missionaries” from the US 
and tracing its origins to the 1944 Harpers Ferry conference for an international educational 
organization rather than to CAME. It then proceeded to conflate UNESCO reconstruction 
activities to an American plot to export the “American way of life” to the “marshallized 
countries” of Western Europe. “Under the guise of providing material assistance for the 
reconstruction of educational institutions destroyed by war,” the article asserted, “UNESCO 
essentially is trying to interfere in the internal educational affairs of other countries in the spirit 
of ‘international understanding’ in its Anglo-American interpretation.”102  
Despite this onslaught, the international organization, following the creation of “two 
Germanies,” reaffirmed its commitment to Germany in correspondence with commanders of the 
Western zones and expanded its schemes to reach a larger portion of the German population.103 
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In 1950, the FRG recruited sixty German citizens specializing in subjects related to UNESCO to 
sit on a “Committee for UNESCO Activities,” which acted as an informal version of the national 
commissions organizing UNESCO affairs in official member states. In 1951, the international 
organization orchestrated the creation of three institutes in West Germany––the Institute for 
Education in Hamburg; the Institute for Social Sciences in Cologne; and the Institute for Youth 
in Gauting. According to historians Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, the first institute 
labored to reform German education; the second to utilize the social sciences in order to find new 
approaches to issues “of vital importance to West Germany”; and the third applied the findings 
of the latter two institutes to the education of German youth.104  More importantly, West 
Germany became a UNESCO member state in 1951––twenty-two years before the UN accepted 
both the FRG and the GDR into its membership in 1973.105  
*                 *                 * 
From 1947 to 1950, UNESCO contacted Soviet authorities in the eastern zone of 
Germany on no less than eight occasions with pleas for cooperation, but ran up against a wall of 
silence. In December 1947, UNESCO mailed its first letter to Soviet authorities following the 
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vote of the second session of the general conference endorsing the extension of negotiations with 
the Allied Control Authority begun the previous spring. The next month, UNESCO transmitted a 
copy of the same letter it sent to other military governors to the Soviet powers in East Berlin 
after the Authority elected to cease discussions over the organization’s possible assistance to 
Germany. In March 1948, Deputy Director-General Laves hand delivered to a staff member of 
the Soviet military government a request for an “interview” with the Soviet commander during 
his stay in Berlin before the extraordinary session of the executive board in April. That May, 
UNESCO gave documents detailing the actions supported at this session to the Soviet military 
governor. In 1949, it kept the Soviet Union up to date with developments in UNESCO’s program 
in West Germany with three letters––two in the aftermath of the creation of the FRG in the 
spring and one in the fall. Finally, the international organization in 1950 asked the Soviet 
government if observers from the eastern zone of Germany could attend the fifth session of the 
general conference in Florence, Italy. Over the course of three years, the USSR did not respond 
to any of these missives from the international organization.106  
The Soviet reaction to UNESCO operations in Japan reveals how Soviet officials 
interpreted UNESCO through the anti-internationalist lens of late Stalinism as well as their 
perception of the potential threat of the organization to their interests in the defeated enemy 
nations. As Kulnazarova and Duedahl argue, UNESCO’s engagement with the Japanese people 
developed more organically on a grassroots level than among the West Germans. Prior to the 
organization’s formal incursion into the country, academics and others at dozens of universities 
throughout Japan set up UNESCO “associations” and “clubs” oriented toward raising awareness 
of UNESCO’s message of peace in a country exhausted by war. In October 1948, following 
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negotiations with the American Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General 
Douglas Macarthur, UNESCO launched an “action plan” and later created an “International 
Committee of Experts” for Japan similar to the organ overseeing the German program. In April 
1949, UNESCO opened an office in Tokyo to manage activities comparable to those in 
Germany. In 1951, Japan became a UNESCO member state alongside the FRG.107  
In a report on “UNESCO and other organizations in Japan” sent to Moscow in June 1950, 
a political adviser to the Soviet branch of the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) excoriated the 
international organization as a weapon used by the West to indoctrinate the educated segments of 
Japanese society into the hegemonic ideology of American capitalism. The “lofty words” of the 
UNESCO Charter, he wrote, epitomized “the cosmopolitan and pretend apolitical views of 
bourgeois representatives from the sciences and culture, and of the idealist pacifists” who, 
having become obsessed with “preaching a nationless and classless so-called ‘united world 
science’ and ‘world government,’” were “the direct servants of the modern contenders for world 
domination.” Thus, he reasoned, it was “not by chance” that “rightwing socialists, famous as 
servants of imperialism,” took on “an important role in the UNESCO movement.” From the 
perspective of the Soviet political adviser, the American government had encouraged “the 
development of Japanese relations” with UNESCO and other UN specialized agencies in order to 
execute the policy of “peace without a peace treaty,” which entailed “the dragging out of 
American occupation indefinitely” by avoiding the signing of an official agreement to end 
hostilities. Furthermore, the UNESCO clubs and associations that had sprung up all over Japan 
not only aimed to “serve the abovementioned goals of American imperialism,” but also to carry 
out “anticommunist, anti-Soviet propaganda and the dissemination of the pernicious influence of 
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American ideology.” Noting that the heads of the education and cultural divisions working at 
Macarthur’s headquarters had participated in the meetings of the UNESCO associations and 
clubs, he observed that the occupation authorities, in addition to inciting the “diffusion of the 
ideology of American imperialism,” sought to use UNESCO for the “colonization of Japanese 
science, culture, and art.” But because of a mixture of internecine fighting among the UNESCO 
movement’s leadership, competition between the Japanese ministries of foreign affairs and 
education over control of these groups, as well as a possible illegal misuse of funds, the 
international organization’s message had not “captured the working masses” and remained 
confined to “the narrow framework of bourgeois scientists and cultural circles” who intended to 
use it “as a means of political propaganda.” At the same time, UNESCO’s ability to seduce this 
elite strata of the Japanese population had compelled the “democratic organizations and trade 
unions” aligned with the Soviet cause to regularly attack UNESCO chapters in Japan as devoid 
of “any kind of clear goals or practical activity” and detached from “the life of the people and 
their needs in the spheres of culture and knowledge.”108     
Thus, by the time that the USSR’s relationship with the UN reached a low point in 1950 
due to the fallout over the struggle for China’s seat at UN headquarters in New York, UNESCO 
had held the status of organization non grata in the Soviet Union because of its cosmopolitan, 
“world-government” ethos and direct role in the reconstruction of the Western zones of “ex-
enemy” nations through which the fault lines of the capitalist and communist blocs ran. When 
the UN secretary-general, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, visited Moscow in May 1950 to persuade 
Stalin to recommit to the UN after the USSR walked out of the security council in protest over 
the absence of Maoist China, he pressed the Soviet leader on what amounted to an almost 
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complete embargo of UN specialized agencies by the USSR. In his “memorandum on questions 
for consideration of the development of a twenty-year program for the achievement of peace 
through the UN,” Lie offered a ten-point plan to the US, France, the UK, and the Soviet Union 
that included a proposal for the “more decisive use of the specialized agencies of the United 
Nations” and called for “more active support from all governments, including the membership of 
the Soviet Union in some or all agencies of which it is not currently a member.” On the eve of 
his meeting with Stalin, the secretary-general held talks with Gromyko on this memorandum, 
unsuccessfully beseeching the Soviet diplomat to give in to entreaties for the USSR to abandon 
its opposition to UNESCO and other UN organizations.109 
When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, and the security council exploited the 
absence of the USSR over the China question to sanction military intervention, UNESCO all but 
confirmed its perceived alignment with the West in the Cold War by supporting UN operations 
in South Korea. In the month before communist forces breached the thirty-eighth parallel, 
UNESCO had selected the Republic of Korea as a UNESCO member state, implicitly endorsing 
the government that a month later would become an anticommunist protagonist in what 
historians would call the first hot war of the Cold War.110 In response, the Soviet newspaper 
Literaturnaia gazeta castigated all “UNESCO hypocrites,” and the organization’s new director-
general, the Mexican statesman Jaime Torres Bodet, in particular, for taking sides in the battles 
of the Cold War. “Following Truman, who declared his campaign of ‘total propaganda’ for the 
dissemination of ‘truth,’” the publication mockingly explained, “Bodet announces that 
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UNESCO’s mission is a ‘permanent crusade in the name of truth and tolerance’” that included 
“the Kuomintang ghouls” and “such zealots of ‘truth and tolerance’ as Titoist Yugoslavia and the 
puppet governments of South Korea, Malaya, and Transjordan, which have been quickly 
admitted to UNESCO membership.”111  With hostilities underway, the security council on July 
31 urged UN specialized agencies, including UNESCO, to provide assistance in their respective 
spheres of activity to the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea––an appeal ECOSOC 
reiterated on August 14.112 UNESCO complied with this request on August 26, when its 
executive board chose to “relieve the needs of the civilian population in Korea within the fields 
of education, science, and culture by means of emergency relief and at the appropriate time by a 
reconstruction project.”  
To accomplish this grand design, UNESCO put aside $100,000 for a “special fund,” 
promised to dole out “educational supplies” on an “emergency basis,” arranged donations from 
other countries through UNESCO national commissions and NGOs, and assembled a UNESCO 
mission to visit the country and recommend long-term measures Korea should take to rebuild its 
educational infrastructure.113  Reflecting the coalition fighting against Kim Il Sung’s army, 
UNESCO’s five-man mission to Korea consisted of specialists with pedagogical experience 
either in the West and its former colonial dominions or with the international organization. The 
chief of the mission, Dr. Donald P. Cottrell, served as the dean of the College of Education at the 
Ohio State University, but had worked for the US War Department as an “expert consultant” on 
education in Germany during the war and had spent time in China as a specialist on educational 
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reconstruction a year before Mao came to power. Along with Cottrell, a Mexican educational 
specialist working for UNESCO, a British engineering professor at St. Catharine’s College, 
Cambridge University, the former head of educational administration of the colonial French 
Concession in Shanghai, and a Filipino superintendent of schools joined the mission.114 
Touching down in Korea in September 1952, the team conducted “field investigations,” 
consorted with officials in the Korean Ministry of Education, and gave speeches to Korean 
educators replete with positive characterizations of school systems in Western countries. At the 
end of their tour, the mission produced an extensive roadmap to the United Nations 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) for their quest to modernize Korean education. They stressed 
the need for a “reorientation of the method and content of education” in Korea away from the 
“undemocratic” practices implemented under Japanese occupation, a familiarization of Koreans 
with “modern educational development elsewhere,” and a transition from “authoritarian” Korean 
educational tradition to “a more decentralized system” built on “originality” and “grass roots” 
democracy. Advising UNKRA that it should set up an educational division, the report delineated 
a “Five-Year Program for United Nations Assistance” comprising a fifty-five-million-dollar 
budget for twenty projects dedicated to the construction of school facilities, the importation of 
experts from around the world to Korea, fellowships for Korean pedagogues to study abroad, the 
standardization of the Korean language, and the founding of training centers for Korean 
teachers.115  
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In the final year of Stalin’s rule, relations between UNESCO and the communist bloc hit 
rock bottom. The three people’s democracies had all withdrawn from the international 
organization in response to the Korea campaign and other UNESCO moves. The admission of 
General Francisco Franco’s Spain into UNESCO in November 1952 also precipitated a wave of 
attacks in the Soviet press on the world body for its appeasement of reactionary forces. A 
December issue of Pravda featured an article on Poland’s withdrawal from the organization 
alongside a cartoon of a large rodent, adorned with fascist regalia and sporting a holster 
emblazoned with the name “Franco,” peering maliciously through the two O’s of the Russian 
acronym for the UN. To illustrate how this pest had reached the world body, the drawing depicts 
a manhole stamped with the Russian transliteration of “UNESCO” under the rodent held open by 
the grotesquely slender hand of an unknown man with a dollar sign on his cuff (see figure 1 on 
the next page).116 The following February, Czechoslovakia also quit UNESCO due to its 
acceptance of Spain. In the same month, Izvestiia published a lengthy review of a book, The 
Secret Weapon of the Doomed, which spelled out how UNESCO and other Western agencies 
served as arms of “American espionage.”117  
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Figure 2. Pravda Cartoon about UNESCO. Source: “Nota pravitel’stva pol’skoi narodnoi 
respubliki o vykhode iz IuNESKO,” Pravda, December 8, 1952, 4. 
 
*                 *                 * 
The absence of the communist superpower in UNESCO during the late 1940s and early 
1950s cast a shadow over all of the international organization’s actions and forced commentators 
in the West to rethink the place of international organizations in world affairs. For those 
concerned with international relations, and especially members of the American foreign-policy 
establishment, the Soviet Union came to symbolize the radical difference or particularities 
complicating the universalist internationalist project, becoming an object of their meditations on 
how to enlarge the international organizational system of the postwar period to encompass 
cultural and political diversity. 
By the time of the rollout of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, many American statesmen 
and thinkers had concluded that UNESCO should give up on pleading with the Soviet Union to 
partake in its program and instead work to consolidate a new world order that excluded the 
hermetic USSR. In April 1947, Dr. George Stoddard, the president of the University of Illinois 
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and a member of the American delegation to the founding conference of UNESCO, told the 
American College of Physicians that “it would be better for Russia to stay out [of UNESCO] 
until it is willing to meet with other nations under conditions of free speech, majority rule and the 
exchange of persons.” But he also urged the international organization to “fight with all its 
weapons” to ameliorate the strained international situation.118  
That same month, Byron Dexter, an editor for Foreign Affairs (the influential American 
periodical of the Council on Foreign Relations that would two months later publish George 
Kennan’s famous “X Article” on the “Sources of Soviet Conduct”), wrote for his magazine an 
article, “UNESCO Faces Two Worlds,” in which he advised the international organization to 
abandon its sensitivity to the attacks lobbed at it by the Soviet Union and build a new 
international society around the communist fortress. According to Dexter, UNESCO grew out of 
the “widespread belief that only to the degree that there is a world community will world law be 
practicable and a world political organization be effective.” Given the international 
organization’s function as “an instrument devised to help build that community by working 
directly to mold men’s ideas,” it could not avoid “dealing with some of the most political issues 
now confronting statesmen and people.” This grave responsibility inhered in UNESCO’s dual 
nature as not only an “education clearing house” for professionals of different stripes but also the 
preeminent intergovernmental agency in charge of the field of mass communications rapidly 
bringing the global population closer together. “It is the one-world idea,” Dexter proclaimed of 
the latter, “particularly vivid in the imaginations of Americans and heralded by the new technical 
devices which can be described soberly enough as introducing changes in communication 
comparable in importance to those effected five centuries ago by the invention of movable type.”  
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For Dexter, UNESCO reserved for itself “the task of promoting mass media in order to 
induce the greatest possible degree of understanding among the men and women of the world.” 
Yet UNESCO faced a “great paradox” as the vanguard of this technological revolution. 
Referring to Ribnikar’s criticism of Huxley’s Scientific Humanism and the Yugoslav’s 
disparagement of the “‘the free flow of ideas’” as a “pro-fascist” pretext to “penetrate the masses 
by a new propaganda,” Byron noted “the depth of the gulf that separates communist and 
‘Western’ views of free speech,” asking the reader if, in “attempting to bridge” the divide 
between these two perspectives, might “UNESCO cut the world more sharply into two 
communities?” Answering this question, Dexter dismissed the international organization’s 
efforts to make artificial changes to its program, arguing that the organization would inevitably 
alienate the USSR and sharpen the divide between East and West because the expansionism of 
the Soviet Union left no room for the innate “world mission” of UNESCO. While encouraging 
the United States to take seriously the concerns of other noncommunist countries that UNESCO 
would become a one-way conduit for a deluge of American culture throughout the world and 
hence a tool of American domination, Dexter asserted that the “only guarantee that the gap” 
between the “Soviet and Western worlds” would “not widen is for all the world to become 
communist.” Like UNESCO, he reasoned, “Russia does not doubt that a world community is 
desirable and necessary, but she has her own blueprint of the nature of that community.” The 
international organization should therefore cease its self-denigration for the nonparticipation of 
the USSR in its program, since “the agency’s larger aim of bringing peoples more closely in 
touch with peoples is repugnant to the Soviet Union” and an objective the USSR would fight 
“outside UNESCO or inside, as she thinks best.” By sticking to its principles, Dexter declared, 
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“UNESCO will work amid danger” but also “in confidence that it is on the road that leads to the 
coming political shape of things.”119 
In contrast to Dexter’s imploration that UNESCO abandon its futile attempts to include 
the Soviet Union in its work, Dr. Richard McKeon, dean of humanities at the University of 
Chicago and a UNESCO activist, drew on Ribnikar’s rejection of Huxley’s Scientific Humanism 
to formulate in 1948 a “philosophy for UNESCO” that would accommodate the ideological 
outlooks of all cultures. A primary contributor to the federalist Committee to Frame a World 
Constitution, McKeon brought a pluralist approach to tailoring the organization’s universalist 
aspirations to the tapestry of difference covering the globe. From McKeon’s point of view, 
UNESCO needed to forego the explicit articulation of a philosophical “doctrine” or set of 
“principles.” Instead, it had to acknowledge and accept difference by exhibiting its philosophy 
through the identification of common problems and courses of action. In McKeon’s opinion, 
UNESCO had displayed this approach in its first years, becoming “a concrete illustration of 
philosophy . . . in the sense of systematic endeavors to achieve agreement concerning projects 
directed to purposes common to many otherwise divergent philosophies.” Moreover, while 
UNESCO should work to ensure that “cultural differences are not merely noted and tolerated, 
but recognized and appreciated as embodiments of values,” it should stay true to its motivations 
for seeking “common action” by venturing to create in “some manner” a “world community” 
through the altering of “the present interrelations of nations and peoples in directions and ways 
calculated to promote understanding and peace.”120 In short, McKeon developed a complex, 
multilayered philosophy that conceived of action as the foundation upon which to gather the 
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multifarious global population to solve problems and, through this practice, realize its 
internationalist ideal.    
Other intellectual leaders ruminated over whether UNESCO should entangle itself in the 
immediate political crises of the time or set its sights on the supposedly apolitical issues in 
education, science, and culture that would cement peace in the long run. The poet and former 
Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, in a speech to the fifth meeting of the US National 
Commission for UNESCO in September 1948, petitioned for the international organization to 
strive toward, in his words, “the preservation of the precarious peace on the foundations of which 
the lasting edifice––to say nothing of our present lives and living carcasses––must stand if they 
are to stand at all.” Disagreeing with his colleagues who contended that UNESCO’s meddling in 
international politics could “only end in disaster,” MacLeish warned that the Cold War went 
beyond the expertise of “soldiers” and “diplomats.” “It is a ‘war’ of which the battlefield is 
men’s minds––and in which the weapons are the things by which men’s minds are moved,” he 
enunciated. “It is, in other words, precisely such a war as the Constitution of UNESCO, not the 
textbooks of the war colleges and the examples of the foreign-service schools, forsees [sic].” The 
“stupidities of the Soviet bureaucracy” in their attempts to control Soviet culture, he went on, 
proved that the USSR knew the location of the real “battlefield.” Seeking to depict UNESCO as 
though it transcended and embraced all beliefs, MacLeish trumpeted the international 
organization as waging a battle for “human community” rather than the narrow “ideologies” 
dividing nations. UNESCO must use the “common international languages” of “the arts, of 
literature, of science” in order “to remind men of those things they hold in common, those things 
which befall each one as they befall others.” By taking on the mantle of “a kind of trustee” for 
these shared values and deploying “all the intelligence and all the tools it possesses to declare 
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and to define the vast and tragic human experience which underlies all the dogmas and 
doctrines,” he opined, UNESCO could “well break the paralysis of the ‘Cold War.’”121   
Opposing such advocacy for the politicization of UNESCO in the near term, the 
theologian and philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr described the organization in his 1950 article, 
“The Theory and Practice of UNESCO,” as a mechanism through which the groundwork for a 
more peaceful world could be laid only in the long durée. Most known for his realist prescription 
for American foreign policy articulated in his 1952 book, The Irony of American History, the 
liberal anticommunist took a much more tempered view of UNESCO’s capabilities than 
MacLeish. An active participant in the international organization, Niebuhr discerned as the “error 
of UNESCO” its assumption that “its various forms of cultural cooperation are of immediate 
political significance in resolving overt conflicts in the world community.” This propensity was 
exemplified by UNESCO’s aspiration to act as “a ‘bridge’ between Russia and the West.” For 
Niebuhr, the faith that the end of the “moral isolation” of the Soviet Union would produce “a 
genuine exchange between the two worlds” overlooked the fact that “the most tragic conflicts” 
broke out “between disputants who know very well what the other intends, but are forced by 
either principle or interest to oppose it.” As an alternative, Niebuhr proposed that UNESCO “find 
its justification in the contribution it makes to the integration of the emergent world community 
rather than in its supposed contributions to ‘peace.’” Likening the organization to a university 
that “may greatly contribute to the total moral and intellectual resources of a community and thus 
be indirectly relevant to the settlement of a given dispute,” he saw UNESCO as aiding in a trend 
toward peace but in the roundabout way of engendering the social fabric necessary for a world 
community. “Sometimes the immediate utility of an action is the more certainly achieved if it is 
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not sought too directly,” he wrote of the impatient expectation that UNESCO have an instant 
impact on Cold War tensions. “If for instance we could seek for the economic and moral health 
of the noncommunist world without too much preoccupation with the danger of Russian 
expansionism, we might well be more successful in averting that expansionism by achieving the 
health of our own world.” Using themes that would surface in his other writings, Niebuhr 
worried that UNESCO might become “subject to the enervation of disillusionment” due to its 
grandiose pretensions. “The work in which UNESCO is engaged,” he counseled, “requires a 
‘long pull’ and not a short one.”122          
Niebuhr could not anticipate that within four years of the issuance of this article, the 
Soviet Union would allow UNESCO to put its grand design of forging a “world community” 
embracing the Soviet Union to the test. But at the time of the communist takeover in China, 
hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and a “Red Scare” permeating the US government, the 
chance that the USSR would join UNESCO likely seemed less plausible than the outbreak of 
war. As the Soviet Union under Stalin modulated its socialist internationalist rhetoric with an 
increasing Russocentric nationalism and xenophobia, many in the West viewed the 
internationalist vision exemplified by UNESCO as the best antidote for war and placed their 
hopes in international organizations in a way not seen before. Likewise, the Soviet boycott of 
UNESCO in the late 1940s proceeded logically from a perception that the international 
organization belonged to a constellation of institutions formed to implement a new world order 
fundamentally at odds with the control over Soviet culture and scholarship that Stalin understood 
as necessary for rebuilding after the wartime destabilization of the USSR and in the midst of the 
Cold War. The language of “anticosmopolitanism” in the Soviet Union can be understood only 
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in the context of this interplay between the internationalist “moment” in the postwar West and 
the reassertion of the authority of the state and party in the Soviet Union. While Stalin would 
have hesitated to sign his country up for any international organization centered around the 
convocation of the educated elite of communist and capitalist countries, the zealous invocations 
of “world government” and the “free flow of ideas” made by Western statesmen and intellectuals 
involved in UNESCO lent credence to the Soviet perception of the international organization as 
an instrument of homogenization under the aegis of American and West European powers.  
As subsequent chapters will show, many of these concerns over the fundamental structure 
and culture of UNESCO did not disappear with the death of Stalin in 1953. Rather, the new 
Soviet leadership resolved to challenge Western internationalism at its core and illustrate to the 
world that the communist way could realize internationalism more effectively. However, the 
question remained as to whether the USSR could change the rules of the game of international 
organizations and defeat the West while playing on Western terms.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE “KEY TO THE WHOLE SYSTEM”: THE USSR ENTERS UNESCO, 1954-1959 
 
The death of Stalin in 1953 left Western observers and the Soviet population alike 
uncertain about the future direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. In the following 
months and years, the new Soviet collective leadership, which had existed in an embryonic form 
in the final years of Stalinist rule, quickly initiated reforms reversing the ideological line that had 
set the USSR on a trajectory away from the internationalist ethos of UNESCO in the preceding 
period.123 Just thirteen months after the death of Stalin, the USSR joined UNESCO, thereby 
giving the organization’s proponents in the West hope that the communist bloc would come out 
of its hermetic state and take up the fight to establish peace through cooperation in education, 
science, and culture. Likewise, Soviet diplomats and bureaucrats charged with handling 
UNESCO exhibited an eagerness to lessen the tensions of the previous decade. Over the next 
five years, however, Soviet officials responsible for engagement with the international 
organization began to have second thoughts over whether the USSR should have taken this risky 
leap into the world of international organizations in the first place.  
Although the Soviet Union officially became a UNESCO member state in April 1954, 
Soviet archival sources reveal that this public manifestation of the Soviet Union’s new look at 
UN specialized agencies resulted from a secret decision made by the Presidium of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS Presidium, the new name of the Politburo) at
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the behest of Molotov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) on October 29, 1953––six months 
prior to the date commonly cited in scholarly and other literature.124 In an indication of the 
importance Stalin’s successors attached to gaining a foothold in the constellation of UN 
organizations, the new rulers––N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov after the arrest of L. P. 
Beriia in June 1953––set in motion the process of joining UNESCO and the ILO before other 
more famous forays into the outside world (such as Khrushchev’s 1955 tour of Asia, the Geneva 
Summit, as well as bilateral cultural exchanges). Moreover, the Presidium commenced this 
unprecedented reversal of Stalinist foreign policy in the midst of other pressing crises at home 
and abroad, including the mess left to them in the Soviet agricultural sector and broader 
economy; the German question and the fate of a GDR seething with uprisings that year; as well 
as the problem of reforming the penal system by ridding it of its Stalinist “excesses” and 
rectifying the mass persecution, torture, and falsification of evidence conducted before 1953.125  
For UNESCO, these conciliatory moves came as a complete surprise. On November 12, 
1953, the American UNESCO Director-General Luther Evans, a blunt, patriotic former librarian 
of congress from Texas, received from his counterpart at the ILO, the American David Morse, a 
copy of a letter from the legation of the USSR at the Soviet embassy in Bern, Switzerland, 
notifying the ILO chief that the USSR had resolved to “accept the obligations of the constitution 
of the said organization.” Informing Morse that the letter “should be regarded as the official 
document” signaling the Soviet desire to join the international organization, the legation 
reiterated the USSR’s previous complaints about the ILO with respect to its need to bolster “the 
representation of wage-earners and other categories of workers in its directing organs,” stressing 
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that the communist state would reject any provisions previously passed by the ILO that ran 
counter to Soviet interests. It also made the reservation that the USSR would not adhere to 
statutes in the international organization’s charter referring disputes over ILO conventions or the 
organization’s charter to the International Court of Justice absent the “consent of all parties.”126  
On the same day that Evans obtained this news, the attaché to the Soviet embassy in Paris 
planted the first seeds of hope that the USSR would join UNESCO when he showed up 
unannounced at the office of the UNESCO Governments and National Commissions Division 
and asked an official for “documentation” on the international organization. While not “directly” 
broaching the prospect of the USSR becoming a member of UNESCO, the Soviet attaché made 
clear to the UNESCO official that the USSR expected “future cooperation” and gave the 
impression that the visit represented a testing of the waters. “It is significant that this is the first 
occasion in over five years that I have received a call from a representative of the USSR or any 
request for documentation,” the official wrote to Evans. Hinting that the British government 
might have launched an effort to convince the Soviet Union to end its boycott of UNESCO, he 
noted the cryptic responses to his inquiries from contacts in the British UNESCO Commission, 
who declined to answer his question on the matter and stated only that their “lips are sealed” but 
that they would let him know “as soon as there is any definite information.”127   
Over the winter, Soviet envoys took small steps to reach out to UNESCO. Because no 
country could only partially ratify the charters of UN organizations, the reservations expressed 
over the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which the Soviet Union eventually 
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communicated to UNESCO in addition to the ILO, raised eyebrows among the chiefs of both UN 
agencies.128 Learning of this reaction of UNESCO and ILO officials from the Soviet ambassador 
to France, Molotov recommended to the Presidium that it relent on these proposed qualifications 
to its membership and join the two international organizations unconditionally. “In order not to 
complicate the entry of the USSR into UNESCO, MID SSSR thinks it desirable to send 
UNESCO a letter with notification of the entry of the USSR into this organization without 
raising our reservations,” Molotov reasoned. “MID has in mind in this respect that, as a 
UNESCO member, the Soviet Union would have the opportunity to defend its position 
concerning our reservations.” Thus, on March 22, 1954, the Presidium approved a resolution to 
finalize Soviet membership in the ILO and send official letters on behalf of the USSR, Ukrainian 
SSR, and Belorussian SSR (BSSR) informing the UNESCO director-general that these countries 
planned to sign the UNESCO Charter.129 
Since these messages did not arrive at UNESCO until April 13, the organization was in 
the dark about the degree of Soviet interest in UNESCO until a week before the country accepted 
the terms of the charter. On April 9, a spokesman for the British Council, a body responsible for 
cultural diplomacy, set off a minor storm of confusion in the press when he stated that he had 
“no definite news” regarding Soviet intentions. Finally, the Soviet ambassador in London, Ia. A. 
Malik, signed the UNESCO Charter at noon on April 21 in the British Foreign Office, making 
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the USSR the seventieth UNESCO member state.130 As an illustration of the extent of British 
investment in bringing the prodigal state into the international organization, Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden personally sent the telegram to UNESCO confirming Soviet enrollment.131  
An hour before this ceremony, a Soviet delegation took its seat alongside emissaries and 
observers from more than fifty countries in The Hague to debate for three weeks the draft of the 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, which 
UNESCO envisioned as a landmark agreement among states to preserve material culture in 
warzones in light of the destruction of artifacts in the Second World War. As the first UNESCO-
sponsored gathering attended by Soviet representatives, the convention represented an 
opportunity for the Soviet Union to commit symbolically to UNESCO’s mission of promoting 
concerted international cooperation in the field of culture and show its ability to lead the way on 
this cause. In his report on the convention, V. S. Kemenov, the chief of the Soviet delegation and 
a fiery socialist realist art critic who had recently played a role in the attacks on 
“cosmopolitanism” under Stalin, portrayed his main objective at the meetings as the 
strengthening of the convention in the face of bids by Western nations to weaken it for their own 
militaristic purposes. “The central question of the discussion,” according to Kemenov, revolved 
around the Soviet push to expunge language backed by the American delegation in articles four 
and seven of the convention that provided loopholes in regulations requiring protection of 
cultural artifacts in the event of “military necessity.” In addition to this central bone of 
contention, the communist detachments, with an eye toward countering attempts by Western 
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empires to exclude conflicts in their colonial territories from the convention, pushed for an 
excision of statutes restricting its coverage to international wars. From the perspective of Soviet 
negotiators, the resistance of smaller capitalist nations to Soviet proposals derived from pressure 
exerted on them by the US and the UK behind the scenes. When the French delegate suddenly 
turned against a Soviet amendment, they attributed his about face to rumors of a “social ‘call’” 
from Paris and a visit by the Frenchman to the American embassy the day before. They also 
regretted the “passive position” of Asian and Latin American delegates at the conference, but 
reported that the Asians “usually” expressed sympathy with their views in private conversations. 
In spite of a full defeat of their effort to purge the convention of exceptions for “military 
necessity” and only a partial victory on the dispute over internecine imperial warfare, Kemenov 
and his partners gave a favorable review of the results of the conference. Endorsing Soviet 
adoption of the convention, they characterized the sessions as evincing a “progressive character” 
and transpiring “peacefully and business-like.”132   
Unaware of these internal approbations, UNESCO executives had little inkling as to how 
the USSR viewed the international organization or what specific aspects of its program the 
Soviet Union would seek to change once its citizens appeared in its organs in the upcoming 
months. UNESCO had little insight into the opinions of the new Soviet rulers and what their 
reversal of Stalin’s position portended.  In the weeks after welcoming the Soviet Union into its 
ranks, UNESCO conducted a review of Soviet remarks during the meetings of ECOSOC before 
1953 but found little useful except one occasion on which Soviet attendees directly criticized the 
budget and “propaganda” of the organization. In other instances, the Soviet ECOSOC delegate 
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either abstained from commenting at all or tersely uttered his approval of the fusillades of insults 
launched at the organization by his Eastern European comrades.133  
American officials involved in UNESCO matters panicked at the arrival of the USSR in 
the international organization, which came at an inopportune time for them in the context of 
American domestic politics. While American UNESCO intermediaries had to appease a 
widespread campaign to ban UNESCO materials from American public life and purge the 
UNESCO administration of accused communists (see chapter 3), they also bore the 
responsibility of convincing these enemies of UNESCO that the organization’s core mission and 
activities played a vital role in projecting American values abroad.  
In a statement released in the weeks after the USSR joined UNESCO, Dr. George 
Shuster, who presided as chairman of the US National Commission for UNESCO, admitted that 
only time would tell what the shift in Soviet policy meant. However, he cited the attacks from 
the communist world on UNESCO, its refusal to join the organization, and its constant 
transgression of the concept of “the free exchange of ideas and knowledge” as sufficient grounds 
for other countries to cautiously “assess the implications of this communist move and to stand 
ready to resist any sudden moves to undermine UNESCO’s effectiveness.” Shuster placed the 
“burden” on the USSR to live up to the UNESCO Charter, the precepts of which he argued ran 
counter to previous Soviet actions. “I believe,” he concluded, “that Soviet membership in 
UNESCO has created an unparalleled opportunity for a world audience to contrast Soviet 
promises and Soviet performance.”134 In a speech to the Miami Chamber of Commerce in May, 
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US Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs David Kay, while airing his concern 
that the Soviet acceptance of the terms of the charters of the ILO and UNESCO amounted to 
little more than an extension of the Stalinist “peace offensive,” conjectured that the USSR had 
come to appreciate UN specialized agencies and feared missing the chance to use them as an 
entry point into the developing world. At the same time, he questioned whether it would “adapt 
itself to the free world atmosphere in which these United Nations activities function” or merely 
exploit these agencies for “disruption through infiltration.”135 
Believing that they had a fellow traveler in the office of the director-general, many of the 
most influential and important American figures upholding the US-UNESCO relationship sought 
to use their longstanding acquaintance with Evans as a direct line through which they could, in 
clear violation of the organization’s autonomy from interference by a government, badger the 
international organization into fostering a suspicious and icy reception for the USSR. In the two 
weeks following the inauguration of the USSR as a UNESCO member state, former Assistant 
Secretary of State Benton, who had led Erenberg on his tour of the US in 1946, inquired of 
Evans in a raft of letters whether the enlistment of the USSR would “make UNESCO’s road 
more difficult in the United States.”136 Disagreeing with a remark from a UNESCO Secretariat 
staff member that the Soviet entry might provide “the adrenaline needed by a sick and debilitated 
patient,” Benton related to Evans his anxieties over the possibility that the USSR would instead 
“castrate and devitalize” UNESCO. To plan for any anticipated Soviet maneuvers undermining 
US objectives in the organization, Benton insisted that Evans journey from Paris to Washington 
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D. C. to hold urgent talks with President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles.137 In a reply later that May, Director-General Evans sought to resist this pressure, 
refusing to travel to the United States and stating that he “must assume” the Soviet Union aspired 
to “devote their efforts to the advancement of the purposes of the organization and that they will 
cooperate in the same way as other member states.”138 But Benton dismissed Evans’s sunny 
outlook and wondered if the director-general had forgotten to whom he answered when declining 
to scurry to the White House. “Unhappily,” he sardonically advised the director-general, “the 
UNESCO board and the general conference are not those who must be persuaded of UNESCO’s 
performance.”139  
Over the next several months, Evans resisted petitions from Benton and other prominent 
American UNESCO supporters on the subject while ignoring several articles placed in the 
American press to bully him into submission by casting doubt on the desirability of having the 
USSR in UNESCO.140 In correspondence with Walter Laves, the former American UNESCO 
deputy director-general who Benton selected to chair an American panel on the Soviet decision 
to join UNESCO, Evans revealed his frustration with the hawkish stance of Benton and others. “I 
am greatly worried,” he wrote, “about the possible mishandling of relations with the USSR in 
regard to its participation in UNESCO.”  Rejecting attempts to transform UNESCO into a 
“forum” for the Cold War, Evans suggested that any preemptive hostile steps by the US would 
alienate other countries wishing for UNESCO to stay above the petty accusations of immorality 
the two superpowers hurled at each other as part of their propaganda war. Mutual labors on 
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common problems, he predicted, would earn the appreciation of the world’s population better 
than “proving . . . that all Russians are slave laborers or that all white men in the South have to 
kill a Negro to be eligible to vote.”141 At the eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference 
in Montevideo, Uruguay, at the end of 1954, the Soviet delegate likely corroborated, in the eyes 
of Benton and other American UNESCO promoters, their prediction that the polemics of the 
Cold War would corrupt the relative placidity of past general conferences. Despite some 
examples of cooperation between the US and the USSR, the chief Soviet delegate made his debut 
at the first plenary session and set the tone for the rest of the conference by rebuking UNESCO 
for allowing Taiwan to retain its status as a UNESCO member state.142  
But apart from attending major conferences and some dabbling in UNESCO’s initiatives, 
the USSR had almost no practical impact on the international organization in 1954 and 1955. 
During the summer and fall of 1954, diplomatic and other personnel from Soviet domestic 
agencies studied UNESCO’s overall program but made no effort to engage in a way comparable 
to even the smallest of UNESCO member states. The UNESCO Division for Documents and 
Publications, along with other departments, delivered to the Soviet government hundreds of 
publications that included bibliographies published by the organization and copies of recent 
editions of UNESCO reports in English and French.143 Inside the Soviet Union, academic 
institutions circulated memos detailing the multifaceted threads of UNESCO’s activity, asking 
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their employees to consider in which aspects of the organization the Soviet Union should 
partake.144 In 1955, a handful of Soviet academicians showed up at UNESCO seminars (for 
example, the seventeenth and eighteenth conferences on public education, as well as meetings on 
solar and wind energy). That year, the Soviet Union also became a member of international 
associations closely affiliated with UNESCO (the International Bureau of Education, or IBE, and 
the International Political Science Association, or IPSA); permitted its scholars to compose 
articles for UNESCO publications (on the teaching of the social sciences in the USSR and the 
trip of Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz to Russia in the nineteenth century); and put together a 
team of Soviet historians who began to provide input into one of UNESCO’s major enterprises, 
the Project for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind (see chapter 7).  
Yet the Soviet leadership, disregarding or perhaps unaware of the decentralized and 
intensive work done in other countries to corral universities, civic organizations, and public 
agencies to participate in UNESCO, erroneously assumed at first that it could handle the 
exacting tempo of UNESCO and the organization’s demands through a highly centralized 
process of mediation concentrated in the highest ranks of MID, the Soviet Ministry of Culture, 
and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Consequently, supplications for Soviet 
involvement in UNESCO-linked organizations and events went unanswered for months. In a 
review of the situation conducted later on, the USSR Ministry of Culture found that Soviet 
organs often did not receive UNESCO requests until after the deadline to fulfill them had already 
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passed. On average, it took three months for UNESCO letters to reach their intended destination 
in the Soviet Union.145 
In the context of this sputtering start to Soviet engagement and motivated by hopes for a 
deescalation in the Cold War in the wake of the July 1955 Geneva summit between the heads of 
state of the “four powers,” UNESCO sought to assert itself as the primary channel through which 
the intellectuals of the capitalist and communist blocs could lay the foundation for mutual 
understanding between the two sides. In October 1955, the international organization managed to 
include a ten-page memorandum written by René Maheu (the assistant director-general and 
future director-general of UNESCO) as part of the agenda of the meeting of the foreign ministers 
of the four powers taking place in Geneva as a follow up to the summit earlier that year. The 
document, “Concerning the Role UNESCO Could Play in the Development of Relations 
Between East and West,” not only advertised to the foreign ministers how they could employ 
UNESCO’s program to facilitate dialogue between their countries, but also outlined a plan to 
bring their populations closer together. In particular, Maheu proposed that the upcoming general 
conference in 1956 adopt a UNESCO “major project” on “the development of educational, 
scientific, and cultural relations between the countries of East and West.” Paid for by a “special 
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fund” that would receive half of its money from UNESCO and half from the coffers of the four 
countries, this project would take measures to increase the teaching of the French and English 
languages in the Soviet Union while expanding the study of Russian and “other languages” of 
the USSR in France, England, and the United States. It would also convene experts to assure the 
“accuracy” of depictions of the other three countries in the textbooks of each nations’ public 
school systems; provide resources for the publication of academic and other types of literature in 
each country from the other three powers; support the translation of English, French, and Russian 
scholarship into all three languages; and disburse funds for the reproduction of art from the four 
countries for circulation.  The UNESCO note also urged the four powers to take steps to 
encourage the “free exchange of information” and “eliminate obstacles” to the flow of all 
documents between the nations with the exception of secrets pertaining to national security.146         
While Molotov, in a letter to the Presidium on December 1, reacted with suspicion to the 
motivations behind the memorandum, he expressed interest in some of the ideas for collaboration 
it contained. On the one hand, the call for the “free exchange of information” caused the Soviet 
leaders to recoil from the document as a possible plot by Western states. The “main proposals” 
of the memorandum, in the words of Molotov, “reflect, albeit in a softer form, those proposals of 
the Western powers which we rejected at the Geneva meeting . . . as aimed at interfering in the 
internal affairs of states.” Thus, he maintained, the “Western powers,” having “not achieved their 
goals at the Geneva conference,” conspired to “use UNESCO for discussion of only those issues 
that interest them.” On the other hand, the Soviet foreign minister identified some elements of 
the UNESCO plan that did not “raise objections” from the Soviet perspective, such as the 
teaching of languages and the dissemination of replicas of national art. After discussing the 
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matter at several meetings, the Presidium decided to send a reply to Director-General Evans on 
December 30 that detailed which schemes it found of interest while criticizing the “freedom of 
information” segments and the absence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in UNESCO.147 
On February 20, 1956, or just five days before Khrushchev gave his “Secret Speech” on 
Stalinist repression to a shocked audience at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, Molotov revealed to the Soviet people this correspondence with the 
international organization in a statement over the airwaves of Radio Moskva. According to a 
report from the Norwegian Telegraph Agency obtained by UNESCO, the Soviet foreign 
minister, phrasing this revelation as if the USSR had concocted the initiatives laid out in the 
memorandum, expressed his support for an “International Fund under UNESCO for the purpose 
of cultural cooperation between countries” that would “assist member states of UNESCO with 
the exchange of cultural delegations, professors, students, exhibitions and scientific material, and 
to arrange international congresses and youth meetings.”148 The next day, Pravda and Izvestiia, 
amid extended coverage of the Twentieth Party Congress, ran an article by an anonymous author 
summarizing communications between Evans and Molotov. The featured story integrated the 
formerly taboo international organization into the new narrative of Soviet internationalism in the 
post-Stalinist era. “The Soviet minister of foreign affairs,” the article recounts, “stressed [to the 
director-general] that the Soviet government is for broad international cooperation in the sphere 
of cultural exchange and the strengthening of cultural relations,” viewing this “cooperation as 
one of the most important means of strengthening peace and creating an atmosphere of trust 
                                                     
147 Ibid., ll.102-105. 
 
148  The Norwegian Telegraph Agency characterized this proposal as having been made “in a letter to the Director-
General Luther Evans, in response to a request from UNESCO to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers to 
state their view on the role which this particular United Nations Organisation ought to play concerning the 
development of relations between East and West.” “Publication via Moscow of Letter from U.S.S.R. Foreign 
Minister to UNESCO Director-General,” February 21, 1956, AG 8: Box 1934, X07.211 (470), UNESCO Archives. 
 89 
between peoples.” Moreover, the article casts this onetime symbol of the cosmopolitan decay of 
national culture and imperial subordination of peoples as a main instrument for realizing 
Khrushchev’s foreign-policy platform of peaceful coexistence. “In the expansion of cultural 
exchange between peoples,” the article continues, “UNESCO––an organization specially created 
to help achieve the goals of international peace, general wellbeing and mutual understanding 
between peoples through the development of education, science and cultural––is called upon to 
play an important role.”149  
The memorandum UNESCO sent to the Soviet foreign minister at the Geneva conference 
therefore opened a line of communication between the higher-ups in the communist world and 
UNESCO that resulted in the introduction of a favorable interpretation of the international 
organization into Soviet public consciousness for the first time. By addressing the Soviet public, 
Molotov signaled a revolution in Soviet foreign policy, alerting Soviet citizens to a radically new 
approach to multilateral organizations. Coinciding with the denunciation of the “cult of 
personality” that same week, the announcement confirmed the transformation of the Soviet 
Union into a willing participant in an international organizational system inspired by Western 
internationalism but designated as antithetical to the nationalist isolationism propagated under 
Stalin just three years before. 
The October memorandum also brought the attention of Soviet leaders back to UNESCO 
and the question of how to invigorate Soviet activity in the organization after little progress in 
cultivating relations since 1954. In late November 1955, V. A. Zorin, the deputy of MID who 
served two stints as the USSR ambassador to the UN over the course of his career, appealed to 
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the Presidium to send a delegation to a meeting of representatives from governmental agencies 
responsible for cultural diplomacy mentioned by Maheu in his communiqué. Assuring the 
Presidium that the decisions of the conference would not place any binding “obligations” on 
represented states, Zorin convinced the Soviet governing council to approve a delegation to the 
conference consisting of the head of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with the 
Abroad (VOKS), as well as the deputy ministers of the USSR Ministry of Culture, the Ministry 
of Higher Education, and MID (i.e., Zorin himself).150 What these emissaries learned at this 
conference only reinforced in their minds the need to organize more effectively their country’s 
dealings with UNESCO. While attending the conference, A. I. Denisov, the chairman of VOKS, 
had a lengthy conversation with the UNESCO Secretariat employee charged with funneling 
printed materials to the USSR. Speaking “frankly” as a fellow communist, the French UNESCO 
worker complained about the “extreme slowness” from the Soviet agencies in getting back to 
UNESCO, citing his experience of not receiving a reply to a letter he had given to the Soviet 
embassy more than a year previously. Now that the international organization had “ceased to be 
an American branch for cultural affairs,” Denisov’s interlocutor concluded, the USSR should 
send materials “ranging from bibliographies on various spheres of knowledge to articles and 
essays on different themes of Soviet life (for example, about fishermen in some region, 
sanatorium works, and so on).”151 
But most importantly in terms of the long-term trajectory of Soviet involvement in 
UNESCO, the 1955 memorandum from the international organization accelerated the creation of 
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an infrastructure inside the Soviet Union that would function as a permanent conduit for 
sustained cooperation between Soviet domestic agencies, UNESCO, and its many constituent 
international organizations until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.  
On December 1, or the same day Molotov wrote the Central Committee about Maheu’s 
letter, the Presidium passed a resolution to establish the Soviet UNESCO Commission, which 
would act as the sole manager of the flow of information and people among Soviet educational, 
scientific, and cultural agencies and the international organization. This resolution came at the 
request of Zorin and the deputy minister of culture, S. V. Kaftanov, who had grown frustrated 
over the inability of the USSR to take advantage of UNESCO. “The absence in the Soviet Union 
of an organ that can unite the diverse activity necessary for participating in UNESCO, and which 
could carry out the necessary coordination of activities, greatly complicates the implementation 
of work related to our involvement in the organization,” the two ministers explained. Given the 
real dangers of fraternizing with Western persons and institutions under Stalinism, Soviet 
domestic agencies had hesitated to reciprocate when UNESCO contacted them. “Without a 
decision that obligates our agencies to participate in UNESCO,” the two functionaries 
emphasized, “Soviet organizations directly concerned do not take a sufficiently active part, and 
sometimes, noting that they are not instructed to do so, completely refuse to participate in 
UNESCO work.” Attaching to their proposition a description of other national commissions, the 
Soviet apparatchiks recommended that the USSR model its commission on those in other large 
countries (the US, France, the UK, etc.) and predicted that “the beginning of the USSR’s 
participation in UNESCO and organizations related to it would allow us to receive valuable 
scholarly information and also use UNESCO channels to expand our international cultural and 
scholarly relations.”  
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The Presidium agreed to direct the ministry of culture to form the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and relegate responsibility to it for all UNESCO matters. After selecting as 
chairman of the commission the Minister of Culture N. A. Mikhailov and allotting five people 
from this ministry to serve as secretarial staff, the Presidium made the commission an 
interagency affair by drafting eight high-level officials from Soviet organs relevant to UNESCO 
as permanent members, including Gromyko, as a MID deputy foreign minister; V. N. Stoletov, 
the deputy minister of higher education; P. V. Zimin, the deputy minister of the RSFSR Ministry 
of Education; academician A. V. Topchiev, the chief scholar-secretary of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR) Presidium; L. N. Solov’ev, the deputy chair of the All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS); Denisov, the VOKS chairman; as well as R. V. 
Babeichuk and G. Ia. Kiselev, the deputy minister and minister of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR 
respectively.152 In the following months, the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR set up their own national 
commissions with Babeichuk and Kiselev as chairs.153 The Presidium of the Communist Party 
also formally ordered all “union, union-republic, and republic ministries and agencies” to comply 
with UNESCO requests passed along by the commission.154 
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In December 1955, the Presidium set up the commission’s counterpart and primary ally 
in Paris––the Soviet UNESCO Delegation.155 A replication in miniature of the USSR 
ambassadorial detachment at UN headquarters in New York, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
had an organizational structure resembling that of other Soviet diplomatic outposts. A chief 
permanent delegate acted as the “ambassador,” sitting on the executive board and governing the 
delegation. This position had four occupants over the first fifteen years of its existence: from 
1956 to 1958, Kemenov, the former delegate to the 1954 Hague convention; from 1959 to 1961, 
A. G. Kulazhenkov, a former ambassador to Mexico; from 1961 to 1965, A. P. Pavlov, a former 
ambassador to France in the last years of Stalin’s rule; and from 1965 to 1971, V. K. Sobakin, a 
Soviet international legal scholar. The delegation also employed an attaché; first, second, and 
third secretaries, each of which nominally dealt with one of UNESCO’s specialties (social 
sciences, natural sciences, mass communications etc.); support staff (accountant, typist, chauffer, 
cook); and advisers, including the official BSSR and Ukrainian SSR permanent delegates to 
UNESCO.156 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Ukrainian and BSSR permanent delegates 
chafed at their awkward position of belonging to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation while 
simultaneously purporting to speak for republics recognized as independent by the UN. “Because 
of this duality,” Kiselev wrote to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1963, the BSSR 
permanent delegate “must contact foreigners in UNESCO . . . on issues relating only to the 
Soviet UNESCO Delegation. UNESCO Secretariat employees always meet these approaches 
with perplexity or an ironic smile, and in a number of instances refused to talk to the BSSR 
delegate at all.” When a Soviet secretariat worker let slip to a Belgian UNESCO envoy that the 
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BSSR permanent delegate aided the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, the Belgian, at a meeting of 
the executive board, moved to shut down a speech by the BSSR representative “on the basis that 
he, supposedly, was the second orator from the same power––the USSR.”157 
Staffed and financed by MID on the basis of advice from the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission, the delegation was subject to the rules and privileges of other diplomatic personnel, 
carrying out its duties in “close contact” with the Soviet embassy in Paris but under the “general 
guidance” of the commission and the “observation” of MID. As the eyes and ears of the Soviet 
Union at UNESCO, the delegation had to monitor events at the international organization while 
cultivating relationships with UNESCO employees and delegations from other UNESCO 
member states, especially those from the communist bloc. In terms of its daily tasks, the 
delegation had to vigorously defend Soviet interests in meetings with UNESCO officials; tout 
the achievements of the USSR in education, science, and culture; keep the commission privy to 
the latest UNESCO news; report to MID and the commission the successes of other countries in 
UNESCO-related areas of knowledge; counter the influence of capitalist countries in the 
international organization; supervise the lives of Soviet international civil servants in the 
UNESCO Secretariat; and host Soviet groups or individuals temporarily visiting UNESCO for 
seminars and conferences.158   
The founding of the Soviet UNESCO Commission reflected not just a desire on the part 
of the USSR to use UNESCO as a platform for propaganda, but also a sincere acceptance of the 
international organization’s philosophy and mission of achieving peace through international 
intellectual communion. The 1956 constitutional regulations delineating the purposes of the 
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Soviet UNESCO Commission stipulated that it should enhance “the use of UNESCO for the 
comprehensive development of cooperation” between the USSR, the international organization, 
“its related organizations,” and its member states; advertise “USSR policies aimed at 
strengthening peace” and “lessening international tension”; and also focus on “increasing 
international cooperation and mutual understanding between all governments through the 
preparation and dispatching of relevant information to UNESCO, its related organizations, and 
national commissions.” The commission would accomplish these objectives by showcasing the 
“achievements of the USSR in science, culture, and education”; providing commentary on, and 
proposals for, drafts of the biennial plans passed by the UNESCO General Conference; 
formulating specific directives for delegations to sessions of the general conference, executive 
board, as well as regional conferences; determining whether or not the Soviet Union should join 
organizations, councils and associations holding consultative status with UNESCO; nominating 
candidates for positions in the UNESCO Secretariat and as technical experts in “weakly-
developed countries”; and fostering “working contacts” with all foreign persons and institutions 
falling within UNESCO’s orbit.159 
As a coordinating body, the commission took on the enormous job of operating as an 
intermediary between UNESCO and hundreds of Soviet universities, academic institutes, public 
organizations, and press agencies, delivering to these organs thousands of invitations, calls for 
applications, information requests, and publications from the international organization annually. 
The regulations outlined how, in theory, the commission would function as a middleman 
between UNESCO and Soviet society. When the commission received solicitations, it “studied” 
them in order to settle on which Soviet agency or agencies could most effectively respond with 
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appropriate personnel or documentation. Once the assigned agencies had drafted a reply under 
the loose guidance of the commission, they had to mail it back to the commission and the USSR 
Council of Ministers (as well as, for sensitive matters, to the Central Committee) for final 
approval. Oddly, the regulations also contained a provision that contradicted this procedure by 
permitting individual Soviet organizations, if UNESCO directly addressed appeals to them, to 
unilaterally confer with the international organization provided that they pass along copies of the 
correspondence to the commission.160 As subsequent chapters will show, this qualification 
caused constant headaches for members of the commission left out of the loop as they struggled 
to keep track of developments.161 
More problematically, the responsibility for fulfilling UNESCO petitions fell on domestic 
agencies lacking the incentives with which national commissions in other countries lured their 
compatriots to write for UNESCO publications, work in its administration, or attend its 
conferences. Instead of commanding the commission to organize and pay for all Soviet activity 
in UNESCO, the regulations devolved to Soviet domestic agencies the chores of devising 
proposals, assembling delegations, selecting candidates for secretariat posts, and funding the 
expenses accrued by delegations or individual specialists in preparation for and while serving 
abroad (these costs included “reports and materials, stands, exhibitions, [and] photos” made 
before and after returning from the trip as well as salaries, transport, and per diem stipends 
during travel).162 While, in the West, UNESCO had established through advertising campaigns a 
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reputation among professionals in the fields under its purview, represented an internationalist 
ideology popular among a significant number of academics, and offered prestige to those keen 
on advancing their careers or the reputations of their institutions, the international organization 
had little resonance or allure among Soviet citizens or their employers who, if they had heard of 
UNESCO at all, gleaned their knowledge of the organization from the multiple denunciations of 
it as a cosmopolitan tool for Western imperialists in the Soviet press before 1953. As we will see, 
the recalcitrance of Soviet organizations, almost all of which had little interest in diverting their 
resources outside their own walls let alone beyond Soviet borders, continued to surface as one of 
the core weaknesses in the Soviet crusade to exert influence on UNESCO. 
The composition and structure of the Soviet UNESCO Commission grew larger and more 
complex as it underwent several reforms over the next decade. In the summer of 1957, the 
commission moved from the ministry of culture to the USSR Council of Ministers’ State 
Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (GKKS)––а new organ succeeding the 
defunct VOKS and charged with handling the upswing in cultural and academic exchanges 
between the USSR and the rest of the world. This transfer arose out of a realization that the 
expansive mandate of GKKS aligned more closely with the multidimensional UNESCO program 
than any specific ministry. As Minister of Culture Mikhailov observed when arguing for the 
reassignment, his ministry was “only one of the agencies interested in UNESCO work.”163 While 
most of the members and secretarial staff stayed on at the commission after its relocation, 
Mikhailov relinquished his position as chairman of the commission to GKKS Chairman G. A. 
Zhukov, a seasoned journalist who had worked as the Pravda correspondent in Paris from 1947 
to 1952 until assuming the job of editor-in-chief of the Pravda international section for five 
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years.164 In February 1958, Zhukov orchestrated a reorganization of the commission, dividing its 
labor among Soviet domestic agencies in order to increase productivity because of the disparity 
between the large amount of money the USSR invested in the organization ($1.7 million 
annually, or 15 percent of the total UNESCO budget and the second largest contribution of any 
country behind the US) and the inability of the commission to furnish specialists to write for 
UNESCO or show up at its events.165 While the American UNESCO Commission had more than 
one hundred members and twenty-eight people in its secretarial division at the State Department, 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission consisted of only nine members and five administrative 
workers. To open up what one person on the commission called this inordinately “exclusive 
group,” the Soviet UNESCO body recruited in 1958 the head of the Soviet Information Bureau 
(Sovinformburo), the deputy editor-in-chief of Pravda, and the deputy chairman of the State 
Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting. By the end of the decade, the commission 
included over twenty prominent figures from a diverse array of Soviet agencies. By 1967, thirty-
six persons sat on the commission.166  
Most importantly, Zhukov divided up the obligations of the commission among seven 
committees. Easing the burden of each individual member of the commission who hitherto had 
answered personally for entire UNESCO fields, the committees produced proposals, 
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publications, and delegates for corresponding UNESCO divisions and major projects. Thus, the 
director of the AN SSSR Institute of Oriental Studies, B. G. Gafurov, led a committee on the 
UNESCO major project “on the Mutual Appreciation  of Eastern and Western Cultural Values” 
(the “East-West” project), which sought to develop cultural understanding between Asian and 
Western countries; the deputy chief scholar-secretary of the AN SSSR Presidium, N. M. 
Sisakian, took the reins of the committee for natural sciences; the deputy academic-secretary of 
the AN SSSR Division of Economics, Philosophy and Law, V. P. D’iachenko, spearheaded the 
committee on social sciences; the vice president of the RSFSR Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, 
N. K. Goncharov, ran the committee on education; the deputy editor-in-chief of the Bol’shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), A. A. Zvorykin, directed the 
committee on culture; the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Sovetskaia kul’tura (Soviet Culture), 
V. I. Orlov, commanded the committee on information; and the director of the All-Union State 
Library of Foreign Literature (VGBIL), M. I. Rudomino, ran the committee on library sciences 
and bibliography.167 As UNESCO outposts stationed at some of the major professional centers of 
the Soviet Union, these committees further integrated the communist world into the global 
network of the international organization. For example, the committee on library sciences and 
bibliography, one of the most successful of these units, employed forty-six librarians at VGBIL 
in Moscow and by 1960 had established branches in the cities of five constituent republics 
(Alma-Ata, Frunze, Leningrad, Riga, Vilnius). The committee presented Soviet bibliographic 
materials to UNESCO; familiarized  “the Soviet library community with achievements in library 
sciences abroad”; hosted librarians from foreign countries (in 1960, it welcomed representatives 
from Sweden, the UK, and Czechoslovakia); published the Russian translation of the journal 
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UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries; and sent Soviet librarians to UNESCO conferences as well as 
the annual convention of the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions 
(IFLA), which had consultative status with UNESCO and was the preeminent worldwide 
professional organization for librarians.168 
While these measures gradually improved Soviet responsiveness to UNESCO and made 
its domestic apparatus commensurate to those of small UNESCO member states, this burgeoning 
system for mobilization in the USSR paled to the extensive and decentralized complex in the 
communist country’s main adversary, the United States. Simply put, the American head start on 
the USSR in the institutionalization of a consciousness of international organizations meant that 
the Soviet Union had as much of a chance of rivaling it in the battle for hegemony in UNESCO 
in the 1950s and 1960s as it did of surpassing the US in meat and dairy production or other areas 
of economic competition in which Khrushchev had promised his compatriots inevitable 
superiority.169  
Indeed, the US National Commission for UNESCO spanned the entire country and 
boasted major figures from a broad selection of professions. An “advisory body” controlled by 
the State Department, the US National Commission relied on the aid of the assistant secretaries 
of state for public and UN affairs as well as the Office of Education of the Federal Security 
Agency (a predecessor to the US Department of Education). It also enjoyed the backing of 
hundreds of organizations spanning the national, state, and local levels. In 1950, for example, the 
following individuals served on the commission: ten officials from the federal government (the 
librarian of congress, the commissioner of education, the directors of the Smithsonian Institute 
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and the National Gallery of Art, Maine Senator Margaret Chase Smith, and others); one governor 
(Chet Bowles of Connecticut); three college presidents or provosts (from Hunter College, Kansas 
State, and UCLA); four superintendents from school districts or boards of education (those of 
New York City, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Washington state); and almost sixty representatives 
from civic organizations (the National Education Association, Social Science Research Council, 
National Academy of Sciences, National Grange, B’nai B’rith, Negro Newspaper Publishers 
Association, among dozens of others). This commission–which celebrated in 1949 the fact that 
over 9,000 people flocked to Cleveland, Ohio, to see former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt 
address the annual US-UNESCO “national conference”–oversaw “panels” sponsoring UNESCO-
themed events (a “dramatic arts” panel, for instance, partnered with around 400 “theater groups” 
to encourage the performance of plays espousing “international understanding”). The National 
Research Council and the American Council on Education teamed up with the commission to 
draft scholars for UNESCO seminars and insert UNESCO topics into the curricula of American 
schools. Fifty “state” and “local” councils also convened discussions on UNESCO issues. Even a 
department store in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, reportedly sponsored a “UNESCO meeting” that 
attracted “more than a thousand men and women.” In Elmira, New York, a “local UNESCO 
conference” brought over a thousand people together to found a “permanent UNESCO Council 
for Elmira.”170 At institutions of higher education in the state of Kansas alone, UNESCO 
councils sprung up at Baker University, Bethany College, Kansas State, Friends University, the 
Municipal University of Wichita, Washburn Municipal University of Topeka, and the University 
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of Kansas.171 Although the anticommunist, isolationist attacks on UNESCO from the American 
Right (explored in the next chapter), along with a disillusionment with the lack of progress of the 
international organization, tempered this enthusiasm somewhat by the late 1950s, UNESCO 
continued to boast a sizeable American following. In 1955, a “Citizen Consultation Program” 
comprised fifty-five UNESCO statewide and local gatherings as well as a series of symposia 
about UNESCO on college campuses. At the national conference that November, 1,000 
delegates from all over the United States congregated in Cincinnati, Ohio, to examine 
UNESCO’s program.172  
While the Kremlin and those at the helm of the Soviet UNESCO Commission drastically 
underestimated the scale of domestic voluntarism UNESCO required of large countries, some of 
the rank-and-file of the Soviet foreign-policy community comprehended the gap between the 
USSR and the US with respect to their recruiting practices for international organizations. In 
April 1956, Mozhaev, the GKKS official and consultant to the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
whom we met in the introduction, penned a letter to Khrushchev in which he underscored the 
importance of UNESCO for the new Soviet doctrine of “peaceful coexistence,” rattling off the 
reforms needed in Soviet thinking to fight the West on its turf. A graduate student who at the 
time helped plan research on “the legal regulation of cultural relations” at the International Law 
Department of Moscow State University, Mozhaev took stock of the dramatic transformations in 
his field over recent years, declaring the permanent break with the Stalinist boycott of 
international organizations as a fait accompli. “Previously,” he noted, “the principle tenet in 
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relation to our possible participation in such organizations was as follows: because the activity of 
certain international organizations was aimed at the dissemination and strengthening of 
bourgeois ideology, we do not participate in them. But this was earlier.” Since the “international 
situation” had “changed radically” as a result of “the international isolation of the USSR” 
becoming a thing “permanently of the past,” the Soviet Union, he argued, “can and should 
change [its] attitude to the myriad of international organizations.” Citing the writings of Lenin to 
legitimize his case, the international-relations expert pushed for the USSR to “skillfully use all 
our opportunities for the bolstering of the struggle against hostile ideology, including within 
international organizations of the bourgeoisie.” Making his chagrin known over the “weak” 
stance of the USSR, he exhorted Khrushchev to direct the Soviet state to conduct a systematic 
review of, and make a “long-term plan” for, Soviet entry into the most effective of these bodies.  
But Mozhaev went beyond merely enumerating reasons for an increase in Soviet efforts 
to elevate their influence in these organizations, lobbying for a massive public offensive inside 
the Soviet Union in the mold of the grassroots initiative in the US. Admitting that the birth of the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission marked a “new step forward in the activation” of Soviet 
endeavors in UNESCO, he nevertheless regretted that the Soviet “share in the implementation of 
the UNESCO program” remained “negligibly small” due to the tendency of Soviet domestic 
organs to “underestimate the opportunities that membership in UNESCO presents for the 
strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples.” By allowing Soviet agencies to erect a 
“wall of excessive caution,” and thereby doom requests from the international organization to 
“drown in the archives of these institutions,” the young foreign-policy wonk warned that the 
USSR was “closing” itself off from “one of the international channels for the distribution of 
truthful information on the development of science and culture in the USSR.” In order to educate 
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Soviet society about the value of UNESCO, Mozhaev judged, “there needs to be the constant and 
moreover tremendous help of the public [obshchestvennost’].” Highlighting the big tent of 
persons belonging to the American commission, he pointed to the “positive organizational 
experience of some bourgeois countries and, in particular, the USA” as an example to follow, 
describing how the American national UNESCO conferences drew “representatives of 
universities, colleges, theaters, museums, the film industry, libraries, athletic organizations, 
tourist organizations, etc.” To match the Americans, Mozhaev therefore beseeched Khrushchev 
to permit “the broad and continuous involvement of the Soviet public in the work of the 
commission.”173       
Because the power of a nation in UNESCO depended in part on the quantity and quality 
of the citizens it furnished to participate in the organization’s program, the US and other Western 
countries had the upper hand because of their larger pool of possible candidates for selection as 
contributors to UNESCO publications, workers in its administration, or participants in seminars 
and conferences. In the short term, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had no realistic expectation 
of challenging the US in this respect without encouraging Soviet citizens to independently come 
forward through a public relations campaign about UNESCO on the same scale as the US 
publicity drive. This would require an intensive allocation of resources for the waging of a far-
reaching mobilization in the spirit of the contemporaneous “Virgin Lands” campaign. As this 
study will demonstrate, however, the long-term dilution of US influence in UNESCO, as a result 
of the entry of new countries into the international organization, provided an opportunity for the 
USSR to increase its situational power through the forging of alliances with UNESCO member 
                                                     
173 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 151-61. 
 105 
states leery of the West and open to alternative benefactors in the game of multilateral 
cooperation. 
*                 *                 * 
At its first meeting on January 5, 1956, the Soviet UNESCO Commission spent fifteen 
hours huddled in the ministry of culture brainstorming about ways to educate its members on the 
unknown international organization and drawing up a strategy for how to proceed over the next 
year. The commission secretarial staff pulled together for reference a collection of documents on 
the history and protocols of UNESCO, a card index of “leading UNESCO activists,” samples of 
UNESCO publications, and a catalogue of all UNESCO books. The chairman then imposed 
deadlines for the completion of projects (such as the selection of articles from Sovetskaia 
kul’tura to submit to UNESCO periodicals, the devising of a plan for challenging the 
international organization on the China question, the coercion of Soviet domestic institutions into 
becoming involved with NGOs tied to UNESCO, and the organization of delegations for 
upcoming conferences).174  
In the spring and summer of 1956, the existence of the commission improved the 
country’s utilization of UNESCO as a means of furthering the general foreign-policy agenda of 
the new Soviet leadership. By September, the Soviet Union had agreed to accept foreign 
scientists to study in the USSR for six months on UNESCO grants; nominated specialists to sit 
on UNESCO consultative committees; and sent delegations to two UNESCO regional 
conferences for Asia and Europe in Tokyo and Aix-en-Provence.175 Prompted by the USSR, 
UNESCO put on a conference in Geneva that July on the political, legal, economic, and 
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historical dimensions of peaceful coexistence at which scholars from the communist and 
capitalist blocs debated recommendations from the International Economics Association (IEA) 
and other UNESCO-affiliated scholarly organizations on Khrushchev’s new vision for easing 
tensions.176 The Soviet UNESCO Delegation also quickly discovered that UNESCO represented 
a valuable venue for developing bonds with the intellectual classes of countries lacking official 
diplomatic relations with the USSR. In February, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to a session of 
the UNESCO Executive Board in Madrid held informal conversations and exchanged gifts with 
the mayor of the Spanish capital and the country’s minister of education. This first contact, 
which took place more than a decade before an official diplomatic mission from the USSR 
opened in Spain, led to the UNESCO Secretariat arranging a back channel between AN SSSR 
and Spanish academic institutes despite the public hostility between Franco’s regime and the 
communist world. Building on this relationship, the Spanish and Soviet delegates to the 
executive board later examined the feasibility of a détente between the two countries. Like other 
countries that would exploit the UN as a covert means for communicating with adversaries, the 
Soviet Union utilized UNESCO repeatedly over the next decade to foster ties with several other 
countries in which the USSR had no diplomatic mission, including Australia, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia.177   
In spite of these incremental steps, a sudden darkening of the “international situation” 
overshadowed the progress of the commission and delegation by the end of the year. On October 
23, widespread demonstrations broke out across Hungary against the Stalinist government 
controlled by Mátyás Rákosi and in favor of the ascension to the post of prime minister of the 
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reform-minded Imre Nagy. On November 5, following two weeks of tortured deliberation in the 
Kremlin, Soviet troops fanned out across Hungary to suppress the uprising, leaving the streets 
covered with dead civilians and provoking the loudest outcry from the West over communist 
aggression since the Korean War. On the same day of the brutal crackdown in Hungary, British 
and French forces touched down in Egypt and brought the dispute between European powers and 
the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser over the fate of the Suez Canal to a head.178 And in the 
morning on that fateful day during which these two crises converged, the seminal event on the 
UNESCO calendar for that year, the ninth session of the general conference, kicked off in New 
Delhi, India.  
The incessant cascade of news from the Middle East and Eastern Europe wreaked havoc 
on the best laid plans of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation for what amounted to 
the Soviet Union’s first major appearance in the world of international organizations beyond UN 
headquarters in New York. Having diligently prepared for the conference for almost a year by 
tailoring the composition of the Soviet delegation and its speeches to courting India and other 
Asian countries at the heart of the new “nonaligned” movement, Soviet authorities had to 
abruptly send Soviet representatives, who had already arrived in Delhi, “additional directives in 
light of the changing international situation.” These messages instructed the Soviet party to 
politick among other delegations for resolutions condemning France, the UK, and Israel for their 
“aggression” in Egypt while relying on procedural rules to block any mention of the unrest in 
Hungary.179 But as the Soviet crackdown continued, these instructions proved of little use for the 
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rebuttal of the unforeseen attacks of other countries on the Soviet invasion of Hungary. When the 
Soviet delegation begged Moscow to “urgently pass along” direct updates on the official position 
of the Soviet state on the Hungarian insurrection, their bosses back home told them that all such 
information would go through its normal route and end up at the Delhi branch of TASS, the 
Soviet news agency. Yet because meetings of the general conference began at nine o’clock in the 
morning, or before the arrival of the latest TASS report, the head of the delegation, Kemenov, 
complained that this arrangement made the team’s job “practically impossible” by forcing them 
to “organize, on our own, around-the-clock duty at the radio-receiver, translating the morning 
editions of Indian magazines and briefs to the press.” Only after the Hungarian debacle had 
wound down did Soviet attendees of the conference receive direct communications from the 
Soviet Union. “In the future,” Kemenov wrote, “it is necessary that Soviet delegations at 
conferences are provided with timely information, especially if their work is taking place in a 
period of exacerbation of the international situation.”180   
At the general conference, Kemenov and his cohort navigated a tense atmosphere from 
the start. Just four days before it opened, UNESCO received from the Library of the Hungarian 
National Academy of Sciences in Budapest a telegram protesting “the bloody and bellicose 
aggression of Soviet troops in Hungary” and imploring the international organization, as the 
putative protector of cultural and intellectual heritage threatened by wartime destruction, to 
“provide moral support for the total and immediate withdrawal of the Red Army from our 
country.”181 In the first hours of the conference, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dealt 
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the Soviet contingent a strong blow by referencing the Soviet incursion into Hungary. As the 
Soviet delegation rued in its final report, the leader of the nonaligned world, in his welcome 
address, “put the aggression in Egypt and the events in Hungary on the same plane, speaking 
with the same condemnation of them as supposedly equally significant occurrences.” The 
“wavering” of Nehru throughout the conference on this point “created an extremely fragile 
position for the Indian delegation . . . and made it difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach a 
firm agreement with the Indians.” Over the course of the conference, the Soviet contingent 
“rebuffed the slanderous fabrications” of the “Atlantic bloc” regarding the “counterrevolutionary 
rebellion in Hungary.” It also strongly opposed a resolution that did not explicitly mention Israel, 
the UK, and France as the belligerent countries in Egypt and instead denounced all “aggression” 
worldwide, thereby implicitly censuring the Soviet role in the Hungarian conflict rather than 
restricting the reprobation to the Suez Crisis. After unsuccessfully attempting to woo Egypt and 
other Middle Eastern countries to introduce, in conjunction with the USSR, a resolution 
specifying the attackers, the socialist countries put forward their own resolution, which the 
conference ultimately rejected with twenty-two member states in favor (socialist and Middle 
Eastern countries) and thirty-two against (Western nations and their Latin American allies).182  
Later in the proceedings, the Soviet delegation struggled to deflect accusations of a lack 
of empathy for the plight of those affected by the violence in Hungary. To thwart a Belgian 
proposal to redirect $200,000 from the UNESCO budget for assistance to Hungary and Egypt, 
Soviet representatives demanded that the Hungarian government approve the resolution before it 
entered into the minutes of the meeting. But to the dismay of their Soviet partners, the Hungarian 
delegation called for an “acceleration of this assistance” and commended the Belgian motion as 
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honoring “the ideals of UNESCO.” At the forty-seventh session of the UNESCO Executive 
Board in March 1957, UNESCO formalized this decision and empowered the director-general to 
select a permanent “expert” to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Austria 
for the purpose of supervising the education of Hungarian children who had left Hungary and 
fled to the neighboring country during the uprising. Because the socialist camp viewed these 
refugees as enemies of the current Hungarian government and disapproved of the “mostly 
American” educational organizations under the auspices of the UNHCR expert, the Soviet board 
member criticized the appointment of this envoy and abstained from voting on the resolution. 
“Not speaking directly against aid to Hungarian children abroad,” he reported back to Moscow, 
“the Soviet delegate insisted all funds be equally distributed to assist Hungary and Egypt.” 
Donations to Hungarians outside their country, the board member argued, would make this 
distribution uneven.183 Once this resolution passed, UNESCO quickly hired an expert for the 
UNHCR position in Austria and by the summer of 1957 had expended thousands of dollars to 
ship chairs, desks, typewriters, books, projectors, and other equipment emblazoned with 
“UNESCO badges” to Hungary.184 To the annoyance of Soviet officials, UNESCO employees 
continued to bring up the Hungarian crisis for years to come. In 1959, for example, the UNESCO 
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deputy director-general tried to negotiate the release of intellectuals imprisoned during the 1956 
demonstrations.185 
In spite of the failure of the communist bloc to present itself as the guarantor of peace 
during the conference, several socialist representatives espied some auspicious developments in 
retrospect. Thanks to Soviet pressure, the “East-West” project abandoned its orientalist focus on 
ancient culture as the only valuable contribution of Asian life to the world and shifted part of its 
activities to taking stock of the decolonization in Asia occurring at the time.186 The socialist 
member states also celebrated their missionary work, as representatives of the Soviet Union, 
among the broader population of India. In Delhi, professionals belonging to the Soviet delegation 
gave lectures at universities and schools; appeared on radio programs; and met with Prime 
Minister Nehru. Outside Delhi, they visited Bombay, Hyderabad, Allahabad and other cities to 
present on Soviet education and open an exhibit on the topic.187 When attendees from all socialist 
countries gathered the day after the conference to evaluate their overall performance, Eastern 
European delegates pointed to these moments in order to justify closer collaboration within the 
eastern bloc on UNESCO affairs. Warning of the poor “ideological cooperation” between 
socialist countries and the threat of Western attempts to exploit this weakness to “flirt” with 
individual people’s democracies, the Polish emissary called on the communist world to foster 
their own “inner UNESCO,” or “an organization that would coordinate cooperation between the 
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Soviet Union and people’s democracies in science, education, culture, etc.” This pitch set off a 
drive over the next decade to better harmonize the tactics of socialist states that would lead to 
regular, intrasocialist consultations before and after major UNESCO happenings. Expressing 
remorse over the rejection of the international organization under Stalin, those who spoke at the 
meeting acknowledged that they “had not properly valued UNESCO,” labelling as a “mistake” 
the Eastern European walkout in the early 1950s. “In leaving UNESCO,” the Pole remarked, “we 
left the battlefield.” After conversing with the heads of Western national commissions, another 
member of the Polish delegation marveled at the size and sway of these rival commissions, 
comparing them unfavorably to Eastern European commissions. “We were ashamed,” he bluntly 
admitted of the socialist commissions, which he claimed existed “in name only.” This 
embarrassment before the West compelled those at the meeting to back a rapid expansion of their 
commissions––a proposition that some socialist countries executed better than others.188 
*                 *                 * 
Eager to turn the page on the Hungarian debacle, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and 
Delegation brought in the new year of 1957 with a determination to prove through UNESCO that 
the USSR not only led the way in education, science, and culture, but also stood at the vanguard 
of the internationalist mission at the core of the organization. This resolve reflected a broader 
confident idealism sweeping the Soviet Union at the time as well as the reinvigoration of Soviet 
internationalism intertwined with the new foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. The 
“optimism” of the “early years of the Thaw,” historian Melanie Ilic points out, “was fueled by 
real and tangible achievements in economic growth and in scientific and technical developments 
in the 1950s and was reflected in the somewhat utopian promise of the building of communism 
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in the near future that was set out in the 1961 Party Program.”189 Determined to “catch up and 
overtake” the United States on the world stage, the Kremlin infused Soviet foreign policy with 
what Zubok describes as an “ideological romanticism,” or a belief in the “global victory of 
communism” through a “solidarity of workers and peasants around the world.” A harkening back 
to the Leninist roots of the USSR, this resurrection of “internationalist themes of ‘unity of 
working people’ and ‘fraternal solidarity’” replaced the “Russocentric chauvinism” of late 
Stalinism with a socialist internationalist platform sharing the values of peace and international 
cooperation professed by UNESCO.190 The World Youth Festival in the summer of 1957 and the 
launch of the first satellite “Sputnik” in the fall of that year seemed to confirm the conviction that 
communism could shine as a beacon of international communion among nations and outdo the 
US as an innovator in everything from ballet to the space race. Sitting at the intersection of these 
two major pursuits as both a symbol of peace and a venue for parading national successes to a 
worldwide audience, UNESCO seemed to correspond perfectly to Soviet strengths and 
Khrushchev’s desire to show off Soviet ingenuity.  
The de-Stalinizing policies adopted after 1956 also rejuvenated education, science, and 
culture inside the Soviet Union, reestablishing these spheres of human activity as central venues 
of Cold War competition and making them more conducive to international exchange. In 1958, 
Khrushchev announced a set of educational reforms designed to “strengthen the ties between 
school and life.” Enhancing the role of polytechnic education in the Soviet Union, these reforms 
provided Soviet UNESCO intermediaries with a practical educational model to advertise to 
weakly-developed countries faced with a choice between Western and Soviet technical 
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assistance through UNESCO (see chapter 9).191 The prioritization of polytechnic education 
proceeded from the Soviet leadership’s glorification of applied science as the key to 
Khrushchev’s promise to “catch up and overtake America.” Beginning in 1956, the Soviet state 
trumpeted the onset of a “Scientific-Technological Revolution” in every aspect of Soviet life 
from research in nuclear physics to the modelling of kitchens. In accordance with the 
fundamental Marxist-Leninist premise that rational planning would quell the chaos of capitalism, 
this revolution entailed an enhanced utilization of science and technology to improve society as a 
means of demonstrating the superiority of the socialist order in the context of the Cold War. “In 
the postwar world,” the historian Susan Reid explains, “advanced science and technology were 
fundamental to the arms and space race as well as for international prestige. But only the 
socialist system, founded on scientific principles, it was argued, was capable of fully applying 
the technological revolution to human life.”192 To realize this revolution, Soviet scientists 
dramatically expanded the scope of their research and began to engage with the latest Western 
trends such as cybernetics. Notwithstanding the continued sway in Soviet agricultural studies of 
the famously spurious theories of heredity and genetics of Lysenko, Soviet scholars also 
challenged and eventually got rid of the most egregious pseudoscientific theories permeating 
Soviet academia under Stalin.193 At a deeper level, the Soviet conception of science underwent a 
transformation over the course of the 1950s from partiinost’ (party-mindedness) to nauchnost’ 
(science-mindedness), or a recognition that “science was important beyond its compatibility with 
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party decrees” as an independent “force of production” determining the development of 
technology in the Marxist-Leninist schema of social evolution.194 Opening up more space for 
autonomous scientific research, the latter transition enabled Soviet academicians to more 
proficiently speak the universal language of science when participating in UNESCO activities.   
In contrast to the anti-intellectual rhetoric of late Stalinism, the Thaw unleashed by the 
new leadership in the Kremlin similarly led to a convergence of how the Soviet intelligentsia 
viewed the role of culture in Soviet society and UNESCO’s conception of culture as a means of 
enlightening the common man and making better citizens. As Tromly maintains, scholars of the 
Khrushchev era have depicted the intelligentsia as using culture to carve out a space for a kind of 
“‘proto-politics,’ in which intellectuals and their supporters sought to ‘create a new language of 
civic culture,’ a framework of social and moral responsibility, truth and sincerity.’” Tromly 
situates this renewed emphasis on culture in a “longstanding mission civilisatrice” central to the 
self-image of the intelligentsia as a distinct social class within the USSR. Culture as a force in 
society became “all the more urgent in the disorienting post-Stalin era as only it could overcome 
Stalinism, which was a moral failing predicated on a lack of enlightenment.”195 Thus, these new 
framings of education, science, and culture, while still heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, made Soviet work in these fields more responsive to UNESCO’s vision of intellectual 
endeavors as serving a universal, moral good. 
UNESCO also offered an alternative to other types of international bodies considered by 
the USSR as more detrimental to its geopolitical interests. In August 1957, Yves Brunsvick, a 
senior official in the French UNESCO Commission who would go on to serve as president of the 
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IBE in the late 1980s, shared with Soviet Permanent Delegate Kemenov his aspiration for 
UNESCO national commissions to form the foundation of a “‘Big Europe,’” or “a 
commonwealth of all European governments including the USSR and the people’s democracies,” 
to oppose the “‘Little Europe’” enshrined in the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) that spring. “For this,” he speculated, “it is necessary to foster close relations between 
European UNESCO commissions, strengthen the exchange of delegations, students, cultural 
figures, materials, and so forth.” The relative independence of these commissions in Western 
Europe, he reasoned, would help to circumvent the political factors preventing integration.196 
Although it is not clear what the Soviet government thought of this idea, it demonstrates the 
forgotten centrality of UNESCO to relations between European nations in the first two decades 
after the Second World War and the diverse possibilities for the USSR to contribute to 
international governance during the Cold War.  
Mindful of the overlap of UNESCO’s mandate and Soviet talents as well as the 
organization’s importance in multilateral relations, the commission aimed to introduce the USSR 
to the world and welcome UNESCO into the Soviet Union in 1957. On top of work on the first 
UNESCO event in the Soviet Union (a meeting of the International Congress of Sociologists on 
“the question of peaceful coexistence” in Moscow), the commission invited UNESCO observers 
to tour the eastern bloc and consult with officials in Moscow on how to stimulate Soviet 
UNESCO activity. In May, Prem Kirpal, the Indian director of the UNESCO Department of 
Culture, traveled for seventeen days to Prague, Bratislava, Leningrad, and Moscow to evaluate 
the national commissions of the two countries and iron out plans to increase the involvement of 
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the communist world in the international organization generally as well as the “East-West” 
project in particular. In line with the Soviet state’s new fixation on improving the image of the 
Soviet Union in the eyes of foreign visitors, the Czechoslovakian and Soviet commissions busied 
the Indian UNESCO director with an unrelenting schedule of ballets, banquets, plays, concerts, 
tours, and other displays of Soviet and Czechoslovakian cultural feats while peppering him with 
flattering remarks that showed, in his words, the “high esteem in which [UNESCO] is held” in 
both countries. At times, this performative celebration of UNESCO had a comedic effect. For 
example, as Kirpal walked through the halls of the M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public 
Library in Leningrad, he spotted a set of unremarkable, bureaucratic papers from the UNESCO 
Executive Board (known as 47/EX documents) set out “in a glass case in a prominent part” of 
the library. In Moscow, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had Kirpal sit down for an interview 
with the deputy editor of Sovetskaia kul’tura on television and give a talk on Moscow radio in 
order to raise awareness of UNESCO’s program among the educated strata of Soviet society. On 
the one hand, the UNESCO executive found the Czechoslovakian UNESCO Commission better 
“organized” and more “active” than the Soviet UNESCO Commission, commenting that the 
USSR suffered from “less familiarity” with the organization and came off as preoccupied with 
using UNESCO as a bullhorn through which to advertise the Soviet way of life.197 “For some 
time,” Kirpal wrote in his report, “the main task of UNESCO in the USSR will be to explain its 
program and disseminate its publications among large and numerous groups of intellectuals in a 
vast country.” On the other hand, he emphasized that his Soviet acquaintances exuded 
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excitement over UNESCO ventures, especially the “East-West” project, which provided a means 
for the Soviet Union to depict itself as a civilization reconciling Asian and European cultures. 
Furthermore, Kirpal identified tangible signs that the Soviet UNESCO Commission took 
seriously the education of the Soviet population on UNESCO’s purpose and enterprises. Indeed, 
the production of UNESCO publications in the Soviet Union had already evoked intense 
curiosity from diverse layers of the Soviet public. 
Ignoring the protests of the US, UNESCO also directed the head of its Bureau for 
Relations with Member States (BMS), Jean Chevalier, to conduct a similar fact-finding mission 
in the Soviet Union from July 26 to August 14. A French academic who, according to the Soviet 
permanent delegate, had connections with the French foreign ministry, Chevalier went to 
Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet government to observe the World Youth Festival and to 
take in the state of UNESCO operations in the Soviet republics. In Moscow, he inspected three 
UNESCO exhibits in the Library of Foreign Literature, the Moscow Pedagogical Institute, and 
the House of the Central Union of Journalists of the USSR. Set up to enlighten the thousands of 
youth at the festival about UNESCO’s work to realize world peace, the exhibits contained 
photographs and publications “organized by theme” about the international organization for the 
scrutiny of those taking part in what became the seminal spectacle signifying the rejuvenation of 
Soviet internationalism after Stalin. In the opinion of Chevalier, the UNESCO exhibitions did 
not live up to the extravagance of other attractions at the festival in terms of their capacity to turn 
the heads of youth with flashy graphics. Although the exhibition received enough attention to run 
out of brochures handed out to inquisitive passersby, Chevalier lamented that the “small 
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exhibition” on “UNESCO aims and activities” in the Library of Foreign Literature was “quite 
pathetic” and unremarkable in the context of the overall festival.198  
The collaboration between UNESCO and Soviet officials in 1957 lay the basis for a 
substantial uptick in Soviet contributions to the organization. In their annual reports for 1958, the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation proudly described how they had boosted the 
number of Soviet citizens studying abroad on UNESCO grants; selected Soviet scholars and 
other specialists to go to dozens of UNESCO conferences, symposia, and seminars; and secured 
acceptance of the “majority” of their proposals at the tenth session of the UNESCO General 
Conference that fall.199 Such statements of satisfaction, however, concealed a growing 
disgruntlement among members of the commission and delegation with their powerlessness not 
only to revolutionize overnight the ponderously bureaucratic, Western-dominated international 
organization into a “progressive” instrument for solving the problems the USSR considered most 
“pressing,” but also to motivate Soviet domestic bodies to respond to the incessant demands of 
the organization.   
Throughout 1957 and 1958, a stream of rejections of Soviet specialists for jobs in the 
UNESCO Secretariat, along with a refusal to publish polemical Soviet articles in UNESCO 
publications, fed a perception in the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation that 
UNESCO conducted a policy of systematic discrimination against the USSR. In light of 
UNESCO’s focus on striking up a dialogue between Asian and European cultures through the 
“East-West” project, the USSR grew progressively angry over the absence of the PRC and the 
presence of Taiwan in the international organization. While UNESCO kept the door open for 
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scholars from mainland China to participate in the project, the USSR repeatedly failed to get 
resolutions passed revoking the status of Taiwan as a UNESCO member state––an action that the 
PRC saw as a precondition for it to contemplate joining the international organization. In 1958, 
the Central Committee went so far as to order the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to notify the 
UNESCO Executive Board in September that the USSR might “reconsider” its membership in 
UNESCO if the organization did not reverse its position on the China issue.200 This 
intensification of the Soviet push to force UNESCO into accepting the PRC as a member state 
coincided with the falling out between Khrushchev and Mao over their personal distaste for each 
other and the more radical path taken by the Chinese as exemplified in the start of the Great Leap 
Forward that year.201 On the level of cultural relations between the two communist powers, the 
deputy head of international affairs of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
politely but firmly overruled the Soviet UNESCO Commission’s plan to include the work of 
Chinese scholars in the “East-West project,” hinting that the USSR should completely abandon 
one of the seminal initiatives of the UNESCO program in the late 1950s.202 Caught between 
seeking common ground with UNESCO and appeasing their hardliner communist ally, the 
Soviet Union found itself in total “isolation” during debates over China in UNESCO and 
privately vented its exasperation that India and other Asian countries, motivated by their own 
quarrels with their communist neighbor, declined to side with the USSR on the China 
question.203  
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Sensing American machinations behind all of these setbacks, Soviet UNESCO 
intermediaries pinned the blame for their lack of progress on the American Director-General 
Evans and placed their hopes for undermining Western control of the organization on ousting 
him in the next election for the top UNESCO post in the fall of 1958. In the course of their 
plotting, Soviet officials learned the convoluted political intrigue and deal making part-and-
parcel to the operations of UN specialized agencies. 
The USSR found a large number of willing partners from across the ideological and 
international spectrum in their attempt to remove Evans from the director-generalship. In his 
five-year tenure, the former librarian of congress and New Dealer from Texas had alienated most 
of the secretariat and the cultural aristocracy of the majority of UNESCO member states by 
abetting McCarthyist investigations into the political leanings of Americans employed by the 
secretariat. As the Soviet UNESCO Delegation developed a picture of how Evans governed the 
international organization, it also got a taste of the seamy underside of UNESCO and how it 
functioned behind the scenes. The off-the-record practices of patronage, careerism, and mud-
slinging of those closely involved in the international organization only confirmed many of their 
preconceptions about the power relations dictating supposedly neutral international organs. In a 
September 1957 article in the London Evening Standard that drew the attention of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission, Foreign Affairs Correspondent Sam White likened Evans’s reign to an 
“eastern monarchy” filled with “sycophants” who had replaced “the top-notch” experts once 
governing the organization. “In Paris,” White explained, “it is well known that UNESCO is 
going through some sort of crisis; that in UNESCO there is widespread antipathy for the 
director-general . . . and that there are allegations directed at him of vanity, nepotism, and a lack 
of initiative.” The British journalist summarized how Evans had enraged UNESCO staff 
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members when he spent a luxurious weekend in a castle outside Paris at the same time that the 
devaluation of the franc set off “a state of alarm and agitation” among UNESCO employees over 
possible cuts to their salaries.204 Ruffling feathers further in the secretariat, the American 
UNESCO boss gratuitously personalized his executive role by distributing to UNESCO workers 
his own newsletter. Funded by the UNESCO budget but prepared by an Australian friend of 
Evans who had no official position in the organization, this “UNESCO House News” featured 
reports about the director-general’s daily work and humorous articles meant to improve the 
“morale” of the secretariat, such as a piece on the “UNESCO cat” that “hung around the 
building.”205  
In addition to alienating his colleagues in the UNESCO bureaucracy, Evans outraged 
important member states other than the Soviet Union. The British and French, for example, 
expressed bewilderment that he signed off on UNESCO sending to Egypt radar equipment as 
part of the emergency educational assistance package following the Suez Crisis.206 More than a 
hint of anti-American elitism and disdain for all things “low-brow” coming out of the US at mid-
century colored much of this resentment of Evans from those invested in this premier 
organization for cultural affairs. European and Soviet officials agonized together over a shared 
fear that, in the hands of Evans, UNESCO might fall victim to the Americanization of European 
life after the war. “I want to put two guns in his hands, then he would be an American cowboy 
and not the UNESCO director-general,” the Spanish representative to the executive board 
confessed to Kemenov. Similarly, their Belgian counterpart on the board disparagingly referred 
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to Evans as the “dude from Texas” in conversation with the Soviet permanent delegate, 
observing that the director-general “lacked culture.” Jean Thomas, the French deputy director-
general, although speaking out on behalf of Evans as one of the only UNESCO officials 
genuinely trying to help the USSR, characterized him as an arrogant American exceptionalist. 
Evans, he reflected, “is convinced that the American way of life is the very best in the world, that 
American politics is the best in the world, etc. In everything Evans is convinced of this in general 
and in advance, as something indisputable, as all Americans believe.”207 
Confident of amassing sufficient support to beat Evans, the Soviet delegation spent over a 
year meeting with dozens of UNESCO powerbrokers and corresponding with Soviet embassies 
around the world in search of a desirable opponent.208 Because American nationals directed three 
UN specialized agencies (UNESCO, ILO, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, or 
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IAEA) and two of the three UNESCO directors-general since 1946 had come from the “Anglo-
Saxon” countries, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation felt entitled to put forward a 
candidate from either the people’s democracies or the Soviet Union. Keenly aware of the 
unlikelihood that a communist would make it through the nomination phase in the executive 
board or the election in the general conference, however, they smartly raised the idea only as a 
means of compelling the Americans to compromise on a nominee from either a European 
country outside NATO or a nonaligned Asian country. Identifying India and Scandinavia as the 
best possible regions from which to select a candidate, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation privately 
endorsed either the Swedish former UNESCO Department Director Alva Myrdal (a renowned 
social scientist, the wife of the famous sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, and a future winner of the 
Nobel Peace Prize for her disarmament activism), or the Indian Dr. Zakir Husain (a member of 
the UNESCO Executive Board who had recently been elected as governor of Bihar province and 
would go on to serve as the third president of India in the late 1960s).209  
After confidants of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation in the UNESCO Secretariat ruled out 
these names since a Scandinavian and an Indian already led two organs in the UN system (UN 
Central in New York and the FAO), the Soviet Union settled on getting behind either the head of 
the higher-education system in France or a longtime UNESCO devotee from Brazil.210 By the 
summer of 1958, these two candidates represented the best alternatives in the face of a new 
threat from a dark horse candidate who represented for Soviet officials an even worse selection 
than Evans. In the late spring and over the summer, Vittorino Veronese, an Italian lawyer, 
diplomat, and current chairman of the UNESCO Executive Board, became the most popular 
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prospective replacement for Evans among noncommunist UNESCO member states. Owing to his 
staunch Catholicism and close ties with the Vatican, the specter of Veronese as director-general 
set off a panic in the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation over a perceived spread of 
influence of Catholics in the international organization. While Veronese had an edge over Evans 
in his total support among member states, the anti-Catholic sentiments expressed by some 
Western secretariat leaders, who suggested in conversations with the Soviet delegation that 
Veronese would not run without the permission of the Vatican, only fueled Soviet fears of a 
Catholic conspiracy to take over UNESCO and other specialized agencies. The Soviet permanent 
delegate also worried that Veronese, who assented to most American proposals as chairman, 
would strengthen the pro-American bent of UNESCO more effectively than Evans given his 
administrative skills and popularity in Western Europe.211 When the executive board met in 
Cologne to coronate a new director-general that September, the “international situation” made 
the entire session unusually tense, not only because of its location in the FRG but also because 
the West Germans had thrown their support behind Veronese. Kemenov, as the Soviet 
representative to the board, portrayed the talks taking place that month between French and 
German leaders Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer over Franco-German cooperation on 
Berlin and European unification as shaping the mood of the meeting.212 To Kemenov’s dismay, a 
further narrowing of the field in the race for the director-generalship left the USSR with no good 
options. After the Brazilian abruptly withdrew his candidacy, Kemenov voted for a Belgian in 
the first two rounds of voting and then a Frenchman in the third. But in the fourth and final 
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round, Evans and Veronese became the frontrunners, with the Italian as the clear favorite. Forced 
to choose between two unacceptable nominees and realizing that Veronese would likely win, 
Kemenov cast his vote for Evans––the man whom the USSR had set out initially to depose at all 
costs. Two months later, however, the general conference confirmed Veronese as the new 
UNESCO chief.213 
For conservative elements in the Soviet apparatus handling UNESCO affairs, the election 
of Veronese symbolized the entrenched Western hegemony within the organization that made the 
Soviet decision to enlist in it a failed experiment from the start. On October 10, three weeks after 
the executive board nominated Veronese, Chairman Zhukov passed along to other commission 
members a “completely secret” and “urgent” memorandum in which he floated the idea of giving 
UNESCO an ultimatum at the upcoming general conference. If the organization did not reverse 
course on banishing Taiwan, he suggested, the USSR would “temporarily suspend” its UNESCO 
membership and payment of its annual dues. Zhukov acknowledged that the “previous boycott of 
this organization” had been “inaccurately construed abroad as a rejection by the Soviet Union of 
international cooperation in science and culture.” He also conceded that Soviet participation in 
UNESCO had “improved the prestige of the USSR in the international arena.” Nevertheless, he 
contended that a variety of “political and financial considerations” had cast doubt on the value of 
the organization. On top of the daily costs of running the commission and delegation, the Soviet 
Union, as the second largest financial contributor to UNESCO behind the United States, 
contributed nearly $2 million annually in 1958 for the UNESCO budget. According to the Soviet 
chairman, about half of this budget went to sustaining the salaries of UNESCO Secretariat 
personnel, the vast majority of whom hailed from Western countries. Since Taiwan did not have 
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to pay its membership dues, Zhukov calculated that another $90,000 of Soviet money given to 
UNESCO helped cover the unofficial debts of what he viewed as an illegitimate member state. 
The rest of the budget financed UNESCO’s “program of activities.” But because the director-
general had the authority to divide these funds among various projects approved by the general 
conference, Zhukov asserted that Veronese would continue the tradition of Evans of using Soviet 
money to publish “anti-Soviet” articles and sponsor “reactionary” NGOs.  
The commission chair also predicted that the financial burden on the Soviet Union would 
become only heavier in the near future. In sessions of the general conference and executive 
board, smaller member states, especially countries receiving technical assistance from UNESCO, 
consistently voted to increase the organization’s budget. At the September session of the 
executive board, for instance, only Franco’s Spain stood with the Soviet representative against 
upping the money pouring into UNESCO’s accounts. The Polish board member, flustered by his 
orders to side with the Soviet Union on such an unpopular move, “stepped out into the hall” in 
order to avoid voting against the will of the overwhelming majority of countries. To save face on 
the world stage while withdrawing from UNESCO, Zhukov believed that the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission should remain intact so as to maintain its contacts with other countries and send 
“observers” to UNESCO events. He also suggested the USSR divert its two-million-dollar 
UNESCO disbursement to bilateral relations with Asian and African countries, which “would 
have an immeasurably larger political effect than spending the same money through UNESCO 
channels.” This reallocation, Zhukov concluded, “would force the countries of Asia and Africa, 
who enjoy the ‘charity’ of UNESCO, to more sharply raise the issue of the lawful rights of the 
PRC in this organization, as well as in other organizations related to the UN.”214  
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On October 25, the Central Committee directed the commission to make a final decision 
on whether to quit UNESCO based on the results of the general conference that November. On 
the eve of the conference, Zhukov publicly lambasted UNESCO for catering to American 
anticommunism in an article for Pravda, “Wither UNESCO?”215 This attack on the organization 
startled UNESCO leaders, who brought it up in meetings with the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
years later.216 The awarding of the Nobel Prize to B. L. Pasternak weeks before the conference 
likely aggravated this apprehension over the prolongation of Soviet membership in an 
international organization enacting a program over which the USSR had little control. After a 
televised roundtable of Nobel Prize laureates on “Man and Scientific and Technical Progress” at 
the 1958 UNESCO General Conference achieved a viewership of 40 million people in Western 
Europe, the commission heard rumors that UNESCO intended to put on a similar roundtable for 
winners of the Nobel Prize for Literature, thereby daring the USSR to bar Pasternak, its only 
recipient of the prize in this genre, from coming.217 
Zhukov’s signaling of a potential Soviet exit from UNESCO met widespread opposition 
from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation as well as other members of the commission. When the 
socialist delegations to the general conference got wind of the deliberations, they issued a strong 
dissenting opinion to the commission and Central Committee. A. N. Kuznetsov, the head of the 
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Soviet delegation to the general conference and deputy chair of the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission, wrote that Zhukov’s article had sparked “animated” discussion not only in the 
UNESCO Secretariat and Western European press, but also at the socialist countries’ 
coordinating meeting for the conference. “The delegations of the USSR, BSSR, Ukrainian SSR 
and other socialist countries,” he stated bluntly to the commission, “expressed the opinion that 
we should not leave UNESCO or suspend membership contributions, and that it is necessary to 
take steps to develop and intensify our work in this organization.” To make the case for the 
USSR staying in UNESCO, Kuznetsov portrayed the proceedings of the general conference as a 
constructive experience. Instead of taking their previous “passive” stance on issues important to 
the Soviet Union, the weakly-developed countries had “bitterly opposed imperialism and 
colonialism” in a way not seen before. The growth in votes in favor of the Soviet position on 
China and the upturn in the number of times the Americans found themselves in the minority 
“clearly” manifested this newfound progressivism. “The exit of the Soviet Union from 
UNESCO,” Kuznetsov maintained, “would leave these countries without support in the face of 
the American bloc.” Moreover, the USSR had secured a standing in UNESCO “better and more 
durable than in any other UN specialized agency.” On top of giving the Americans a chance to 
“increase their influence” in the organization, Soviet abdication of its seat at UNESCO would 
prove a lasting embarrassment for both the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies. “An exit 
from UNESCO would be used by our enemies to organize a smear campaign against the Soviet 
Union,” Kuznetsov anticipated. “Such a step would be completely incomprehensible to Asian 
and African countries and put the socialist countries, which already left UNESCO and returned 
to it again, in an uncomfortable position after an exit by the Soviet Union.” Rather than faulting 
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UNESCO, Kuznetsov reproached the commission for its lackadaisical efforts to force Soviet 
domestic institutions to do their part.218  
In January 1959, commission member Mozhaev rebutted Zhukov in an original and 
groundbreaking Marxist-Leninist analysis framing noncommunist international organizations as a 
positive product of historical evolution. Tracing the advent of this trend in diplomacy and the 
proliferation of international organizations over the previous century, the GKKS official declared 
that multilateral institutions proceeded from the progressive advancement of science and an 
awakening of human consciousness. “The huge increase in the number of international 
organizations and the strengthening of their role in international life,” he theorized, “is a 
reflection of the objective process of the further complication and development of the system of 
international relations, caused by the unprecedented rise of science and technology and the 
enormous growth of the consciousness of peoples.” Moreover, the entry of the USSR into these 
organizations and especially UNESCO, Mozhaev assessed, had made this type of international 
interaction “one of the main forms of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation among 
states with different socioeconomic systems.”  
Mozhaev enumerated the unique benefits international organizations presented to the 
Soviet Union. While bilateral avenues shut down when Cold War crises erupted, international 
organizations extended constant lines of communication. “Every time there is an exacerbation of 
the international situation, our bilateral relations with capitalist countries (especially in the field 
of culture) are greatly reduced or completely eliminated,” he observed, citing the Suez Crisis and 
the Hungarian Revolution. But “cultural exchange through international organizations (UNESCO 
and others) continued during this time.” If certain elements of the “bourgeois intelligentsia” 
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desired to reach out to Soviet “scholarly and cultural figures” but had reservations about doing so 
due to “possible repression by the official powers of their country,” they could resort to 
international organizations. Mozhaev also highlighted three tangible objectives of Soviet 
participation in multilateral bodies: 1) to disseminate Soviet propaganda through the more than 
one thousand publications released by international organizations (which could infiltrate 
countries lacking cultural treaties with the USSR); 2) to “expose” the “reactionary” policies of 
“imperialist states”; and 3) to obtain information on “foreign science, technology, and culture.” 
Yet the USSR, Mozhaev disapprovingly appraised, had overlooked this essential machinery of 
international politics to its own detriment. “It is safe to say,” he lectured, “that there is not one 
category of our foreign policy that is more neglected or poorly controlled than work in 
international organizations. We cannot put up with this situation.”219  
By the spring of 1959, the collective outcry from the rank and file convinced Zhukov, 
MID, and the Central Committee to keep the USSR in UNESCO. Having sold itself as the 
vanguard of peace and internationalism to the world, the Soviet Union could not extricate itself 
from the international organizational system without the risk of becoming irrelevant to the major 
problems communism promised to solve. Notwithstanding the real biases toward the West at the 
core of these institutions, Soviet mezhdunarodniki (internationalists) on the commission and in 
the delegation recognized that a “boycott” of the organization would conger up in international 
public opinion memories of the Stalinist past that most of them regarded as harmful to their 
country’s reputation. Whatever the failures of the UN in mitigating Cold War tension, UNESCO, 
as a symbol of long-term international cooperation, played the normative role of inducing its 
member states to commit to sustaining a minimal degree of international transactions in the fields 
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of education, science, and culture. For the Soviet Union, the need to gain a foothold in the 
burgeoning world of international organizations trumped the expectation that the USSR would 
get any material payoff from the policies of these bodies. By joining UNESCO, the USSR tacitly 
conceded that traditionally Western international organizations were the main vehicles for 
tackling international issues. But just as Marxism-Leninism held that workers would create a 
better society by seizing the means of production developed under capitalism, the commission 
and delegation aspired to undermine Western control of these “bourgeois” international 
organizations in order to remake them for their own purposes. The next section examines how 
the USSR sought to supplant the hidden roots of this Western supremacy where they lay firmly 
planted in the UNESCO bureaucracy.  
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SECTION 2 
 
“NO NEUTRAL MEN”: A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SOVIET INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
SERVANT, 1956-1967 
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In the summer of 1956, Iu. V. Dubinin, the future Soviet ambassador to the United States 
(1986-1990) and official herald to the American public of M. S. Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” 
found himself in a pickle. Content with his first assignment abroad as a low-level functionary at 
the Soviet embassy in Paris, the twenty-six-year-old graduate of the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO) had to come to terms with the possible derailment of his plans 
for a stable career trajectory through the Soviet diplomatic ranks when Moscow abruptly ordered 
him to apply for work as a French-Russian translator in the UNESCO Secretariat. After some 
cajoling from the Soviet ambassador to France, S. A. Vinogradov, Dubinin resolved to fight for 
the job and to show up for UNESCO’s language examinations a stone’s throw away from the 
Arc de Triomphe at the Hotel Majestic on Paris’s Avenue Kléber. Having passed the exams, 
Dubinin met with Émile Delavenay, the director of the UNESCO department overseeing 
translation who had gained international notoriety during the Second World War collecting, 
analyzing, and broadcasting letters from Vichy and occupied France as assistant director of the 
BBC’s European Intelligence Department.220 But when the veteran propagandist informed 
Dubinin that the department had decided to waitlist his candidacy, the discussion erupted into a 
heated argument that ended with the novice Soviet diplomat storming out of the room with a 
sardonic “farewell.”221  
Nevertheless, the intervention of Soviet Permanent Delegate Kemenov forced UNESCO 
to promptly enlist Dubinin. No sooner had he signed on to UNESCO than the international 
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organization sent him to work at the ninth session of the UNESCO General Conference that 
November in New Delhi, India, where Prime Minister Nehru welcomed UNESCO delegates 
from dozens of nations to a city at the center of the burgeoning nonaligned movement.222 But en 
route to the conference, Dubinin and his coworkers literally flew through a hotspot of the bipolar 
geopolitical conflict that both UNESCO and the nonaligned nations aspired to transcend. During 
a late-night pit stop in Cairo, as he whiled away the layover sipping lemonade peddled by 
Sudanese vendors in the airport, Dubinin noticed a throng of European-looking families 
meandering about with “anxious faces” and suitcases in hand. Suddenly, the troupe of UNESCO 
translators heard: “To the plane! Fast! Faster!” Once on board, Dubinin learned that the faces he 
had seen belonged to British and French evacuees. Upon arrival in New Delhi, he also got wind 
that his was the last civilian flight to leave the airport before Western powers bombed it in the 
opening salvos of what the world would come to know as the Suez Crisis.223  
Over the next three years, Dubinin experienced the ambiguous mixture of anxiety, 
alienation, sense of accomplishment, and feelings of international solidarity part-and-parcel to 
the everyday life of a Soviet international civil servant––a breed of Soviet identity peculiar to the 
post-Stalin era. After unexpectedly landing his position in the UNESCO Secretariat, he camped 
out of a Peugeot in the French countryside; mastered the unfamiliar challenge of impromptu 
interpretation; became proficient in the esoteric terminology required for translating the texts of 
international organizations; engaged in battle with UNESCO superiors suspicious of the 
allegiances of their Soviet subordinates; and, on the last night of his stay in Paris, accepted an 
invitation for dinner at the villa of his boss and erstwhile nemesis, Delavenay. As Dubinin 
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remembered forty years later, the two one-time bitter foes departed “as good colleagues, and let 
bygones be bygones.”224  
In the following four chapters, I provide the first case study of the Soviet experience of 
the international civil service. By examining the quotidian routines of Soviet professionals sent 
to work in the UNESCO Secretariat, I offer a picture of the initial, formative decade in which the 
Soviet Union began to develop practices to deal with this novel type of interaction with 
international organizations. The USSR’s campaign to mobilize Soviet specialists from a variety 
of professions to live in Paris and take on the role of international civil servant in UNESCO 
represents a rare example of Soviet citizens not only living in the capitalist West for an extended 
period of time, but also navigating a foreign work environment surrounded by Western 
colleagues and subordinate to Western supervisors. Leaving influential positions and putting on 
hold promising careers at top Soviet institutions, hundreds of Soviet international civil servants 
lived and worked for years at a time at UN organizations during the Cold War. The cream of the 
crop of the Soviet professional class, these Soviet UN employees carried their experiences in this 
setting back home with them as they continued to shape Soviet foreign and domestic policy 
following their tenure in the UN system.   
Having sworn an oath of loyalty to their new employers that they would transcend their 
allegiances to governments or political movements and neutrally serve the interests of the 
international organization alone, these Soviet professionals, along with their non-Soviet 
colleagues, represent an overlooked but consequential group of players on the field of 
international relations during the Cold War. Unlike the diplomats who have taken center stage in 
most histories and journalistic accounts of the UN, but who only sporadically visited the halls of 
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the organization to rattle off prepared speeches or wrangle with UN representatives before 
returning to their respective missions, members of the international civil service toiled day in and 
day out at the headquarters of UN institutions to compose policy proposals for upcoming general 
assemblies or executive councils and to ensure the execution of the resolutions approved by 
member states. Coming from the wide array of countries belonging to the UN constellation of 
international agencies, they did the dirty work and pulled the strings that determined the 
implementation of these organizations’ programs. Because they took on the responsibility to put 
into practice and to flesh out the details of the vague decisions of the better known representative 
organs, secretariat desk jockeys possessed an unparalleled power to shape the course of UN 
action from behind the scenes.225  
Although a very small number of Soviet diplomats worked in the secretariat at UN 
Central in New York before the death of Stalin, concerted efforts to plant Soviet nationals in UN 
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administrations began only after the new leadership in the Kremlin resolved to enroll the Soviet 
Union in the world government’s specialized agencies.226 From the perspective of the post-
Stalinist Soviet leadership, the secretarial nodes of the UN network constituted the real ruling 
class of an international organizational system that obscured its hierarchical structure with a 
façade of democracy designed to legitimize a Western, bourgeois controlled world order. As the 
Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO wrote in 1965, “nearly all questions about the practical 
activity of UNESCO are decided in the bowels of the secretariat and often personally by the 
director-general, while the member states are only informed of the adoption of these 
decisions.”227 Soviet foreign-policy officials therefore judged Soviet infiltration of these civil 
services as the key to establishing influence in, and gaining insider knowledge from, one of the 
primary venues of confrontation in the Cold War.  
Yet the few scholars who have studied the Soviet view of the international civil service 
have dismissively depicted communist authorities as either curiously apathetic to the only 
permanently operating establishments of the UN or simply eager to use them as outposts for 
espionage in light of their auspicious placement in some of the main governing hubs of the 
West.228 While the USSR, along with other states, did exploit the secretariats as convenient 
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covers for its intelligence agents, these authors, who did not have access to Soviet archives and 
who rely on either personal experience or word-of-mouth claims of stereotypical communist 
deviousness, gravely understate the importance Moscow attached to these institutions and fail to 
appreciate the role of international administration in the country’s dialogue with the outside 
world. After all, the disgruntlement that the UN civil service produced in Soviet ministries and 
commissions dealing with UN affairs led to one of Khrushchev’s more infamously unsuccessful 
propositions concerning international organizations––the replacement of the executives of all 
secretariats, from the UN secretary-general to the UNESCO director-general, with “troikas” of 
eminent statesmen from the socialist, neutral, and capitalist blocs.229  
Moreover, an explanation of the vexation of Soviet officials with UN secretariats sheds 
light on a longstanding catch-22 with which Soviet and Russian foreign-policy dignitaries have 
grappled from the inception of the idea of world governance. If Soviet and Russian leaderships 
have long felt compelled to participate in international organizations because their absence 
permitted the West to control the actions of these bodies, their ingrained suspicion that the same 
arenas operated with built-in structural biases toward the West lent these efforts to get involved a 
feeling of futility that undermined Soviet (or Russian) prospects for success in these 
organizations. In short, my study of Soviet international civil servants shows that one of the 
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greatest vulnerabilities in Soviet thinking about the world stemmed from a contradiction between 
the need to become an active player in the international community and a refusal to accept and 
convince its population of the legitimacy of this community’s institutions as impartial 
mechanisms for fair interaction with other states. The necessity of placing Soviet nationals in 
secretariat positions, which required they transcend national and other parochial interests to serve 
an international ideal, clashed with a deeply held belief that the claims of neutrality justifying the 
existence of these personnel amounted to little more than euphemistic language cloaking 
Western dominance. In other words, the implicit and explicit codes of conduct that defined a 
good international civil servant created a work culture that required Soviet employees to 
assimilate values of “neutral” conduct and loyalty to an internationalism that the Soviet state 
perceived as a hostile ideology perpetuating Western hegemony within international 
organizations and, vicariously, the broader international community these organizations claimed 
to represent. As Khrushchev told journalist Walter Lippmann in a 1961 interview, “while there 
are neutral countries, there are no neutral men.”230 At the same time that he voiced this distrust of 
international secretariats, the Soviet first secretary recognized the importance of these offices and 
decided to permit Soviet agencies responsible for the involvement of the USSR in international 
organizations to take the risk of dispatching Soviet citizens to labor under a foreign power 
structure and ethical regime.  
Because the UNESCO Secretariat represented the largest employer of Soviet citizens of 
any of the administrative bodies of the UN’s constituent agencies, and recruited from a wider 
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pool of Soviet cadres because of its broad mandate of science, education, and culture, it offers 
the best means to exhibit how Khrushchev’s desire to weaken Western control of the United 
Nations system put Soviet citizens in problematic situations illustrative of the broader pitfalls the 
Soviet Union faced when challenging the United States and Western Europe on the international 
stage. On the one hand, the USSR expected Soviet secretariat employees to secretly violate the 
rules governing the conduct of international civil servants, maintaining in private an unfailing 
allegiance to, and constant liaison with, the Soviet state and the Communist Party. This entailed 
the devising of an elaborate set of practices geared toward supervising, educating, and policing 
those assigned to the UNESCO Secretariat. On the other hand, in order to achieve the major 
objective of the USSR to rival Western countries in the number of citizens working in the 
secretariat, and as a result gain more control of the machinery of the international organizational 
system, Soviet UNESCO workers paradoxically had to excel in their positions as international 
civil servants in the eyes of Western colleagues by adhering to the code of conduct of the 
international civil service and thereby prove the desirability of future Soviet candidates for 
placement in UNESCO.  
In essence, Soviet international civil servants had to negotiate the jurisdictions of two 
antithetical power structures and ethical regimes––the international civil service and the 
communist state-party apparatus. Furthermore, these two authorities respectively controlled what 
I call the “public” and “private” lives of “sovsotrudniki mezhdunarodnykh organizatsii,” or 
“Soviet employees of international organizations.” To many historians of the Soviet Union and 
the communist world, the use of these two categories as an analytical framework for scrutinizing 
the everyday worlds of individuals living in socialist societies has proven problematic at best. 
Given that this bifurcation of social reality into separate spheres originated in analyses of the rise 
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of classical liberalism and its attendant attributes (“civil society,” “public opinion,” “bourgeois” 
family life, etc.) in Western Europe and North America, many scholars have had to creatively 
manipulate the parameters of this binary to make it applicable to a social order in which, as 
historian Deborah Field has observed of the Khrushchev era in her thoughtful probing of these 
concepts, the “contradictory policies of the Soviet state” at times melded the “public” and 
“private” while at other times “allowed some separation between the two,” making their 
“meanings . . . both intangible and variable during this period.”231 This amorphousness begs the 
question as to whether the distinction bears any relevance at all to communist countries.  
For my purposes, however, the public/private scheme helps to convey the singularity of 
Soviet international civil servants as a genus of “Homo Soveticus.” Although the strict 
opposition of public and private modes of being does not universally correspond to all social 
circumstances that have existed in the modern West, my study benefits from the fact that the 
statutes of the international civil service clearly defined the boundary between and enforced two 
discrete public/official and private/personal spheres in its members’ routine spatial and temporal 
itineraries. In particular, these regulations prohibited those subject to them from allowing 
themselves to manifest any signs of their political, nationalistic, or ideological preferences not 
only in the UNESCO workplace but also in public view generally, relegating these aspects of 
their identities to the private sphere, or to what the social theorist Jeff Weintraub designated as 
that part of life which is “hidden or withdrawn” from the public gaze.232 Since this meant that the 
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Soviet UNESCO Delegation in Paris could not openly exert control over Soviet members of the 
UNESCO staff, and found itself restricted to policing them in the areas of leisure, socializing, 
and domesticity associated with the private sphere of the West, the communist identities of these 
Soviet nationals became personalized, intimate, and consequently more amenable to 
reconception in the absence of the constant intervention by the Soviet state, Communist Party, 
and fellow comrades that occurred in workplaces or other public spaces back home.  
Thus I argue that the lives of Soviet international civil servants demonstrate what 
happens when Soviet “subjects” enter the constructed “bourgeois” division of life into public and 
private spheres. In the 1950s and early 1960s, both of these spheres in the West were shaped by 
the conformist cultural milieu of the postwar white-collar workforce as famously depicted in 
American writer Sloan Wilson’s 1955 novel The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit.233 Investigated at 
length in contemporaneous scholarship such as C. Wright Mills’ 1951 White Collar: The 
American Middle Class or William H. Whyte’s 1956 The Organization Man, the corporate and 
state bureaucracies dominating Western postwar public life created a sense of conformity to a 
“system” or “machine” before the onset of the youth movements of the late 1960s. While Soviet 
responses to the rise of Western consumerism during these decades have long fascinated scholars 
of the post-Stalin era, historians have yet to produce substantive research on how this 
conformity, a less alluring side of Western society than its material products, might temper 
Soviet enchantment with the idea of the West if experienced firsthand.234 Characterized by its 
discontents among the Western intellectual elite as breeding “phonies” and “one-dimensional 
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men” devoid of an authentic individuality, the era’s cultural archetype of the new “company 
man” of the capitalist world accentuated the division of life into a private world of domesticity 
and a public performative persona.235 In the private sphere of the American middle class, for 
example, the historian Elaine Tyler May identifies the policy of “domestic containment,” or the 
fortification of the home as a bulwark against communism, as one of the distinguishing features 
of American society in the 1950s.236 In the public sphere of the 1950s, sociologist Erving 
Goffman highlighted the role of performance in social situations, delineating the “dramaturgical 
problems” constituting mundane forms of social interaction and putting under the limelight the 
“stage craft and stage management” of interpersonal relations.237 The theme of performance as 
an intrinsic aspect of public life similarly surfaced in Western discourse about the communist 
bloc in the 1950s. In his reflections on the “captive minds” of Polish intellectuals who conformed 
to the new communist regime, the Polish émigré and poet Czeslaw Milosz accused his former 
compatriots of “becoming actors” not “on a theater stage, but in the street, office, factory, 
meeting hall, or even the room one lives in.”238    
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The Soviet citizens who worked at UNESCO and lived in Paris experienced a peculiar 
version of this dichotomization of life into a private realm and a public guise. A bureaucracy of 
over 1,000 employees from mostly Western European and North American countries, the 
UNESCO Secretariat obligated Soviet citizens not only to engage in petty politics, social 
intrigue, and careerist calculations, but also to perform as international civil servants and 
conform to the international civil service in the complex public interactions of their workday 
while leaving their Soviet identity at home. Outside of the workplace and in the “Soviet colony” 
centered around the Soviet embassy, these Soviet UNESCO workers were subject to a Soviet 
variant of “domestic containment” designed to shore up their communist loyalties as part of a 
Soviet “family” or collective and fortify them against the corrupting influences of the secretariat 
as well as their broader Western environs in the French capital.  
While other researchers have provided new insight into how Soviet citizens assessed the 
West after episodic contact with it through exhibitions, travel, and material culture, this section 
of my dissertation therefore contains the first assessment of a small group of the Soviet 
professional elite whom the Soviet state more fully immersed in Western society than even the 
most privileged of their fellow countrymen. In contrast to Soviet diplomats, tourists, trade 
representatives, reporters, and technical experts, who when traveling abroad either remained 
largely sequestered in Soviet ambassadorial compounds or visited the West only for limited 
durations under the meticulous watch of their minders, Soviet UNESCO employees, left to their 
own devices outside the Soviet colony in Paris and in the public sphere as international civil 
servants, had to maneuver through a Western work culture and cope with their foreign 
counterparts by independently reinterpreting and elaborating on the mission given to them by the 
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Soviet foreign-relations complex.239 Owing to this public dimension of Soviet secretariat 
members’ time abroad, they present a rare opportunity to showcase the complexity and diversity 
of Soviet reactions to the Western world and how these perspectives depended not so much on 
calculated decisions, but on a wide variety of factors, including the interpersonal or material 
contingencies and power relations at play. 
I take my cue from the “theory of practice” articulated by French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu, focusing on how Soviet international civil servants learned to adapt to their unusual 
position in the UNESCO Secretariat and the impact of this learning process on their views of the 
Soviet Union.240 Instead of couching these opinions as determinations based on rational 
deliberation over the plusses and minuses of the Western world, I concentrate on the ways in 
which Soviet UNESCO workers came to understand as self-evident the norms or expectations of 
the UNESCO bureaucracy not because of a conscious choice to do so, but due to a more basic 
need “to just get by” each day as company men in the UNESCO power structure and ethical 
regime. While on the surface, for instance, the fact that UN Under-Secretary-General Arkadii 
Shevchenko became the highest-ranking official ever to defect from the Soviet Union in the late 
1970s implies that secretariat officials harbored a proclivity to make grand political or moral 
judgments on the USSR, his memoirs suggest that what bothered Shevchenko most was not the 
USSR’s violations of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights, but the more mundane burdens his 
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Soviet bosses put on him that contradicted and disrupted his job as under secretary-general. 
These included making him “act like an idiot at the UN” by “defending a Soviet position while at 
the same time pretending to act objectively” as under secretary-general; do “political work which 
had nothing to do” with his profession as a “diplomat” but which “intruded” into his “personal” 
life; and, “most distasteful of all,” take on the function of acting as a “moral watchdog” over his 
“fellow Soviets in New York.”241 These words convey how Shevchenko’s defection grew out of 
his dissatisfaction with life under the dual power structures and ethical regimes the Soviet state 
had foisted upon him by sending him to work in the UN Secretariat while still holding him 
answerable to Soviet codes of conduct. 
Because of the pressure of balancing these two regimes, however, most Soviet 
international civil servants had decidedly mixed reactions to their time in the West. In reports 
back to Moscow, they expressed sentiments reminiscent of the gripes harbored by Westerners 
alienated from the daily grind of Western middle-class life, including feelings of loneliness, 
anxieties over their material situation, and negative thoughts about their coworkers in the 
secretariat. Indeed, only a tiny handful of Soviet nationals working in UN secretariats defected. 
The vast majority of Soviet UNESCO employees battled through these ups and downs of their 
work and eagerly returned to their homeland upon the expiration of their contract. But 
Shevchenko’s shame over living a lie, along with irritations over the work his Soviet overlords 
had delegated to him, reflects an internalization of the unstated and stated ethics of the 
international civil service that many Soviet secretariat staff underwent through the practice of 
these ethics on a daily basis.  
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Although most Soviet international civil servants consciously preserved their fealty to the 
Soviet cause, I argue that Soviet nationals hired by UNESCO unconsciously absorbed the values 
of the international civil service. The partitioning of their lives into a public performance of 
neutrality as UNESCO company men and a private, personal consciousness of communist 
identity instilled by the Soviet state through clandestine chores–as well as political and leisure 
activities–effectuated a tension between their daily UNESCO tasks, or the broader mission the 
Soviet Union assigned to them of becoming international civil servants, and the requirement that 
they maintain their day-to-day allegiance to the USSR both in their private lives and secretly at 
UNESCO. As long as they could fulfill UNESCO and communist assignments or goals at the 
same time, they held on to an uncontested conviction that they worked as faithful missionaries of 
the communist gospel abroad. However, when their Soviet superiors’ aspirations for control over 
them interfered with their UNESCO work, or when the Soviet Union’s failure to live up to 
UNESCO’s norms of international exchange created obstacles in their work life, these citizens 
developed an increasing frustration with their own government’s practices and its apparent 
weaknesses in playing the game of international cooperation. In the long run, the dispatching of 
Soviet citizens to work in international organizations threatened to spawn a small but influential 
class of Soviet professionals who, while mostly hostile to the West and patriotic as communists, 
gradually grew aware of the shortcomings of their own system and the imperative that the Soviet 
Union accede to the norms dictated by international organizations if it wanted to compete 
internationally. 
Viewed from this perspective, violations of the rules imposed by the Soviet state on 
Soviet international civil servants represented not just acts of individual disobedience but acts of 
conformity to an alternative regime. Instead of treating instances of indiscipline as assertions of 
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individual autonomy by a liberal subject, I show that Soviet UNESCO employees broke the rules 
of the Soviet state out of a necessity to meet the expectations of the international civil service.242 
Similarly, the few defectors among this group cited the norms of the international civil service to 
justify their flight. In the eyes of the members of the Soviet colony whom these deserters left 
behind, their betrayal did not derive from their own personal decision-making. Rather, it revealed 
that they had come under the influence of UNESCO, its ethos, and the shadowy Western forces 
governing the organization. 
I arrange the next four chapters thematically to contribute a multidimensional portrait of 
Soviet international civil servants in their first decade of existence. In chapter 3, I set the stage 
for Soviet entry into the UNESCO Secretariat, tracing the origins and evolution of the concept of 
the international civil service and its ethical regime before 1956 in order to spotlight the main 
rules and ethical code imposed on Soviet UNESCO workers throughout the Cold War. In chapter 
4, I evaluate the Soviet Union’s campaign to undermine the Western domination prevailing at 
UNESCO headquarters, spelling out the hiring methods of the international organization and 
how the Soviet UNESCO Commission tried to mobilize a sufficient supply of qualified 
candidates for secretariat posts back in the USSR. In chapter 5, I proceed to a reconstruction of 
the private lives of Soviet international civil servants, depicting how the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation struggled to police its flock of secretariat officials living in the French capital during 
their time off from UNESCO day jobs. Finally, in chapter 6, I chronicle the conundrums, 
missteps, as well as triumphs Soviet jobholders encountered, committed, and attained in 
UNESCO offices and hallways, selecting examples that speak to the extent to which they 
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assimilated to, or recoiled from, the new mores and power relations they had to contend with in 
their public performances.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BLUE BUREAUCRATS, RED CONSCIENCES: THE LEFF AFFAIR AND THE 
FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT, 1919-1956 
 
As international legal scholar Jacques Lemoine contends, the creation of an international 
civil service represents a novel achievement of the twentieth century. In accordance with the 
great power emphasis on limited cooperation among sovereign, restoration-oriented empires in 
the diplomacy initiated at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, no permanent, international secretarial 
service detached from governmental control existed for administrative needs at the landmark 
diplomatic congresses of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.243 International gatherings 
outside traditional diplomacy in the area of international jurisprudence, including the 1868 
Geneva Conference, the 1874 Brussels Congress, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, 
proceeded without intermediary personnel and thanks to the sponsorship of individual 
governments and private philanthropists.244 Nonetheless, the growing prevalence of 
“conference” diplomacy between the European powers required some degree of enhanced 
coordination of records and communication among participating European countries. 
Consequently, representatives from visiting national delegations began to shoulder the 
secretarial duties of translation, drafting, and serving as rapporteur, while the host country often
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selected one of its diplomats to serve as secretary-general, the impresario of the conference 
tasked with organizing and keeping a common record of the proceedings.245 Additionally, a 
handful of international organizations launched in the latter half of the nineteenth century, such 
as the International Red Cross, the International Telegraph Union, and the International Postal 
Union, although comprising national chapters maintaining limited relations with small, central 
bureaus, in many respects presaged the international civil services of the next century.246  
International affairs scholar Robert S. Jordan argues convincingly, however, that the 
founders of the League of Nations modeled the international administration of this 
intergovernmental body not on these nationally controlled and often purely technical 
international agencies, but on the modes of management of a much more expansive and 
powerful transcontinental behemoth: the British Empire. Originating in what Jordan identifies 
as the presumption that “there should be a bureaucratic cadre of nonpolitical officials who 
would serve whatever ‘government of the day’ the sovereign empowered to rule,” the structure 
and practices of the international secretariat of the League derived from the methods the British 
developed to coordinate wartime policy implementation following the end of the Second Boer 
War (1899-1902) and throughout the First World War.247 As these secretarial functions became 
more influential in their management of state organs responsible for consulting the prime 
minister on wartime operations, the various inter-Allied coordinating agencies set up between 
1914 and 1918 to deal with issues such as wheat supply and maritime transportation adopted 
these secretarial practices, leading to an increasing recognition of the need for secretarial 
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services internationally.  
At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, this wartime experience stood in stark contrast to 
the failures of conference diplomacy in the years preceding the war. Many attendees believed 
that, in the event of an international crisis, having an independent “consultative machinery 
which could serve the needs of all parties, and thus be a ‘neutral’ arena,’” would help prevent 
the breakdown in diplomacy that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.248 Hence, in 
Jordan’s words, a burgeoning British system for “coordinating statecraft,” which arose out of 
"Britain's imperial role in protecting its dominions as well as its colonies, became an important 
contribution to the development of a form of international administration . . . designed to help 
prevent a recurrence of warfare among the industrial states of Europe."249  
If the shape of the League’s secretariat proceeded from the British and Allied 
experiences of concerting the activities of diverse institutions, the particular norms and 
regulations of the new international organization derived from the broader bureaucratic 
practices emerging in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Western European states. Under 
the auspices of its first secretary-general, former British foreign officer Sir Eric Drummond, 
the League’s secretariat developed standards that obligated the newly invented international 
civil servant to conform to organizational principles indistinguishable to those highlighted by 
German sociologist Max Weber as the main aspirations of modern administrative organization 
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in the West. Most importantly for our purposes, the international civil service demanded what 
Weber identified as the separation of “official activity from the sphere of private life,” and “an 
acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office . . . ”––i.e. the “segregation” 
of private interests from the fulfillment of official duties. In the case of the League, the need to 
foster an international workforce disinterestedly carrying out the work of the organization 
meant that the exclusion of “private interests” from the workplace and “fealty” to one’s 
vocation necessitated the sequestration of national, political, and other less universal 
manifestations of identity to the private sphere for the sake of impartial service to the abstract 
concept of an “international community.”250 Article 1 of the League’s Staff Regulations 
enshrined this removal of more parochial affiliations from public international life as one of the 
main commitments of the international civil servant: 
The officials of the secretariat . . . are exclusively international officials and their duties 
are not national, but international . . . . they pledge themselves to discharge their 
functions and to regulate their conduct with the interests of the League alone in view. 
They are subject to the authority of the secretary-general, and are responsible to him in 
the exercise of their functions. . . . They may not seek or receive instructions from any 
government or other authority external to the secretariat of the League of Nations.251 
 
    In other words, the creation of independent international administrations, comprising 
personnel from a variety of countries who worked exclusively for a worldwide organization, 
represented an internationalization of the bureaucratic practices of the modern state. 
Throughout the interwar period, Drummond took on the daunting task of translating 
this idea of allegiance to an abstract notion of the state, which had emerged within national and 
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imperial contexts, into a vehicle for fostering international cooperation in the League’s offices 
for the purposes of implementing policies reflecting the will of a society of nations. In 1931, 
Drummond outlined to prospective British civil servants the achievements of the mechanism he 
had crafted over the previous decade. Growing from a collection of four planners responsible 
for sketching the blueprint of the new bureaucracy in a room on Manchester Square in 1919, to 
a staff of 698 persons representing 43 nationalities operating out of Geneva in 1931, the 
League Secretariat, Drummond explained, consisted of “the majority of ministries which are 
found in a national civil service,” complemented by treasury, translation, and other technical 
sections formed out of the most effective approaches of other “national services.” To dispel the 
myth that, as secretary-general, he directed a conglomeration of nationally segregated divisions 
(“an English, a French, and a German section”), Drummond justified his decision to constitute 
these divisions by specialty, stressing that the “daily collaboration of individuals from various 
contries [sic] and continents has seldom given rise to difficulties, since all are inspired with the 
same spirit and working for the same end.” Additionally, the requirement that these officials 
“serve the League as a whole and not any particular government . . .[had] been admirably 
observed, though for certain mentalities it is difficult, and great care has therefore to be taken 
in the choice of members of the secretariat.”252 
Whatever the failures of the League’s parliamentary and executive branches to prevent 
the spiral of crises of the 1930s and the recommencement of full-blown warfare in 1939, the 
leaders of the League continued to promote this experiment as a remarkable success worthy of 
retention into the postwar era. As the Allies began to turn the tide of the war and looked to the 
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creation of a new international organizational system following victory, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs sponsored a study by Drummond and five other senior League officials on 
the “practical lessons” of their “direct experience of how international machinery works.” The 
group published in 1944 a pamphlet, The International Secretariat of the Future, in which they 
exhorted the Grand Alliance to emulate their endeavor in forging an international civil 
service.253 The great powers tasked with framing the new organization in the fall of that year at 
the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which agreed to incorporate some kind of international civil 
service into the postwar body, left undetermined the exact structure of the administration.254 
While Soviet delegates pressed for a curbing of the secretary-general’s freedom to hire staff 
without consulting member states, introducing proposals at the 1945 San Francisco Conference 
as well as the successive meetings of the UN Preparatory Commission that would mandate 
governmental approval of candidates for positions and lead to the effective nationalization of 
various branches of the UN workforce, the majority of the delegates rejected these measures.255  
In this way, the UN inherited, with slight modifications, the bureaucratic backbone of 
the League of Nations that the Western victors of the First World War had modeled on the 
ideal of a modern apparatus rising above particularistic interests for the sake of a larger 
international political entity. In Chapter XV, Article 100 of the UN Charter, participants in the 
San Francisco Conference continued the League’s precedent of guaranteeing the “international 
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character” of staff for the new international organization.256 Because the Soviet Union before 
1953 eschewed UN specialized agencies, the Western-dominated conferences that founded 
UNESCO and other UN subsidiary organs followed the example of the UN with little 
resistance. Article VI, Paragraph 5 of the UNESCO Charter, which laid out guidelines for the 
creation of the UNESCO Secretariat, contained little more than a rephrasing of Article 1 of the 
League’s 1933 Staff Regulations, replicating the fissure of life as an international civil servant 
into the roles of public internationalist on the job and private citizen with national, political, 
and other identifications off the clock. The Charter also barred any staff, including the director-
general, from acting in the interests of any government.257 
In the heady years after the establishment of UNESCO in 1946, the Western Europeans 
and, to a lesser extent, Americans, who made up the overwhelming majority of UNESCO staff, 
set out to create a workplace in the spirit of the League Secretariat, in which they could 
perform international cooperation on an everyday level as an act of allegiance to the 
internationalist ideals of the UNESCO Charter.258 Dominated by a Western work culture that 
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expected the separation of its employees’ personal political convictions from their official 
duties, the UNESCO Secretariat, as a neutral means of international administration, remained 
untested by the diverse claims for representation that would fill its offices and hallways in the 
decades following decolonization and the end of Stalinist isolationism. Yet the first major 
challenge to this Western ethos of international service emanated not from the Communist East 
or nonaligned South, but from inside the West itself.    
*                 *                 * 
On May 4, 1951, David Neal Leff, an American program specialist working since 1949 
for UNESCO’s Department of Reconstruction, went to the US Consulate in Paris with his wife 
to renew their passports. Instead of performing the perfunctory procedure Leff had grown 
accustomed to that lasted “only a few minutes,” US consular officials interrogated the couple 
separately about their travel outside the United States since birth; forced them to sign affidavits 
of their statements; and explained that approval of renewal of their passports would have to go 
through Washington. Three months later, the US Consul took their passports and “without 
warning locked them in a drawer,” commenting curtly that Leff could retrieve them only when 
his family was “ready to board the boat for the United States.” The consul general also offered 
scant advice. “If my government doesn’t want me to be abroad, I go home,” he told Leff. “My 
advice to you, young man, is to go home.”259  
Unbeknown to Leff, US authorities had confiscated his passport under Article 51.135 of 
the Regulations of the Secretary of State, an amendment made to US passport rules in 
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compliance with the 1950 McCarran Internal Security Act giving the American government the 
right to refuse issuance of a passport, except for return to the United States, to persons accused 
of supporting the “world communist movement.”260 Left in the dark about the accusations 
levied against him, Leff continued to urge UNESCO officials to ascertain possible remedies to 
his situation. His Israeli boss, Dr. Jacob Zuckerman, who on a business trip to New York could 
only infer from the terse responses of State Department officials that Leff could do “little or 
nothing” to retrieve the passports, warned him not to “jeopardize” the UNESCO Department of 
Reconstruction “by risking the notoriety of further action.”261 
Irrespective of the allegations against Leff, his pedigree before joining UNESCO had 
made him ripe for the “world communist movement.” Born in New York City in 1918, Leff 
received his bachelor’s degree in history and journalism from Stanford University in 1939.262 
Fresh out of college in the final years of the Great Depression, the twenty-two-year-old 
witnessed firsthand the destructive potential and ruthless inhumanity many at the time 
interpreted as the inevitable seeds of a dying capitalist system’s decay. As a “case review 
supervisor” for the Migratory Labor Program of the US Department of Agriculture from 1940 
to 1942, he “certified destitute farm families as eligible for federal aid” in Arizona and 
California, ensuring “uniform application of relief criteria” while training staff for “camp and 
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relief office administration” in a region inundated by thousands of poverty-stricken “Okies” 
from the Dust Bowl who had migrated west throughout the 1930s. Leff then moved from 
supervising aid for Uncle Sam to overseeing and collaborating in an act of ethnic cleansing 
perpetrated by the US government. For six months in 1942, he worked as chief of the Reports 
and Procedure Section for the Japanese Evacuation Program of the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA). In this position, he “was ordered by the War Department to handle the 
agricultural phases of evacuating some 125,000 Japanese from the Pacific Coast,” 
implementing “procedures for registering and reassigning the lands of Japanese farmers” and 
writing the final report on this operation for the secretary of war. Following this rapid 
population transfer in the name of national security, Leff traveled to Mexico, where from 1942 
to 1943 he assisted the FSA in the launching of the “Mexican Labor Importation Program” 
(Bracero Program), a mobilization of cheap Mexican labor for exploitation in support of the 
American war effort. “As a wartime labor supply measure,” Leff later explained, “the United 
States imported under contract several hundred thousand Mexican laborers to work as farm 
hands and railroad track workers.” His assignment included the setting up of the recruiting 
center in Mexico City, where he “interviewed, examined, fingerprinted, X-rayed, 
photographed, signed up and ticketed” prospective laborers and later served as “chief escort for 
many of the special trains” taking them north.263 
  After these expeditions among the impoverished and persecuted masses of American 
society, Leff transitioned to another phase of his career that not only endowed him with the 
arcane knowhow and qualifications requisite for a UNESCO functionary, but also introduced 
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him to a country where communists acted as national saviors. Presumably impressed with his 
quick accumulation of experience in handling and administering aid to uprooted peoples, the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the US Department of State recruited 
Leff to come to Washington in 1943 as an associate divisional assistant preparing draft 
resolutions for the upcoming Atlantic City Conference for the establishment of UNRRA. 
Following brief stints in the secretariat of this conference and as a designer of the original 
UNRRA staff manual and “‘passport,’” Leff enrolled in a “special UNRRA field training 
course” on the Balkans at the University of Maryland in 1944. Within months, the new 
reconstruction organization shipped him off to Cairo, Egypt, and Bari, Italy, as part of the 
“advance party” of the UNRRA Yugoslav mission. Attached to the military-liaison team that 
entered Yugoslavia before the UNRRA mission, Leff took on the post of field observer in 
1945, making surveys of the economic situation in Dalmatia and Montenegro, but soon left for 
an appointment as a public relations officer “sending despatches [sic] in ‘journalese’” to 
UNRRA headquarters. In light of his apparent talent in this respect, the Belgrade UNRRA 
Mission hired him as assistant director of public information to educate Yugoslavians and “the 
people of the world” on the “plight and needs of a war-devastated country, and what UNRRA 
was doing about it.” In this capacity, Leff not only composed visual, audio and print materials, 
including a “multi-panel pictorial exhibit” that traveled around Yugoslavia and Europe, but 
also continued to produce numerous field surveys on Displaced Persons (DPs) and “famine 
situations.” These surveys undoubtedly forced him to deal with, and recognize the allure of, J. 
B. Tito’s partisans. Finally, in order to raise awareness among his fellow Americans of 
UNRRA relief efforts, Leff finished his time with the organization on a lecture tour of the 
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United States in 1946.264  
Thus, over the course of seven short years, Leff had served the US Department of 
Agriculture, the US Department of State, and the UN––three institutions all closely connected 
in American public opinion with two of the most famous suspected American communists of 
the postwar Red Scare: Henry A. Wallace (US Department of Agriculture) and Alger Hiss (US 
Department of State and the UN). Yet regardless of this extensive background working with 
the victims of capitalism and subsequently their self-proclaimed liberators in Eastern Europe, 
and despite his justifiable apprehension as an American national living abroad without a valid 
identification, Leff had good reason to believe that his career at UNESCO would remain 
beyond the grasp of American authorities no matter what political beliefs he adhered to in his 
private life. When he came to Paris of his own volition a mere two years before his passport 
problems and applied for a position in UNESCO, had the organization not “cleared him 
verbally” with the US Delegation?265 At any rate, since he had taken the international civil 
servant’s oath of allegiance to UNESCO, relinquishing under threat of disciplinary action any 
responsibilities to governments or interests outside of the international organization, what 
business did the American legal system have in investigating his personal convictions or the 
work he conducted in the service of the international community? And because his superiors at 
UNESCO had also sworn to govern with the interests of the organization alone in mind, how 
could they, legally and in good conscience, succumb to any government pressure to purge him 
and other members of an international workforce meant to transcend the national interests of its 
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265 Although the American government in the 1940s did not have the same security procedures it would later set up 
for American citizens, UNESCO officials often sought approval for American candidates as a measure of good faith. 
A written note in Leff’s personnel file confirms the US Delegation cleared him upon appointment: “Untitled 
Attachement to Application of David N. Leff,” 1949, AG 8: Personnel Records: David N. Leff, UNESCO Archives. 
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member states?  
 Unfortunately for Leff, events taking place at the same time across the Atlantic Ocean 
undermined any such assumptions of protection he may have entertained. Because of the 
instrumental role New Dealers played in the founding of the UN and the internationalist 
ideology the new organization preached, isolationist and anticommunist activists in the US 
Congress and the American public had long suspected that UN headquarters in Manhattan 
functioned as an outpost for Soviet espionage and communist activity on American soil. In 
1949, as the fear of an expanding communist world order intensified following Mao Zedong’s 
ascent to power in China and the USSR’s first test of an atomic bomb, the trials of Alger Hiss, 
who had presided over the 1945 UN Conference in San Francisco as secretary-general, and the 
arrest of accused spy Judith Coplon at a rendezvous with a Soviet UN Secretariat official, V. 
A. Gubichev, further convinced anticommunist crusaders in the US government that the UN 
served as a safe haven for communist elements operating under the cover of the international 
civil service.266 Facing an increasingly hostile host government and eager to uphold the 
reputation of the organization, the Norwegian Trygve Lie, as the first UN secretary-general, 
along with his assistant secretary-general for administrative and financial services, the 
American Byron Price, set up that same year an information-sharing liaison with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department in order to receive security clearance 
for candidates applying to work in the UN administration––a practice that would later expand 
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to all US nationals employed by the organization in New York.267  
Over the next four years, Lie purged US citizens from the UN administration with the 
justification that communist associations and political convictions fell into a special category of 
private persuasion that threatened the neutral public identities of these officials. During the 
early 1950s, with the UN backing the Western push to destroy communist forces on the Korean 
peninsula, the secretary-general fired a handful of UN workers on temporary contracts who, 
according to the intelligence of American authorities, posed a security risk to the United States. 
In late 1952 and early 1953, a grand jury convened by Roy Cohn (the famous legal guru of the 
McCarthy era), as well as a series of hearings of the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the 
US Senate Judiciary Committee, called for testimony a group of American nationals working 
in the UN Secretariat, many of whom refused under the fifth amendment to answer questions in 
relation to “past or present membership in the Communist Party.” In response, Lie terminated 
the contracts of these employees on the grounds that, notwithstanding an international civil 
servant’s right to “private personal opinions and beliefs,” he or she had a “clear obligation 
under the Charter and Staff Regulations to take no part in any activity, either open or secret, 
aimed at subverting or overthrowing a member government.” In addition, he stressed the 
importance in his decision of “the fact that the United States is the host country to the 
permanent headquarters,” arguing that these citizens’ silence before American investigators 
had “cast unjustified suspicion upon their fellow staff members” and imperiled  “the position of 
the whole organization in the host country.”268 In this manner, Lie rejected accusations that he 
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268 Lie made these statements before the Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly on 
March 10, 1953. Trygve Lie, “The Personnel Policy of the United Nations: Text of the Secretary-General’s 
Statement Before the Resumed Seventh Session of the General Assembly” (United Nations, Department of Public 
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had violated his oath as an international civil servant in bowing to the pressures of a 
government, characterizing his actions as a special case in which the interests of the 
organization aligned with the need to maintain good relations with its host country by 
abstaining from abetting individuals supposedly subversive to that country.  
The seizure of Leff’s passport inaugurated the expansion overseas to UN specialized 
agencies of this hunt for communists working in the UN system, but was also colored by a 
deep-seated animosity among the American public toward UNESCO in particular. Although 
located outside of the United States and therefore exempt from accusations of operating as a 
front for communist activity on American territory, UNESCO’s ideological mission of 
promoting internationalist sentiments of mutual understanding and exchange of peoples in the 
perennially contested spheres of education, science, and culture, made it the most vulnerable of 
all the specialized agencies to attacks from those fearful of the “one-world” and “globalist” 
aspirations understood as the underpinnings of the UN project. Historian Anthony Q. Hazard 
describes how, in the early 1950s, this disdain for UNESCO among the American public 
spurred congressmen, the press, and conservative civic groups, such as the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, to activate a sustained nationwide campaign to stymy the penetration of 
UNESCO ideology into American intellectual life and institutions. In 1953, for example, 
public pressure from disgruntled parents and the press succeeded in compelling the Los 
Angeles school board to ban all UNESCO materials and events from city schools in response 
to outrage over the usage of UNESCO publications to instill “international understanding” in 
students.269 The perception that UNESCO acted as a bullhorn for agitators of a hybrid 
movement of communist “one-worlders” only intensified American suspicions of the small 
                                                     
269 Hazard, Postwar Anti-Racism, 64–76. 
 166 
clique of US nationals working for the organization. 
The combination of these ingrained misgivings and the US government’s interest in 
weeding out all Americans with dubious connections embedded in the UN drove the expansion 
of the so-called “loyalty investigations” from their original focus in New York to specialized 
agencies in Geneva and Paris. In order to obviate a more radical bill introduced in December 
1952 by US Senator Patrick McCarran that required all American international civil servants to 
obtain clearance from the government or face imprisonment and fines, President Harry S. 
Truman, eleven days before leaving office, signed Executive Order 10422 on January 9, 
1953.270  In effect, this decree extended to all American UN officials the same elaborate regime 
of security clearances and background checks Truman had set up for federal workers after the 
formation of the Federal Employee Loyalty Program in the weeks before the president’s 
enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947.271 Secretary-General Lie responded to the 
new order by allowing American authorities to use the international territory of UN 
headquarters for fingerprinting and investigating UN workers. Meanwhile, on February 6, 
1953, the US permanent delegate to UNESCO, Charles A. Thomson, sent all American 
UNESCO employees, including Leff, a stack of forms to complete in a week’s time that 
included directions for submission of fingerprints to the US Consulate, along with questions 
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concerning possible membership in the almost 200 organizations, ranging from the Abraham 
Lincoln Brigade to the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Attorney General Tom C. 
Clark classified in 1947 as “totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive.”272  
The United States took advantage of its place as the largest contributor to the budgets of 
UN specialized agencies to compel them to force their employees to do the paperwork 
prescribed under Executive Order 10422. On February 20, US Assistant Secretary of State 
John Hickerson alerted the American acting director-general of UNESCO, John W. Taylor, 
that “continued support” of UN organizations by the United States could not “be assured” 
without “full cooperation of all the heads of the specialized agencies” in the ongoing cases, 
adding that the State Department expected the termination of the contracts of US citizens 
“demonstrated to be or likely to be engaged in subversive activities.”273 Days later, the head of 
the UNESCO Bureau of Personnel and Management (BPM), William Farr, advised all 
Americans under his purview that not submitting the forms “may prejudice their reputation and 
cause embarrassment and damage to the organization,” but refrained from intimidating 
UNESCO employees with outright dismissal.274 The UNESCO rank-and-file resisted this push 
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to dictate the personnel policies of the UN system in violation of the stipulations in the 
UNESCO Charter that forbade the director-general from acquiescing to “instructions from any 
government” and the contrivance by a member state to “seek to influence [UNESCO staff] in 
the discharge of their duties.”275 While one American UN employee outside UNESCO refused 
to fill in the documents, Leff and two other US citizens turned a deaf ear to appeals of the US 
and the director-general to hand in the questionnaire, making UNESCO a focal point of 
American anticommunist attention and ire.276   
Having failed to coerce Leff to “board the boat” home and corral him into completing 
through correspondence an application originally intended for its own personnel, the US 
government changed tactics, introducing formal legal procedures to coax Leff into divulging 
his political orientation. In April 1953, a special grand jury, which was formed in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York earlier that year to investigate US 
nationals working in the secretariats of the UN system, summoned Leff to testify in person on 
May 21 in relation to alleged “‘conspiracy to commit offence or to defraud the United States,” 
making him the first person in US history to receive a subpoena from a grand jury abroad.277 
After Leff declined to show up in New York because of concerns American immigration 
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services would not let him return without a passport to his family and workplace in Paris, 
Director-General Taylor suspended Leff with pay pending the results of a UNESCO 
investigation, citing Staff Regulation 1.4 and Staff Rule 92 that empowered him to discipline 
subordinates for “conduct incompatible” with the responsibilities of a UNESCO employee.278 
However, on July 28, the UNESCO Appeals Board, a judiciary committee responsible for 
oversight of administrative compliance with UNESCO regulations, nullified this decision and 
reinstated Leff. Since the grand jury had not indicted Leff for a specific crime and abstained 
from making their summons compulsory by imposing a penalty on him for not appearing, the 
board found no “prima facie evidence” of any kind of “serious misconduct.”279  
The favorable ruling of the UNESCO Appeals Board did not mark the end of Leff’s 
headaches, but the beginning of a second phase in which the exacerbation of his tribulations 
stemmed in large part from the election that summer of Luther Evans to replace Taylor as 
director-general. As soon as Leff returned to work, Evans, expressing his disagreement with 
the UNESCO Appeals Board decision, proposed that UNESCO transfer him along with his 
position and family to New York so he could testify before the grand jury without losing his 
job. Rejecting this offer on the principle that UNESCO had no business intervening in “purely 
personal matters between a citizen and his government,” Leff argued in an “interview” with the 
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director-general on August 3 that the organization had picked up where US officials had left 
off by persecuting him for his absence before the grand jury even though the US had not 
reacted with punitive action. He emphasized that the administration’s desire to dispatch him to 
New York, while solving the problem of separation from his family, represented a violation of 
his “contractual rights” to obtain a “stable pattern” of employment alongside “congenial” 
associates and at a location where he desired to “build a useful life-work.” Furthermore, 
because he helped run the UNESCO Gift Coupon Program in Paris, a project coordinated by 
UNESCO but managed by national commissions in member states, the relocation of his 
position in this specialty to the United States meant the placement of him under the auspices of 
the State Department’s National Commission for UNESCO. In essence, Evans wanted to 
reassign Leff outside of UNESCO and into the clutches of the member state seeking to end his 
career.280  
Although Evans reassured Leff that his proposition stood as purely “voluntary” in 
nature, he implied to other UNESCO staff that Leff remained vulnerable to dismissal if he 
refused. At the same time, the director-general persisted throughout the fall of 1953 to pressure 
Leff to accept his recommendation as an adequate solution to his predicament. According to 
members of the UNESCO Staff Association (STA) present on behalf of Leff at his interview, 
Evans became “very angry” and responded to objections with “strong, and even abusive, 
terms,” advising his employee that “he would consider as evidence of diminished integrity any 
attempt by Leff to ‘quibble’ over small changes” to the description of his duties after leaving 
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for New York.281 Discounting Leff’s move to assuage the UNESCO leadership by asking the 
organization to request that the grand jury convene in Paris, Evans informed Leff on December 
3 that he had resolved to move unilaterally, now ordering Leff to prepare by December 17 to 
leave for New York with the threat of termination.282 Four months later, the UNESCO Appeals 
Board annulled Evans’ instructions, but the US government intervened again in direct response 
to the board’s repeated successes in interrupting Evans’ actions.283 On March 11, Judge Henry 
W. Goddard of the Southern District of New York ordered Leff to show cause before the court 
on March 25 as to the reasons the judge should not hold Leff in contempt for not responding to 
the subpoena issued the year before. As a result, Evans instructed him in a letter dated March 
22 to adhere to the court’s command. After Leff disobeyed the court’s injunction to show up on 
the aforementioned date, Judge Goddard signed a bench warrant authorizing the US district 
marshal to arrest Leff. 284 On March 31, Senator McCarran introduced an unsuccessful bill to 
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Congress that would punish noncompliance with a call for testimony before a grand jury with 
forfeiture of American citizenship.285 Auspiciously for Leff, however, the Staff Association 
convinced the director-general to agree to wait to dismiss Leff until the judge had considered a 
cross-motion filed by his attorneys to cancel the warrant based on the fact that, since the Walsh 
Act of 1926 that permitted the serving of subpoenas to witnesses outside of US borders only 
pertained to subpoenas related to court trials, the grand jury had no jurisdiction over Leff.286  
Meanwhile, yet another branch of the elaborate American congressional and judicial 
apparatus concocted to deal with alleged communists set its sights on Leff. In the summer of 
1953, President Eisenhower, as an amendment to Truman’s Executive Order 10422, 
institutionalized the American government’s hunt for American international civil servants in 
the form of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board (IOELB).287 This board 
sent Leff an “interrogatory form” in March 1954 and invited him to voluntarily appear before it 
at the American embassy in Paris that July. After Leff refused to grace the IOELB with his 
presence for reasons of conscience and fear of inadvertently committing perjury, the board 
notified Evans that they had “reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of David Neal Leff.”288 As a 
                                                     
285 S. 3230, 83rd Cong. (1954), March 31, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 
1953-1957, UNESCO Archives; and “Congressional Record-Senate: Statement by Senator McCarran [copy],” 
March 31, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. 
  
286 Leonard B. Boudin, “Notice of Cross-Motion, United States of America v. David Neal Leff, United States 
District Court, Southern District of New York,” April 6, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires 
américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. April 6 1954: According to Leff, his lawyer “opposed the contempt 
citation on the basic legal ground that the law (Walsh Act of 1926) which provides for the subpoenaing of witnesses 
outside the territory of the United States applies only to court trials and not to Grand Jury investigations. In fact, the 
subpoena served on me was the first Grand Jury subpoena in American history ever served abroad”: David N. Leff, 
“Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights,” 2. 
 
287 The State Department offered a detailed explanation to Executive Order 10459, which created the Loyalty Board 
for international civil servants. John Foster Dulles’ name appears at the bottom of it, but it is unclear whether he 
wrote it or merely authorized it: Department of State, Unclassified Verbatim Text, June 22, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 
Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. 
 
288 See the second ruling of the ILO Administrative Tribunal: International Labour Organization Administrative 
Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the matter of Mr. David N. 
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result, Evans forewarned Leff that he would not renew his contract upon expiry––a decision 
once again overruled by the UNESCO Appeals Board two months later with the rationale that 
Leff’s nonattendance did not “constitute a lack of integrity or a violation of the obligations 
defined in the existing Staff Rules and Regulations”.289 In the meantime, the ILO 
Administrative Tribunal, a judiciary branch of the ILO charged with legal questions involving 
international civil servants in the UN, upheld in September the overruling by the UNESCO 
Appeals Board of Evans’ attempt to deliver Leff to New York in December 1953, while also 
castigating his threats of dismissal after the show cause notice in March 1954.290  
Notwithstanding these setbacks, Evans persevered in his uncompromising posture 
toward Americans he believed had comported themselves insubordinately. On December 10 
1954 (Human Rights Day), the director-general utilized the broader powers recently bestowed 
on him by the UNESCO General Conference in Montevideo to suspend Leff and six other 
members of the secretariat for displaying a lack of “integrity” in their conduct as international 
civil servants in rebuffing the overtures of the IOELB that July.291 As Leff resorted to the by 
now familiar route of appeal to the ILO Administrative Tribunal, US District Judge Sylvester 
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289 For a summary of Leff’s experience with UNESCO in relation to the IOELB, see the Appeals Board decision: H. 
Puget, “Appeals Board Case Nos. 18, 19, and 20,” November 2, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 
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IOELB leading up to the July hearings: “Resume of Legal Advice from the Staff Association Lawyers Concerning 
the Visit of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board to Europe,” July 1, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 
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290 “International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of August-September 1954, 
Sitting of 6 September 1954, Judgment No. 15 in the Matter of Mr. David Leff.” 
291 “UNESCO Staff Association Press Release: UNESCO Staff Association Protests Measures Taken Against Seven 
Colleagues,” December 11, 1954, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957: S.A. 
P/R 2, UNESCO Archives. The following report of the UNESCO Staff Association contains a thorough overview of 
the broader powers granted to the director-general at the General Conference in Montevideo: “Staff Association: 
Extraordinary Session of the Staff Assembly, Monday 20 December 1954 at 5 p.m. Report of Executive Committee 
(Item 2 of Proposed Agenda),” December 20, 1954, AG 10: STA 2.1/2 Documents de l’Association, Circulaires, 
Comptes-rendus, Rapports, STA 259-611, 1954-1957: St.AC/362, UNESCO Archives. 
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Ryan dismissed the contempt proceedings of the previous year because a specific court order 
had to authorize a subpoena given abroad and include travel expenses.292  
Over the next two years, Leff wandered through a Kafkaesque maze of successful 
appeals and ensuing countermeasures thrown at him by the office of the director-general and 
the American legal system. In April 1955, the ILO Administrative Tribunal rejected the 
reasoning behind Evans’s choice not to renew the contracts of Leff and other US nationals, but 
in May Leff received another subpoena from the grand jury.293 In October 1956, the UNESCO 
Executive Board lost its bid at the Hague International Court of Justice to abrogate the findings 
of the ILO Administrative Tribunal, but Evans insisted that reinstatement of Leff remained 
“inadvisable” and opted instead to pay him an indemnity. Unable to return to his country of 
origin and trapped in France without a passport, Leff vowed to fight on.294   
*                 *                 * 
                                                     
292 While the judge cited these reasons when he dismissed the contempt charge, Leff notes that other political events 
may have also played a role. In a letter written to the president of the UNESCO Staff Association, Leff notes that 
Roy Cohn, the creator of the Grand Jury and an aide to Senator McCarthy who gained notoriety for initiating much 
of the anti-communist persecutions of the early 1950s, had recently been “implicated in the confession of false 
evidence on the part of one Harvey Matusow.” Such accusations would soon lead to Cohn’s downfall. Anecdotally, 
Leff also claimed that Cohn tried to visit him in Paris in April 1953: David N. Leff, “Letter to Pierre Henquet, 
President, UNESCO Staff Association,” February 10, 1955, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires 
américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. 
 
293 “International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 
1955, Judgment No. 18 in the matter of Mr. David N. Leff”; Jacques Mercier, “The Independence of International 
Officials in the Judgments of the Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation,” 6–8; and David N. Leff, 
"Letter to Corliss Lamont, Committee for the Defense of the Bill of Rights.” 
 
294 Significantly, not only the USSR but also the French and British representatives to the Executive Board voted 
against the appeal of the ILO Administrative Tribunal’s ruling. This conveys the relatively isolated position of the 
US among its western allies in this hunt for communists in the international civil service: Jacques Mercier, “The 
Independence of International Officials in the Judgments of the Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation,” 
13–14. For the Hague Advisory Opinion, see: “I.C.J. Communique No. 56/17 (unofficial),” October 23, 1956, AG 
10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. For Evans’ refusal to 
rehire Leff and offer of indemnity,  as well as Leff’s promise to fight on, see: David N. Leff, “Letter to Colleagues,” 
December 13, 1956, AG 10: STA 3/5 Dossiers 9.4 à 9.7 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. 
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In the years immediately preceding the inception of efforts in the USSR to mobilize 
Soviet citizens to work in international organizations on an unprecedented scale, the so-called 
UN “loyalty” investigations of Leff and other UN officials sparked an intense debate that 
contested, clarified, and eventually reinforced the boundaries demarcating the realm in which an 
official had the right to a private, political life, on the one hand, and the reasonable outer limits 
of the public, neutral personae international organizations expected their employee to maintain, 
on the other. The question of Leff’s status in UNESCO became a major crucible of the viability 
of fostering an apolitical “esprit de corps” among employees of international organizations from 
diverse political and national backgrounds, out of which the norms of conduct imposed on the 
lives of Soviet international civil servants throughout the Cold War emerged. 
The conflicting viewpoints driving the controversy over whether Leff had violated the 
norms of conduct incumbent on an international civil servant revolved around competing 
interpretations of UNESCO Staff Regulation 1.4, which both Taylor and Evans had cited in 
their multiple decisions to discipline Leff. The regulation mandated in Weberian fashion a 
public loyalty to the interests of the office and a relegation of the proclivities arising from 
personal identity to a sphere outside the public gaze, emphasizing that “members of the 
secretariat shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner consonant with the good repute 
and high purposes of the organization” by abstaining from “activity that is incompatible with 
the proper discharge of their duties.” This included “any action, and in particular any kind of 
public pronouncement, which would adversely reflect upon their status.” While the regulation 
underscored that UNESCO personnel did not have to “give up religious or political convictions 
or national sentiments,” it also delimited the sanctioned space for political action to a private 
sphere that could not encroach on the international civil servant’s role as a neutral cog of the 
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international organizational machinery, stressing that employees should “at all times exercise 
the reserve and tact incumbent upon them by reason of their international responsibilities.”295 
The root of disagreement during the loyalty investigations resided in three ambiguities in this 
statute: the definition of “private” as opposed to “public” political participation; doubt over 
whether communism, as a uniquely revolutionary, totalizing ideology, could remain confined 
to a private world without inevitably culminating in public subversion; and the extent to which 
the director-general had the power to determine the answers to the latter two questions on the 
basis of one UNESCO member state’s designations of acceptable political affiliations.  
The UNESCO director-generalship asserted that the resistance of Leff and his colleagues 
to revealing their political inclinations through testimony amounted to a public act that 
threatened to “adversely reflect upon their status” as UNESCO functionaries and, vicariously, the 
reputation of the organization. Repeatedly denying that measures taken against Leff amounted to 
a violation of his own pledge to work solely for the good of UNESCO, Evans insisted that his 
imperative that Leff cooperate with US authorities had no relation to “‘McCarthyism, 
witchhunting [sic] or political persecution.’”296 Even though US authorities had not accused Leff 
of a violation of the law until 1954, the director-general characterized Leff’s refusal to testify as 
“a serious matter which can gravely damage the prestige and reputation of the organization,” 
implying that the United States’ expectation that UNESCO officials fulfill their duties as citizens 
of their respective countries aligned with the interests of the organization to have publicly 
                                                     
295 I quote Staff Regulation 1.4 from: “International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session 
of April 1955, Sitting of 26 April 1955, Judgment No. 18 in the Matter of Mr. David N. Leff,” 16. 
 
296 Quoted from: President, Staff Association, “Letter to Head, Bureau of Personnel and Management,” April 15, 
1954, 1, AG 10: STA 3/4 Dossiers 9.1 à 9.3 Fonctionnaires américains, 1953-1957, UNESCO Archives. 
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responsible and reputable individuals in its employ.297 Thus, UNESCO officials averred that their 
qualms with Leff did not derive from his political beliefs in isolation, but from his willful, 
publicized defiance of the legal system of a UNESCO member state. 
The machinations Evans resorted to for the purpose of garnering sufficient authority to 
get rid of Leff, however, show that the director-general wanted to diminish the scope of, and 
exert more control over, opportunities for his subordinates to engage in politics outside the 
workplace and thereby expunge communism from the ranks of the organization. At the eighth 
session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1954, Evans managed to secure the adoption of 
an amendment to the staff regulations that disallowed all political activity with the exception of 
voting.298 This regulation clearly targeted communism, the bête noire hanging over the 
conference, as a marginalized mode of political involvement that, unlike the mainstream parties 
dominating American electoral politics, relied heavily on a wide array of agitation tactics, such 
as meetings, rallies, demonstrations, the circulation of literature, etc. The assumption that 
communism exacted the total commitment of its followers, and hence subversion of all other 
duties, implicitly motivated this whittling down of permitted politics to the confines of the voting 
booth.  
The director-general also pushed through an amendment that permitted him to punish 
Leff retroactively on the basis of his personal political history. The prosecutor responsible for 
Leff’s show-cause order claimed the fixation on Leff grew out of a 1946 report in a communist 
                                                     
297 Quoted from a letter submitted for Evans during the first hearing at the ILO Administrative Tribunal. 
“International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal: Ordinary Session of August-September 1954, Sitting 
of 6 September 1954, Judgment No. 15 in the Matter of Mr. David Leff,” 3. 
 
298 The exact wording of the amendment: “Staff members may exercise the right to vote but shall not engage in any 
political activity which is inconsistent with or reflects upon the independence and impartiality required by their 
status as international civil servants.”  “Records of the General Conference, Eighth Session, Montevideo, 1954: 
Resolutions” (UNESCO, 1955), 19, UNESDOC. 
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newspaper, The People’s World, on “a reception in Mr. Leff’s honor sponsored by the American 
Committee for Yugoslav Relief.” The attorney general had placed this committee on his list of 
“subversive” organizations a year after Leff made this fateful visit in his official capacity as an 
UNRRA representative on a lecture tour in 1946.299 To strengthen his actions against Leff, Evans 
succeeded in gaining the power to fire a member of the UNESCO Secretariat “if facts anterior to 
the appointment of the staff member and relevant to his suitability and which reflect on his 
present integrity come to light” that would have prevented hiring in the first place.300  
In short, UNESCO officials maneuvered to exert the organization’s formal regimen of 
control over the entirety of their employees lives, to diminish the range of political identities 
UNESCO employees harbored in their private lives and pasts with the goal of appeasing the 
anticommunist bellicosity gripping the US government.  
In contrast, the leaders of the UNESCO Staff Association and its umbrella, the Federation 
of International Civil Servants’ Associations (FICSA), struggled to uphold the divide between 
the public neutrality of the international civil servant and his or her right to a private life of 
political freedom. The STA not only afforded emotional and philosophical solidarity with Leff 
through the passing of resolutions expressing opposition to the loyalty investigations, but also 
allotted financial and logistical assistance through a “special fund” and the arrangement of his 
legal services in New York and Europe.301 More importantly, the STA and FICSA leaderships 
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formulated thoughtful and vigorous defenses of the UNESCO employee’s ability to lead a 
multidimensional political life without violating the neutralizing norms regimenting his or her 
public behavior. The STA took issue with Evans’s moves to aggrandize power in the months 
before the 1954 Montevideo Conference, depicting the director-general’s utilization of nebulous 
language, especially the word “integrity,” as an imprecise standard of conduct that endowed the 
director-general with inordinate leeway in choosing to dismiss an employee. Warning against 
attaching any kind of “political connotation” to the concept of integrity, “since it is almost 
impossible to determine at what point the participation of a staff member in some national 
political activity becomes inconsistent with his obligations as an international civil servant,” the 
two unions called for a strict definition of the term that condemned only comportment deemed 
“morally reprehensible and punished by law.”302 In response to the resolution reducing the 
UNESCO employee’s political life to suffrage, the STA underscored the prerogative of its 
members to retain a full spectrum of “interdependent” national civic obligations outside the 
office, including freedom of association as “one of the fundamental human and democratic 
rights.” From their perspective, the mere act of voting had “no great significance unless it is 
preceded by a process of enquiry which may be carried out, for instance, in connexion with 
affiliation to a legally constituted political party.”303 
                                                     
302 Noting that “integrity” had different nuances in meaning in English and French, the two working languages of 
UNESCO, the STA and FICSA argued against the use of this word as a means of determining loyalty in an 
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303 Ibid., 4–5. 
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After advocating for the buttressing of an inviolable nonpublic domain in which the 
international civil servant as a citizen enjoyed the classic liberal freedom of alignment of thought 
and action with particularistic interests, the STA reiterated the sacrosanctity of the public 
neutrality of the international civil servant. But “the problem,” they explained, resided in the 
need to “strike a balance between . . . the need to form an independent and impartial international 
secretariat and . . . the desire to respect the interests of staff members who have a right not to be 
cut off from their national political heritage.” As a “solution,” FICSA and the STA rejected rules 
against concrete political activity, arguing instead for reliance in designating misbehavior on the 
passage in Staff Regulation 1.4 that obligated UNESCO staff to act with the “tact and reserve 
incumbent on international civil servants.”304 This proposal simultaneously upheld the 
international civil servant as a personification of impartial international administration and 
exonerated Leff of accusations that he had displayed a lack of integrity that infringed on his 
public role. It put the onus on the UNESCO employee to avoid the deliberate enunciation of 
political convictions in the workplace and in the public eye, but also justified and even endorsed 
the alleged misconduct that had compelled the director-general to go after Leff in the first place: 
the persistent avoidance of succumbing to the McCarthyist imperative that he confess his 
political beliefs.  
In their opinions in favor of Leff, the ILO Administrative Tribunal concurred with the 
definition the STA advanced in its writings on the case, constructing for the future international 
civil service a dichotomous ideal of its staff members as both liberal civil subjects and abstract 
public servants deprived of the right to openly express political perspectives or flaunt evidence of 
their sociocultural habitus. In the second hearing of Leff’s case in April 1955 concerning the 
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question of whether the director-general had acted in the interests of the organization in not 
renewing the contracts of American nationals, the ILO Administrative Tribunal declared that the 
regulations “clearly” provided for “the entire freedom of conscience . . . in respect of both 
[UNESCO employees’] philosophical convictions and their political opinions,” but also enforced 
“the duty to abstain from all acts capable of being interpreted as associating them with 
propaganda or militant proselytism in any sense whatever.”305 This implied that international 
civil servants could hold political views and associations provided they bar these influences from 
dictating their primary public identities or interfere with official tasks.  
Significantly, the tribunal also suggested that Evans, not Leff, had gravely undermined 
the independence of the UNESCO Secretariat in his response to the affair. “It will suffice to 
realise,” the judges observed, in the event that another of  “the seventy-two states and 
governments involved in the defendant organization brought against . . . one of its citizens, an 
accusation of disloyalty and claimed to subject him to an enquiry in similar or analogous 
conditions,” the position Evans took set a “precedent obliging him to lend his assistance to such 
enquiry and . . . invoke the same disciplinary or statutory consequences, the same withdrawal of 
confidence, on the basis of any opposal by the person concerned to the action of his national 
government.” Thus, if Evans aided the United States in its persecution of Leff and his American 
colleagues, he had also to abet all member states with equal rights under the UNESCO Charter in 
their exercise of similar means of control over citizens. This hypothetical meant that, “in matters 
touching on conscience,” international employees would work in “a state of uncertainty and 
insecurity prejudicial to the performance of their duties” likely to “provoke disturbances in the 
international administration such as cannot be imagined to have been the intention of those who 
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drew up the constitution of the defendant organization.”306 The court’s identification of Evans as 
the principle source of the challenge to the international civil service simply conferred official 
sanction to a feeling widely shared in the international secretariats of the UN. By bowing to the 
wishes of the Americans, the director-general opened up a Pandora’s box of claims on nationals 
in the secretariat from governments with all types of sordid histories of heavy handed oppression 
and transgression of international law. As Evans’s own man tasked with personnel policy, Farr, 
explained to Leff in 1953, UNESCO was “worried stiff about the possibility of other member 
states using this subpoena method to withdraw their nationals, but probably would not cooperate 
if such regimes as the Spanish, Egyptian or South African tried it.”307  
The composition of the ideal international civil servant expressed in the ILO Tribunal 
rulings informed the philosophy, values, and expectations constituting the work culture of the 
international secretariats of the UN for decades to come. In 1954, the International Civil Service 
Advisory Board (ICSAB) reinforced and nuanced these formulations in its seminal Report on 
Standards of Conduct in International Civil Service, a foundational text that, as Lemoine wrote 
in the early 1990s, “remains a classic which still today guides the international official” and “is 
given to each new official on appointment” in the UN system.308 Instead of discouraging the 
preservation of “political views or national characteristics,” ICSAB argued that “the highest type 
of loyal international civil servant” could possess both public neutrality and private predilections 
by placing “international obligations” before his or her own interests, adding that staff could 
accept this prioritization more easily if they comprehended that, “from the long-range point of 
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view,” national and other interests “can only be served by the promotion of world peace and 
prosperity and the successful progress of the international organizations toward these 
objectives.”309 Moreover, the job of the international civil servant presupposed that its occupant 
internalize a regimen of self-censorship and regulation of behavior, to “keep himself under the 
strictest observation.” Far from needing to “be a neuter in the sense that he has to have no 
sympathies or antipathies,” the ICSAB report continued, a functionary of the UN system had to 
“be fully aware of the human reactions and meticulously check himself so that they are not 
permitted to influence his actions.”310 In terms of distinct activities, this entailed abstention from 
certain “public manifestations” of political inclinations, such as running for, or holding, office; 
the expression of political views in speeches or the press; involvement in a “political campaign 
committee” or finance; and petitioning.311      
The United States imposed a clearance process on US citizens applying for spots in 
international organizations into the 1980s.312 Yet the “waning zeal” of American investigators, 
the legal chastening of Evans, and the election to the post of secretary-general in 1953 of Dag 
Hammarskjöld, who for the most part rejected Lie’s obedience to the US government, 
guaranteed that the ILO Administrative Tribunal and the ICSAB report gained supremacy in 
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fostering the work culture and outlining the role of the international civil servant.313 In the case 
of UNESCO and other UN specialized agencies outside the United States, the overabundance of 
Western European officials, who had little sympathy for American zealotry and often came to 
UNESCO because of a strong devotion to the internationalist ideal, bolstered this conception of 
the international civil servant as the quintessential standard foisted on all members of the 
secretariat throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  
For Leff, regrettably, the reinvigoration of the principles safeguarding his career came too 
little too late. A sacrificial lamb to the internationalist project, he had no option but to choose 
between the ideological sides of a conflict poised to tear the UN ideal to shreds. In March 1957, 
Leff telephoned Kemenov, the Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO, who arranged a meeting 
for Leff and his wife with the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. Describing how 
their political evolution made them “convinced of the aggressive intentions of American 
imperialism,” the couple recounted, in the first secretary’s words, their lifelong “active 
participation in progressive social activities” and resolve to “devote themselves to the struggle 
for peace, friendship among peoples, and the best ideals of the American people.” Yet in a clear 
indication that the US investigations had accomplished little more than radicalizing their victims, 
Leff told his Soviet interviewer that his “final worldview” had not cemented until “the bitter 
struggle against the State Department and its agent, Luther Evans.”314 While he assured the first 
secretary that he could “calmly answer the questions posed by the ‘American secret police’ 
[okhranka],” Leff nevertheless reasoned that, if he returned to the United States to continue the 
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battle, “he would not consider himself worthy to bear the name of a man, since in this case he 
would have bargained with his conscience” by capitulating to his persecutors. “Today's America 
is bleak,” Leff went on, “and the clouds of a surging reaction are threatening its future, but I 
believe, as does my wife, that not long from now, when the people of the USA understand the 
reactionary essence of American imperialism, neither McCarthy, nor Dulles, nor their imitators 
will hold out.” When that time came, he predicted, his country would need “people who could 
lead the fight for the best ideals of mankind, and who were ready to do anything in the name of 
those ideals.” In anticipation of this future, Leff explained that he had come to the delegation 
confident that his “single hope” lay in seeking, “for this current phase, political asylum in the 
Soviet Union, so that we can prepare there for the coming fight for a free, socialist America.”315  
The Soviet UNESCO Delegation, remarking on the passion with which Leff presented 
his case and the couple’s “ideological-theoretical preparation,” sent Leff’s asylum application to 
the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, who passed it along to MID and the Central 
Committee with a request for advice on the matter. After months of unanswered reminders, the 
Soviet UNESCO Delegation grew impatient and in October advised the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and MID that the Leff family, as members of the American Communist Party, 
found themselves in a “difficult situation.” Since Leff now worked for a private company that 
wanted him to travel, he faced the prospect of once again losing his job due to his inability to 
obtain a passport. Even worse, because US authorities had scheduled a new trial for him on 
November 24, the delegation and Leff both feared he faced “deportation from France and 
imprisonment.”316 At last, Leff managed to relocate to Prague in 1959 after accepting an 
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“invitation” from the Czechoslovakian UNESCO Commission to “undertake a long-term 
research project.”317 Once settled down in his new socialist environs, he took on odd jobs 
meeting Western visitors and translating Czech scientific writings, but soon became a radio 
personality and editor for the North American Service of Radio Prague.318 One source claims 
that he “was first to relay in English the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia” over the airwaves 
during the 1968 Prague Spring. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Leff 
rejoined the West, serving as an editor for Bioworld, an American periodical covering 
innovations in the health sciences. He died in 2004.319 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IN SEARCH OF “SOVSOTRUDNIKI”: UNESCO RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND 
SOVIET MOBILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS 
 
As Leff voyaged east, Soviet specialists headed west to take up the foreign vocation of 
international civil servant. Before the USSR could effectively use the international civil service 
to bend UNESCO in its favor, the Soviet UNESCO Commission had to identify experts from 
Soviet educational and cultural organs capable of getting into the specialized agency. The Soviet 
Union’s rejection of these organizations before 1953 gave Western countries carte blanche to 
staff the UN with their own nationals and reach overwhelming numerical superiority in their 
secretariats. Under Stalin, the USSR did not have a single citizen in any of the secretariats of the 
UN specialized agencies and only a small number at UN headquarters.320 Beginning in 1955, the 
Kremlin mobilized Soviet human resources in the hope of reaching parity with the West in its 
share of citizens staffing UNESCO and other UN administrations. Yet the USSR had to grapple 
with a number of mechanisms built into UNESCO’s bureaucratic machinery that reproduced the 
preponderance of Westerners in the international organization.  
A major facet of this ingrained Western dominance arose out of the UNESCO 
leadership’s goal of reconciling a high turnover rate among its staff with the need to cultivate a 
group of permanent workers invested in the organization. Similar to other Western European 
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postwar international organizations, including the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), the Western European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the personnel policies of the UNESCO Secretariat consisted of a contradictory 
hybridity of an American style of recruitment and a European administrative system. For its 
hiring practices, UNESCO drew on the “American job principle,” relying on an open, 
competition-driven application process for positions that required specializations in the fields of 
education, science, and culture. These posts usually took the form of isolated assignments with 
renewable but short-term, multiyear contracts. This situation led to frequent hunts for 
replacements for people who had left their careers to serve as UNESCO officials. At the same 
time that it adopted this method of recruitment, however, UNESCO adhered to a variant of the 
“continental European notion of a career service,” designed to accrue staff capable of developing 
a general knowledge of the intricacies of international organizations in order to enable them to 
don multiple hats over time and thereby accumulate the qualifications and experience necessary 
to make a career out of service in UNESCO. To foster this stable workforce, UNESCO extended 
to successful temporary employees “permanent contracts,” which promised a career trajectory 
and path for promotion through the UNESCO ranks from P-1 to P-5, or even a D-1 or D-2 slot as 
department director.321 
These techniques of recruitment and retention produced two strata of international civil 
servants within the UNESCO Secretariat. On the one hand, the “American” principle forced the 
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Commission de la carrière Documents, 1960-1963, UNESCO Archives. 
 189 
secretariat to fill positions of professionals who, having come to the organization on what 
amounted to extended sabbaticals from their primary careers, served only temporarily. On the 
other hand, UNESCO’s use of the “European” model of civil service yielded an entrenched 
cohort of Western bureaucrats who, having for the most part cut their administrative teeth on the 
global stage in other international organizations or Western European colonial services, made 
their careers and reached the heights of both informal and formal power within the UNESCO 
Secretariat.322 This permanent class of officials, the majority of whom joined the organization in 
its early days or at its inception, conceived of themselves as veteran insiders embodying the 
institutional knowledge that preserved the organization’s “esprit de corps” and work culture.323  
These Western Europeans and Americans dominated the secretariat’s leadership and held 
a monopoly of permanent contracts long after the USSR joined UNESCO. Because the Soviet 
Union, in fear of ideological contamination, forbade its citizens to live abroad for more than five 
years, Soviet prospective appointees, rarely able to ascend to this upper echelon of UNESCO 
society, looked to the temporary directorships and posts left open by those transients hired under 
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the “American principle.”324 But in 1959, up to 60 percent of UNESCO officials held permanent 
contracts.325 In 1962, permanent-contract holders increased to 65 percent of the 1,058 posts in 
UNESCO, leaving only 37 vacated temporary spots for the Soviet Union to procure that year.326 
As a result, both the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation perceived permanent 
contracts as “the main obstacle for improving the representation of socialist as well as neutral 
countries,” castigating them for turning “the UNESCO Secretariat into a kind of ‘retirement 
home’ [pensionnyi dom] for an entire caste of ‘international civil servants’––émigrés mainly 
from England and France.”327 The farther up the secretariat hierarchy Soviet officials looked, the 
more they came to regard permanent contracts as the key to Western rule over UNESCO. In the 
opinion of V. A. Kovda, the Soviet director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences 
during the first half of the 1960s, the UNESCO “higher-ups” (verkhushka) consisted of a “group 
of friends who, after ten to twelve years of working together,” had “essentially become a clique” 
pursuing their own interests in the international organization. “The principle of a permanent 
contract for UNESCO cadres,” he continued, “is a very great evil.” Because workers on these 
contracts “are guaranteed a high salary” and “a large pension in the future,” they had “no real 
incentive to actively work for the benefit of UNESCO member states.” Kovda also concluded 
that, “due to this principle, it is almost completely impossible to free the UNESCO apparatus 
from parasitical and harmful elements.”328 K. M. Pushkov, the lone Soviet specialist in the 
UNESCO department charged with hiring (the Bureau of Personnel and Management, or BPM) 
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in the early 1960s, cast the careerism UNESCO fostered in its staff as the fruit of a capitalist 
mindset pervading the organization. “Any refusal of requests for an increase in rank,” he 
observed of his Western colleagues in a report to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1960, “is 
seen as a personal insult, an infringement on the ‘natural’ desire of people to receive more . . . 
since . . . in accordance with their bourgeois, selfish psychology, there is no distinction made 
between private enterprise and the international organization.”329  
In an attempt to bridge the chasm between the number of UNESCO officials hailing 
from the West and those from the socialist or rapidly decolonizing regions of the globe, BPM 
complemented the American and European forms of administration with an affirmative action 
dimension known as “geographical distribution,” which gave member states target quotas of 
positions. Based largely on the proportions of member states’ financial contributions to 
UNESCO, this quota system worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union as the second largest 
contributor to the organization behind the United States. Seeking to assure that all governments 
had the chance to send at least one of their nationals to work in UNESCO, BPM sought to 
increase staff from “underrepresented” and “nonrepresented” member states while gradually 
reducing the number of persons from “overrepresented” member states. But because 
geographical distribution showed preference only to Soviet employees fitting the idiosyncratic 
profile of a given job, it did little to mollify the USSR’s feelings of disenfranchisement. By 
way of example, the Soviet UNESCO Commission received in October 1960 a description of a 
low-level opening as program assistant in the UNESCO Department of Education requiring 
“knowledge of, and practical experience in primary education and primary school teacher-
training in more than one country; acquaintance with primary education developments in Asian 
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countries; administrative experience in an international organization,” as well as “good 
knowledge of English or French, and a working knowledge of the other language.”330 As this 
chapter will illustrate, the search for a Soviet citizen with these attributes proved difficult.  
To strike a balance between the demand for specialized expertise, equitable 
representation of member states, and the cultivation of a corps of officials with knowledge of the 
workings of international organizations, BPM set up a convoluted series of stages of selection 
with different levels of criteria emphasizing all three needs. While this procedure lent a degree of 
entitlement to countries such as the USSR bereft of a sufficient presence in the secretariat, it also 
gave antecedence to those already working in Western-dominated international organizations and 
persons with skills and professional experience widespread in the West but rare in the socialist 
bloc. When a vacancy appeared in the secretariat, UNESCO posted a job advertisement in the 
UNESCO building and subsequently sent a notice to UNESCO regional centers, other UN 
specialized agencies, and the national commissions of underrepresented or nonrepresented 
member states with a deadline of three months to apply. Although this order of notification 
allowed the Soviet Union and other states under their quota to act before the overrepresented 
countries in Europe and North America, if the director of the department containing the position 
favored a specific UNESCO employee, the director-general had the power to give priority to 
those already initiated in the UN club by limiting the circulation of this information to other 
specialized agencies or UNESCO headquarters, where the announcement would be posted for 
five to seven days before broader dissemination.331 After the three-month deadline to submit 
applications passed, BPM sorted the applications into the following groups, again giving 
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preference to applicants from the UNESCO community: A) candidates already employed by 
UNESCO; B) nominees selected by member-state governments; C) persons who apply without 
“consultation” with their governments; and D) previously rejected applicants.332  
Once BPM completed its sorting task, it forwarded all applications to the hiring 
department, which made a recommendation for a single candidate or a shortlist of those most 
suitable to a personnel committee. On paper this committee comprised up to twenty members of 
various nationalities, but it actually had a strong majority of Westerners. According to a 1962 
report by the Soviet UNESCO Commission, eight years after the USSR joined UNESCO, and 
two years following the influx of newly decolonized African countries, “two Americans, two 
Englishmen, two Indians, three Frenchmen, and only one Soviet person” composed the 
committee. This ad-hoc group approved the final candidate based on five measures: 1) education; 
2) language ability; 3) experience in specialization; 4) experience in international organizations; 
and 5) geographical distribution. Although the fifth measure leveled the playing field, the second 
and fourth measures tilted the competition back in the other direction. The second benchmark, 
aiming to ensure that all candidates could communicate in English and French (the two “working 
languages” used daily in the organization), marginalized those from outside the “Anglo-Saxon” 
world and Francophonie, granting supremacy to native English and French speakers while 
making other languages second-class vernaculars. Similarly, because no Soviet citizen, apart 
from the sprinkling of people already working in the UN, had experience in international 
organizations, the fourth measure counteracted the efforts of the USSR to expand its number of 
UNESCO staff members.  
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The committee then submitted its recommendation to the director-general, who could still 
unilaterally appoint someone of his own choosing. In this manner, the process depended on the 
whim of an office occupied by an American from 1953 to 1958, an Italian from 1958 to 1961, 
and a Frenchman from 1961 to 1974. In the words of a Soviet official in BPM in 1962, the USSR 
felt that its “political opponents” controlled “a bureaucratic machine” in which, “for all the 
seeming democracy in the selection of candidates, the real master is the director-general, who 
has the last word in the appointment of any employee.”333  
In addition to these structural prejudices in UNESCO’s approach to recruitment, the mere 
fact that UNESCO and other specialized agencies placed their headquarters in Western Europe 
granted a leg-up in the application process to those already living in, and accustomed to, Western 
European social, cultural, and political environs. As a matter of logistics, it made sense to hire 
Western Europeans in certain situations. Because the USSR and other member states considered 
it impractical for financial reasons to dispatch personnel to Paris for clerical and technical 
UNESCO occupations, local French citizens filled the vast majority of UNESCO jobs as typists, 
secretaries, watchmen, receptionists, and custodians. In the opinion of the UNESCO leadership, 
this use of local manpower seemed self-evident. In the suspicious minds of the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation, French domination of these seemingly mundane functions enabled Westerners to 
control the everyday operations of the organization. If a Soviet employee needed a memo 
transcribed, a letter delivered, or trash emptied, he or she relied on personnel whose foreignness 
made them suspected spies. In a 1964 letter to S. K. Romanovskii, the chair of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission at the time, Soviet UNESCO and embassy officials advanced a desperate 
and partially successful proposal to use the wives of Soviet UNESCO officials for these tasks, 
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complaining conspiratorially that the existing situation allowed the French, and vicariously the 
French director-general, René Maheu, “to control practically all activity of any employee of the 
UNESCO Secretariat.”334 The mounting unease over the influence of the French in UNESCO 
also led P. I. Ershov, the Soviet deputy director-general of UNESCO from 1960 to 1964, to press 
the Soviet permanent delegate in 1962 to propose moving the international organization to “a 
neutral country (Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna)” in order to cleanse it of the “direct moral and 
psychological influence of being in Paris” and in close proximity to NATO headquarters.335 
Likewise, the UNESCO leadership worried that the USSR conspired to infiltrate its organization 
with communist propagandists and intelligence agents. In the spring of 1958, Director-General 
Evans outraged his Soviet counterparts when he declined to hire the engineer S. A. Shumovskii 
for the directorship of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences after the American Look 
magazine exposed Shumovskii’s role in the 1930s as a Soviet intelligence operative who 
groomed spies in the American aeronautical industry from his base at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT).336 UNESCO departments also balked at hiring Soviet professionals who 
had worked or studied at institutions considered too closely affiliated with the Communist Party. 
In 1964, senior UNESCO officials fought against the appointment of a nominee to serve in the 
UNESCO Department of Social Sciences for the simple reason that he had graduated from the 
                                                     
334 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 133-34; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, l. 124. The hesitancy to send lower-level 
“technical” workers to Paris reflected the broader policy of the Soviet embassy in Paris to avoid employing Soviet 
citizens as chauffeurs and typists. This arose from the perceived deficit (among these less educated Soviet citizens) 
of knowledge of foreign language and political training. For a discussion of this issue at the Soviet embassy in 1965, 
see the minutes of the meeting of diplomatic personnel that August: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 232-36.  
 
335 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 134. NATO was forced to move the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) from its home outside of Paris to Brussels, Belgium, in 1967. 
 
336 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 106-10; 130-33; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, ll. 124-29. For a brief discussion 
of Shumovskii’s place in the history of Soviet espionage in the United States, see: John Earl Haynes and Harvey 
Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 50. 
 196 
Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, which the director of the UNESCO 
Department of Social Sciences characterized as a school for “party propagandists.”337 
Far from operating on neutral ground, as the status of UN buildings as “international 
territory” would suggest, the hiring proclivities of UNESCO and other UN recruiters bore strong 
imprints of the social networks, cultural expectations, and political circumstances of the locales 
of these international organizations. Socially, an “old boy” network stretched out beyond the 
walls of UNESCO to UN specialized agencies in Geneva, Rome, and Vienna, creating a situation 
in which UN employees alerted each other to vacancies or hired longtime acquaintances from the 
small world of international organizations before scoping out newcomers. For example, in 
August 1957, Dubinin and one of his Soviet colleagues informed the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation that their boss in the UNESCO Russian Translation Section, the “white émigré” 
André Salomon, had suggested they work as adjunct Russian interpreters in the founding 
conference of the IAEA in Vienna that October. But without consultation with the USSR as an 
obviously interested party and the largest pool of native Russian speakers, conference planners 
chose another émigré, the head of the UN European Office’s Russian Translation Section in 
Geneva, to oversee Russian translation at the conference. Further enraging and confusing Soviet 
officials, Salomon later revoked his offer to transfer the two Soviet translators to the conference, 
explaining that its organizers planned to find translators among the émigré community in Vienna. 
Complaining to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that Salomon had “become quite active in 
notifying Russian émigrés living in Paris of opportunities for employment in Vienna,” Dubinin 
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warned of “a danger existing from the first days of the new agency that the Russian Translation 
Section will be staffed mainly by émigrés.”338  
Soviet promoters of candidacies had to learn what personal characteristics Western 
recruiters found desirable in prospective international civil servants. In 1960, a Soviet employee 
of the European Division of the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported 
to Moscow in a memorandum–which then circulated among all agencies dealing with the UN–
that the executive director of UNICEF, the American Maurice Pate, had dismissively referred to 
one Soviet applicant as a “sleepy librarian,” hinting that the organization would reject her on the 
basis of affability irrespective of her qualifications. The Soviet UNICEF official advised Soviet 
agencies to avoid including such people on lists of candidacies in the future: “An element of 
‘personality’ [lichnost’],” he explained, “has a large role in the positive decision of the question 
of acceptance for work in UN secretariats, i.e. the personal appeal to foreigners of this or that 
candidate, his erudition, experience, etc.”339 
At UNESCO regional centers outside of France, Soviet success in acquiring positions 
depended on the vicissitudes of Cold War bilateral relations and Western European politics. For 
the first seven years of Soviet participation in UNESCO, members of the secretariat, with an eye 
toward maintaining the international organization’s relations with West Germany, obstructed 
Soviet efforts to station its pedagogical specialists in UNESCO’s three major educational 
institutes. As Leo Fernig, an expat South African acting as deputy director of the UNESCO 
Department of Education, explained to a Soviet UNESCO employee in 1958, a small circle of 
UNESCO officials (whom he referred to as “little men believing they are conducting grand 
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policy”) had undermined the nongovernmental status of these institutions by citing the West 
German government’s potential negative reaction when denying requests from the Youth 
Institute to send a Soviet representative.340 At last, the Gauting Institute managed to make the 
vice president of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations a member of its governing board 
in 1960.341  
The UNESCO leadership did take some steps to place Soviet citizens in their 
administration in the years immediately after the USSR joined UNESCO. From 1956 to the 
beginning of 1958, the director-general reserved openings for Soviet citizens provided that they 
had the necessary linguistic, administrative, and specialized skills. In the summer of 1956, 
Malcolm Adiseshiah, a UNESCO assistant director-general and renowned Indian education 
specialist, visited Moscow to personally evaluate candidates for senior and low-level spots 
considered opportune for Soviet specialists. But in its initial bids to proffer people corresponding 
to UNESCO’s high standards, the nascent Soviet apparatus presented to UNESCO blatantly 
unqualified candidates who made a negative impression on the organization’s leadership. In 
conversation with the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Adiseshiah claimed that “in the UNESCO 
Secretariat it was felt that one could not take candidates proposed by the USSR seriously” since 
“not a single one” of the nearly thirty Soviet applicants under consideration in 1956 “matched 
the description of the vacant position.” To prove his point, he noted the offering of a Soviet 
orientalist (vostokoved) as director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences.342 At the 
same time, many Soviet applicants eventually hired by UNESCO only exacerbated the 
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organization’s disinclination to look to the socialist country for labor when they showed up for 
work months after their planned start date on account of the copious red tape involved in 
obtaining Soviet exit visas.343 
The few early successful Soviet aspirants usually possessed an amalgam of foreign-
language capability, sociability, and experience in administering large bureaucracies that focused 
on narrow educational, scientific, or cultural fields. For example, in 1957 UNESCO recruiters 
chose T. A. Beliaeva, the head of the Exchange and Acquisitions Department of the Lenin State 
Library in Moscow, as chief librarian at the UNESCO library on the first floor of its 
headquarters. After having interviewed Beliaeva on behalf of UNESCO, a UN technical 
assistance recruitment officer traveling through Moscow described her as a “very likeable, 
cultivated and pleasant person,” remarking favorably on her twenty years of experience at the 
Lenin Library and responsibility for managing 110 staff members divided among six sections. 
Although she declared “herself not to be an expert in bibliography” and could communicate in 
English only “hesitantly,” the recruitment officer stressed Beliaeva’s fluency in French and 
predicted she would “become a good staff member within three months’ time.”344 Nonetheless, 
the selection of Beliaeva resulted from a deliberate skirting of the application process that 
UNESCO performed only as a brief act of favoritism toward the USSR. While BPM advertised 
the librarian post “in the house,” it chose to mention it confidentially to the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation before alerting other member states and consciously passed over an assistant 
UNESCO librarian who they deemed equally qualified for the job.345  
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Despite Beliaeva’s success story, UNESCO department directors sometimes had to fire or 
transfer some of the Soviet hopefuls given preferential treatment in the late 1950s because of 
their lack of qualifications needed for a job. In 1957, the director of the UNESCO Department of 
Program and Budget hired a Soviet national for a post but quickly decided not to renew his 
contract because “he did not have the necessary preparation in the area of budgets and finances 
for the performance of his duties.”346 This embarrassing early termination occurred in spite of the 
fact that the director knew of the Soviet employee’s deficiencies before taking him on as a 
subordinate. This suggests that senior UNESCO staff pressured departments to forego proper 
vetting of Soviet candidates’ professional background.347 Owing to “insufficiencies” on the part 
of a flood of Soviet candidates in language capabilities as well as experience in administration 
and international organizations, the picture remained dim for the USSR throughout much of the 
1950s. As Adiseshiah bluntly remarked in 1957 to the Soviet side concerning a recent vacancy, 
UNESCO needed a “miracle” to pick a Soviet national.348 
For Soviet participants in conferences and other UNESCO activities, the sparseness of 
Soviet international civil servants created the overall impression that the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation had utterly failed to fulfill their mandate. On March 31, 1960, N. A. 
Figurovskii, the director of the AN SSSR Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and 
Technology, after traveling to Paris for the first session of an editorial committee for one of 
UNESCO’s reports on scientific research, presented the Central Committee with a laundry list of 
complaints about “the very small number of Soviet people in the UNESCO apparatus” and the 
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USSR’s overall “insufficient use of the opportunities of international cooperation” that the 
international organization had to offer. Embarrassed by this assessment of their work, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission rebutted Figurovskii’s conclusions in a note to the Central Committee, 
pointing out that he had not only been speaking from a position of ignorance (given that he 
incorrectly stated that the USSR had “only one man” in UNESCO), but also underestimated the 
“difficulties” they faced finding candidates who fit the job description for a vacant office.349  
Beginning in 1958 when the USSR Council of Ministers transferred the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission to GKKS, however, the USSR started to make strides in planting its people, and 
hence gaining substantial influence, in the secretariat. The number of Soviet nationals in the 
organization’s offices expanded from just eight at the beginning of 1957 to twenty in the spring 
of 1962. Although the cohort of Soviet nationals employed by UN Central in New York 
exceeded this number by far, the number of officials working in UNESCO outpaced Soviet 
progress in other UN specialized agencies. In 1962, for example, the USSR had only fifteen 
people in the UN Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations (BTAO), thirteen in the FAO, six 
in the ILO, and three in the WHO.350 By 1965, the Soviet Union’s share of personnel working in 
UNESCO ballooned to thirty-six.351 From 1956 to 1967, a total of at least fifty Soviet citizens 
left elite posts in Soviet educational, scientific, cultural or diplomatic institutions to work in the 
UNESCO Secretariat for more than a year while dozens of Soviet linguists served temporarily as 
translators under contract with the international organization. Although most of these Soviet 
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international civil servants were male and Russian, a handful came from the western and eastern 
Soviet republics and a tiny portion were female pedagogues or librarians. 
The Soviet UNESCO Commission especially rejoiced over the acquisition of the offices 
of heads of divisions and departments, which they could transform into Soviet fiefdoms within 
the organization. In 1958, one Soviet employee became head of a division in the UNESCO 
Department of Education. A year later, UNESCO named a Soviet scientist as deputy director of 
the UNESCO Scientific Regional Center in Jakarta, Indonesia.352 The USSR then added a few 
directorships that positioned the communist country to exert influence on all UNESCO activity 
in the natural sciences and educational assistance to the developing world. At the end of 1959, 
Kovda, a soil scientist and senior member of AN SSSR, assumed the directorship of the 
UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences; two years later, V. S. Martynovskii, the director of 
the Institute for Refrigeration in Odessa, received the deputy directorship for technical education 
of the UNESCO Department of Education; and in 1963, UNESCO assigned another Soviet 
specialist to a senior position at the recently created UNESCO Institute for Educational 
Planning.353 In 1961, the international organization also tapped Ershov, a former ambassador to 
Switzerland and the first Soviet envoy to Israel after the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, to 
serve as one of the organization’s deputy directors-general.354 More importantly, the USSR 
gradually developed a pool of Soviet citizens who had gained the experience in international 
organizations that UNESCO sought for its staff as conference attendees, experts, and translators. 
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Martynovskii exemplified this trend, having spent the late 1950s as a UNESCO technical expert 
at the Indian Technological Institute in Bombay, India.355 
That said, the USSR perennially fell short of its goal to reach the quota range for 
personnel assigned to the country in accordance with its role as the second largest contributor to 
the UNESCO budget. In 1958, Soviet international civil servants made up 30 percent of their 
quota in the secretariat. This percentage rose to 36 percent in 1962, but decreased to 33 percent 
in 1963, and would fluctuate in the same range for the next decade.356 For comparison, in the 
early 1960s England and France enjoyed a presence amounting to as much as 220 percent and 
410 percent of their quotas respectively.357 While at least one Soviet national served at any given 
time in the majority of UNESCO divisions, the departments of social sciences and culture, as 
well as the cultural exchange service, went years without a single Soviet employee.358 Thus, the 
Soviet Union continued to occupy less than 5 percent of UNESCO positions while paying up to 
17 percent of the international organization’s annual expenses.359 The communist state fared no 
better in other quarters of the UN. In 1962, Soviet secretariat workers accounted for only 3 
percent of ILO staff. Of the more than 1,000 bureaucrats working at UN headquarters in New 
York, 7 percent came from the socialist bloc, 67 percent from NATO countries, and 26 percent 
from the “neutral” countries.360 That the communist superpower, far from outpacing Western 
                                                     
355 For biographical information on Martynovskii, see: Vladimir Martynovskii, “Curriculum Vitae,” n.d., 1–4, AG 8: 
Personnel Records: Martynovsky, V., UNESCO Archives. For his selection as a UNESCO technical expert in 
Bombay, see: UNESCO Technical Assistance Programme, Letter to Mr. Vladimir Martinovski, December 17, 1956, 
AG 8: Personnel Records: Martynovsky, V., UNESCO Archives. 
 
356 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11. l. 267; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 99. 
 
357 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 224. 
  
358 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, ll. 103-5; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 199.  
 
359 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 323. 
 
360 Rubinstein, The Soviets in International Organizations, 267–68. 
 204 
Europe or the United States, struggled to surpass even tiny nations such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands in representation at UN offices begs the question of why, apart from what Soviet 
representatives somewhat justifiably decried as UNESCO’s policy of “discrimination,” the 
USSR failed so miserably in meeting their own expectations of concentrating manpower in these 
administrations.361 
The missteps of the Soviet UNESCO apparatus in delivering professionals to work in the 
UNESCO Secretariat stemmed from the total lack of experience of the USSR’s foreign-relations 
structure in selecting candidates in response to the demands of a foreign institution. As chapter 1 
illustrated, the Soviet Union under Stalin abstained from multilateral international organizations 
with secretariats, conducting bilateral cooperation with the noncommunist world. Soviet agencies 
supervising the international exchange of persons before the Second World War, such as VOKS 
and its smattering of “friendship societies” abroad, facilitated the travel of delegations and 
individuals for episodic sojourns in the West. In contrast to these bilateral transactions, in which 
a hierarchy of Soviet gatekeepers chose intellectuals suitable to go abroad, UNESCO and other 
postwar international organizations reserved the right to act as principal arbiter of who should 
“represent” the USSR in their administrations.362 The challenge of crafting a mechanism to 
supply citizens not only ideologically “prepared” enough to pass Soviet litmus tests for travel 
abroad, but also compatible with whatever specialization UNESCO happened to need, left the 
coordinators of Soviet participation in UNESCO scurrying to uncover ways to generate such a 
system ex nihilo.  
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The Soviet state turned over to a single agency–the Soviet UNESCO Commission–the 
daunting task of selecting “candidates for positions in the UNESCO apparatus and its related 
organizations.” The dearth of Soviet citizens trained in the two UNESCO working languages 
became the central hurdle for the commission. The USSR faced a severe shortage of foreign-
language speakers that hampered not just the USSR’s ability to supply international civil 
servants, but also the superpower’s capacity to carry out its increasing commitments in more 
pressing matters of international relations. In November 1955, Foreign Minister Molotov wrote 
to the Central Committee appealing for the party’s permission to send fifteen teachers of 
English, French, and German from MID’s Higher Diplomatic School (VDSh) and MGIMO to 
live and study in London, Paris, and Berlin for six months. “Although the majority of 
[diplomats],” Molotov noted, “can work with documents and the foreign press, as well as 
conduct simple conversations in foreign languages, a significant portion of diplomatic 
personnel are still not fluent in foreign languages, which is especially manifested in an 
insufficient knowledge of spoken language.” The rudimentary skills in Western languages 
acquired by these diplomats, he claimed, exhibited the poor quality not only of their teachers, 
but also of their teachers’ teachers. Acknowledging their “good theoretical preparation,” 
Molotov contended that the teachers at Soviet foreign-service academies fell short of instilling 
fluency in their students “since they themselves are cut off from the language environment and 
in their day studied with people for whom the foreign language was not native.”363  
If MID, four months after the Geneva Summit and at the onset of “peaceful 
coexistence,” lacked a contingent of diplomats fluent in major European languages to execute 
the sensitive facets of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union endured a veritable vacuum with 
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respect to English- or French-speaking specialists in agencies with no relation to foreign 
policy. Unlike a few of the experts the USSR commissioned to help “weakly-developed 
countries,” Soviet UNESCO employees did not have the benefit of bringing with them an 
interpreter. Thus the commission embarked on a quest to single out specialists fluent in at least 
one of the two working languages and proficient in the other. In response to a flood of letters 
mailed regularly by the commission, dozens of Soviet ministries, universities, and academies 
insisted they did not employ anyone who knew one of the two UNESCO working languages 
and fit the job description. In a bid to display the multinational character of the USSR, the 
commission also addressed pleas for applicants to the ministries of education of the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani SSRs, the Central Committee of the Tajik SSR, as well as other regions of the 
“Soviet East,” almost all of which gave negative answers.364  
Much to the chagrin of members of the commission who saw the relative proficiency of 
MID personnel in foreign languages as a panacea for their paucity of multilingual applicants, 
UNESCO, with the exception of translators and deputy directors-general, rejected Soviet 
candidates whose sole professional experience consisted of diplomatic service.365 The Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation in Paris also wanted MID officials to serve in UNESCO, but for different 
reasons than those driving the commission. Financially, the delegation lamented that MID 
neglected to bridge the divide between “midites” and “nonmidites” (midovtsy and nemidovtsy, 
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or diplomats from MID and non-diplomats) working abroad, emphasizing that this 
differentiation bred confusion over how to scale the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees 
deprived of official diplomatic ranks. Politically, the delegation bemoaned the unpreparedness 
of Soviet UNESCO workers for handling routine interactions with foreigners. At a 1965 
meeting of diplomats at the Soviet embassy in Paris, Sobakin, the Soviet permanent delegate, 
objected to the fact that “nonmidites” under his purview, “arriving to work in UNESCO, are 
often encountering diplomatic work for the first time, and thus have no work experience in this 
field, no skills establishing contacts and working with foreigners, even though, as a rule . . . 
they are good workers.” To compensate for this inexperience, he continued, “it is necessary to 
create some kind of short-term courses for the preparation of cadres for international 
organizations, where Soviet specialists–not diplomats–would be given their first skills for 
working abroad.”366 These dilemmas led the delegation to needle the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission over the prospect of enlisting MID apparatchiks. “It should be kept in mind,” the 
commission retorted after one of these missives, “we need for work in UNESCO 
predominately specialists of various branches of education, higher education, science, and 
culture, with current experience in these spheres.”367  
 For all the handwringing over the inaccessibility of MID’s diplomats, the roots of the 
commission’s ineptitude grew out of deeper discrepancies between UNESCO’s conception of 
the right of nationals to transnational movement, and the aspirations of the Soviet state and 
party to control its people. In essence, the USSR fell short of its goal of contesting Western 
control over the secretariats of UN organizations because of the inherent disadvantages it 
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suffered from the incongruity between the open, spontaneous, and competitive recruitment of 
UNESCO and the Soviet state’s highly insular, top-down, vertical style of mobilization.  
The closed nature of Soviet society barred it from contributing to one of the most 
lucrative sources of UNESCO recruitment: nationals applying voluntarily and independently of 
their governments. The USSR divested itself of the opportunity to attract people through the 
monetary and material incentives UNESCO pitched to non-Soviet prospects. A career at 
UNESCO or other specialized agencies lured many Western Europeans with its promises of a 
good salary, a lofty mission, and life in a dynamic world capital. Further stiffening competition 
to the detriment of the Soviet Union, in 1962 Director-General Maheu increased the salaries of 
UNESCO employees in order to incentivize the recruitment of specialists with greater 
prestige.368 In contrast, since the USSR confiscated Soviet international civil servants’ salaries 
and redistributed them as smaller stipends (see the next chapter), MID found it difficult to 
formulate a method of payment for its UNESCO employees commensurate with the expensive 
living standards of European cities.369 For this and other reasons discussed later, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission grappled with the question of how to stymy the high attrition rate 
among Soviet UNESCO workers who requested permission to return to the homeland before 
the expiration of their contracts.370  
Moreover, while the United States, the United Arab Republic, and a few African 
countries imposed security clearances on subjects interested in working for international 
organizations, the USSR stood alone in its enforcement of examinations of candidates’ 
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“ideological preparation” for living abroad and uncompromising posture against the acceptance 
by one of its citizens on his or her own volition of an offer from UNESCO.371 In line with 
established protocol, UNESCO sent individual invitations to the personal addresses of Soviet 
academics, experts, and others interested in working for the organization. This provoked AN 
SSSR to complain to the commission that diffuse outreach to its members “greatly 
complicates” work “in the selection and arrangement of appropriate candidacies in those 
instances when invited comrades for this or that reason cannot go.”372 The commission 
forwarded these grievances to the delegation, instructing it to urge UNESCO to use the 
commission as the lone conduit for correspondence with Soviet citizens.373 The preclusion of 
voluntary applicants from the USSR put the communist country at a disadvantage. In 1963, of 
the 1,269 applications received by UNESCO for 40 vacancies open to external competition, 
965 came from individuals applying of their own will and 304 originated in proposals from 
governments. While the official UNESCO missions of France, the United States, West 
Germany, and India put forward 7, 43, 10, and 5 candidates respectively, UNESCO accepted 
242, 125, 29, and 35 applications from nationals of these countries who appealed to UNESCO 
for work independently of their governments. In the same year, the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission passed along just sixteen applications.374 
Oddly enough, the USSR encountered rivals from within the socialist camp during the 
concours for admission to the UNESCO bureaucracy. With the exception of brief boycotts of the 
UN during the Korean War, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and several other people’s democracies 
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participated in UN specialized agencies from their founding, continuing to host UNESCO 
activities even after communist takeovers in the late 1940s turned these nations inward and away 
from the West (see chapter 1). Because of this longer history of interaction with the international 
organizational system, Eastern European countries tended to outshine the unschooled USSR in 
the game of give-and-take at the center of the race to people the secretariat. This led to 
considerable discord among the eastern-bloc nations when multiple socialist applicants found 
themselves jockeying for a single post. After Director-General Evans in 1957 simultaneously 
offered the deputy directorship of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences to Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR with not “a word about negotiations to fill this position carried 
out with the other countries of the socialist camp,” the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission accused Evans of purposefully pitting the communist allies against each other in 
competition for secretariat slots.375 Nonetheless, Eastern European officials privately 
acknowledged their own culpability for this problem. In 1965, the Ukrainian permanent delegate 
to UNESCO, N. T. Reshetniak, in conversation with the Czechoslovak permanent delegate, 
Ludek Golubek, expressed regret over the existence “in the past” of “unhealthy competition for 
receiving places in the secretariat among candidates of socialist countries.”376 
The USSR’s sequestration of its inhabitants from the outside world generated another 
self-defeating tendency in the form of chronic reluctance to furnish detailed backgrounds of its 
candidates for UNESCO posts. In the cases when Soviet domestic institutions managed to 
deliver applications to UNESCO on time, they provided UNESCO with cursorily composed or 
incomplete forms without the required photograph of the applicant, a thorough curriculum 
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vitae, contact information for professional references, etc. As the Soviet permanent delegate 
groused to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1959, “the applications are composed in such a 
way that it is sometimes difficult to get an idea of our candidate.” Given the unlikelihood of 
UNESCO scheduling an interview with a specialist working in the Soviet hinterlands, and the 
fact that this paperwork often constituted the only lens through which UNESCO could evaluate 
suitability for a job, the delegate begged the commission for an answer as to “why we do not 
give more detailed data on the work of our candidates, even if this data does not always 
correspond to reality.”377  
The bungling of Soviet applications arose out of a fundamental disagreement between 
the USSR and UNESCO officials over whether to assess the merit of prospective employees on 
the basis of personal accomplishments or the status of member states on the world stage. The 
international organization’s position that Soviet applicants undergo scrutiny as individuals, 
bearing their own professional and moral attributes disassociated from the prestige of their 
country, conflicted with the commission’s arguments that UNESCO take in people because of 
the USSR’s collective educational, scientific, and cultural achievements. Frustrated with what 
had become by 1959 a routinized rejection of its candidates, the USSR utilized diplomatic 
pressure to achieve its ends. While Soviet representatives to the executive board and general 
conference annually introduced resolutions enunciating the importance of geographical 
distribution in the shaping of the secretariat, Foreign Minister Gromyko and other senior 
diplomats demanded in meetings with the director-general a Soviet presence in the secretariat 
on par with the USSR’s standing as a “great power” and UNESCO’s second largest financial 
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benefactor, advising the organization not to bite the hand that fed it.378 Successive directors-
general, correctly interpreting these demarches to cut off funding as empty threats, reminded 
their Soviet interlocutors of the USSR’s deficit of competitive applicants. Replying to a protest 
from the delegation in 1959, Director-General Veronese took exception to the Soviet assertion 
that “an objective consideration of the qualifications of presented candidates would show that 
these qualifications meet the requirements that are necessary for occupation of these positions.” 
In light of this incorrect claim, Veronese shot back, he could “only come to the conclusion” 
that the delegation was “insufficiently aware of the nature of the described work and the 
statements submitted by Soviet candidates.” Referring to the Soviet presumption that the 
USSR’s reputation trumped the meritocratic hiring process, the director-general pointed out 
that “a simple confirmation from Soviet authorities that, in their opinion, a candidate is fully 
qualified to receive a position, cannot replace a full [application] form.”379 After all, the very 
premise motivating Soviet officials to air such grievances violated the ethics governing the 
international civil service. In answer to a question from a Soviet UNESCO worker as to the 
reason no Hungarians had become part of the UNESCO bureaucracy, Veronese advised his 
subordinate: “there are no representatives of governments in the secretariat, but only 
international civil servants, who cease to be citizens of their countries and become citizens of 
the world.”380  
Meanwhile, Soviet functionaries in Moscow contemplated various measures designed 
to engender a steady availability of Soviet citizens suitable for the international civil service. In 
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1958, the Soviet UNESCO Commission began a long battle to browbeat each domestic 
ministry, academy, and university relevant to UNESCO into creating multiyear “plans” for 
mobilizing personnel as well as “reserves of cadres” filled with either ten to fifteen or twenty to 
twenty-five experts waiting in the wings for an open spot in the organization.381 From 1958 to 
1967, these entreaties, along with a petition for the Soviet Institute of International Relations 
(IMO) to establish a department focused on training international civil servants and an appeal 
for UNESCO to set up language courses for Soviet citizens in Moscow, repeatedly fell on deaf 
ears.382  
The commission realized it had to convince Soviet agencies relevant to UNESCO of the 
importance of the international organization, educate chiefs of these agencies on “the 
objectives” of their participation in UNESCO, and impose a system of accountability through 
the imposition of “personal responsibility on the heads of the organizations or their deputies for 
work related to UNESCO.” To this end, the commission proposed the convening of meetings 
in the Central Committee with the USSR Ministry of Culture, the USSR Ministry of Higher 
and Secondary Special Education (MINVUZ), the RSFSR Ministry of Education, and other 
organs. 383 To rectify the “incorrect position” of these institutions toward UNESCO, the 
commission and delegation also tried to lure Soviet professionals for assignments by 
highlighting the educational opportunities of working abroad.384 When looking for a good fit 
for a post in the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences in 1959, the delegation stressed to 
the commission that a specialist on “modern bourgeois sociology” at the AN SSSR Institute of 
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Philosophy would find it worthwhile to serve in UNESCO since he could get acquainted with 
his foreign counterparts and their latest work.385  
Yet the stonewalling on the part of these domestic organizations derived from the 
inadequacy of their international departments, which remained chronically overworked and 
understaffed. The USSR Council of Ministers, the Presidium, and the Central Committee spent 
most of the time they allotted to international organizations pressuring Soviet establishments 
into cultivating reserves of technical experts for travel to the decolonizing world. And even 
with respect to this higher priority, Soviet authorities judged ministerial and academic 
administrations as woefully deficient. A memorandum written for the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) claimed in 
1961 that an “unsatisfactory situation” with the reserves of experts for weakly-developed 
countries resulted from the fact that each agency carried out this project “on a case-by-case 
basis,” in a “disorganized” manner and “without the necessary accountability.” In MINVUZ 
and other Soviet ministries, the supervision of reserves of cadres fell on the shoulders of 
“essentially a single employee who is also responsible for a lot of work in the selection of 
specialists for bilateral agreements and therefore cannot ensure the timely selection and 
registration of specialists for recommendation to UNESCO.”386 
The systemic defiance of the commission’s recruitment requests also reflected the 
Soviet leadership’s disregard for the need to integrate new agencies overseeing international 
cultural and educational diplomacy into the preexisting chains-of-command governing the 
network of Soviet institutions at home. Although Malenkov and Khrushchev embarked on 
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“antiministerialist” campaigns from 1954 to 1957 aimed at ridding the Soviet bureaucracy of 
the “parallelism” and “hyper-centralisation” typifying Stalinist administration, these moves 
toward decentralization, better interministerial coordination, and clear-cut divisions of labor 
among organs of the Soviet state overlooked the urgency of eradicating their insularity by 
forcing compliance with the Soviet UNESCO Commission’s unprecedented commitment to 
link domestic agencies to international institutions.387 Lacking what the commission, in a 
crossed-out complaint from 1958, characterized as the crucial wide-ranging “authority to 
effectively implement and coordinate activities related to the practical participation of the 
Soviet Union in UNESCO affairs,” Soviet-UNESCO intermediaries had little recourse to 
official instruments of coercion in their drive to mobilize Soviet professionals from an eclectic 
collection of agencies specializing in everything from television broadcasting to nuclear 
physics.388   
In fact, the power relations between the Soviet UNESCO Commission and domestic 
institutions were often reversed. The power of Soviet ministries and organizations to accede to 
or spurn appeals for applicants afforded these bodies considerable leverage over the 
commission. In January 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR revolted 
against both the Soviet UNESCO Commission and the international organization on behalf of 
Ukrainian institutions, notifying Moscow and Paris that Ukraine would not submit experts for 
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UNESCO technical assistance to weakly-developed countries until the republic filled its quota 
in the UNESCO Secretariat. The motivation for the Ukrainian authorities’ rebellion issued 
from a long-simmering anger that, in spite of UNESCO’s recognition of the Ukrainian SSR as 
an independent member state, Soviet central authorities reserved complete control over the 
nomination of prospective experts from the peripheral republics. “The current procedure of 
registering Soviet experts for UNESCO (and other international organizations),” the Ukrainian 
deputy minister of foreign affairs explained in a letter to the commission, ascribed to GKES 
alone the ability to “select and present candidates, including those from the Ukrainian SSR and 
BSSR.” Since GKES, “having received requests from all UN agencies for experts from the 
USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the BSSR, completes them in all instances (with insignificant 
exceptions) only as experts from the Soviet Union,” the deputy minister griped that Ukrainian 
emissaries to UNESCO could not “guarantee to this or that international organization that 
experts selected in the republic will definitely be presented as candidates of Ukraine.”389 
 But the Ukrainian protest also manifested a far-reaching dissatisfaction over the 
botching of the Soviet venture to get its nationals into the secretariat. While agreeing with the 
warning of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that “the refusal to present candidacies of 
Ukrainian experts does not scare the secretariat,” the ministry believed its boycott served as a 
justifiable riposte to the disincentivizing cycle of application and rejection the country’s 
professionals had weathered at the hands of UNESCO over the previous decade. Ukrainian 
organizations, the deputy minister stressed, met “significant difficulties in the preliminary 
selection of candidates for UNESCO in connection with the fact that the number of specialists 
who speak foreign languages well in the republic is limited.” On the one hand, when UNESCO 
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turned down these “qualified workers, with whom the organizations for which they work are 
reluctant to part with,” Ukrainian academies and ministries “in the future refuse to give us new 
candidates.” On the other hand, “the organizations from which UNESCO headquarters have 
taken people then show significantly greater interest in the presentation of new candidates.” 
Thus, he concluded, the Ukrainian UNESCO Commission would find it “significantly easier to 
interest republican institutions” in sending its people to UNESCO for work as experts “if we 
could prove to these institutions that UNESCO actively cooperates with us and helps fill our 
quota in the headquarters itself.”390  
The problem, however, resided not in the unwillingness of either side to cooperate, but 
in the powerlessness of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to function effectively as a 
middleman caught between two irreconcilable systems with antithetical ways of doing 
business. The commission found itself detached from the Soviet domestic order and deprived 
of the authority and incentives needed to wrangle Soviet specialists from their home 
institutions. Furthermore, the reclusion, obfuscation, and great-power entitlement displayed by 
Soviet organs did little to help curry the favor of an international organization shot through not 
only with Western cultural predispositions and social networks, but also with normative 
structural biases toward voluntary international mobility, information sharing, and 
individualized meritocracy. The recruitment practices of the UNESCO Secretariat ensured that 
the majority of its employees came from Western European and North American countries 
throughout the 1950s and for much of the 1960s. As chapter 6 will demonstrate, this majority 
made the secretariat a difficult and often hostile work environment for the Soviet international 
servants scattered across the departments of the organization.  
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By the late 1960s, the brief window in which the USSR could feasibly catch up to the 
West in its command over the nuts-and-bolts of international organizations had closed. With 
the founding of the Group of 77 developing nations in 1964 and its institutionalization in 1967, 
the main adversary competing with countries in the Soviet orbit for the benefits of the policy of 
geographical distribution gained a powerful lobbying arm that outmatched the USSR’s meager 
tools of diplomatic pressure at UN agencies. In 1967, the fourteenth session of the UNESCO 
General Conference consummated a shift in the making since 1960 from viewing geographical 
distribution as equally encompassing the socialist and non-Western world to rendering utmost 
preference to African nations.391 Over the course of the 1970s, a fresh influx of member states 
into the international organization and changes in how the organization calculated geographical 
distribution reduced the size of the USSR’s personnel quota for workers in the UNESCO 
Secretariat, while the claims of historically underrepresented groups that transcended 
nationality and ideological blocs (e.g., women) also made it harder for the USSR to acquire 
new openings. As a consequence, the Soviet Union did not hit the low end of its target quota 
range until the twilight of the communist era in the mid-1980s.392
                                                     
391 The general conference included a resolution on staff policy that singled out the African states explicitly for 
geographical distribution. While the USSR and other socialist countries still enjoyed preferential treatment as 
underrepresented member states, the focus clearly shifted away from the socialist countries to the developing world, 
which placed the most emphasis on the importance of the UN system because of its role as a vehicle for economic 
development. “Records of the General Conference, Fourteenth Session: Resolutions” (UNESCO, 1966), 131, 
UNESDOC. 
 
392 For a sampling of reports on geographical distribution and the USSR in the secretariat after 1967, refer to the 
following reports: “Geographical Distribution of Secretariat: Report by the Director-General,” September 20, 1974, 
15, 18 C/60, UNESDOC; “Geographical Distribution of Staff: Report by the Director-General,” September 24, 
1976, 20, 19 C/60, UNESDOC; Executive Board, “Staff Policy: General Long-Term Plan for the Recruitment and 
Renewal of Staff: Geographical Distribution of Staff,” August 28, 1980, 44, 110 EX/33, UNESDOC; and Executive 
Board, “Geographical Distribution of the Staff and Revision of the Quota System,” September 11, 1987, 36, 127 
EX/38, UNESDOC. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COMMUNISTS BY NIGHT: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS AND LIFE IN THE 
SOVIET COLONY IN PARIS 
 
For Soviet specialists who made the cut for the UNESCO team, the precondition that they 
separate their political selves from a public guise of international civil service opened up ways of 
being that differed drastically from what Deborah Field has depicted as the “messiness and 
variability of Khrushchev-era byt,” i.e. the absence of a fixed partition between public and 
private spheres for Soviet citizens.393 Unlike in the USSR, where the official script of communist 
identity encroached on both leisure time and the public setting of the workplace, in Paris Soviet 
authorities could tend only to the communist identities of Soviet UNESCO workers in a private 
sphere artificially delineated by the rules of the international civil service. During the workday, 
the neutral candor mandated for UNESCO employees excluded any moves by the Soviet state 
and the Communist Party to safeguard their citizens’ allegiance. In the evenings and on 
weekends, the trappings of “bourgeois” culture and lifestyles threatened to tempt Soviet 
secretariat staff away from the communist path. To shore up communist loyalty in this hostile 
context, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and embassy enacted their own version of “domestic 
containment.” Conspiring to monopolize the private lives of those working in UNESCO, these 
officials sought to recapitulate in this sphere a microcosmic iteration of the social, cultural, and 
political world constituting Soviet society back home. But in the first three years that Soviet 
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citizens worked in the secretariat, these attempts to shepherd their flock into a sealed off bubble 
in the heart of the French capital faced significant challenges arising from the general disarray in 
the social organizations (obshchestvennye organizatsii) of the Soviet embassy in Paris and 
Moscow’s inability to foresee and respond to the ramifications of shipping its people abroad to 
take on the wholly novel role of Soviet international civil servant.    
Beginning in 1956, the delegation strived to integrate its brood of international civil 
servants into the embassy’s branch of the USSR’s recently reinvigorated network of trade 
unions. Under the leadership of Khrushchev, the All-Union Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) 
enacted reforms designed, as historian Junbae Jo demonstrates, to facilitate worker engagement 
by ridding the Soviet trade-union bureaucracy of the “red-tape” existing under Stalin and 
promoting “voluntary participation in the decision-making process” governing industries as well 
as state entities.394 In line with this thrust toward “democratization,” the Local Committee 
(mestnyi komitet, or mestkom) of the United Professional Organization of the Soviet embassy in 
France–which oversaw trade-union chapters of the diplomatic and technical personnel of the 
trade mission, the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbiuro), the consulate, the embassy, and 
the Soviet UNESCO Delegation–set out to make the trade union a “school of communism” that 
would cultivate among their several-hundred fellow countrymen a tightly knit solidarity founded 
on heightened involvement in the cultural, social, political, and work life of the Soviet outpost in 
France.395  
Before the latter half of 1959, however, these revitalizing reforms had little to show in 
terms of increasing the efficacy of the trade union as a vehicle for inspiring Soviet nationals 
                                                     
394 Junbae Jo, “Dismantling Stalin’s Fortress: Soviet Trade Unions in the Khrushchev Era,” in Soviet State and 
Society Under Nikita Khrushchev, 122-30. 
 
395 The local committee cited this famous Leninist quote in a July 1958 report. GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 586, l. 30.  
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stationed in Paris to exhibit the level of communist initiative and discipline considered obligatory 
for living and working in foreign lands. By the late 1950s, the United Professional 
Organization’s lackadaisical and bumbling administration of its activities had allowed the Soviet 
collective to become wracked with what trade-union leaders perceived as chronic absenteeism, 
dilly-dallying, apathy, unruliness, bickering, and negligence. “It is no secret,” a leader of the 
local committee noted at a meeting in December 1959, “that we have many violations of 
discipline.” Soviet personnel who had offices in the embassy, trade mission, and other Soviet 
organs made a habit of coming to work late, leaving their “nooks,” drinking coffee, and 
“playing” on their typewriters.396 An earlier report from March 1959 detailed how Soviet citizens 
had also abdicated their role in making the sporadically held social functions of the Soviet 
colony into fertile ground for political self-improvement. The decision of the trade union to hold 
political lectures and discussions in a movie theater before the weekly screening of movies for 
entertainment meant that participation in these main mechanisms of ideological control oscillated 
with the magnitude of enthusiasm for the film. “Attendance of lectures is almost 100 percent on 
those days when a new, interesting film is being shown,” the local committee scolded in its 
report. “But unfortunately,” it went on, “this is not always for everyone a sign of high 
consciousness, but the desire, sometimes, to get the best seat in the hall. When the lecture or 
discussion is going on without a motion picture, a good half of the seats in the hall remain 
empty.” As evidence, the local committee cited a lecture in 1958 presented by a Soviet employee 
of the UNESCO Department of Education on Khrushchev’s educational reforms to “strengthen 
the connection between school and life” that drew a paltry eight people. On occasions when the 
feature cinematic presentation attracted a respectable audience, some attendees pelted speakers 
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with heckles of “time’s up!” and “its time to finish!” Others completely ignored the lecturer, 
flipping through newspapers and magazines or engaging in “private conversations” among 
themselves.397  
The composers of the report excoriated Soviet citizens on assignment in France for laxity 
in their personal lives. Referring to a recent speech by a member of the trade union that “focused 
on the fact that we have not eliminated gossip and rumors interfering with normal, harmonious 
work,” the local committee instructed the social organizations of the embassy to “wage an 
implacable struggle against the peddlers of gossip or rumors” and “show intolerance of violators 
of the rules of the socialist community, severely punishing them.” It also called for more than the 
“temporary campaign” that followed several recent episodes of “excessive consumption of 
alcoholic beverages,” entreating everyone to wipe out the blight of heavy drinking that 
threatened to erode the self-restraint incumbent on those representing the USSR to the outside 
world. By the same token, the local committee warned its colleagues “not to forget for a minute 
that any rashness or carelessness could be used by the enemy to harm the interests of our state,” 
advising its peers to “always eradicate instances of excessive talkativeness on the telephone” and 
the “improper flinging around of documents.” Those at the helm of the trade union worried that 
their colleagues had lost sight of the heightened risk, “in the conditions of working abroad,” of 
ideological corruption and the unwitting betrayal of their homeland. “We must keep this in 
mind,” the report concluded, “since some comrades, having lived for a time in Paris and thinking 
that they have adjusted to the city and local environment,” had started to “forget that they live in 
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a capitalist country where, along with friends, we have many enemies who are just looking for 
chances to use the recklessness and carelessness of a Soviet person.”398  
But if the local committee for all Soviet agencies in Paris felt the “especially important 
significance” of the “education of our comrades in the spirit of collectivism,” the trade-union 
chapter of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, which consisted of a combination of delegation 
officials and Soviet UNESCO employees, recognized their unique duty in this regard. “The 
social organizations of the UNESCO collective,” the delegation noted in one of its annual 
reports, “have tried in their work not to let out of their sight their special significance given that 
the majority of members of the professional organization . . . constantly work in hostile 
surroundings in an international organization where the Western countries preserve dominant 
positions.” This urgency pertained all the more so since “the conditions of work and everyday 
life (byt’) of members of the [trade] union,” the “vast majority” of whom “live in isolation, in 
private apartments in different regions of Paris,” generated “significant additional difficulties for 
the educational work of the social organizations in comparison to the embassy, trade mission, 
and other Soviet institutions” in Paris.399  
In fact, from 1956 through the first half of 1959, the woefully understaffed delegation 
could not keep track of which people fell under its watch, let alone mold them into a sodality of 
devoted communists resistant to the dangerous influences inherent in becoming UNESCO 
personnel.400 The bizarre story of I. M. Zhukova epitomizes the prevailing disorder in the 
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399 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 325-26. The 1956 statute establishing the Soviet UNESCO Delegation gave MID 
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400 Throughout the late 1950s, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation simply did not have the manpower to oversee Soviet 
citizens working in the UNESCO Secretariat. In 1958, for example, the Soviet permanent delegate was absent from 
Paris traveling on business for all but sixty-four days. As a result, the adviser of the delegation had to fill his position 
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delegation’s drive to establish “kontrol’” over Soviet international civil servants in the late 
1950s. An epidemiologist who left the USSR for unknown reasons at the height of Stalin’s terror 
in 1938, Zhukova went to work as an assistant with the UNESCO Preparatory Commission for 
the creation of UNESCO in 1946 and stayed on for eight years.401 Throughout Zhukova’s tenure, 
her standing with the Soviet state continued to be shrouded in mystery. While she retained her 
Soviet citizenship, the preparatory commission hesitated to hire her, thinking it undesirable to 
“employ anyone of Russian nationality who does not have the full confidence of the Soviet 
government.”402 “I think it is clear,” a UNESCO source eventually concluded after conversations 
with the Soviet embassy, “that she is not persona ingrata though not particularly persona grata, 
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Leningrad State University in 1924; and worked for epidemiological laboratories in Leningrad and Baku in the late 
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UNRRA’s Belgrade bureau from 1944 to 1946, Zhukova secured a recommendation for a UNESCO post from her 
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“markedly successful” in forging contacts with the medical world and “winning the good-will of medical scientists 
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and that we shall be doing no harm to her or ourselves if we appoint her.”403 After the USSR 
joined UNESCO, Zhukova’s rootlessness sowed considerable confusion in the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation. Laid off by UNESCO in 1954, Zhukova moved into a hotel room where she lived off 
her savings.404 But the Soviet UNESCO Commission, evidently motivated by Zhukova’s 
Russianness and unaware of her reputation for chronically disrupting the “normal work of the 
secretariat,” nominated her in the fall of 1956 for a senior post in one of the UNESCO regional 
centers in Asia.405 Although the UNESCO leadership refused to grant her a new career in the 
organization and warned the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that her character as a “bickerer and 
malingerer” suggested that her appointment would “be detrimental to both UNESCO and the 
USSR,” Zhukova used the fact that the USSR had forgotten to withdraw her nomination for over 
a year as ammunition in her incessant demands to the director-general for a UNESCO job. 
Stoking even more alarm for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, she infiltrated the collective of 
Soviet UNESCO employees. In a letter to the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 
January 1958, the Soviet permanent delegate voiced his bafflement that Zhukova, whom he 
mistakenly assumed to be one of his own, had breached the rules of conduct for Soviet citizens 
abroad by traveling outside of France and cherishing as a “best friend” a New Zealander in the 
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secretariat “who is hostile to the USSR.” The delegate also criticized Zhukova’s penchant for 
“unnecessarily” dropping in on the delegation for the purposes of “recounting various items of 
gossip, trying to learn our opinion on various issues, and proposing to some employees to rent an 
apartment with her.” He ended his message with a request for “some information on Zhukova, 
since her explanations are not entirely clear as to how she came abroad and got a job in 
UNESCO, whether there was permission for this from our organs, etc.”406 The commission’s 
response that Moscow had no information on Zhukova’s identity, not to mention the delegation’s 
lack of wherewithal to recognize her over the course of a year and a half as a floater living in de 
facto exile, laid bare the reality that Soviet trade-union administrators in Paris had a deficit of 
knowhow and experience to tap when corralling their secretariat associates into a sealed off 
fraternity.407 
The initial shortsightedness of Soviet authorities also led to longer-term problems in the 
delegation’s campaign to assimilate Soviet UNESCO employees into the general Soviet 
diplomatic corps stationed in Paris. As a result of their indeterminate status as both secret 
representatives of the Soviet Union and international civil servants, Soviet UNESCO staff 
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members became a special category possessing a series of privileges and burdens that would 
alienate them from the rest of their comrades living in Paris into the 1960s and beyond.  
The ambiguous place of Soviet international civil servants, as both employees of an 
international organization and involuntary members of a labor organization controlled by the 
Soviet state, fed a perception among these specialists that the trade union offered little more than 
yet another superfluous financial encumbrance unreflectively imposed on them by distant 
officials in Moscow. In January 1958, the chairman of the Local Committee of Soviet 
Institutions in France, G. N. Petelin, reported to the Central Committee of Trade Unions of State 
Institutions that Soviet UNESCO staff had a habit of refusing to hand over membership fees to 
the trade-union cashier because they also paid monthly contributions to the UNESCO Staff 
Association––the nonmandatory UNESCO labor body that some Soviet citizens joined without 
the approval of their Soviet supervisors.408 That many of these UNESCO employees had racked 
up debts to the Soviet trade union as a result of their contempt for this double tax led the local 
committee to “repeatedly” browbeat these citizens into meting out their arrears or incur “more 
radical measures.”409 The Central Committee of VTsSPS reacted with barely concealed shock 
that Soviet nationals belonged to a foreign labor organization in the first place. “Soviet citizens,” 
the committee emphasized, “can be members of foreign trade unions only with the special 
permission of appropriate organizations.”410 Despite these admonitions, international civil 
servants from the USSR stubbornly withheld sizeable sums of money from the local committee 
into the 1960s––a pattern of insubordination that may have emanated in part from the Soviet 
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UNESCO detachment’s perception that they occupied the status of second-class citizens within 
the Soviet society revolving around the embassy. One Soviet UNESCO worker, at a conference 
of Soviet trade unions in France in February 1963, expressed a widely held concern that “our 
UNESCO organization does not enjoy the same rights among other organizations of the colony” 
in everything from representation on committees to the procurement of rooms for mothers and 
children at the embassy’s dachas.411  
The feeling of alienation among Soviet international civil servants in Paris sprung not 
only from their status as the only fulltime employees of a Western organization, but also from 
their unique living arrangements. Soviet specialists employed by UNESCO gained 
unprecedented physical space to carve out private worlds inconceivable to citizens assigned to 
other Soviet institutions with longer histories of activity on foreign soil. The vast majority of 
diplomats, trade negotiators, and correspondents working for the embassy, military attaché, trade 
mission, and press agencies such as TASS resided together on the Boulevard Suchet, the Rue du 
Général Appert, and the Rue de Prony in Soviet-owned residential buildings replete with “red 
corners” and the prospect of neighborly surveillance policing domesticity.412 Meanwhile, Soviet 
UNESCO personnel lived alone or with their families in “modestly” furnished apartments 
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discussion of films and new literature, etc.,” consisted of a television, Marxist-Leninist literature, and other 
accouterments designed to foster collective, communist education during leisure time. However, these centers of 
communist learning often took on an apolitical function that contradicted their original purpose. The local 
committee of the Trade Union of the Soviet embassy complained in 1959 that these corners “do not always 
correspond to their name” and “are sometimes simply called ‘television [corners],’ which more accurately 
describes them.” The local committee argued that these televisions often brought a corrupting influence to the 
buildings since parents either left their children alone watching French television “all evening” or sat with them 
before the television completely “indifferent to the fact that many evening broadcasts are not designed for children 
and only have a negative influence on their upbringing”: GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 225-26. For the 
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“scattered in the most diverse districts of Paris.”413 As a result, the latter possessed tangible 
privileges in terms of living space, leasing apartments that had at least two rooms; ranged from 
twenty-five to fifty square meters in size; and equipped with furniture as well as utilities included 
in the rent.414 In contrast, Soviet envoys making their homes in the domiciles of the Soviet 
colony lived in “overcrowded conditions” that did not meet the “necessary sanitary 
requirements.” Of the twenty-nine families (ninety-two people) occupying the residence on 
Boulevard Suchet in 1958, ten had two-room apartments with about seven and a half square 
meters of space per person, while the other nineteen each nestled in one room with six square 
meters per person. On the second and fourth floors, eight and nine families respectively, or 
twenty-seven and twenty-eight people, used a single bathroom and communal kitchen.415 The 
situation hardly looked better seven years later when on average five to six families shared a 
kitchen, ten families shared a single bathroom, and one toilet existed for every fifteen 
inhabitants.416 
In other words, while these diplomats, trade representatives, and journalists lived in 
cramped surroundings reminiscent of communal apartments (kommunalki), Soviet secretariat 
workers benefitted from an expansion in domestic space–and hence privatized intimacy–similar 
to those who moved into the khrushchevki springing up all over the USSR in the late 1950s and 
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the 1960s. Curiously, this meant Soviet nationals drafted into the international civil service had 
an easier time than many diplomats hosting foreign “contacts.” For example, twelve days after 
the inauguration of John F. Kennedy on January 20, 1961, a Soviet hand of the UNESCO Bureau 
of Personnel and Management reported to Moscow the details of a discussion he had at his 
apartment during a “return reception” with an American UNESCO functionary who had sailed 
on one of Kennedy’s combat ships during the Second World War. The two talked about the 
personality of the new president and the likelihood of a break with the foreign policy of the 
Eisenhower administration.417 Four years later, the Soviet ambassador to France, V. A. Zorin, 
protested that the absence of “normal living conditions” had long deprived diplomats “of the 
opportunity to host any kind of meetings with foreigners,” which he described as a “business 
necessity.” The congested abodes of distinguished diplomats also provoked “perplexed questions 
and critical comments from the French, which undermines the prestige of the USSR in 
France.”418  
The discrepancy between the comforts and privacy afforded to Soviet secretariat 
jobholders and to other USSR emissaries to France derived from Moscow’s initial oversight of 
the importance of making space for their new UNESCO functionaries on Soviet properties. Left 
to their own devices in the procurement of housing, Soviet UNESCO employees began their time 
in France desperately looking for a place to live. In his memoirs, Dubinin describes how he and 
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his Soviet UNESCO colleagues “roamed around the city to look for an apartment” in November 
1956: “Having learned from newspapers and any other advertisements or acquaintances of a 
more-or-less suitable offer, you had to call or show up at the noted address, introduce yourself, 
then inspect [the apartment], conduct negotiations on conditions, [and] simply bargain over the 
rent, which we then paid out of pocket.” But as the twin crises in Hungary and Egypt filled the 
headlines and Parisians raided stores to stock up on salt for antiradiation baths and other staples 
in preparation for nuclear war, most French proprietors recoiled at the idea of harboring tenants 
from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Dubinin recalls that landlords, upon learning of his Soviet 
citizenship, “either hung up the phone or slammed the door.”419 Even officials of the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation, which merited all the formal pomp and circumstance of a diplomatic 
mission, had trouble finding accommodations. Arriving in Paris in the summer of 1956, the 
families of the second secretary and stenographer of the delegation could not find apartments and 
spent the summer moving “from room to room, living temporarily in the rooms of embassy 
employees who travel to the USSR for vacation or business.”420 
To make matters worse in terms of promoting a tighter “collective” of Soviet citizens 
involved in UNESCO, the “completely unsuitable” conditions of the working premises the 
embassy freed up for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation presented it with “great difficulties in 
carrying out the required ‘educational work’ (vospitatel’naia rabota) among members of the 
collective.”421 The apparatus supervising Soviet participation in UNESCO, which amounted to 
anywhere from five to fourteen people from 1956 to 1967, worked in two small, “dark and 
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cramped” rooms among the residential quarters of the embassy where “technical personnel live 
(surrounded by kitchens, toilets, and a lot of noise due to a proximity to families and children).” 
While the delegation rented four rooms at UNESCO headquarters, it hesitated to handle its 
steady deluge of sensitive documents there since, according to the Soviet permanent delegate, 
these offices fell under “round-the-clock surveillance of the French.”422 MID also withheld an 
adequate supply of low-level service staff for financial reasons and because of a shortage in the 
USSR of less-educated workers with the foreign-language skills compulsory for service 
abroad.423 The delegation griped for years over the elimination of the position of cook-cleaner in 
1958. Apparently, the presence of only one “part-time cleaning lady” for the apartments of high-
ranking Soviet UNESCO dignitaries forced the Soviet permanent delegate to settle in a hotel 
temporarily in 1960. More seriously, the dearth of “technical personnel” indentured to the 
delegation curtailed the ability of Soviet international civil servants to fill their nonworking 
hours with tasks in support of Soviet interests in the international organization. Given that the 
lone, elderly clerical worker the delegation employed in 1960 was “not physically in a state to do 
all the work” of typing, answering phones, etc., secretariat functionaries chose not to work in the 
embassy after the end of their day at UNESCO.424  
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To correct these irregularities, the delegation vociferously lobbied MID throughout the 
1950s and 1960s to grant them permission to purchase a building in France for members of the 
delegation and Soviet secretariat workers to live and work in as one communist collective. But 
the motivation for these entreaties originated not only in a want of working space and desire to 
gather all Soviet citizens under the same roof, but also a mounting urgency to mollify the 
increasing disgruntlement of Soviet UNESCO employees over their material situation.  
In accordance with a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers adopted on December 
1, 1958, the MID Directorate of Cadres conferred on all Soviet citizens working in international 
organizations a Soviet diplomatic title corresponding to their rank in the international civil 
service (the UNESCO P-2 classification equaled the position of attaché and later third secretary 
in the Soviet embassy, the P-3 tier became equivalent to first secretary, etc.). Each month, every 
Soviet UNESCO staff member handed in to the Soviet embassy’s bookkeeper the difference 
between the much higher wages they drew from their UNESCO rank and the pay grade ascribed 
to them on the basis of the directorate’s pay scale for embassy personnel in Paris (e.g., a 
UNESCO P-3 salary minus the salary of the first secretary).425 In short, the Soviet state, in clear 
contravention of the sovereignty of the international civil service, secretly expropriated the 
surplus earnings of its people in the UN.   
                                                     
embassy. “Thus,” Pavlov explained, “comrade Bobovnikova, performing the duties of secretary and typist, is 
forced to ‘migrate’ [kochevat'] from one office to another” and was absent from both offices for either the morning 
or the afternoon. Whenever Bobovnikova left to compose classified documents, no one answered the phone. As a 
result of these absences, “all sent and received UNESCO foreign correspondence . . . is not registered, which could 
lead to the loss of certain documents having great significance.” Pavlov then recounted how in 1962 the delegation 
had lost a checkbook with 800 dollars owed to the international organization. “If this book had not been found and 
handed over,” he concluded, “the delegation could have been placed in a very unpleasant situation.” GARF, f. 
9519, op. 1, d. 120, ll. 80-82. 
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This method would continue through at least the late 1970s: Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, 173–74. 
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On the surface, the standardized “extortion” of clandestine dues from its subjects 
generated a number of benefits for the USSR.426 First of all, it allowed the communist country to 
collect the foreign currency it perennially coveted while also redeeming a considerable portion of 
its annual financial contribution to UNESCO. In 1963, the Soviet ambassador to France and 
Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO proudly reported to MID that they retrieved from levies 
on salaries more than $107,000 of the approximately $3 million the USSR doled out to the 
international organization annually.427 Secondly, it set fiscal limits on the extent to which Soviet 
subjects could use their place on the comparatively generous payroll of Western institutions to 
partake in the capitalist consumer society around them. Thirdly, it hypothetically lessened the 
likelihood that jealousy would germinate among diplomatic personnel over the exceptional 
pecuniary perks international civil servants amassed thanks to their unique assignment.  
Yet the strategy had the unintentional repercussion of engendering extremely “difficult 
material conditions” for secretariat post holders.428 Thanks to what Soviet authorities in France 
plaintively characterized as “the mechanical distribution to Soviet workers in the UNESCO 
Secretariat of salaries of diplomatic workers of Soviet institutions in Paris without attention to 
local conditions,” Soviet UNESCO employees became house poor. While their counterparts 
receiving the same compensation in the Soviet embassy paid a fixed rate of 5 to 8 percent of their 
salary to live in the residential properties owned by the USSR, occupants of stations in UNESCO 
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forked over 25 to 35 percent of their monthly remuneration on “speculative prices” for the 
“cheapest apartments in the current rental market of Paris.”429 Though MID bore the full cost of 
the apartments leased by Soviet directors of UNESCO departments and provided a 50 percent 
subsidy for the rents of P-4 and P-5 servants, the large number of Soviet citizens with P-2 and P-
3 spots swallowed the whole expenditure for their living space.430 Aggravating their financial 
woes, the secretariat crew ran into the unfamiliar financial responsibilities of having to put up 
deposits for their apartments several months in advance and foot the bill for rent during summer 
vacations back to the USSR without recourse to the savings they would have accumulated if their 
government left their salaries intact.431 And whereas embassy representatives had access to 
diplomatic vehicles and the Soviet state reimbursed them for gas, UNESCO workers (except for 
directors) spent their own money on the car, auto insurance, and fuel they relied on to travel for 
tête-à-têtes with foreign contacts.432 All of this raised a quandary for the members of the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation: the more they excelled in getting people into the secretariat, the greater 
the quantity of Soviet nationals who found themselves isolated from their countrymen, struggling 
to make ends meet, and pouring money into the French economy “completely free of charge.”433 
Desperate for a solution, Soviet UNESCO emissaries, when pleading with Moscow to bankroll a 
communal house for the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and Soviet secretariat workers, reasoned 
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that the rent charged to secretariat workers who moved into this house “after a certain amount of 
time would compensate for the cost of the building, and it would bring a net profit.”434 But 
thanks to a combination of MID’s frugality and the sparseness of vacant real estate in central 
Paris, the delegation would not acquire its own premises until the late 1970s.435 
As the annual “growth in prices and sharp rise in rents” in Paris throughout the 1960s 
exacerbated the economic hardships of Soviet UNESCO cadres stuck with stagnant pay, their 
“unequal position” within the Soviet colony fomented a smoldering angst that surfaced from 
time to time in their meetings with superiors.436 According to I. Kiselev, an adviser in MID’s 
Fifth European Division who interviewed Soviet secretariat bureaucrats in February 1964, “all 
comrades expressed bewilderment with the unfair treatment of workers occupying P-2 (five 
people) and P-3 (six people) positions” as a result of the state’s failure to provide them with 
subsidies for housing. “Such a situation,” the MID inspector stressed, “elicits irritation and, I 
would say, discontent from this group of people, and especially the wives,” considering that 
many UNESCO hirelings left prestigious jobs in the USSR to work in the international 
organization.437 For instance, B. I. Sobolev, who promoted international cooperation in television 
broadcasting as a P-2 program specialist in the UNESCO Department of Information, endured a 
long battle to get a raise in his attributed diplomatic rank from attaché to third secretary in light 
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of his former position as head of the All-Union Association for the Exportation and Importation 
of Films (Soveksportfil’m) and a pressing paternal obligation to support three children.438 
The state’s exactions on the salaries of international civil servants incited resistance to the 
timely payment of these tolls. In a March 1964 letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the 
chief of MID’s Monetary-Financial Directorate highlighted multiple cases where “some workers 
allowed delays in the delivery to the cashier . . . of salaries received by them in international 
organizations.” He also bemoaned the fact that persons belonging to the UNESCO detachment 
had come up with several strategies to skirt the USSR’s confiscatory regulations. “A number of 
employees,” the executive of the directorate demurred, “upon returning to the USSR, do not 
close their current accounts in foreign banks, continuing to handle currency located in these 
accounts through other persons by the sending of power-of-attorney documents or bank checks.” 
Because such defiant actions led to “definite damage to the state budget and are direct violations 
of the currency legislation of the Soviet Union,” he reiterated that all income producers toiling in 
international organizations had to surrender their entire salary to the cashier before the fifteenth 
of every month for redistribution. The MID director then declared that they must close their 
foreign bank accounts before departure and ask the relevant authorities of these international 
organizations to transfer any outstanding payments to the USSR Bank of Foreign Trade in 
Moscow for appropriate dissemination.439  
In early 1966, MID reduced the amount Soviet UNESCO employees paid for rent to just 
2 percent of their monthly salary. But what at first had the appearance of a successful resolution 
to the longstanding class envy within the Parisian Soviet colony led only to more cries of 
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inequitable treatment. That February, Sobakin, the Soviet permanent delegate, lamented to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko that the provision of subsidies to Soviet secretariat 
specialists without a similar adjustment to the rents paid by members of the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation had spawned an “abnormal situation,” in which “the adviser of the delegation and the 
Soviet permanent delegates of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR . . . are in much worse material 
conditions than even the employees of the secretariat of the category of P-3 (which corresponds 
to first secretary).”440 Sobakin revealed the fundamental flaw inherent in the Soviet 
government’s insistence on aggrandizing control over the livelihoods of its nationals employed 
by UNESCO. The alignment of UNESCO ranks with MID’s gradations of embassy personnel 
arbitrarily made otherwise incomparable UNESCO jobs comparable to less reputable diplomatic 
posts, thereby providing a language of just hierarchy that some diplomats and most secretariat 
workers drew on to express resentment and dissatisfaction over disparities in income. Distant 
decision-makers in Moscow became bearers of the brunt of the blame for any unjustness in this 
classificatory grid because of their lethargic responses to the steep hikes in prices on the French 
market. In the minds of Soviet individuals laboring daily in the secretariat alongside non-Soviet 
colleagues who reaped the full rewards of their paycheck, the realization of the culpability of the 
Soviet state for their acute material privations threatened to metastasize into feelings of 
animosity that Soviet handlers in Paris would have a hard time reversing.       
*                 *                 * 
In order to preempt any insubordination in light of such trying circumstances, the Soviet 
trade-union apparatus in France, after the half-hearted and lackluster measures taken from 1956 
to 1959, ramped up its push to routinize activities intended to ensure that the civic life of its 
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subjects, including those employed by international organizations, were the exclusive domain of 
Soviet workers’ organizations. In March 1959, the local committee of the Soviet embassy 
commanded all of its subsidiary trade unions to “establish strict supervision” over attendance at 
political, ideological, and business meetings.441 Six months later, MID announced in a circular to 
all Soviet agencies dealing with UN secretariats that it would step up its oversight of 
international civil servants’ communications with their corresponding delegations after a 
realization that secretariat workers were “essentially left to fend for themselves.”442 Because the 
authors of this circular cited the musings of an English director in the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) as evidence for this opinion, the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation shrugged off their assessment as groundless hearsay from a “foreign 
bureaucrat,” defending their minding of Soviet UNESCO employees as adequately stringent.443 
And to be sure, the delegation had conducted political work among its own employees from the 
inception of Soviet involvement in the UNESCO Secretariat. As early as 1958, it scheduled 
regular “production meetings” every Saturday for the gathering of all secretariat jobholders while 
arranging for delegation officials to get together “almost daily” with each Soviet member of the 
UNESCO staff “in specially appointed places to discuss and provide assistance with the 
resolution of work and personal issues that arise.”444 But after 1959, the delegation’s trade-union 
committee, along with the attendant party organization, escalated the attention it paid to devising 
strategies to use these get-togethers to infuse Soviet UNESCO staff with a sufficient level of 
                                                     
441 GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 254. 
 
442 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 101-03.  
 
443 Ibid., ll. 104-05. 
 
444 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 212. 
 240 
“vigilance” and orient their work toward the foreign-policy objectives of the USSR.445 Owing to 
the fact that these convocations either did not occur regularly or “were not always sufficiently 
well-organized,” in 1962 the trade union made individual delegation officials responsible for a 
discreet group of UNESCO employees in a specific department and for filling the free time of 
international civil servants with supplemental “office meetings” held twice a month.446  
Amid the clamor of dishes and shouts of children, the delegation turned these assemblies 
near the kitchen and living quarters of the embassy into a venue for the giving of marching 
orders to Soviet international civil servants and the solicitation from them of unauthorized 
intelligence about the confidential inner workings of UNESCO. Transgressing the rules of the 
international civil service in relation to its immunity from governmental interference, the Soviet 
mission charged its band of UNESCO employees with advancing Soviet objectives in the 
international organization up until the point that it would instigate severe reprimand from their 
bosses.447 Secretariat specialists not only read accounts of their work and happenings in their 
departments before the entire collective, but also submitted records of conversations, reports, and 
memoranda divulging insider knowledge that the delegation forwarded to the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission for reference when formulating policy toward the international organization. Soviet 
bodies responsible for their country’s involvement in the organization evaluated the performance 
of “their” UNESCO functionaries on the basis of their success as one-person paper mills who 
could slap together documents summarizing the internal life of UNESCO, commending “the 
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most proactive and informative of them” for making the most of “their official positions and 
ability to establish contacts.”448  
Anxious to discern the image of the Soviet Union and reactions abroad to the country’s 
foreign policy, the Soviet UNESCO Commission wanted these accounts to detail the political 
proclivities of foreigners laboring in UNESCO and the extent to which secretariat personnel 
from other countries showed “sympathy” for, or “hostility” to, the USSR. Despite the lengthy 
stream of paper it received from Paris, the Soviet UNESCO Commission continued from year 
to year to express dissatisfaction with the irregularity and quality of their nationals’ dispatches, 
griping over signs that UNESCO workers “carelessly” and “hastily” drew up “formal” or 
“abstract” narratives. Throughout 1961 and into early 1962, the commission devised a series of 
guidelines that enumerated the specific minutiae it expected in these communiqués. In a letter 
to the Soviet permanent delegate, the commission compiled a nuanced list of how the 
delegation could organize “a smarter and fuller use of Soviet specialists working in the 
UNESCO Secretariat” by supplementing general observations with more actionable data. In 
order to create a card index that would catalogue upcoming vacancies in the interest of their 
“main task” of filling the USSR staff quota, the commission ordered these employees to 
provide studies of “foreigners working with them,” the “actual conditions of work in vacant 
positions,” as well as “recommendations and proposals on the issue.” To mitigate its own 
disorganization and tardiness, the commission adjured them to give advance notice of 
upcoming UNESCO activities and deliver, at the request of any Soviet agency, 
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“systematically” annotated UNESCO publications containing “relevant information on the 
development of science, culture, and education in foreign countries.”449 The commission also 
called on its secretariat charges to fit their observations into the broader Soviet narrative of the 
geopolitical and ideological struggles of the Cold War. In a separate batch of remarks on the 
1960 annual report of the delegation, the commission advised that workers in UNESCO had to 
go “deeper in terms of content” by furnishing “analytical pieces with syntheses and 
conclusions.” In particular, it wanted them to pigeonhole their findings into an interpretation of 
UNESCO’s “role and influence in the ideological battle between the countries of the aggressive 
imperial bloc and the socialist camp; the Western colonizers and the rising countries of the 
East; and the reactionary and progressive forces of the scientific and cultural intelligentsia.”450 
Apparently, authorities in Moscow had little sensitivity to the fact that their UNESCO 
employees had to cope with a full-time job in the international organization as well as these 
political and professional chores foisted on them during their nonworking hours. 
The unique position of Soviet international civil servants, who traveled around the 
world as emissaries of an international organization, also enabled them to gain access to the 
classified material of governments receiving assistance from UNESCO. In the summer of 1965, 
G. E. Skorov, a D-1 “senior consultant” at UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational 
Planning, spent two months in Tanzania as part of a taskforce to produce educational materials 
on Tanzania, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast for African pedagogues enrolled in courses on 
educational planning in Dakar, Senegal. While composing an analysis for the Dakar classes on 
“linking educational planning with economic development,” Skorov found the time to leak to 
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the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam the contents of “major conversations” he had with 
representatives of the Tanzanian government on “the termination of Soviet-Tanzanian 
negotiations on the giving of economic aid to Tanzania,” along with “a copy of some 
confidential documents” on the Tanzanian five-year plan and a “secret inquiry, prepared for the 
president of the republic on the expected sources of financing for the Tanzanian five-year 
plan,” all of which found their way to Soviet agencies dealing with international economic 
assistance.451 
Beyond wanting to give their delegates to the executive board or general conference a leg 
up on representatives of other member states, Soviet custodians intended these assignments as a 
monitoring tool for ensuring that their UNESCO officials interpreted the organization through 
the prism of Soviet ideology and resisted the real threat that Soviet UNESCO employees’ 
acclimation to the routine role of serving a foreign power structure would defile their resolution 
to prioritize Soviet objectives. Because “international bureaucrats,” the authors of a 1962 
commission memorandum explained, found themselves “surrounded by and in subordination to 
UNESCO employees who are alien and often hostile to the Soviet Union–among whom a 
significant portion consists of agents of foreign intelligence services”–and received “constant 
reminders of the ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’ required by the leadership of the UNESCO 
Secretariat,” Soviet citizens in UNESCO had “difficulty carrying out the policy of using 
UNESCO in the interests of the Soviet Union,” at times developing “notions to the effect that the 
vocation of secretariat employees is the ‘exemplary fulfillment of their service obligations to 
UNESCO’ and not the fulfillment of those to the delegation.” Consequently, they exhibited a 
“tendency to some ‘autonomy,’ the closing of themselves off into the range of issues of their 
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own ‘administrative’ work.” To vanquish this drifting sentiment toward the internationalist ideal, 
members of the delegation delivered a “firm rebuke.” As the memorandum concluded with a 
tinge of dialecticism, the delegation “constantly and systematically” saw to it that “workers of 
the UNESCO Secretariat see the whole sum of problems in using UNESCO in the interests of the 
Soviet Union and do not limit themselves to the narrow confines of ‘their part of work’ in the 
UNESCO Secretariat.”452  
On top of micromanaging the business affairs of its phalanx of UNESCO assignees, the 
trade union endeavored to regiment their behavior in the foreign environment of the West 
through an assortment of “ideological-educational” activities designed to inure them to the 
challenge of holding fast to a proper Soviet worldview when confronted with the antagonistic 
ideas pervading their work hours. Immediately after UNESCO neophytes arrived in Paris, the 
delegation carried out “explanatory work” aimed at “familiarizing them with the specific 
conditions” of Soviet life in Paris, the “working conditions in UNESCO,” and the “practical 
problems of material arrangements (finding an apartment, salaries, etc.).”453 In 1962, the party 
organ and trade union of the delegation launched a new “system of political education” intended 
to inculcate members of the Soviet UNESCO detachment with both a Marxist-Leninist 
framework for processing their foreign surroundings and a “correct” view of the actions taken by 
the USSR at home and abroad. A combination of didactic indoctrination and an emphasis on 
voluntary engagement indicative of the post-Stalinist approach to trade-union work, this 
political-education initially encompassed two seminars led by different members of the 
delegation and the secretariat cohort (“On Major Problems of the Economics and Politics of 
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Capitalist Countries” and “The Use of International Organizations”); individual recitals of 
personal “theoretical and political education”; and independent studies on topics such as “The 
Economic Problems of France” and “The Ideology of Right-Wing Socialism.”454 In response to 
recommendations from the collective, the delegation revamped its curriculum the following year, 
increasing the number of seminars offered with an eye toward aligning them with “the major 
events in the life of the party and country” while simultaneously utilizing “local factual material 
and information on the situation in UNESCO.”455 Throughout 1963 and 1964, it also saddled its 
students with the occasional performance of presentations before the UNESCO trade union (“On 
the Communist Attitude Toward Labor,” “Questions of Discipline,” “On Methods of Preparation 
for Conversations and Records of Them,” etc.); invited guest lecturers to expound on vigilance 
abroad and the recent decisions of the Communist Party; and encouraged UNESCO employees 
to give “special reports” on the international organization at “theoretical conferences” of the 
United Professional Organization.456  
The delegation’s social organizations also subjected their coterie to individualized 
scrutiny and ideological guidance. In the pursuance of “the creation of a healthy, comradely 
environment in which every person feels respect and recognition from the collective and at the 
same time knows that the collective is demanding of him,” the delegation had Soviet 
international civil servants periodically perform samokritika (self-criticism) before the entire 
UNESCO group and arranged for “individual discussions with comrades on questions of 
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compliance with the rules of conduct abroad.”457 In the wake of violations of the norms of 
behavior in foreign countries, the trade union held congregations of the UNESCO contingent to 
review and condemn the wrongdoings of their peers.458 On the whole, Soviet officials favorably 
assessed the attendance of their underlings in these activities after 1959, concluding over several 
years that the “turnout has been satisfactory, the participation of the audience high” with “all or 
nearly all present” speaking in the course of meetings.459  
Apart from direct methods of ideological tutelage, the wider United Professional 
Organization built and oversaw in the heart of the French capital a “Little USSR” designed to 
consume every facet of the lives of Soviet citizens on assignment in “the city of light.” Ever 
mindful of the enticements and lifestyle alternatives the West had to offer, the French branch of 
the Soviet trade-union network, in its own program of domestic containment, worked to conserve 
its members’ sense of belonging to a Soviet community by stacking their leisure time with a 
mélange of cultural, athletic, educational, and touristic activities. On the one hand, this use of 
social functions as a means of sustaining communist loyalty reflected the general efforts under 
Khrushchev to reinvigorate the civic or communal dimension of the communist project back in 
the USSR. As the historian Polly Jones points out, “an understandable, although paradoxical, 
feature of ‘de-Stalinization’ which ran concurrently with its emphasis on individual well-being 
and private freedoms was . . . a renewed attention to mobilizing the population to participate in 
public initiatives and collective life.”460 On the other hand, Soviet international civil servants 
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living in Paris experienced both a privileged and more intensive version of this increased focus 
on the civic obligations of the Soviet citizen owing to their unique but perilous location abroad. 
The embassy put on a variety of prosaic cultural pastimes as well as a series of more 
extraordinary events symptomatic of the privileged place of Soviet nationals sent abroad. On 
Wednesday and Saturday evenings, following one of the political lectures or conferences, the 
trade mission held in its poorly ventilated and overcrowded movie theater the screening of a 
mixture of (usually old) Soviet and French films borrowed from Soveksportfil’m.461 Less 
routinely but more important for injecting comrades with a sense of communist purpose, the 
local committee orchestrated the showcasing of the cultural achievements of the motherland in 
person for its members. It not only dished out tickets for performances of artistic troupes on tour 
from the USSR (the Bolshoi Ballet at the Paris Opera House, a joint performance of the Moscow 
Circus and Ensemble of the Soviet Army at the Palais de Sports, etc.), but also recruited an 
eclectic group of visiting Soviet cultural luminaries and French celebrities sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union for intimate meet-and-greets with the Soviet collective throughout the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, including the legendary performer, Yves Montand; his wife, the giant of French 
cinema, Simone Signoret; the renowned Soviet ballerina, O. V. Lepeshinskaia; the classical 
music virtuoso, M. L. Rostropovich; the acclaimed Soviet writer, M. A. Sholokhov; and the 
pioneering cosmonaut, Iu. A. Gagarin.462 Not satisfied with such spectator forms of cultural 
experience, Soviet trade-union officials simultaneously harvested the aesthetic talents of their 
compatriots through the organization of a choir and various amateur performances, lamenting 
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that such grassroots entertainment begged for more participation. “There are a lot of people 
among us,” the authors of a 1959 report of the local committee repined, “[who] have some sort 
of talent about which the comrades around them do not even know.”463 
For intellectual enhancement, a small room on the fifth floor of the embassy–and, after 
1959, in the trade mission–housed a library, which the trade union believed “should not simply 
be a place for the issuance of books for home, but become a true center of cultural-educational 
work.”464 Open Wednesdays and Fridays from six to nine in the evening, the library offered a 
collection of around 5,000 books surrounded by walls and tables adorned with photo displays 
“reflecting some moments in the life” of the collective.465 Although occasionally benefitting 
from the donation of works from comrades anxious to lighten their load upon return to the 
USSR, the librarian accumulated the majority of her inventory on weekly treks around Paris to 
bookstores where she bought Soviet literature and works written by “progressive” French 
authors.466 The library aktiv also tried to convene “readers’ conferences,” throwing together in 
1959 a book club on Galina Nikolaeva’s Bitva v puti (Battle On the Way) that turned 
“uncomfortable” for the organizers when readers criticized the novel. In the stacks, library 
cardholders could find scattered among a preponderance of dated Soviet fiction a mishmash of 
French language textbooks, pamphlets from the Higher Party School, editions of Soviet political 
studies, and official party histories ordered from Moscow. As the chief information hub for the 
trade-union organization, the library clearly looked to emulate the reading culture of the 
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homeland, supplementing its bibliographic catalogue with over fifty subscriptions to Soviet 
periodicals that included mainstream serials and newspapers such as Pravda, Trud (Labor), and 
Kommunist; journals pertaining to diplomatic, academic, party, and trade-union matters such as 
Mirovaia ekonomika (World Economy), Voprosy istorii KPSS (Problems of the History of the 
CPSU), Partiinaia zhizn’ (Party Life), and Sovetskie profsoiuzy (Soviet Trade-Unions); as well as 
lifestyle or literary magazines such as Ogonek (Flame), Zvezda (Star), Novyi mir (New World), 
and Inostrannaia literatura (Foreign Literature).467  
To keep the bodies of their mental laborers in good shape, the physical-education sector 
of the United Professional Organization supplied the equipment and turf for an array of games 
and athletic contests. Along with sponsoring a fishing club and purchasing miscellaneous items 
for a variety of diversions (ping pong balls, nets, chess sets, checkers, etc.), the sector rented 
volleyball and tennis courts not far from the Eiffel Tower and, during the summer months, in 
Neuilly-sur-Seine to the west of Paris.468 For the facilitation of healthy competition among their 
comrades, Soviet institutions set up independent competitions in ping pong, chess, the Russian 
sport gorodki, volleyball, and pool. Expanding the stimulation of rivalry to the interinstitutional 
and international level, the embassy’s local committee organized playoffs not just among the 
Soviet agencies, but also between Soviet squads and national teams from the “brotherly socialist 
countries located in Paris.”469 After the Soviet lineup took first place in a volleyball tournament 
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in 1962, for example, the Czechoslovak ambassador to France awarded a “crystal cup” to the 
champions.470 
 The embassy designated sacred hiatuses in the workaday routines of its citizens for the 
enactment of national rituals and pastimes that concretized the communist worldview, hosting a 
combination of cultural and sporting activities in exclusively Soviet spaces to celebrate major 
Soviet holidays (New Year’s, International Women’s Day, the 150th Anniversary of the Battle of 
Borodino [1962], anniversaries of the October Revolution, etc.).471 In the course of “evenings of 
rest” on these special dates, the trade union planned elaborate ceremonies commemorating key 
events in the Soviet national and historical mythos, along with amateur concerts, games, 
lotteries, and dancing after dinner.472 Farther afield, the embassy’s dacha in the picturesque 
Parisian suburb of Mantes and the trade mission’s chateau in the sleepy commune of Montsoult 
became important sanctuaries in which Soviet citizens could retire from the drudgery of their 
foreign entanglements to revel in the warm weather after winter’s end and mark traditional 
communist jubilees outdoors. On May Day in 1962, the Mantes premises served as the venue for 
merrymaking and a special buffet to which representatives of the people’s democracies received 
invitations. “The presence of guests,” the writers of the local committee’s annual report recalled 
of the “maevka,” “gave this day a real feeling of a holiday of international solidarity of workers, 
promoting the strengthening of friendship among collectives of diplomatic delegations of 
countries of the socialist camp in France.”473  
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In the spring and summer months of every year, the UNESCO faction took part in weekly 
voskresniki, or Sunday work trips, on the grounds of the Mantes retreat. Intended to instill in 
their participants a sense of shared ownership of Soviet property in accordance with the emphasis 
back home on the “beautification” (blagoustroistvo) of Soviet neighborhoods during the 
Khrushchev era, the voskresniki incorporated a medley of short-term landscaping projects into 
their schedule (e.g., the building of a children’s playground, the renovation of the walls of the 
estate, the upkeep of athletic fields, etc.).474  
The province of the local committee, going beyond the alimentation of a discrete Soviet 
realm cordoned off from the vagaries of the bourgeois society they inhabited, also encompassed 
the crucial challenge of interpreting that strange new world for the Soviet itinerants. Eager to 
give its members “an impression of the country in which they are located, of its culture, daily 
life, and population,” the trade union selected guides from among its ranks to lead the Soviet 
population in France on excursions to the sites of Paris and beyond. In the late 1950s and first 
three years of the 1960s, tourist groups tended to concentrate their visits on the run-of-the-mill 
attractions of France’s medieval and nineteenth-century artistic and architectural icons, such as 
Notre Dame, the Pantheon, the Grand Palais, the Banque de France, and the artwork of the 
Louvre, as well as the castles of the Loire, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, and Chantilly.475  
But when an old hand of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, N. S. Ratiani, began to play a 
leading role in the sightseeing operation of the colony in 1962, she helped attune the excursions 
to the desire of the Soviet trade-union system for an explication of French history through a 
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distinctly Soviet mirror. While the UNESCO trade union began that year to set up for newcomers 
“regular introductions” to the country, and the embassy’s local committee purchased a bus for 
expeditions instead of holding fast to the previous practice of relying on expensive French 
charter companies, Ratiani led the way in the reengineering of the itineraries of these daytrips in 
accordance with complaints that the current circuits did not accentuate France’s revolutionary 
tradition and so as to make the nation’s heritage conform with the teleological narrative 
legitimizing the USSR’s preeminence in world history.476 Up to 1962, “the local committee 
placed great emphasis on the visiting of castles, cathedrals and other historical sites related to the 
Middle Ages of France,” the annual report from that year observed. “This, of course, is 
valuable,” the writers admitted. “Soviet people need to know this side of the history of France.” 
Yet the authors of the report stressed that Soviet excursion organizers “should not in anyway 
forget that the history of France is exceptionally rich with events related to heroic revolutionary 
struggles of its proletariat,” asking why they did “not organize excursions to historic places in 
Paris related to the Paris Commune” or “show our comrades the Red Belt of Paris, the residents 
of which always have been a mainstay of the French revolutionary movement?” To bring home 
the contemporaneity of Marxist-Leninist teachings on the inevitability of the development of 
class-consciousness under capitalism, the trade-union rapporteurs made a pitch for “excursions to 
places where in 1962 there were mass political demonstrations of French workers, as a result of 
which the De Gaullist government was forced to make peace in Algeria and put an end to the 
provocative ventures of the fascist thugs of the OAS [Organisation de l’armée secrète],” the 
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French paramilitary organization that executed terrorist acts in response to the French president’s 
moves toward granting Algeria independence in the early 1960s. 477  
Heeding the call for the provision of a panorama of French monumentality and social 
geography congruent with the Soviet state’s founding ideology, Ratiani’s Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation and the local committee crafted for its members a real-life montage of the local 
communist tradition and its tangible achievements in the present-day. In May 1963, the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation invited colleagues from other Soviet institutions to explore “Leninist 
places in Paris,” examining the “apartment-museum” of V. I. Lenin on Rue Marie-Rose, strolling 
through a park where Lenin “often was,” and surveying a rotunda and lecture hall in which the 
legendary revolutionary delivered speeches. Later that spring, Soviet UNESCO employees and 
delegation functionaries pulled off their own “collective trip” to the red city of Saint-Denis 
where the communist mayor, together with a député of the parliament from the French 
Communist Party (the stalwart ally of the USSR, Fernand Grenier), “told the participants in the 
excursion of the working conditions of the communist municipality of Saint-Denis, the life of the 
workers, the struggle for their rights.” After accompanying their Soviet friends to the house of 
the composer of The Internationale, Pierre De Geyter, the representatives of the communist-
controlled commune showed off the city’s “Sports Palace, which was constructed by the 
municipality for the workers,” as well as “the hospital [and] new housing blocks that were 
constructed with city funds for the workers.” Lest their peregrinations cease to highlight the 
flaws of the Western political order, the Soviet UNESCO chapter made sure to fit in between 
these communist pilgrimages a viewing of a session of the French National Assembly, “which 
was the material for subsequent conversations on bourgeois parliamentarism and the current 
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regime in France.”478 The next year, the delegation completed a junket to the Flins Renault 
factory that “contributed to a familiarization with the country, its history, and the situation of the 
French working class.”479 
Aside from the rather desultory hodgepodge of recreational and cultural outings 
described above, the local committee, conspiring to obviate the need for its constituents to resort 
to French social services, built up its own welfare infrastructure and communal enterprises 
within the Soviet colony. The UNESCO group had access to a cafeteria (stolovaia) that won high 
praise from Soviet international civil servants. “Nowhere in Paris,” one UNESCO worker 
remarked, “can you find meals like those in our cafeteria.”480 The provision of healthcare also 
became a central concern in the trade union’s quest to exempt the colony from dependency on 
interaction with French institutions. But the medical wing of the trade union, for much of the 
1960s, consisted of a single doctor with a rudimentary proficiency in French who divided her day 
into mornings receiving patients at the embassy and afternoons riding public transportation to 
make house calls, often for what the doctor dismissed as “trifles” not needing medical 
attention.481 From a financial standpoint, the physician’s penchant for refusing to give referrals to 
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affordable French specialists led to a drain of foreign currency because many patients went to 
French clinics anyway and asked the embassy to swallow the costs ex post facto.482  
In addition to extending to Soviet workers the amenities necessary for living in France 
without excessive interaction with the host government or society, the United Professional 
Organization provided the political and social preconditions for them to raise their families in a 
Soviet milieu. To busy the housewives who tagged along with their husbands to France, the local 
zhensovet (women’s council) ran a cluster of kruzhki (circles) for sewing and the study of 
French.483 In the UNESCO group, a male employee from the delegation or secretariat coached 
female spouses on politics and the “contemporary international situation” in colloquia that 
resembled the political-educational program for the men.484 Loath to entrust their children to the 
French educational system, the zhensovety, in conjunction with a “Parents’ Committee,” aided in 
the running of a small elementary school (for pupils grades 1-5) whose teachers sometimes 
moonlighted as social workers responsible for inspecting the home environments of the colony’s 
progeny. In 1959, the new faculty of the school went to all of the children’s residences in order 
to assess how children spent their free time and “the living conditions of each student”––“where 
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the children prepare for lessons, whether they have a special place, a children’s corner, and 
whether they sit correctly while doing homework.”485  
Realizing that their children felt “deprived in Paris of courtyards where they can play” 
and “special institutions” where they could “receive extracurricular education,” the “Children’s 
Sector” of the local committee crammed the downtime of its tykes with hobbies and 
engagements propitious to rearing well-rounded Homo sovietici.486 During recess, pupils either 
played on the embassy grounds in good weather or stayed indoors reading Soviet children’s 
journals (Pioneerskaia pravda, Murzilka).487 After school let out in the afternoon, the children 
converged in kruzhki for skillful hands (umelye ruki) arts-and-crafts projects, walking 
expeditions, embroidery, carving, housekeeping, and the theatrical performances of fairy tales.488 
On the weekends, the youngsters went to the Bois de Boulogne for “observation of nature with 
the coming of fall,” and took field trips to the zoo, inner-city gardens, or the editorship of 
L’Humanité. In observance of key holidays on the Soviet calendar, parents and teachers made 
their offspring both the object and subject of the festivities. With the coming of the forty-second 
anniversary of the October Revolution in 1959, the school searched for a veteran of either the 
Great Patriotic War or the Civil War to engage in a “conversation” with the children on the 
momentousness of the Bolshevik ascent to power. It also cast the young ones as acolytes in the 
solemn “ceremonial meeting” planned for the holy day and had them make displays attesting to 
                                                     
485 Once students graduated from the fifth grade, they returned to the USSR to take up studies at Soviet secondary 
schools. During their time in France, they were taught in Russian and only learned French in outside kruzhki. GARF, 
f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, ll. 4-7.  
 
486 GARF, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 1573, l. 139. 
 
487 GARf, f. 7709, op. 26, d. 740, l. 3. 
 
488 Ibid., l. 161. 
 257 
their knowledge of the USSR’s revolutionary genesis.489 Once school ended and vacations 
kicked off, the dacha in Mantes became the site of a daycare and pioneer camp bustling with 
campfires, around which the children performed the usual pioneer rituals.490 At other times, the 
dacha metamorphosed into a safe space for families in the midst of dangerous political turmoil 
that seemed to corroborate for Soviet nationals their country’s depiction of the capitalist 
organization of society as inherently conducive to the rise of fascism. When what the local 
committee construed as a “wave of OAS terroristic activity” spread across France and Algeria 
before and after the signing of the March 1962 Évian Accords, parents formed a night watch at 
the dacha to protect juveniles from the rightwing terrorist network.491  
*                 *                 * 
Thus, from the delegation’s tiny corner in the embassy to the dacha in Mantes, Soviet 
international civil servants had at their disposal a diversity of activities designed to make a home 
away from home and relieve the pain of “culture shock” that put at risk their communist fealty 
and resolve to fulfill Soviet objectives. But to what extent did all the aforementioned tactics for 
building an inviolable Soviet enclave in the center of the West, especially after their 
intensification in 1959, succeed in making the collective of Soviet secretariat workers 
insusceptible to the atomization part and parcel to its members’ daily isolation as well as 
impervious to the taboo inveiglements of life abroad? Irrespective of their chaperons’ 
asseverations to the contrary, the unprecedented arrangements of Soviet secretariat bureaucrats, 
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who resided throughout the French capital and worked in complete sequestration from the Soviet 
body politic, greatly curbed the delegation’s ability to monitor the ideological sanctity of their 
subordinates. In reality, Soviet international civil servants enjoyed more freedom to explore the 
West and dabble in its forbidden fruits than any other Soviet citizens stationed abroad.      
Despite the best efforts of the delegation leadership to give the impression in their reports 
to Moscow that they ran a tight ship of frequent interaction with their peers in the secretariat, the 
UNESCO mission suffered from persistent disorganization, truancy, and communication 
breakdowns among its own officials. In his 1964 assessment filed for MID, Kiselev painted a 
picture of the reigning disorderliness in the delegation’s business: “At the party bureau and 
operational meetings, it is repeatedly noted that the necessary daily routine is lacking; no one 
knows where workers are, in the UNESCO building or in the embassy; . . . [and] some workers 
cannot be found for several days.” Alarmingly, the MID adviser gleaned from his conversations 
that the inveterate erraticism in the schedules of workers went all the way to the top of the 
delegation. “Many employees,” he disclosed, “complained that Comrade A. P. Pavlov [the 
Soviet permanent delegate from 1961 to 1965] himself often arrives to work late, arranges a 
lunch break for himself at a different time than all of the employees, and therefore there is little 
chance to communicate with him.”492 Such unreliability on the part of its functionaries only 
added to the preexisting difficulties encountered by the delegation when plotting regular 
chitchats with their people in the secretariat. As Pavlov himself admitted in a report from the 
same year, meetings for “mass-political and ideological-educational work” transpired not as 
often as he would have wanted on account of “the fact that part of [the Soviet UNESCO 
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collective] are formally officials of international organizations and have their own daily 
schedule, in many ways different from the schedule of the delegation.”493  
Kiselev also discovered in his interviews information that belied the delegation’s 
assertions that it counseled UNESCO operatives on how to approach their jobs in the 
international organization. In 1962 and 1963, “collaborative work of employees of the delegation 
and the secretariat on documentation, information, reviews, [and] evaluations” took place willy-
nilly and without any planning whatsoever. Additionally, some members of the delegation and 
secretariat posse fretted over inadequate guidance from Moscow as to how they should approach 
UNESCO. “In conversations,” Kiselev commented, “workers drew attention to the fact that the 
commission and MID’s Division of International Economic Organizations (OMEO) in the course 
of the year did little to orient the collective of Soviet employees in UNESCO.” In particular, the 
agencies seldom sent directives on “precisely what issues should be further studied” and hardly 
ever specified “what kind of political information” they considered interesting enough for their 
correspondents in the secretariat to relay to the Center.494   
This widespread confusion precipitated a trend among a segment of Soviet international 
civil servants toward social fragmentation, estrangement, and disassociation from the centers of 
social activity put in place to shore up their allegiance to the Soviet state. Although many 
UNESCO staff members partook in the happenings of the broader colony, Kiselev regretted that 
events in the delegation’s “club” in 1963 drew only “a small portion of the employees of the 
delegation, the secretariat and their wives, while evening entertainments, lectures, or 
presentations for the collective itself, with the exception of one instance, are not held at the 
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delegation.” Similarly, the MID inspector learned from the wives that they “almost do not know 
each other” and “live in isolation.” In general, Kiselev reported that his interlocutors inundated 
him with “complaints of isolation and the absence of a collective of UNESCO employees.”495  
Perhaps inevitably, Soviet UNESCO employees preferred to spend their nonworking 
hours with the delights on offer in Paris, one of the cardinal hubs of Western culture and 
consumerism. As Kiselev mentioned in his dispatch to Moscow, “a small group of workers have 
fallen for French cinema, frequently visiting cafes and at the same time are rarely seen at the club 
of the embassy.”496A fascination with Western culture–or, equally plausibly, a desire to profit off 
it–also emboldened one Soviet UNESCO translator and career teacher at the Moscow State 
Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages to break the domestic laws of the USSR. In August 
1964, Moscow customs officers arrested M. G. Anisenko upon his return to the Soviet Union 
following a half-decade stint at the international organization. Notwithstanding the delegation’s 
past evaluations of the former UNESCO hand as a “politically literate, ideologically and morally 
steadfast” person who bore the qualities of a “good family man,” Soviet customs found in 
Anisenko’s suitcases dozens of “anti-Soviet” clippings from satirical newspapers and the 
“bourgeois” daily Le Figaro; ten issues of the humor magazines Le Rire, Comics Magazine, Fou 
Rire, and 200 Histoires Pour Rire, which contained jokes about the Soviet Union; a copy of 
Albert Camus’s The Rebel among seven other banned books; three spy novels from Jean Bruce’s 
prohibited OSS 117 series; one-hundred and twenty-four issues of “tabloid, entertainment and 
semi-pornographic magazines” such as Playboy, Lui, Cinémonde, and Jours de France; and a 
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couple of “semipornographic,” parodic dictionaries.497 Thus, a positive assessment of an 
international civil servant’s character and ideological scrupulousness did not necessarily reflect 
their immunity to Western ideas and cultural products deemed anathema to the preservation of 
communist purity.    
But Soviet UNESCO professionals’ experimentation with material and intellectual 
contraband became less of a source for unease than the possibility that any feelings of alienation 
developed living abroad would make them fall off the radar of the delegation and into the 
clutches of Western intelligence agencies. The case of M. N. Kuznetsov, a P-4 editor in the 
UNESCO Russian Translation Section, illustrates the high degree of independence Soviet 
UNESCO employees possessed compared to other Soviet citizens on assignment in foreign 
countries. It also reveals the anomie they experienced as individuals expected to live in public as 
essentially Western citizens with Western jobs but secretly subject to the heavy-handed coercive 
methods of a Soviet state deeply suspicious of its citizens living outside the country.  
In the afternoon on New Year’s Day 1962, Kuznetsov disappeared from his home and 
office for six days, leaving a cryptically short note to his wife that he would “return on the sixth.” 
A day later, his wife reported to Ambassador Vinogradov that her husband had gone AWOL. On 
January 8, just a day after Kuznetsov resurfaced at his desk in UNESCO headquarters, MID 
whisked him back to Moscow for not sleeping in his apartment and leaving Paris without prior 
approval––two actions that clearly breached the USSR’s rules of conduct for citizens working 
abroad.498 In light of his unblemished record and lengthy tenure in Paris, Kuznetsov’s dereliction 
of his duties must have surprised his Soviet higher-ups. After all, the delegation, only eleven 
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months prior to his absconsion, had portrayed the four-and-a-half-year veteran of UNESCO as a 
“politically steadfast, morally sound” man who took an “active” part in the social life of the 
delegation as the leader of a seminar on the “Economics and Politics of Capitalist Countries.”499  
When meeting with the deputy chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission on January 
13 and the head of the MID Directorate of Cadres on January 24, Kuznetsov narrated a long 
history of marital strife to justify his illegal departure, telling his Soviet questioners that his 
twelve-year marriage had gradually “become more strained” and that, despite a hope things 
would “settle down,” his “not very good” relationship with his wife had “only worsened” 
following their move to France in September 1958. Kuznetsov claimed that the delegation had 
nonetheless ignored his persistent implorations for permission to go back to the USSR in order to 
secure a divorce. As a result of this frustrating situation, he had begun to stay at work until two 
or three o’clock in the morning during the month leading up to the episode in question. But every 
time Kuznetsov arrived home from one of these nights burning the midnight oil, he found “the 
door locked with the key and the doorbell disconnected.” Tired of banging on the door, 
“disturbing the neighbors,” and still finding himself locked out, the stranded husband chose on 
several occasions to either check in to a hotel or sleep in his car, determining that “this way he 
would ‘not bring harm to anyone’” even though he knew the rules binding him to an address 
registered with the Soviet embassy. With respect to the nearly weeklong absence under 
investigation, Kuznetsov argued that his “familial relations” had finally “forced him” to take a 
vacation.500 As a consequence, he had gone to see the sights of Paris and subsequently traveled 
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hundreds of miles south to the French Riviera, where he toured the city of Nice and the 
principality of Monaco after a stopover in Dijon.501    
In these interrogations, Kuznetsov revealed how his lengthy stay abroad had endowed 
him with a markedly non-Soviet presumption of entitlement to autonomy in mobility and 
decision-making. Instead of confessing his wrongdoing and begging for forgiveness when his 
Soviet inquisitors pressed him to “realize his guilt,” the former UNESCO translator “behaved 
extremely disingenuously, answered in monosyllables,” and “took on the posture of an offended 
man.”502 By way of response to questions as to why he had not apprised the Soviet permanent 
delegate of his journey beforehand, Kuznetsov retorted that he had obtained a leave “in the 
prescribed manner in the UNESCO Secretariat” from his boss, a Soviet citizen at the helm of the 
Russian Translation Section, and that “anyone else could arrange a leave quite easily without 
asking permission of the delegate.”503 In this riposte, Kuznetsov exploited the ambiguities in the 
overlapping and contradictory hierarchies spawned by the USSR’s covert strategy for subverting 
the international civil service. His reference to the official green light that he received from his 
Soviet superior in UNESCO obfuscated his blatant use of the procedures of the secretariat to 
shake off Soviet surveillance and functioned as a face-saving technique to exonerate him of 
accusations of premeditated rebellion. At the same time, he granted UNESCO authority over 
whether he had the right to take a break from work, thereby challenging the goal of the Soviet 
state to reserve for itself total control over citizens employed by international organizations. As 
the object of the competing ethical regimes and power structures of the international civil service 
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and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, Kuznetsov tactically surrendered to the former jurisdiction 
over his life when the latter got in in his way, undermining the Soviet state’s postulate that “its” 
international civil servants were nothing more than undercover sycophantic diplomats.   
In the bipolar framework ingrained in the minds of his Soviet cross-examiners, 
however, Kuznetsov’s delinquency, instead of coming across as an act of creative disobediance 
in which an individual deployed the rules of one of his masters to defy the other for his own 
ends, had all the signs of the machinations of Western espionage. The multiple accounts of the 
incident submitted by Kuznetsov’s wife to Vinogradov certainly corroborated their hunch that 
Western spies had turned the UNESCO interpreter. As the concerned spouse imparted to the 
ambassador, Kuznetsov had recently treated her and their nine-year old son “poorly,” stayed 
out late, and responded to their queries as to what he did on these late nights with one word––
delishki, or the Russian equivalent of muttering “work stuff.” She further recited how on 
December 31, the night before Kuznetsov walked out of the apartment, two French-speaking 
strangers called their residence, introduced themselves to her as “friends of your husband,” and 
asked the woman if they could speak with the man of the house. “His refusal to tell me the 
names of these persons and describe how he had acquired acquaintances unknown to me,” the 
communist housewife recollected, “naturally aroused my suspicions.” To contextualize 
Kuznetsov’s behavior, she reminded Vinogradov that her “husband worked in an international 
organization, the environment of which is fundamentally different from the environment of 
Soviet institutions,” requiring Soviet UNESCO employees to labor “constantly in foreign 
surroundings” where they encountered “people of different nationalities, views, attitudes, and 
intentions.” She then couched her rationalization for the denunciation of her significant other in 
language that attributed to the secretariat the kind of cosmopolitanism that Stalinist sermons 
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had cast as threating to contaminate Soviet nationals with infectious sympathies. “Being in this 
heap, in this motley stream,” she reasoned when alluding to her husband’s workplace, “one can 
perchance fall into its current and begin to swirl in it. Thus, hearing the call of strangers who 
also described themselves as friends, I thought of this stream and, fearing my husband had 
compromised himself and driven by a sense of obligation, I came to you.”504  
Taking their lead from the misgivings articulated by his partner, the MID and Soviet 
UNESCO Commission officers asked Kuznetsov again and again if he had met with anyone 
during his unauthorized furlough and how he preoccupied himself generally outside of his 
work life. The accused replied that he had traveled by himself and normally frittered away his 
downtime relaxing at home, going to museums and libraries, or sometimes playing chess with 
Soviet UNESCO colleagues. When asked if he had arranged a rendezvous with someone on 
New Years’ Eve, Kuznetsov acknowledged that he had socialized with a Spanish communist’s 
Soviet-Latvian wife whom he knew from the secretariat, but insisted that he “did not have a 
relationship with her.”505 Whatever the nature of his movements and fraternizations, MID and 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission promptly closed his case, returning the disgraced cadre to his 
previous post at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and alerting its executives of “his 
improper behavior abroad.”506  
The decisive steps MID and the Soviet UNESCO Commission took in reaction to 
Kuznetsov’s desertion spoke to their alarm over the convergence of his flight with the calls he 
fielded from foreigners rather than a concern over his temporary decampment in vacuo. Indeed, 
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the regular violation on the part of Soviet UNESCO workers of the protocol for logging 
business travel outside of France compelled the delegation to pester MID in 1963 to 
decentralize the process so that the delegation could license some of them to fly out of Paris 
with little notice for “urgent” and “unforeseen” trips.507 Nevertheless, the Kuznetsov affair 
represented the exception instead of the rule in terms of how Soviet UNESCO officeholders 
comported themselves. By and large, Soviet international civil servants, while undoubtedly 
bending the codes of conduct to their advantage when beyond the gaze of their taskmasters, 
retained a strong loyalty to the Soviet mission that fed off the plethora of social and cultural 
activities the Soviet colony carried out for precisely this purpose.  
But the alternation of micromanagement from their Soviet guardians and relative 
freedom-in-isolation that Soviet UNESCO staff underwent in their lives outside the workplace 
led to a personalization and privatization of their communist identities. Expected to preserve 
fidelity to the USSR with the help of only a rudimentary version of the Soviet public sphere 
that reinforced the communist faith of their countrymen back home, UNESCO officials from 
the Soviet Union had to weather, and concoct fittingly communist countermoves to, the 
“provocations” of everyday Western life unsupervised and alone. They also had to reconcile 
their dual jobs as secret agents of their government and servants to an international 
organization with little help from Soviet authorities, who remained banned from snooping 
around the offices of the secretariat and had developed an understanding of UNESCO inferior 
to their minions working within its walls. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the long hours 
these communist individuals labored in the “motley stream” of the secretariat forced them to 
reconceptualize and refashion what it meant to faithfully champion the Soviet cause on the 
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world stage.  
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CHAPTER 6 
  
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS BY DAY: THE COLD WAR OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
IN THE UNESCO SECRETARIAT 
 
Each weekday morning, Soviet international civil servants commuted to UNESCO 
headquarters to work in the secretariat, where they faced a UNESCO ethical regime and power 
structure radically different from the regulations imposed on them in their downtime by the 
proxies of the Soviet state in Paris. Upon securing their posts in UNESCO, all newly hired Soviet 
nationals had to sign a pledge that they would “solemnly undertake to exercise in all loyalty, 
discretion, and conscience the functions entrusted” to them as UNESCO staff members. They 
had to promise to “discharge these functions and regulate” their “conduct with the interests of 
UNESCO only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions” from “any government or other 
authority external to the organization.”508 As Soviet secretariat personnel found out, this entailed 
making decisions and completing tasks that at times contradicted their orders from the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission and Delegation, both of which could not openly infiltrate the walls of 
UNESCO to lend a guiding hand to their charges.  
In addition, their oath to serve the international organization necessitated that they obey, 
collaborate, and share coffee breaks with Western bosses and other officemates bearing attitudes 
and personalities informed by and embodying a variety of national backgrounds, ideologies, and 
individual quirks. These coworkers did not fall into the clear-cut categories of friend or foe with
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which Soviet professionals tried to organize the new social landscape they inhabited. Rather, 
they constituted the sui generis culture of the international organization’s permanent workforce. 
In his 1978 retrospective on UNESCO, Richard Hoggart, a British pioneer of academic cultural 
studies who served as UNESCO deputy director-general in the early 1970s, aptly described this 
culture of the international organization not only as a cosmopolitan microcosm of the 
international community, but also as a secluded and self-absorbed society consumed with petty 
social tensions. “The internal life of the secretariat,” he wrote, “is exceptionally intense and 
inbred; UNESCO headquarters is a cocoon, a hothouse, a vast and uneasy hamsters’ nest. For 
many members of staff, UNESCO and its internal affairs form a total world, a continuous drama 
almost wholly concerned with the staff’s own common life.”509 
Surveying this confusing environment and often working alone in departments with 
hundreds of foreigners, Soviet UNESCO employees had to assign meaning to the humdrum 
office politics they encountered by appropriating and refashioning elements of the Soviet 
narrative of international struggle between capitalist and communist countries, using this 
narrative to interpret and act on the mundane conflicts, alliances, and uncertainties of their 
workplace. Moreover, they had to solve the inscrutable puzzle their country placed before them–
–how to excel at playing the “rules of the game” of the international civil service while not 
letting these rules shape them.  
In this chapter, I offer an exploration of the range of ways Soviet international civil 
servants coped with these challenges. In particular, I show that these newcomers to the world of 
international organizations came up with original and highly personalized narratives, selectively 
reframing official Soviet presumptions of the outside world into plots sometimes at odds with the 
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sanctioned positions of their Soviet superiors toward the international organization. As Soviet 
international civil servants attempted to explain their milieu in reports to the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation, they produced a collection of musings on their foreign environs 
remarkably heterogeneous in their tenor and topics, which ranged from gossip about foreign 
colleagues to elaborate but sometimes half-baked schemes for Soviet cultural diplomacy.510 The 
stories Soviet UNESCO employees told about themselves did not simply reflect, due to a desire 
to please their Soviet bosses or a heightened political militancy, an exaggerated imagining of 
their daily battles as miniature reproductions of the worldwide struggle to determine whether the 
capitalist or communist system was superior. Rather, their accounts reveal a reduction of 
international politics to the level of the mundane in order to make sense of why their government 
had sent them into the unknown and often baffling circumstances of the UNESCO Secretariat.  
Moreover, Soviet UNESCO employees viewed the UNESCO bureaucracy through 
categories of thinking prevalent in the Soviet society they had left behind. In her study of late-
Stalinist middle-brow literature, literary critic Vera Dunham highlights the appearance in Soviet 
discourse during late Stalinism of a class of middling bureaucrats who formed the base of social 
support for the Soviet state in the late 1940s.511 “Public in employment but private and inner-
directed in its strivings,” this new social group bore a remarkable resemblance to the depictions 
of middle-class professionals pervading 1950s American culture. “The Soviet middle class does 
consist of many Soviet Babbitts and organization men, as well as of white-collar mid-culture 
                                                     
510 Anne Gorsuch describes an official communist “script” governing the behavior of Soviet citizens abroad and 
determining how they were evaluated by their minders in reports to authorities in the USSR. She argues that this 
script, which contained officially sanctioned lines praising the achievements of the Soviet Union, did not always 
translate well when performed in front of non-Soviet audiences. See Gorsuch, All This Is Your World, 128-29. 
 
511 Dunham argues that the Soviet state struck a “Big Deal” with this new breed of Soviet citizens. For Dunham, the 
Soviet state received the allegiance of this class in exchange for material goods and a tacit sanctioning of middle-
class values. Vera S. Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1990), 13-14. 
 271 
men and women,” Dunham maintains. The rise of this new class enabled the reemergence, after 
the idealism following the revolution, of an archetype with deep roots in Russian history known 
as meshchanstvo. The meshchanin, or a person typifying this archetype, displayed a knack for 
“social climbing,” “careerism,” and “complacent vegetation” as well as a “fervor for 
possessions” reminiscent of the nouveau riche populating the postwar suburbs and working in 
the corporations of the West.512  
After Stalin’s death, the Soviet press and intelligentsia made these bureaucrats scapegoats 
for the economic and technological stagnation of the past. “Technological innovation conflicts 
between noble innovators and scheming bureaucrats,” the historian Denis Kozlov notes, “became 
a fashionable topic in literature and journalism in 1956.” As Kozlov explains, the most famous of 
these attacks on Soviet bureaucrats, V. D. Dudintsev’s 1956 novel Not by Bread Alone (Ne 
khlebom edinym), impressed on Soviet readers “a powerful image of Soviet industrial 
management as a corrupt yet omnipotent bureaucratic machine that resisted improvement and 
innovation, a system in which capable administrators were exceptional, and against which the 
chances of a lonely inventor were practically nil.”513 This embrace of dynamic innovation 
reflected a broader yearning during the Thaw to overcome the legacy of Stalinism and 
“bureaucratism” by returning to the revolutionary roots of the Soviet project in the ideas of Lenin 
and the idealistic experimentation of the 1920s.514 The Soviet search for an authentic communist 
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mission unspoiled by bureaucratic malfeasance paralleled the search for authentic individuality 
in American culture in the 1950s and early 1960s discussed in the introduction to this section in 
chapter 3.515  
Soviet international civil servants drew on this anti-bureaucratic language to read their 
foreign workplace. Specifically, they type-casted adversarial bosses and colleagues as Western 
versions of the corrupt Soviet bureaucrats described by Dunham and Dudintsev. To retain their 
status as outsiders in the UNESCO Secretariat, Soviet UNESCO employees portrayed 
themselves in reports to Moscow as champions of the revolutionary “romanticism” of the 
Khrushchev era in battle with an entrenched bureaucracy whose Western employees corrupted 
the lofty internationalist values shared by the USSR and UNESCO. By identifying privately as 
authentic communists, they differentiated themselves from the “phony” neutral men who 
pretended to serve an internationalist ideal and the conformist work culture of the UNESCO 
Secretariat as defined by the ethics of the international civil service. At the same time, Soviet 
UNESCO workers had to perform the role of international civil servant, putting on what 
Goffman calls a “personal front” that accorded with their position in the UNESCO Secretariat. 
They also had to comport themselves with a degree of collegiality. In Goffman’s terminology, 
Western UNESCO employees had the power to determine the “definition of the situation” in 
UNESCO, or to shape social interactions by making “a moral demand upon” Soviet citizens, 
“obliging them to value and treat . . . [them] in the manner that persons of . . . [their] kind have a 
right to expect.”516 The bifurcation of their lives into a private Soviet sphere and a public sphere 
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of international civil service engendered contradictions each Soviet professional in UNESCO 
struggled to reconcile. To both excel under the UNESCO regime and fulfill their objectives as 
communists in the organization, Soviet nationals tried to carve out their own niches within the 
UNESCO bureaucracy so that their personal communist identities aligned with the ethics of the 
international organization. 
No matter how fervently these communists claimed to represent their country in the 
international organization, however, they could not remain immune to UNESCO culture and 
ethics. As Milosz observes in his contemplation of Polish intellectuals who put up a façade of 
fealty to the communist regime, “conscious acting, if one practices it long enough, develops 
those traits which one uses most in one’s role, just as a man who became a runner because he had 
good legs develops his legs even more in training.”517 Thus, I also demonstrate that Soviet 
UNESCO employees, out of a need to get by day to day, adopted the norms, practices, and 
values they had to adhere to in their public lives as international civil servants.518 While 
remaining allegiant to the Soviet state, a number of them began to advocate in their missives 
back home a frustration with their government’s interference in their public assignments as 
international civil servants and a consternation with its refusal to conform to the expectations 
UNESCO had of its member states.  
This chapter also sheds light on how the Soviet diplomatic, press, and trade corps dealt 
with the elaborate code the Soviet Union formulated for ensuring their communist purity while 
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stationed abroad. For Soviet secretariat workers, no fixed, geographical border separated the 
noncommunist, foreign world of the “West” and the Soviet community as it did for their 
compatriots back home. Instead, officials in the Soviet embassy and Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
defined what it meant to be in the Soviet colony, and hence to be a faithful communist, on the 
basis of behavior, or whether Soviet UNESCO employees abided by the demanding and 
impractical set of rules imposed on Soviet citizens in foreign countries. Soviet secretariat 
personnel therefore experienced the bipolarity of the Cold War not as a distant drama unfolding 
in the news, but as a struggle to maintain discipline in the “enemy’s rear” and as a division of 
their everyday actions into those acceptable to their Soviet handlers and those transgressing these 
limits. Soviet authorities enforcing these statutes obstructed the jobs they sent Soviet UNESCO 
employees to do, thereby inviting the disobedience of international civil servants seeking to 
negotiate the UNESCO and Soviet ethical regimes foisted on them by these two competing 
power structures.  
I begin this chapter with an assessment of the job performances of Soviet specialists as 
international civil servants, chronicling their accomplishments and mistakes in this novel 
profession. I then describe how they understood and reacted to their foreign coworkers and the 
UNESCO work culture. The next portion of the chapter investigates the extent to which Soviet 
secretariat functionaries adopted the ethics and norms of the international civil service and how 
they compared the practices of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation to those of the 
international organization. Finally, I end the chapter with an analysis of how Soviet UNESCO 
employees navigated the disciplinary regime prescribed for them by their Soviet managers, 
illuminating the accomplishments and failures of the Soviet state in preserving the communist 
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identities of their people at UNESCO and preventing them from becoming full-fledged 
international civil servants.  
*                 *                 * 
Given the demand of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation that their workers 
in the UNESCO bureaucracy violate the ethics of the international civil service, the performance 
of Soviet UNESCO employees at the international organization depended on their adeptness in 
concealing their clandestine work from UNESCO supervisors. But Soviet professionals under the 
watchful gaze of their UNESCO overlords could hardly hide their ulterior obligations to the 
Soviet state. Within the first two years of Soviet enlistment in the UNESCO Secretariat, the 
organization’s administrators grew wise to the forbidden errands run by their communist 
personnel, uncovering the practice of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation of violating, in the words 
of the classified documents of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the “internal rules” of the 
secretariat by forcing the cohort of Soviet UNESCO translators (“having in mind a better use of 
this group” than their official jobs in the secretariat) to “process various materials” circulating 
between the delegation and the organization.519  For example, on November 28, 1957, Roger 
Barnes, the director of the UNESCO Languages Division, summoned Dubinin into his office, 
flung a paper written in French that he had received from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation on the 
table, and coyly stated: “excellently written document Mr. Dubinin.” After Dubinin denied he 
had ever seen the typed pages before him, Barnes, sardonically sniping that only Dubinin “could 
translate into French so well,” proceeded to recite the oath of the international civil service. “To 
read to me this oath in such circumstances,” Dubinin remembered in his memoirs, “was 
tantamount to a reprimand for violations of the ethics of an employee of the UNESCO 
                                                     
519 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 65; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 117. 
 276 
Secretariat, since working for someone else, including one’s own government, . . . should not be 
done by secretariat employees.”520 To “avoid possible future misunderstandings,” Barnes sent 
Dubinin a memo in which he reminded the future ambassador that he must seek approval of the 
chief of the Russian Translation Section any time he vacated his desk “during working hours for 
any considerable length of time (say, more than ten minutes).” Barnes also stressed that the 
Soviet translator must leave “official consultations” with the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to his 
boss.521  
The fact that Soviet citizens completed chores for their delegations remained an open 
secret in UNESCO and throughout the UN system for the duration of the eastern bloc’s 
existence. Hoggart observed that, in his time at UNESCO, “the Soviets” found it “almost 
impossible to believe that a member of the secretariat is not also a member of his national civil 
services, or at the least a dutiful mouthpiece and reporter.”522 In the early 1980s, Shevchenko 
corroborated these conjectures. “Through an elaborate organizational structure,” he explained, 
“the Soviet mission maintains full control over the daily work of Soviet nationals in the 
secretariat.”523 As Lemoine remarked in his analysis of the international civil service from the 
                                                     
520 Dubinin, Diplomaticheskaia byl’, 65–66. 
 
521 With respect to “official consultations,” Barnes emphasized that Dubinin could discuss topics of translation with 
Russian/Soviet associates but only in an unofficial way. “This does not prevent you,” he wrote, “from discussing 
informally with any of your friends, for example, matters of Russian terminology; but such informal consultations, 
useful as they may be, are not part of your official duties and must therefore not interfere with or delay the 
performance of your official duties.” He also implicitly told Dubinin that the renewal of his contract depended on 
him learning English so he could not only translate from Russian to French and vice versa, but also from Russian to 
English and vice versa. Roger Barnes, “Memo DPL. 57/370,” December 3, 1957, 1–3, AG 8: Personnel Records of 
Mr. Y. Doubinine, UNESCO Archives. 
 
522 Hoggart, An Idea and Its Servants, 45. 
 
523 He went on to describe this control: “All these staff members are part of the Ob'edinennye referentury (United 
Sections) of the Mission, where they receive direct instructions about how they should do their jobs in the 
secretariat and what their specific contributions should be to the work of the Mission itself.” Shevchenko, Breaking 
With Moscow, 294-95. 
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early 1990s, “the appetite of Soviet officials for photocopies of documents in draft–which in 
most cases will officially reach the USSR mission in a matter of days–is well known.”524 
Yet so long as Soviet UNESCO servants did not get caught red handed or allow their 
patriotic commitments to interfere with their official transactions, the UNESCO administration 
refrained from taking punitive measures in response to these suspected violations. Indeed, the 
majority of grievances Western UNESCO bosses aired to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation or 
submitted in their internal performance evaluations concentrated on Soviet specialists’ lack of 
the necessary ingenuity, qualifications, or competency to fulfill that part of UNESCO work 
conferred on them. The diversity of these critiques suggests that the nature of the foibles Soviet 
UNESCO employees exhibited throughout the workday depended more on their personal 
qualities than a common Soviet pedigree. Sobolev, when he came up for promotion in rank as a 
program specialist in the Department of Mass Communication in the early 1960s, received 
chastisements for needing “guidance when dealing with new situations,” having strengths 
“primarily on the administrative rather than the creative side,” and finding it “difficult to be 
critical of his own shortcomings” or solve “unforeseen problems.” In contrast, Dubinin won 
plaudits in one assessment from 1958 for demonstrating in his work as a translator “a lively and 
receptive intelligence which enables him to readily assimilate new ideas and adapt himself to 
new situations.”525  
But even complaints pertaining to professional performance sometimes stemmed from 
the difficulty Soviet citizens faced when trying to handle their dual missions and UNESCO’s 
                                                     
524 Lemoine made these remarks when discussing Shevchenko’s tell-all memoir, noting that “the ‘revelations’ of the 
former Soviet under-secretary-general for political and security council affairs confirmed what was widely suspected 
in the secretariats of the United Nations and of the agencies.” Lemoine, The International Civil Servant, 61-62. 
 
525 Émile Delavenay, “Within-Grade Increment,” December 19, 1958, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. Y. 
Doubinine, UNESCO Archives; Tor Gjesdal, “Within-Grade Increment,” April 21, 1960; and “Within-Grade 
Increment,” June 3, 1962, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Solobev, UNESCO Archives. 
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consequent frustration with their hesitancy to show sufficient exuberance in their capacities as 
international civil servants.526 The occupational tribulations of V. P. Biriukov, who began his 
UNESCO career in January 1957 as a P-2 program assistant in the Public Liaison Division of the 
Department of Mass Communication, spotlight the bind in which these personnel found 
themselves. In July 1957, the Israeli director of the Department of Mass Communication, Dr. 
Jacob Zuckerman, notified the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that he had no choice but to give 
Biriukov a negative evaluation and dismiss him after his probationary contract expired that 
August. In response to the Soviet envoy’s inquiries as to what made Biriukov “not suitable” for 
the post, Zuckerman named what the third secretary labeled as the usual laundry list of 
“platitudes,” which included complaints that Biriukov “supposedly did not have work experience 
in international organizations; that he, supposedly, showed little initiative and that, finally, his 
knowledge of English, not to mention his knowledge of French, was lacking.” Zuckerman 
finished his review of Biriukov’s conduct with the aside that––in the Soviet secretary’s 
paraphrasing of the director’s words––“in five minutes” he could “have an ideal Anglo-Saxon in 
this position.”527 But Biriukov’s incompetence had more to do with his impossible mission of 
appeasing both UNESCO and his superintendents in Moscow than any personal failings.  
Although the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation dismissed Zuckerman’s 
disparagement of their fellow countryman’s “inactivity” as part of a pattern of discrimination, 
they admitted in correspondence with each other that his criticisms were “largely justified” and 
stemmed from the antithetical job descriptions imposed on him by UNESCO and the Soviet 
                                                     
526 A lack of “initiative” and “creativity” remained a constant refrain in UNESCO evaluations of Soviet 
professionals. For one of many examples apart from the case of Biriukov (described below), see: Tor Gjesdal, 
“Within-Grade Increment,” April 22, 1960, 2, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Solobev, UNESCO Archives. 
 
527 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 35-36.  
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government.528 Biriukov’s responsibilities included what he characterized as “the promotion of 
the expansion of the network of contacts” between communist institutions, UNESCO and those 
wanting to use UNESCO as a means of communication with socialist professionals; “the 
dissemination of informational materials on the general nature of UNESCO activities” to 
“nongovernmental” organizations, academies, and other agencies in the communist world; and 
the advertisement of the UNESCO Gift Coupon Program east of the Iron Curtain.529 In essence, 
UNESCO expected Biriukov to act as chief UNESCO propagandist in the USSR and its Eastern 
European satellites. Thus, the “complaints” directed at Biriukov, the Soviet camp recalled, “were 
caused mainly by the fact that Biriukov was instructed to increase the propaganda of UNESCO 
activity in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. Owing to the fact that we are not 
interested in UNESCO propaganda in the USSR, Biriukov could not fulfill this instruction.”530 
To save face in UNESCO while simultaneously abiding by Soviet preferences, Biriukov chose 
“carefully the addresses of organizations,” only mailing them “suitable material” and “trying to 
prevent the expansion of contacts especially with social organizations and individual people.”531 
                                                     
528 Ibid., l. 36; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 52-54. 
  
529 He also had similar duties for the Scandinavian countries. Of course, these nations did not present the same kind 
of problems as those in the eastern bloc. As Biriukov put it in February 1959, he was tasked with kick starting 
relations between the eastern bloc and UNESCO immediately after the USSR joined the organization: “In this 
period [the calendar year of 1957], there were almost no relationships between these countries and the division, and 
my position was founded by UNESCO specifically to establish and increase contacts with organizations and 
individual representatives of science and culture in these countries, direct contacts with the division of relations 
along with other divisions and services of UNESCO, and indirect [contacts] with interested organizations and 
persons of other countries seeking relations with these countries through UNESCO.” See Biriukov’s annual reports 
to the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 72-73; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 
2, d. 6, ll. 268-72. For corroboration of his description, see the official job description to which he responded and 
applied for in the UNESCO Archives: “Summary Post Description,” July 27, 1956, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. 
V. Birioukov, UNESCO Archives.  
 
530 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 78.  
 
531 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 269-70. But after the end of Biriukov’s second probationary contract in December 
1957 and a year of limbo within the Public Liaison Division, Zuckerman transferred him to the photo library of the 
Division of Visual and Auditory Information. While UNESCO officials believed that his professional background, 
as a coordinator of the exportation and importation of films and newsreels from North America for Soveksportfil’m, 
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Regardless of these cases, the majority of UNESCO workers from the USSR excelled in 
their official, public positions in terms of the immediate tasks assigned to them, ascending the 
UNESCO ranks with little resistance and earning praise from their supervisors for their  
“intelligent,” “level-headed,” “practical,” and “industrious” approach to their responsibilities.532 
In order to prove themselves to be competent international civil servants, Soviet UNESCO 
personnel resorted to one of three tactics for survival: 1) the harmonization of their Soviet 
interests with their public UNESCO duties on the basis of the shared ideals of UNESCO and the 
USSR; 2) the making of their private, Soviet designs acceptable in public by exploiting the lack 
of knowledge of the Soviet Union in the international organization to become an advocate for the 
introduction of Soviet practices or information in their particular field; or 3) the remaking of 
their public settings so that their immediate environs in the UNESCO Secretariat conformed to 
the culture and composition of personnel of Soviet organizations back home. The careers of A. 
K. Zhegalova, S. A. Tangian, and Kovda offer examples of how each of these tactics played out.  
The case of Zhegalova represents how some Soviet citizens reconciled their roles by 
exploiting the common universal ideals espoused by the USSR and UNESCO. Once she adapted 
to the standards of the international organization, she became a distinguished figure in the 
UNESCO community. A former diplomat and teacher who served for three years in the 
                                                     
would help him in producing posters and slides for this department, Biriukov again managed to provoke the 
dissatisfaction of his coworkers because of what he depicted as internal office politics. He eventually finished his 
career at UNESCO in the less ambiguous role of Russian translator. Biriukov claimed that his difficulties in the 
photo library grew out of the fact that he had once been offered his supervisor’s job. He also attributed his poor 
work to the poor selection and quality of the photos in the library. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 271-72. 
 
532 In 1964, for example, more than one-third of Soviet UNESCO employees either earned increases in rank or 
received promises from the UNESCO leadership that they would obtain such a raise in the next year.  However, 
many UNESCO executives grumbled to Soviet emissaries about the weak language skills of Soviet recruits. GARF, 
f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 321. The administrators overseeing Sobolev and Dubinin gave them mostly positive remarks 
notwithstanding the criticisms mentioned above. For other examples of positive evaluations of Soviet workers, see 
Tor Gjesdal, “Within-Grade Increment,” March 31, 1958, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. N. Kovalsky, UNESCO 
Archives; and Rudy Salat, “Within-Grade Increment,” May 23, 1960, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mrs. T. Beliaeva, 
UNESCO Archives. 
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UNESCO Department of Education, Zhegalova created a niche in which she could distinguish 
herself as both a proselytizer of Soviet notions of women’s equality and a valued member of the 
secretariat.533 Arriving at UNESCO headquarters in November 1956 when the majority of the 
international organization’s executives were at the general conference in New Delhi, Zhegalova 
took advantage of what she called a relatively “more peaceful atmosphere” of a half-empty 
building to “become acquainted with the main program documents and the nature of the activity” 
of her new workplace. In the first four months of her time at UNESCO, the fifty-three-year-old 
Soviet pedagogue quickly grew overwhelmed not only by the strange environment of UNESCO 
but also by an onslaught of duties that included the review of the program adopted in Delhi for 
the broader department, participation in a flurry of department-wide meetings conducted 
exclusively in English, and the drafting of a two-year plan for her division. “All of this required 
great exertion,” she remembered in a 1957 report to the Soviet Union, “but also helped me to 
more quickly become familiar with this new and very specialized work, with its basic outline.” 
Although she had no record of past employment in an international administration, she oversaw a 
Western dominated office (“two Americans, one Canadian, one Indian, three Englishwomen, and 
three Frenchwomen”) with specialists who boasted years of experience working in international 
organizations. These pedagogues, according to Zhegalova, had “a very weak understanding of 
public education in the Soviet Union” and abided by “the theoretical tenets of bourgeois 
pedagogy––first and foremost American and English research in this area.” In her capacity as 
                                                     
533 According to a 1956 letter to Director-General Evans from the chief of the bureau of personnel and management 
about Soviet candidates for the secretariat, Zhegalova had worked for four years in “the Soviet Ministry for 
Education where she was chief of the Information Division.” It is not clear, however, which “Soviet ministry of 
education” employed her. She also worked as a “secondary school teacher in history from 1928 to 1935” and 
“served for three years at the Soviet embassy in Paris.” This biography suggests that the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission recruited her because of her dual experience in a UNESCO specialization (education) and diplomatic 
work. William Farr, “Soviet Candidates,” July 9, 1956, 1, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Sobolev: PEM/Memo No. 
4168, UNESCO Archives. 
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head of the Division of Secondary Education, Zhegalova orchestrated UNESCO’s projects to 
improve polytechnic education while also arranging activities to reform curricula and teaching 
aids for secondary schools. She also steered UNESCO’s initiative to introduce “into the curricula 
of secondary schools issues that contribute to the education of children in the spirit of 
international understanding.” The latter, which aided in the spread of the “Model UN” 
movement, entailed the advancement of teaching about the UN and human rights as well as the 
maintenance of UNESCO’s “associated schools,” which were located in dozens of countries and 
functioned as spaces for “experimentation” in such teaching.534  
Zhegalova also made history in the sphere of Soviet engagement in multilateral 
diplomacy, becoming the first Soviet national to represent a noncommunist international 
organization at the proceedings of another international organization. No sooner had she settled 
into her role than the UNESCO leadership dispatched her to UN headquarters in New York 
where Zhegalova, as the sole UNESCO delegate, participated from March 14 to April 10, 1957, 
in the eleventh session of the Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW), an annual 
conference hosted by ECOSOC and founded in 1946 to promote and safeguard the rights of 
women internationally.535 Her presence in Manhattan sparked an outcry from the American 
Right and particularly the grassroots campaign in Southern California to purge schools of 
UNESCO-based curricula. In the two months after she left New York, concerned Americans 
                                                     
534 Her job improving polytechnic education included the accumulation of knowledge concerning “the state of 
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preparation of UNESCO experts assigned to aid educational systems in developing countries. Her attempts to reform 
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535 Ibid., l. 68; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 28. For a brief history of the UNCSW, see Michael Haas, 
International Human Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008), 200. 
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latched on to Zhegalova as the face of the hidden communist conspiracy to use the UN as a 
vehicle for the global spread of “totalitarianism.”  In a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles 
Times published on May 28, American citizen Marian Pollack articulated her outrage at 
UNESCO’s employment of the Soviet citizen. “We are spending,” she noted, “a half million 
dollars to investigate United States citizens who seek employment in international organizations . 
. . and yet, sitting over these people in UNESCO is a communist from Moscow, Russia. How 
stupid can we get?”536 In the same edition of the LA Times, Jean Nugent demanded that “the 
public should be informed” of Zhegalova’s hiring by UNESCO.537 Catherine Thorp of Santa 
Monica cited Zhegalova’s control of the production of “high-school level” educational 
publications as reason to ban UNESCO materials from American schools. “Is it not enough,” she 
wondered, “for UNESCO to be explained to our children, both the good and the bad, as it is at 
present? Why must they be instructed in it as these radical groups demand?”538  
Zhegalova also later became a fleeting person of interest for FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover and the main object of suspicion in a chapter on international organizations in the widely 
read 1964 book, None Dare Call it Treason, a foundational text of the anticommunist American 
Right.539 But despite her reincarnation as a symbol of the creeping Red menace among American 
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539 In February 1961, a woman from Wapato, Washington, after disclosing her interest in the John Birch Society, 
penned a letter to J. Edgar Hoover in which she inquired as to whether “the chief of the secondary education division 
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the headquarters of UNESCO is in Paris, France.” In fact, Zhegalova no longer held her post in UNESCO by this 
time, having returned to the Soviet Union in 1960. Nevertheless, she remained the personification of the threat 
emanating from UNESCO for many anticommunist crusaders long after her retirement. In 1963, a citizens’ 
organization, the “Watch Washington Club,” produced a pamphlet that asked its readers to ponder Zhegalova’s role 
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conservatives, Zhegalova earned praise from the UNESCO leadership for how she handled her 
trip. René Maheu, who at the time held the office of UNESCO permanent representative to the 
UN in New York, told the Soviet permanent delegate that Zhegalova had “brilliantly dealt with 
her mission” even though she “faced great difficulties” given that “she had never been to the 
United States and did not know English well.”540 Nevertheless, Zhegalova managed to use her 
trip to New York to gather intelligence for Soviet agencies, relaying to the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission information she had learned from Maheu regarding the annual meeting of the US 
National Commission held in Washington, D. C., that year.541 
Upon returning to Paris and until her retirement in late 1959, Zhegalova combined her 
dual roles as a Soviet patriot and international civil servant by demonstrating the progressive 
ideals of the Soviet Union as a champion of women’s rights in the international arena. In 
addition to expanding the pedagogical research in her division for the 1961-1962 program to 
focus on the development of “female education” in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, she 
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received in 1958 from Director-General Evans the unofficial status as the point person 
“responsible for all work UNESCO does relating to women issues.” Observing in the same year 
that Zhegalova was “greatly respected” and had fostered “great authority” in UNESCO, the 
Soviet permanent delegate to UNESCO moved to nominate her for the position of UNESCO 
deputy director-general. In the year leading up to her retirement, she prepared a preliminary 
report on discriminatory policies in education that would, in her words, “serve as the basis” for 
one of UNESCO’s landmark legal achievements, the 1960 Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education (CADE).542 In 1959, she traveled back to New York to sit again on the UNCSW and 
then took part in a series of meetings and conferences at the UNESCO Institute for Education in 
Hamburg. “This has allowed me,” she wrote, “to become better acquainted with the direction and 
content of the organization’s activities, . . . its staff, and a number of educational specialists.”543 
Finally, she participated in a seminar on adult education hosted by “international women’s” 
NGOS in London and facilitated the travel of other Soviet representatives to not only UNESCO 
conferences, but also events put on by the French and English national commissions.544   
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Another Soviet member of the UNESCO Department of Education, Tangian, seized on 
the reputation of Soviet public education among pedagogical circles in the West to act as a 
source for fresh ideas for reforming education in the developed and developing worlds. In 
December 1956, the thirty-year-old Armenian graduate of the V. I. Lenin Moscow State 
Pedagogical Institute (MGPI) joined the Education Clearing House, UNESCO’s largest division, 
as a P-3 program specialist and worked there for more than five years. Functioning as the 
preeminent global hub for the collection and dissemination of educational information, the 
Education Clearing House compiled research on the structures of public education systems and 
methods of teaching in all countries with available sources in order to create multilingual 
publications (reference works, monthly bibliographies of pedagogical work, reports, 
monographs, serials, etc.), which served as the main sources of knowledge of international 
educational trends for ministries of education, teaching associations, and libraries worldwide. 
Assigned to the sector of the division that sent statistics and other forms of information in 
response to requests and questions, Tangian spent his day finding and dispatching materials to 
fulfill what he characterized as a “very diverse” array of inquiries on “the kind of educational 
system in a given country; how professional teaching is organized in a given country; how 
language is taught in the schools of various countries; what is being done for the education of 
blind or deaf children and how to organize this type of education; and so forth.” While the 
appeals mainly came from “government organs of different countries wanting to carry out 
reforms, changes, or innovations in the public education of their country,” Tangian specified that 
he “most often” fielded calls from “weakly-developed countries wishing to get to know the 
experience of, and situation with, an issue in developed countries, especially us.” 
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The problem with this, Tangian stressed, arose out of the fact that, “by the time I arrived 
to the [Clearing House], there was no literature on the Soviet Union, and what was there, was not 
published in the Soviet Union and bore a predominantly anti-Soviet character.” This repository 
included “a few outdated brochures on specific issues and a number of works by bourgeois 
authors that present public education in our country in a distorted manner.” Thus, the Soviet 
UNESCO worker explained that, “with the available materials, the [Clearing House] could not 
give information in response to requests, which come quite often, on public education and 
different aspects of education and teaching in the USSR.” Tangian blamed this dearth of Soviet 
publications on the willful neglect of his Western colleagues, citing as evidence his ability to find 
a 1954 monograph by the preeminent educational scholar, E. N. Medynskii, in a Parisian 
bookstore. “UNESCO acquired the book,” he complained, only after he “bought it, brought it in, 
and showed it to the [UNESCO] workers, with the address and store noted, all of which, 
however, they knew very well.” In his first two years, the young Soviet pedagogue therefore 
made it his vocation to revamp UNESCO’s collection and succeeded in getting his bosses to 
weed out “bourgeois” literature on the Soviet Union while ensuring that “only Soviet 
publications can be used to discuss Soviet education.” As a result, he managed to throw together 
“a considerable collection . . . on education in the USSR” that consisted of “party books, 
brochures, journals,” and other sources sent from Moscow. This allowed him to exploit 
UNESCO as a conduit through which the Soviet Union could distribute materials to “countries 
like Australia with no diplomatic relations with the USSR.”545  
As one of the few Soviet nondiplomatic personnel traveling on business throughout 
Western Europe, Tangian also became an unofficial spokesman for the achievements of his 
                                                     
545 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 254-62; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 74-75. 
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country in the field of education by casting his expertise on Soviet pedagogy as an important 
contribution to UNESCO from a loyal international civil servant whose main concern was 
international improvement of educational practices. In 1959, he took part in a seminar on “access 
to the pedagogical profession” hosted by the Hamburg Institute. Although he represented 
UNESCO and not the Soviet Union at this event, Tangian acceded to the request of the institute 
to bring legal documents outlining the position of the Soviet state with respect to the topic of the 
seminar, reported on Soviet education, and met with participants from other countries who 
wanted to hear more about the Soviet perspective on teaching. When attendees expressed points 
of view at odds with Soviet ideology, he also “thought it necessary” to voice his disapproval. 
After an Englishman argued that the international “decline in the quality of teachers was 
somehow inevitable” due to the increasing intellectual demands of the profession, Tangian called 
this thinking “Malthusian.” In reply to participants who proclaimed that there “should be more of 
a prevention of the profession becoming largely female” because of women’s domestic 
responsibilities, he pointed out that “it was necessary to find conditions in which women had the 
same rights as men.” At a press conference, Tangian responded that, while he was “attending the 
meeting as an observer from UNESCO,” he felt it permissible to note that, “in the USSR, the 
situation differs from other countries; the Soviet government ensures the preparation of the 
requisite amounts of qualified teaching cadres through planning.”546 In 1960, Tangian led a 
seminar at the Sorbonne’s L’Institut d’étude du développement économique et social (IEDES) on 
                                                     
546 He also held long talks with the deputy director of the institute, who impressed Tangian with his stories of his 
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outline of the history of the Worker-Priest Movement and citations for further reading on the subject, see Rebecca 
Clifford, Nigel Townson, and Péter Apor, “Faith,” in Europe’s 1968: Voices of Revolt, ed. Robert Gildea, James 
Mark, and Anette Warring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 231. 
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the “role of planning in the development of education in the USSR.” Later that year, he gave a 
lecture to the Society of Secondary School Teachers in the Swiss canton of Vaud on “the role of 
education in Soviet society” that attracted 400 people. After this session, which lasted three 
hours due to the number of questions from the audience, the newspaper La Tribune de Lausanne 
published an extensive article on his talk.547  
If Zhegalova synchronized her private worldview and her public role by profiting from 
the overlapping ideals of her two masters and Tangian repackaged his political biases as filling a 
gap in the international organization’s repository of information about Soviet educational 
practices, Kovda wielded the power of his position to turn his dominion within UNESCO into a 
Soviet outpost nestled in the heart of the organization. From 1959 to 1965, the professor of soil 
science at Moscow State University and member of AN SSSR governed, as the director of the 
UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, one of the most fiercely contested spheres the 
international organization dealt with throughout the Cold War and oversaw the department’s 
“regional centers” scattered around the developing world. Located in Montevideo, Cairo, New 
Delhi, and Djakarta, these UNESCO satellite offices allied with educational establishments to 
cultivate education in Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia 
respectively.548  
Kovda executed his duties as a director and UNESCO envoy with the vigor of a loyal 
international civil servant. In 1959, he visited Vienna as the official UNESCO delegate to the 
                                                     
547 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 24-25. 
 
548 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, l. 31. Kovda worked at the Soil Institute of AN SSSR from the 1930s through 1958. 
While holding positions at a number of Soviet institutions over the years, Kovda also served as the chief scientific 
adviser to Guo Moruo, the first president of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) in the PRC, from 1954 to 1955. 
For an outline of Kovda’s professional career, see “Biograficheskaia spravka, Kovda Viktor Abramovich,” 
Informatsionnaia sistema arkhivy Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, accessed December 17, 2016, 
http://isaran.ru/?q=ru/person&guid=7EF8FBB1-6667-3A17-8225-F112EEB14D9F. 
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Board of Governors of the IAEA, for which he drafted “preliminary plans” for UN interagency 
cooperation in the training of nuclear physicists, engineers, and technicians in “weakly-
developed countries”; acted as liaison between the IAEA and major scientific NGOS; and 
formulated proposals to improve on how the two organs encouraged the peaceful use of atomic 
energy.549 Later that year, he traveled to Tunis, where he again donned the hat of UNESCO 
representative to kick off a series of expeditions and courses focused on salinization and irrigated 
soils in the Middle East that fell under the auspices of the UNESCO Arid Zones Program. A joint 
project launched by UNESCO and the FAO for the purpose of studying ways to transform desert 
into arable land, the Arid Zones Program produced maps depicting the fertility of soil globally 
and became one of UNESCO’s most famous contributions to agricultural education.550 As the 
main driver behind the program during his tenure at UNESCO, Kovda showed off to the world 
the Soviet agricultural expertise famously championed by Khrushchev, delivering the 
introductory remarks to the courses in the Tunisian parliament. “The work of the courses,” the 
Soviet pedologist remarked in his report to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, “is a major 
international event in the Middle East. The president and government, as well as the press, tried 
to show that after liberation from the French, Tunisia is growing, developing, and playing a 
special role in the politics of the Middle East.”551 As director, Kovda also became the primary 
                                                     
549 Kovda leaked his report to UNESCO on his time in Vienna to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. While the 
IAEA engaged in the “technical” work of promoting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the UNESCO 
departments of natural and social sciences dealt with the educational dimension of this initiative, fostering research 
and raising public awareness concerning advancements in radiobiology, or the study of the risk of radiation exposure 
to public health and the latest preventative measures. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 13-30. 
 
550 According to international affairs scholar J. P. Singh, Kovda “spearheaded” this project during his time as 
director. J. P. Singh, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Creating Norms 
for a Complex World (New York: Routledge, 2011), 78. For an outline of the achievements of, and the ideology 
behind, the Arid Zones Program, see Diana K. Davis, The Arid Lands: History, Power, Knowledge (Cambridge: 
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551 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, ll. 90-92. 
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mediator between UNESCO and the Pugwash Movement, lobbying for UNESCO to more 
actively participate in the movement by sending scholars to its conferences and declaring to the 
director-general that the Report of Working Group 4: Science and Technology in Developing 
Nations, which the twelfth meeting of the Pugwash Conference adopted in 1964, represented “a 
veritable manifesto for the Department of Natural Sciences of UNESCO.”552 By the end of his 
first two years in the department, even the American permanent delegate to UNESCO 
commended Kovda for his openness to American input and accomplishments as director.553   
As soon as the AN SSSR scholar had arrived at UNESCO, however, he made it his 
mission to reconfigure the department so that it resembled the academies that employed him 
back in the USSR. In his five years at UNESCO, Kovda carried out a plan to cleanse the 
department of Westerners and people it with scientists from either the socialist or “neutral” 
countries. Before he signed on as director, the department had employed only one or two 
professionals at any given time from the socialist or neutral countries. By 1961, of the twenty-
four persons staffing the department, six program specialists came from the eastern bloc (four 
from the USSR and two from East European countries) while three were from the neutral bloc.554 
In 1962, out of the forty program specialists in the department, ten came from the socialist 
countries (five from the USSR and five from its satellites), three were citizens of neutral 
countries, and “seven or eight” of those who hailed from the West had proved themselves 
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553 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 194. 
 
554 These numbers do not include the twenty-two Soviet scientists then working as UNESCO experts in India, 
Afghanistan, Egypt, and Burma. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 27; 30; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 289. 
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“friendly” or “honest” toward Soviet policies.555 At the end of 1963, eleven socialist specialists 
(seven from the USSR and four from socialist countries) worked in the department, which had 
recently downsized to thirty-three total employees. Thanks to Kovda’s maneuvering, Soviet 
officials believed that, in comparison to the paltry presence of Soviet citizens in other 
departments, they had the “strongest position” in the Department of Natural Sciences.556  
In addition, the Soviet director, in the face of “resistance” from the UNESCO leadership, 
dramatically restructured the department to mirror the organization of Soviet academic 
institutions and reoriented the expenditure of its three-and-half-million-dollar budget toward 
UNESCO’s increasing interest in lending assistance to the developing world. “The department,” 
he recalled in his 1961 report, “was inherited in a very neglected state: the work program for 
1959 and 1960, prepared by [the former director], was very weak, reflecting little the needs and 
interests of the progressive forces of the world headed by the USSR.” In order to strengthen 
“international cooperation and aid to the weakly developed countries,” Kovda began in his first 
days in office “a radical revamping of the structure of the department based on the organizational 
experience of scientific institutions of the USSR.” By 1961, the department consisted of a 
directorate (a director, two deputies, an administrative-financial adviser, and a “scholar-
secretary” modeled on the chief academic secretary (glavnyi uchenyi sekretar’) of AN SSSR); a 
division for international cooperation (for congresses and relations with NGOs) similar to the 
                                                     
555 The classification of “neutral” and “socialist” countries changed depending on shifts in the international 
alignments of the time. While Kovda characterized Cuba as “neutral” in 1961, he categorized it as a “socialist” 
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employees from Czechoslovakia and Cuba as not always “reliable.” Ibid., ll. 294-95. 
  
556 The American presence in the department shrunk from year to year. In 1962, four Americans worked in the 
department and in 1963 just three US citizens were laboring under Kovda. For more on the politics of international 
scientific cooperation in UNESCO, see chapter 9. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 19, l. 107; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 
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international divisions of AN SSSR departments; a division for the study of natural resources; a 
commission for oceanography; a division for the training of scientists; and a division for 
technological sciences.557 While the UNESCO General Conference rejected Soviet efforts to 
establish Russian as an official working language, Kovda, in his corner of the organization, 
circulated Russian research, forced the publications wing of the department to produce Russian 
translations of some monographs, and introduced “at the spur of the moment” the use of Russian 
“on an equal basis with others” at meetings of the Oceanographic Commission.558  
The Sovietization of the department allowed Kovda to implement an agenda that fulfilled 
“the directives received from the Soviet UNESCO Commission and AN SSSR.” With a group of 
likeminded cadres and an amenable structure in place, he achieved the adoption of a biennial 
plan as well as a preliminary ten-year plan for the department replete with Soviet initiatives 
centered on “the vital interests of the newly liberated countries of Africa and the formerly 
dependent or colonial countries of Asia and Africa.” These plans incorporated blueprints for the 
“development of international scientific cooperation” between scientists and NGOs; assistance 
for “the development of theoretical sciences in all countries”; support for developing countries in 
their search for the “quickest way to industrialize”; and aid to these countries in the founding of 
technological institutes, universities, or national academies of science geared toward producing 
“national cadres.” Armed with around 130 experts sent to more than forty countries and an influx 
of financial resources from the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA), Kovda 
helped supervise the creation of over ten major centers for higher scientific education in “weakly 
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558 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 303-04. 
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developed nations” and the establishment of academies of science in more than five countries.559 
“The development of the work of the department,” he concluded in his 1961 report to Soviet 
authorities, “has permitted the USSR and other socialist countries to exert a lot of influence on 
these countries.” Kovda also predicted that the stimulation by his department of scientific inquiry 
in the developing world would “also quicken the weakening and collapse of the system of 
colonialism while enabling the growth of a working class and progressive intelligentsia in these 
backward countries.”560 With these actions, Kovda not only turned UNESCO’s scientific 
initiatives away from the solipsistic preoccupation of the West with collaboration among 
European and North American nations, but also helped to engineer the reorientation of 
UNESCO’s scientific ventures toward a sustained focus on providing aid to the emerging Third 
World––a lasting legacy that would shape UNESCO’s activities for decades to come.  
Thus, Zhegalova, Tangian, Kovda and others found their own unique ways of reconciling 
their dual roles as agents of the Soviet state and international civil servants. By doing so, they 
successfully showcased the qualifications of Soviet specialists and fulfilled the objectives of the 
Soviet state while also serving UNESCO. However, in order to secure these achievements, 
Soviet UNESCO employees faced an array of difficulties as they navigated the ideologically 
murky environment of the secretariat. 
                                                     
559 While the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), which allotted EPTA funds, decided which countries should 
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*                 *                 * 
Regardless of the relative success of some Soviet specialists at upholding their public 
personae as international civil servants, the majority of Soviet UNESCO workers also expressed 
in correspondence with Soviet agencies feelings of anxiety, anguish, and enmity emanating from 
their struggle to reconcile the dual roles of Soviet agent and UNESCO staff member in the 
foreign surroundings of the secretariat. The success of Soviet UNESCO employees in adapting to 
UNESCO workplace standards represents a remarkable achievement given that they had not only 
to learn on the job the ins-and-outs of international administration but also work shoulder-to-
shoulder with colleagues representing political ideologies and sociocultural backgrounds that 
Soviet citizens had been told all their lives to distrust and despise. Soviet UNESCO staff 
wrestled with the disparity between their private, Soviet motives and their public guise as 
international civil servants alone, receiving little useful instruction from their Soviet handlers as 
to how they should reconcile their subversive objectives with UNESCO’s requirement that they 
cooperate and have productive relationships with their foreign UNESCO workmates for the good 
of an internationalist ideal transcending the interests of any one country.  
In this section of the chapter, I analyze the reports sent back to Moscow of eight Soviet 
UNESCO employees in order to assess how Soviet international civil servants interpreted and 
presented their non-Soviet UNESCO colleagues and the culture of the international organization. 
Instead of a neutral civil service that promoted international cooperation between East and West, 
the secretariat became a microcosmic field of interaction in which the contemporaneous global 
power struggles and negotiations between the USSR and its Western adversaries played out 
among coworkers in the petty politics of the everyday workplace. In their missives to officials in 
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the USSR, Soviet UNESCO employees had to grapple with the diversity of experiences and 
nuanced political inclinations constituting the characters of these acquaintances. 
As chapter 3 demonstrated, a small number of Western communists and a sizeable 
population of left-leaning individuals made up the personnel holding offices in the UNESCO 
Secretariat. In the cryptic words of Kovda, “there is a communist organization in UNESCO. We 
do not have official relations with them, but we know these people. They know us.”561 As a 
corollary to the extensive notes they took on these card-carrying members of communist parties, 
Soviet international civil servants described in their reports the ideological persuasions of 
secretariat officials whose sentiments toward the USSR fell on a spectrum that ranged from 
cooperative objectivity to strong admiration. In 1961, Martynovskii, as deputy director for 
technical education, offered itemized sketches of his coworkers in the UNESCO Department of 
Education for his bosses in Moscow. Among those under his command, Martynovskii singled 
out the most politically progressive and favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union. They 
included a South African specialist of Russian descent in the UNESCO Division of Adult 
Education who “thinks of herself as a communist” and had a penchant for going on rants about 
“reactionaries in UNESCO”; a Uruguayan chemical engineer who exhibited “sympathy” with, 
and “interest” in, the Soviet Union; as well as the Burmese head of the UNESCO Division of 
Technical Education––a former official in the Burmese Ministry of Education (and close 
confidante of Prime Minister U Nu), who spoke of the Soviet Union with “great warmth” and 
had sent his nephew to study in the USSR after traveling there as part of the Burmese negotiating 
team that successfully lobbied for Soviet assistance in the building of a technological institute in 
                                                     
561 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 207. Soviet professionals stationed at the international organization had cordial 
enough relations with the communists inside UNESCO that on at least two occasions they arranged with the USSR 
Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations for the children of these foreign comrades to attend pioneer camps in the 
Soviet Union. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 182; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 19-20; 88. 
 297 
Rangoon in the wake of the 1955 tête-à-têtes between Khrushchev and Nu.562 Martynovskii also 
presided over a number of persons from Asia, Latin America, and Africa who, while not openly 
identifying with the Soviet cause, spoke affectionately of states oriented away from the West. 
For instance, a twenty-nine-year-old mestizo mechanical engineer from Nicaragua assigned to 
the UNESCO Division of Technical Education harbored a strong dislike for American foreign 
policy and expressed “his approval of Castro in Cuba” despite having gone to a university in the 
United States.  
Martynovskii also got to know individuals with unique and diverse worldviews, whose 
opinions did not always correspond to the rigid Soviet classificatory grid. An Egyptian in the 
same division as the Nicaraguan passed muster for Martynovskii because of his faith in Gamal 
Abdel Nasser as “the socialist leader of the Arab world” and a deep hatred of the British and 
French following the 1956 Suez Crisis. At the same time, however, the Soviet deputy director 
took note of the Nasserite’s curiously positive characterization of West Germany as one of the 
few Western nations “against imperialism.” Moreover, a contradiction existed between 
Martynovskii’s orders from Moscow to advance the Soviet cause in UNESCO by supporting 
these foreign comrades and his need to run a department based on the performances of his 
subordinates. While Martynovskii lauded the Uruguayan engineer as “one of the most honest and 
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good” people under his purview, he called the Burmese expert “somewhat of a weak worker” 
who passed off his own responsibilities to others if he did not receive instructions directly.563  
Despite this smattering of allies throughout the UNESCO bureaucracy, Soviet employees 
reacted with suspicion to what they perceived as an overabundance of enemy influence in the 
halls of the international organization. For the first three years of Soviet enlistment in the 
secretariat, even the usage and interpretation in UNESCO of the Russian language fell under the 
control of individuals whom the USSR viewed as vile traitors to the homeland. Because the 
Soviet state had yet to establish the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation when it joined 
the international organization in April 1954, it provided only one of the six Russian translators 
needed for the eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference in Montevideo that 
December. As a result, the secretariat recruited five Russian émigrés from UN agencies in New 
York and Geneva. After the USSR began to regularly engage with UNESCO in 1955, the lack of 
Soviet candidates for permanent translation jobs forced UNESCO to retain several of these 
émigrés for the purpose of setting up the Russian Translation Section at its headquarters in 
Paris.564 By the time the Soviet UNESCO Commission set its sights on this division in 1957, 
these individuals were responsible for the translation and interpretation of the Russian language 
within the secretariat and at all other UNESCO functions. “The Russian Translation Section,” the 
Soviet permanent delegate griped to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in May 1957, “is 
especially littered with anti-Soviet persons. These are, for the most part, white émigrés 
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associated with reactionary French and American intelligence agencies.”565 Although Dubinin 
and one other MID official became translators in the fall of 1956, émigrés occupied the two 
editorships of the section responsible for revising all translations.566 The section chief, André 
Salomon––a naturalized French citizen since 1949 and legal analyst who had lost his Russian 
citizenship along with other émigrés in November 1920––oversaw all “administrative issues,” 
including the hiring of temporary translators for sessions of the general conference and executive 
board as well as the completion of performance evaluations for employees.567  
Soviet officials expressed concern that these bitter foes of communism might 
ideologically contaminate Soviet translators and turn them into agents of Western governments. 
According to the Soviet permanent delegate in a 1957 letter to Moscow, two graduate students 
from the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Languages (MGIIIa), who worked as temporary 
translators in UNESCO, had “allowed unnecessary familiarity” with these émigrés, “even 
addressing them with “‘ty’” (the informal “you” in Russian) in defiance of the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation’s warning that they displayed “an unserious, irresponsible attitude” by establishing 
“acquaintances” with these turncoats.568 In 1959, an adviser to the delegation reported that 
Salomon had developed a habit of monitoring the comings-and-goings of Soviet translators in a 
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bid to “prove to the head of the UNESCO Language Division, Barnes, that Soviet translators 
violate the code of conduct of international civil servants.” The Soviet adviser also nervously 
recounted how Salomon had maneuvered to “‘organize a close friendship’ between the son of 
one of the white émigrés and the Soviet translator, Tsukanov.”569  
Instead of framing their protestations to UNESCO as motivated by these political 
concerns, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation complained about these émigrés’ utilization of an 
“antiquated, bureaucratic” Russian language no longer spoken in the USSR, explaining in 1957 
to the head of UNESCO translation services, Delavenay, that these exiles, “whose native 
language perhaps was Russian,” had become “completely cut off from the living Russian 
language” and consequently could not “translate into the modern Russian written language.”570 
Although Delavenay agreed that the Russian Translation Section should consist only of Soviet 
specialists and promised to replace the expatriated Russians when they retired or their contracts 
expired, the Soviet UNESCO Commission continued to have difficulty finding Soviet nationals 
with the requisite experience translating in international organizations. And while the émigré 
translators, having attained proficiency in the esoteric terminology of UNESCO, received 
enthusiastically positive assessments from their superiors, Soviet agencies preferred to send 
temporary translators who did not remain at UNESCO long enough to become conversant in the 
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[to Paris], an instructional conversation about how to behave in UNESCO as well as a few meetings focused on the 
issue of contact with foreigners.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 212-13; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 8. 
 
570 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 87; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 71. In addition to these complaints, Dubinin 
and other Soviet translators complained that the entire process of translation in UNESCO created numerous 
“semantic inaccuracies and even distortions.” According to the translators, UNESCO protocol required them to 
translate the oral speeches or comments of Soviet representatives to UNESCO events from Russian into English or 
French and then back into Russian again. In other words, all spoken Russian had to be translated into the normative 
Western languages used by the organization, which meant that the remarks of Soviet delegates lost their originality 
and turned into anglicized or francized versions. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, l. 81. 
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organization’s argot.571 Throughout 1958, the “struggle” over the Russian Translation Section 
became, in the words of two Soviet translators, “particularly acute,” as the émigrés, worried that 
their jobs might “be in jeopardy,” exploited the fact that the “head of the section was in their 
hands” to ensure that they “not only keep their posts, but also take open ones.”572 By 1959, the 
Soviet Union had taken over the three editorships in the section and five of the six slots as 
translators.573 At first, Salomon, coming across to the chief of the UNESCO Bureau of Personnel 
as “very disturbed” at the prospect of a retirement forced on him to appease the Soviet state, 
quarreled with UNESCO over the original conditions of his agreement. But in June, he acceded 
to the recommendation that he abandon his place as section head, leaving it open for a Soviet 
citizen who took the helm even though UNESCO leaders judged him as “not yet fit for the 
job.”574     
Outside the Russian Translation Section and in other departments dedicated to education, 
science, and culture, Soviet citizens hired by UNESCO met a diverse assembly of individuals 
who either willfully divulged or, in the eyes of Soviet citizens, unconsciously exuded their 
anticommunist political predilections as well as national and class histories. In particular, they 
surmised that the invisible hand of the American government lurked behind any actions 
                                                     
571 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 87-88; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d, 6, l. 252. For a few examples of performance 
reviews of the émigrés, see Émile Delavenay, “Performance Report–Professional,” March 29, 1955, 1–2, AG 8: 
Personnel Records of Prof. B. Nicolsky, UNESCO Archives; and Émile Delavenay, “Notes Professionnelles 
(Services Organiques),” January 21, 1957, 1–2, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon, UNESCO Archives. 
 
572 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 248. 
   
573 Ibid., l. 249. 
  
574 Harry Dawes, “Mr. André Salomon,” January 27, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Personnel Records of M. A. Salomon: 
PER/Memo A. 4870, UNESCO Archives; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 212. Fear that émigrés would regain 
control of the Russian Translation Section continued to plague the Soviet UNESCO Commission and the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation for years after they acquired all the high-ranking positions in the section. In 1962, the 
delegation sent one of its own officials to work as a translator in UNESCO “due to the threat of admittance into the 
Russian Section of persons from other countries or White Émigrés.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 117. 
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UNESCO officials took that went against the interests of their native country. Director Kovda 
considered his superiors in the UNESCO leadership as lackeys of UN headquarters in New York 
and, vicariously, its host, the United States. When justifying his inability to sway UNESCO 
policy in favor of the USSR, Kovda expounded on how “the fundamental directives of UNESCO 
go from New York through Hammarskjöld with whom [Director-General] Maheu has constant 
consultations.”575 Martynovskii, in his position overseeing the primary division in UNESCO 
responsible for aid to “weakly-developed” countries, viewed Americans and pro-Westerners 
under his watch as saboteurs. “The American UNESCO employees,” he complained, “clearly 
carry out a pro-Western policy, . . . directing their efforts so as to link UNESCO with 
organizations––such as the International Bank for Reconstruction, the Ford Foundation, and the 
Carnegie Endowment––where “the influence of America is greater than it is in UNESCO.” He 
proceeded to call one of his underlings from Peru “a great neutralizer of the actions of Soviet 
employees of this organization” who sought to “curry the favor of the Americans” by 
transferring UNESCO development projects from Martynovskii’s clutches to the UN Special 
Fund in New York.576 N. A. Koval’skii, a specialist in the UNESCO Department of Information, 
noticed that the tone and behavior of his boss, Tor Gjesdal, took on “anti-Soviet tendencies” after 
the Norwegian director had returned in late 1958 from an official visit to the United States during 
which his work had faced criticism from the American government. Shortly after his trip, 
Gjesdal had “permitted himself to go on anti-Soviet tirades on various occasions” and failed to 
                                                     
575 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 40.   
 
576 GARF, f. 9159, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 176-78. In another sign that Soviet ideology shaped how its citizens in UNESCO 
viewed their counterparts, one Soviet specialist dismissed his English colleague as a lackey of American business. 
“It is alleged,” the Soviet employee wrote, “that the secret of his career advancement is the support of major 
financial corporations in the USA.” Ibid., l. 21. 
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appear at an event at the Soviet embassy in Paris “even though he knew that such an invitation 
was for a very small group of persons and his absence would be noticed.”577 
A number of Soviet witnesses to the pervasive sway of the US government in the 
secretariat wanted to emulate the methods their American opponents employed in this respect.  
As a consultant in the Television Division of the UNESCO Department of Information and the 
former head of Soveksportfil’m, Sobolev sent to Moscow a lengthy scheme for how Soviet 
agencies could catch up to their American competitors in the battle over propaganda in UNESCO 
media, basing his observations on the chummy relationships between American representatives 
of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and his non-Soviet coworkers in the 
department. In March 1957, Sobolev reacted with surprise when Director Gjesdal turned down 
his offer to send an official invitation to the head of the USIA Visual Media Section for the 
screening of a UNESCO promotional video “on the distribution of UN and UNESCO stamps.” 
But Gjesdal’s refusal, to the alarm of Sobolev, derived from the close, informal connections 
between UNESCO and the USIA rather than a manifestation of anti-Americanism. As Gjesdal 
told Sobolev, he could simply call the head of USIA since he was an old friend. Bristling over 
his exclusion from a dinner his UNESCO colleagues put on for their USIA cronies before the 
screening, Sobolev described this movie presentation as part of a series of routine, informal pre-
screenings for Western diplomats of featured films which, although slated for release to the 
public under the official imprimatur of UNESCO, consisted of little more than syntheses of 
                                                     
577 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 403-06. In an indication that such assessments of Western bosses depended on the 
individual circumstances and experiences of the Soviet employee as well as the level of tension existing between the 
West and the communist bloc at any given time, another Soviet professional working under Gjesdal came to quite a 
different conclusion about the character of the director of the Department of Information two years later. In 1962, Iu. 
A. Poliakov commended Gjesdal as a “smart man” who treated him (and other Soviet subordinates) “not as a unit in 
the department . . . but as a representative of the USSR, which he has to approach with care and respect.” Poliakov 
further claimed that Gjesdal only displayed hostility to the Soviet Union when under “pressure from above.” GARF, 
f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 216. 
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USIA propaganda footage sugarcoated with UN themes of international cooperation. To counter 
this, Sobolev argued in favor of setting up “centers for Soviet information” in Soviet embassies 
throughout the world modeled on the USIA outlets located in American embassies in Paris and 
other world capitals. These centers would develop relations with UNESCO and governments 
similar to those enjoyed by their American analogues and thereby gain access to the insider 
crowd that Sobolev had encountered at the showing.578 
For many Soviet international civil servants, the power relations and administrative 
procedures permeating the UNESCO Secretariat replicated in miniature the tyrannical relations 
of production undergirding capitalism. In a 1957 analysis of her work settings, Zhegalova 
claimed to have lifted the veil of false bourgeois democracy that concealed the hierarchy and 
Western domination deeply ingrained in her department. “All of the most important issues 
concerning the so-called ‘policy of the department,’” she explained, “are discussed at meetings 
convened by the director of the department or one of his two deputies” and attended by the rest 
of the department. Although “this organization of work is seemingly of a democratic nature,” 
Zhegalova warned that, “essentially, these meetings have almost no practical significance for 
reaching decisions,” all of which depended on the whim of the department director and director-
general. In reality, she assessed, “the style of work of the Department of Education is the same as 
                                                     
578 According to Sobolev, the film combined seemingly innocuous documentary footage and a brief discussion of 
UN stamps with a justification of American foreign policy objectives in Venezuela. His interpretation consists of a 
uniquely Soviet approach to cinematic analysis and conveys the suspicion that many Soviet UNESCO employees 
harbored when it came to the self-promotion and public-relations work of international organizations. In Sobolev’s 
words, “the film had the goal of showing the ‘good’ American imperialism brings to the Venezuelan people. The 
[reel] begins with the story of UN and UNESCO stamps in order to give . . . the impression of objectivity of all 
subsequent [parts] of the film’s narrative and to present the ‘special concern’ of the USA for propagandizing UN 
ideas.” It also stressed “the ‘interest’ of the USA in the cause of peace.” However, the “viewer,” Sobolev went on, is 
then “led to the second, main plot of ‘aid,’ which is provided in the interests of ‘peace and shared prosperity’ from 
the USA to other countries, especially Venezuela.” The final part of the film, Sobolev continued, consisted of “an 
entertaining segment of a race of greyhounds in the USA, which would seem harmless, but in fact is very important, 
since it gives the viewer the impression that the whole thing . . . is far removed from politics––an ordinary newsreel, 
not having any propagandistic goals. In fact, this is not even a usual bourgeois newsreel, but specifically 
manufactured propagandistic film material.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 28-33. 
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that of the whole UNESCO Secretariat––organized in the American form of a complex 
bureaucratic machine in which, first and foremost, the concentration of all threads of control are 
characteristically in the hands of the ‘boss.’” In this power dynamic, Zhegalova cast herself and 
the only other Soviet workmate in the department as forming a small but bold resistance against 
this bureaucratic hierarchy reminiscent of the struggle of the innovative protagonist in 
Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone. “Such a situation,” she continued, “causes the discontent of 
department specialists and, particularly, in the preparation of the first versions of the 1959-1960 
program, there was a collective discussion of these projects as a result of ‘pressure from below.’” 
But if non-Soviet personnel hoped new leadership would reform this unequal system, Zhegalova 
argued that social relations within the department would remain the same, warning of a recently 
appointed director that “it is unlikely he will make any essential changes.” When this new chief 
“provoked ridicule and even outrage” over his request for photos of each of his subordinates so 
he could “get to know them,” Zhegalova boasted that only she and her Soviet accomplice refused 
to consent to this appeal, dismissing it as an example of the administrator’s American “style of 
work.”579  
Soviet archetypes of the Western or nonsocialist “other” pervaded the political profiles of 
UNESCO officials that Soviet citizens dispatched to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. 
Portraying their supervisors as personifying communist caricatures of authoritarian figures from 
the old orders socialism sought to replace, Soviet UNESCO employees, rather than questioning 
the legitimacy of UNESCO’s purpose and philosophy, saw themselves as fighting against a 
UNESCO aristocracy that, thanks to its authoritarian and capitalist impulses, had defiled the 
values and lofty pursuits the USSR and UNESCO had in common. Skorov, for instance, in his 
                                                     
579 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 68-71. 
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1962 report as part of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences, painted a scathing picture of 
Department Director André Bertrand as a petty, miserly, corrupt, and mediocre bureaucrat 
bearing the characteristics of a meshchanin. Dismissing Bertrand as “a creature” of Director-
General Maheu, Skorov branded the esteemed French legal theorist as an indentured servant to 
the UNESCO leadership who “could have never risen to, or even stayed in the position of 
department director . . . without strong support from Maheu.”580 In return for what Skorov 
derided as Bertrand’s “cushy job” at UNESCO, the director had degraded himself through 
obsequious groveling before Maheu, paying “a truly slavish devotion” to the director-general by 
seeking guidance “from the master when deciding any major issues” and allowing a “brutality 
and humiliation” that only a “person who has lost his own dignity and is fully dependent on the 
top brass [nachasl’stvo] could endure.”581 Skorov represented Bertrand as a man “who is only 
afraid of force. And force for him is embodied in the person of the director-general and in no 
way in the general conference and its resolutions.” Skorov excoriated Bertrand for playing the 
broker in an international pay-for-play scheme, alleging that he used “his directorship to quite 
unashamedly extract different kinds of material benefits” and in this way infected the 
international organization with a bourgeois desire to capitalize on his position for monetary gain. 
“Returning from business travel to Latin America, Asia, the USA, and Africa,” Skorov angrily 
                                                     
580 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 24. Skorov depicted Bertrand as a man of “modest abilities” who did not deserve 
his position and had failed to find any other work in France. However, other sources indicate that Bertrand was 
highly respected in the French legal community and was a highly accomplished legal scholar. Before coming to 
UNESCO, he had served as the director of studies at the École Nationale d’Administration, which trained the “top 
civil servants” of France. For more on Bertrand’s biography, see Samy Friedman, “André Bertrand, 1913-1968,” 
International Social Science Journal 21, no. 1 (1969): 5; and Peter Lengyel, International Social Science: The 
UNESCO Experience (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 34. 
 
581 In the mind of Skorov, this obsequiousness and corrupt coveting of “cushy” positions in the international 
organization trickled down from Bertrand to other employees of the department. According to the Soviet secretariat 
official, a “smug” Swiss colleague “of limited intelligence” did everything that “Bertrand commands” and never 
showed any kind of initiative” or dare express his views, while “acting only on the instructions of the boss.” Skorov 
also declared that the Swiss coworker was a person who, like Bertrand, considered “UNESCO as an opportunity for 
a comfortable and easy existence.” 
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recalled of Bertrand, “he regularly thanks his correspondents in these countries through official 
mail, which is read by the entire department, for expensive gifts for his wife and himself, 
pleasure trips and meals, etc.” To reciprocate, Skorov claimed that Bertrand, “often against the 
wills of the bosses of the divisions and negative evaluations written by all employees surveyed in 
departments, quite arrogantly ‘pushes for’ these acquaintances from other countries or from 
France to get UNESCO grants, lucrative contracts, etc.” Skorov monitored the director for 
malfeasance so closely and meticulously that he managed to espy the money-grubbing of the 
capitalist world in the minute transactions of Bertrand’s day. “Additionally,” the Soviet 
professional discovered of his chieftain, “Bertrand is astonishingly stingy. In the UNESCO 
restaurant, he leaves one new franc for tea, and in payment for coffee at the bar, he puts twenty 
centimes in the box and takes back ten.”582  
Apart from individuals who epitomized the American, capitalist, and despotic influences 
pervading UNESCO, Soviet secretariat personnel worked side-by-side with a motley crew of 
globetrotting experts who incarnated a range of backgrounds and political persuasions at odds 
with the communist cause. The presence of a cohort of cosmopolitan Europeans with colonial 
pedigrees reinforced the Soviet presumption that the UN and its aid to decolonizing nations 
facilitated the neocolonialist project of the capitalist West. Skorov castigated the deputy head of 
a division in the Department of Social Sciences as “a typical Dutch colonial official who served a 
longtime in Indonesia and then, after the expulsion of the Dutch from their former colony, spent 
ten years as a UNESCO expert in India.” This specialist “in agrarian questions” also elicited the 
ire of Skorov because of an “openly anti-Soviet article” on collectivization in the Soviet 
                                                     
582 Other Soviet secretariat workers conflated negative personal qualities with antagonism toward the USSR. 
Martynovskii described an Australian peer in his department as “a careerist” and “servant of the Americans” who 
was also “a dirty type” and “drinker.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 24-25; 182. 
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countryside that he had published before the Second World War. “This is a rabid reactionary,” 
Skorov concluded, “an obstinate man, a dyed-in-the-wool and difficult person.”583 Writing in the 
wake of the massive move toward independence of French West Africa, Martynovskii criticized 
Europeans who spoke with approbation of the West’s cultural legacy in recently independent 
countries. He railed against a French pedagogue by the name of Guitton for attaching “very great 
significance to the fact that in the former French colonies education is conducted in French.” 
This mixed with Martynovskii’s annoyance at Guitton’s stickling perfectionism concerning the 
use of the French language in UNESCO.584  
More awkwardly for Soviet UNESCO functionaries, they labored in close quarters with 
Eastern European and Soviet refugees who had experienced the darkest sides of Soviet rule. For 
instance, Skorov had to cultivate a professional relationship with Dr. Witold Zyss, a Polish Jew 
representing Israel who bore witness to Soviet policies of annexation and forced labor. Skorov 
wrote of Zyss that, “after the annexation of Western Ukraine by the USSR, his family was 
deported to the Arkhangelsk region where he learned the Russian language working for two 
years in a labor camp.” Managing to escape the USSR through Central Asia and Iran during the 
Second World War, Zyss wound up in Israel and then attended law school in France. In light of 
the impact of this personal history on Zyss’s attitude toward the USSR, Skorov designated the 
Polish émigré a “reactionary to the bone” who “retains a deep hatred of the Soviet Union.”585  
                                                     
583 Ibid., l. 26. 
 
584 “A typical bureaucrat,” Martynovskii griped, “he usually tries to rewrite all letters arriving for his signature, 
saying that almost no one in UNESCO knows the French language.” Ibid., l. 180. 
 
585 Skorov originally referred to the annexation of Western Ukraine as a “reunification” (vossoedinenie) and then 
crossed this word out, replacing it with a word that could mean accession to, annexation, or incorporation 
(prisoedinenie). Ibid., l. 28. 
 309 
Yet not all of the conduct and personal bearing of secretariat staff members fit so easily 
into the preconceived Soviet binary of friend or foe. In a sign of the degree to which the 
ideological framework and presumptions that Soviet UNESCO employees brought to UNESCO 
determined how they selectively appraised the qualities of their coworkers in official 
representations to Moscow, Skorov intuited political motives from Bertrand’s professional 
behavior and disregarded the overtures of cordiality and neutrality that the French director 
displayed in person. “In Bertrand's work,” Skorov stated, “he persistently pursues a line hostile 
to the Soviet Union, not taking into account the [Soviet] delegation, overriding my 
memorandums, rejecting my proposals that take into account our interests, taking the side of my 
employees when they appeal to him against me, etc.” But this propensity to act as a “staunch 
ideological and political enemy” of the USSR was “masked by a personal politeness and 
‘objectivity’ that, at times, can be misleading in relation to the true essence of his politics.” 
Skorov maintained that Bertrand, who self-identified as a Radical Socialist (i.e., a member of the 
center-left French Radical-Socialist Party), observed at work “an exceptional caution when 
expressing his views.” For Skorov, this explained why the “deep antipathy” of his boss to “the 
socialist system” and his unyielding “hostility to the Soviet way of life” only surfaced in 
“matters not directly related to UNESCO where he is not afraid to give himself away (for 
example, in discussions of pressing issues such as the international situation or the French 
political situation).”  
Because the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation encouraged Soviet UNESCO 
workers to see through any pretenses of “objectivity” in their foreign colleagues, Soviet 
UNESCO employees often dismissed the complexity and inconsistencies in comportment and 
action that they encountered when interacting with these foreigners, searching instead for the true 
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ideological essences of these superficially “neutral” men. Consequently, as Skorov’s assertion 
that Bertrand gave “himself away” demonstrates, if foreigners with a background or outlook 
defined as adversarial to communism treated Soviet international civil servants amicably, Soviet 
specialists discarded these conciliatory acts as part of a façade concealing their inner ill will. 
Irrespective of the rules of neutrality governing the international civil service, Soviet citizens 
employed by the secretariat viewed this imperative of impartiality as a veneer thinly disguising 
national, political, and other particularistic dispositions.586 When sketching the character of a 
Taiwanese member of the Department of Social Sciences, for example, Skorov had to make 
contradictory claims when searching for a way to reconcile the exiled Chinese official’s 
nationality with his actual mien. At first, Skorov stressed that this staff member was “neutral” to 
the USSR. But even though Skorov admitted he had no communication with the Taiwanese 
worker in accordance with directives from Moscow, he proceeded to compensate for this 
comparatively positive rendering by asserting that, “when faced with him at work, I see that in 
practice he does hinder cooperation with the USSR.”587  
In Martynovskii’s corner of the secretariat, a Belgian, who spent his years before 
UNESCO as a colonial inspector of polytechnic education in the Congolese city of Kasai, 
behaved “very business-like” and “objectively,” going so far as to critique the Belgian colonial 
venture in casual conversation with Martynovskii. “However,” Martynovskii added, “I doubt his 
sincerity. Judging from his behavior, he is pro-American.” Similarly, Martynovskii called a West 
                                                     
586 Gorsuch describes a similar phenomenon but reversed, noting that Westerners often expressed suspicion about 
Soviet claims regarding the successes of their country. Gorsuch, All This Is Your World, 109. 
 
587 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 24-26. 
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German he superintended “a very industrious person” who “tries to appear as an objective 
UNESCO employee but pretty clearly reveals his pro-Western sympathies.”588 
Another Soviet explanation for impartial treatment from ideological rivals rested on the 
precept that the presence of the USSR in UNESCO forced the opposition to engage in fair play. 
“The authority of the Soviet Union,” Sobolev proudly declared in a 1959 report on his work, 
“has helped me noticeably.” As an example, he outlined the political leanings of two of his 
supervisors. On the one hand, Sobolev portrayed the French administrator of the Division of 
Visual Media, Jean Keim, as “anti-Soviet personally” due to his experience as the cultural 
attaché in the French embassy in Moscow in the mid-1950s. In the same vein, he characterized 
his other boss, the American head of the Television Division and former editor-in-chief for 
television news for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), Henri Cassirer, as “an enemy of 
the Soviet Union and informant” reporting to the USIA.589 Yet Sobolev also lauded Keim for 
rejecting a proposition advanced by Cassirer to offer the Walt Disney Company the contract to 
make a cartoon about UNESCO and recommending instead that, “on the grounds that this would 
upset the equilibrium in UNESCO’s general policy concerning Soviet cinematography,” the 
international organization hire a Czechoslovakian firm for the project. Although Sobolev 
partially interpreted this “neutrality” as a sign of Keim’s anti-American “French nationalism,” he 
postulated that the “correlation of forces of countries in UNESCO” compelled the Frenchman to 
“keep more or less an objective line and, in any case, advertise his objectivity.”590  
                                                     
588 Ibid., ll. 179-80. 
 
589 Cassirer, a Jew who fled Nazi Germany after the outbreak of the Second World War, became one of the first 
editors of American television news in the late 1940s. At UNESCO, he pioneered the use of television for 
educational purposes throughout the world, disseminating documentaries and other pedagogical aids to countries in 
Africa and elsewhere. For more on Cassirer, see his obituary: Brian Groombridge, “Henry Cassirer,” The Guardian, 
February 18, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/feb/18/broadcasting.guardianobituaries. 
 
590 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 237-38. 
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Plodding through the workday surrounded by this alien society, Soviet international civil 
servants came to see the mundane personal affronts they weathered in the workplace as attacks 
on the Soviet Union generally. In the offices of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, 
the Cold War raged on an interpersonal level between Director Kovda and his American deputy, 
Dr. Hilliard Roderick. From Kovda’s standpoint, as the US Department of State increasingly 
grew uncomfortable with the power the Soviet scientist exerted over this key department in the 
international science battles between the superpowers, the American nuclear physicist purporting 
to be his right-hand man had changed “from a relatively simple and cheerful man” to a “gloomy 
and hostile” subversive. As evidence, Kovda ran through a list of petty offences committed by 
Roderick in the spring of 1961. “He regularly rummages through my papers on the desk in my 
absence,” the Soviet director fretted to the Soviet UNESCO Commission. “He tries,” Kovda 
went on, “to barge into my office to hear at least part of my conversations with visitors or at least 
see the faces of these people. In fights over staff or the budget in the department and during 
difficult or intense work, he is aloof.” Kovda bristled over attempts to “discredit” him or others 
coming from “socialist or neutral countries.”591 In particular, he accused Maheu of trying to 
“exclude the names of Soviet scholars in reports of the Western press” while attributing the 
“successes of the work of the department” to Western scientists. Maheu also supposedly sent his 
“henchmen” to “disrupt” or “make a mess” of the department at the behest of the US.592  
On multiple occasions, Soviet nationals drew indirect reprimands from their UNESCO 
supervisors for their inability to conceal their outrage over manifestations of collusion between 
                                                     
591 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 39. 
 
592 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 17, l. 49; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 39. Even though Kovda viewed Roderick as 
an enemy of the Soviet Union, he and other Soviet specialists charged with overseeing UNESCO affairs claimed 
that the US Delegation to UNESCO disliked Roderick because he was “too cooperative with the Soviet director of 
the department.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 23, l. 53. He also blamed Maheu for the insufficient funds allotted to the 
Department of Natural Sciences by the international organization. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 293. 
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American and UNESCO officials. Fashioning himself as a conscientious warrior for the Soviet 
Union abroad in his 1960 and 1962 reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Sobolev 
repeatedly rehashed a story of how he thwarted moves by Gjesdal and Cassirer to “direct the 
work” of his division to “please their overseas rulers” by propagating “bourgeois ideology” and 
the advertising of “‘UNESCO activity.’”593 According to the Soviet expert, Gjesdal agreed in 
October 1960 to give an interview to CBS during which the reporter planned to ask Gjesdal to 
speak at length on “the growth of racism in relation to Jews in the USSR and West Germany” 
following an uptick in anti-Semitic incidents in the FRG earlier that year. Upon hearing of the 
topic of the CBS segment, Sobolev barged onto the set and, “in front of everyone,” berated “an 
enraged” Gjesdal for agreeing to participate in a program “incompatible with the UNESCO 
Charter” in light of its failure to present “a stark contrast” between “racism in West Germany” 
and the “policy of friendship of the peoples in the Soviet Union.” Although Sobolev assured the 
cancellation of the interview, he, too, suffered consequences for his actions. In Sobolev’s 
rendition of the events, Gjesdal accused him of “undermining the authority of the UNESCO 
leadership and insubordination” but was “forced to back down” after the intervention of the 
Soviet UNESCO Delegation and a threat of resignation from his Soviet underling. Yet the 
director removed Sobolev from the cutting-edge UNESCO initiative of producing educational 
television programs for developing countries, banishing him to an assignment in which he busied 
himself with “an ‘independent’ area of work––the renting out of UNESCO films, which stands 
apart from the fundamental activity of the Department of Information.”594  
                                                     
593 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, l. 56. 
 
594 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 56-58; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, l. 164. 
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The more Soviet secretariat workers asserted their communist identities, the more their 
UNESCO associates treated them as pariahs unworthy of inclusion in the internal workings of 
the international organization. P. D. Tarabaev, a program specialist who served as liaison with 
the USSR and several other states in Europe and North America for the UNESCO Bureau for 
Relations with Member States (BMS), felt that his advocacy for the Soviet viewpoint in 
UNESCO stigmatized him in the eyes of his counterparts in the bureau. “As earlier,” Tarabaev 
despaired in 1961, “the bureau leaders and my section head, McPhee, have done everything 
possible to isolate me from decisions on major issues and not allow my influence, as a Soviet 
man, on the development and execution of secretariat programs or plans and those of the 
bureau.” At first, “this was done very timidly and cautiously.” But in reaction to Soviet proposals 
at a 1960 session of the UNESCO Executive Board to cut the staff and administrative powers of 
the BMS as well as Tarabaev’s unwavering resolve to “actively intervene” with a “Soviet point 
of view” in the bureau, BMS officials began to deploy “such tactics . . . on the spur of the 
moment, practically openly.” If, before the session, his colleagues had treated him “warmly,” 
they began afterward to approach him only for “strictly business” matters, attempting “to create 
an atmosphere of some isolation” around him. While the BMS leadership had previously invited 
Tarabaev to meetings and sought his input on bureau affairs, they began to embargo him––and, 
symbolically, the Soviet Union––as retaliation for the actions of his homeland and his own 
obstreperousness. “Thus,” he lamented, “from December 1961 to January 1962, they stopped 
inviting me to any senior meetings or sessions at all. They stopped showing me drafts of 
programs and work plans, etc. It felt like they were receiving some kind of instruction from the 
top in relation to me.”595  
                                                     
595 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 325-28; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 3, l. 431. 
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Indeed, from low-level workers, such as Tarabaev and Sobolev, to the highest-ranking 
Soviet bigwigs in the secretariat, throughout the 1950s and 1960s such ostracization became a 
systemic practice that UNESCO administrators applied to Soviet workers if they revealed their 
ulterior motives too blatantly. Even Deputy Director-General Ershov turned into an outcast 
among the premier executives of the international organization. As a 1962 memorandum 
composed by the Soviet UNESCO Commission put it, the director-general, his two other 
deputies, and “many . . . employees of the UNESCO apparatus,” used “all their strength to 
attempt to isolate Ershov, to keep him in the dark and bypass him in the decision of a number of 
issues; to present him with a fait accompli or instruct him to resolve issues in a way clearly 
disadvantageous to the Soviet Union.” Furthermore, “there were cases of direct deception of 
Ershov from individual workers in the apparatus of the UNESCO Secretariat.”596 Thus the lack 
of official disciplinary actions taken by the UNESCO leadership for Soviet violations of the oath 
of the international civil service did not mean that Soviet professionals dispatched to the 
international organization avoided informal retribution from their colleagues in response to these 
transgressions. If Soviet UNESCO staff members let the communist dimension of their identities 
dictate their work lives and thereby color their public personae as international civil servants, 
they encountered a strong backlash from a work culture shaped by the ethical regime of the 
international civil service and its mandate that these servants maintain a public “neutrality” while 
relegating their political selves to the private sphere. Ironically, a combative advocacy of the 
Soviet platform or a blatant relaying of information to Soviet authorities therefore undermined 
                                                     
596 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 104-05. Like other Soviet UNESCO employees, Ershov described how 
Westerners in the international organization abused their power. Although the authors of the memorandum noted 
that Ershov’s ignorance of the English language had “exacerbated” his isolation, Ershov confirmed that the director-
general had repeatedly usurped his authority as deputy. “Maheu,” he wrote, “has tasted power and has begun to give 
orders as if it was his own estate (votchina).” Ibid., l. 135. 
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the goal of Soviet UNESCO employees to gain access to insider knowledge about the secretariat 
and exert influence on the UNESCO decision-making process.  
Soviet specialists had to keep their resentments private and appear as sociable and 
harmonious members of the UNESCO team at work if they wanted to excel in their roles as 
moles within the international organization. And in stark contrast to the tension-laden 
environment of antagonists and protagonists in the Cold War that Soviet personnel depicted in 
their annual reports to Moscow, UNESCO authorities, in their work-performance evaluations, 
portrayed their Soviet employees across the board as congenial and agreeable contributors to an 
international workforce created to show a supranational cooperation. For example, when Sobolev 
repeatedly boasted in his reports to the Soviet UNESCO Commission about his protestations 
during the CBS interview with Gjesdal in October 1960, he may have put an eagerness to show 
his reliability as a crusader for the Soviet cause before a desire to paint an accurate picture of his 
regular behavior at UNESCO. In an evaluation of his performance just three months after the 
CBS episode, Sobolev’s UNESCO managers did not mention the incident and applauded him as 
“polite, patient, . . . highly conscientious” as well as “courteous and discreet in his contact with 
others, both inside and outside the house.”597  
Unable to bring up their negative thoughts about UNESCO at work, Soviet UNESCO 
personnel found outlets for their communist views of the international organization either at the 
social functions put on by the Soviet colony in Paris or in the secret communications they 
maintained with the Soviet state. However, even the Soviet UNESCO Commission and 
                                                     
597 Tor Gjesdal, “Within-Grade Increment,” January 10, 1961, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of B. Sobolev, UNESCO 
Archives. Most UNESCO evaluations of Soviet international civil servants contained positive assessments in the 
box titled “Human Relations.” For some other examples, see: Tor Gjesdal, “Within-Grade Increment,” August 17, 
1957, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. N. Kovalsky, UNESCO Archives; and Émile Delavenay, “Within-Grade 
Increment,” July 7, 1960, 3, AG 8: Personnel Records of Mr. V. Birioukov, UNESCO Archives. 
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Delegation overruled and “corrected” the thoughtful conclusions that these specialists derived 
from a communist analysis of their firsthand knowledge of UNESCO. When Sobolev presciently 
warned in 1961 that the organization had begun to turn its attention away from the Western, 
anticommunist crusade for the “free dissemination of information” and divert its resources to 
development programs for the decolonizing world, his Soviet principals in the embassy and back 
in Moscow ignored the evidence Sobolev presented. “Sobolev is not really correct,” they 
advised, “when he reduces all UNESCO work to attempts by Western countries to strengthen 
their positions in the weakly-developed countries. One cannot, of course, underestimate US 
intentions to use UNESCO for ideological sabotage of the Soviet Union.”598  
Tarabaev earned a similar rebuke from his Soviet handlers when he professed to them 
opinions at odds with the Soviet consensus on who posed a threat to their interests in UNESCO. 
In a 1961 memorandum, Tarabaev commented with surprise that “employees of the secretariat 
from the USA” had taken “very sober positions” in meetings by displaying a “good attitude” 
toward the Soviet Union and having objected “frequently and reasonably” to the more 
mendacious proposals of their Western colleagues. He also complimented Maheu as a “man 
holding a ‘sober, healthy, and objective position.’” In reply, the deputy chair of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission in Moscow admonished Tarabaev for “idealizing Maheu” and “taking at 
face value the ostensible objectivity of American UNESCO bureaucrats” without an adequately 
                                                     
598 For more on this transition in UNESCO’s focus, see chapter 9. Sobolev described the “free dissemination of 
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critical posture. “It is completely obvious,” he wrote, “that Maheu and other leading UNESCO 
bureaucrats from Western countries have done everything under various pretexts to refuse to 
satisfy a number of requests of the socialist countries and the USSR in particular.”599 Likewise, 
Skorov drew a rebuke when he cast doubt on the feasibility of accomplishing the Soviet foreign-
policy goal of finding common ground with foreign social scientists or government functionaries 
and converting them to Marxism-Leninism. “While in the departments of natural sciences, 
education, or culture,” Skorov wrote in a 1962 report, “one could find some sort of common 
values, whether it be the elimination of illiteracy in the world, the support of scientific 
discoveries, or the exchange of indisputable cultural values, . . . in the Department of Social 
Sciences such values do not and cannot exist.” Insisting that the “antipodal” natures of the West 
and the Soviet Union did not represent a “discovery” on his part but “ABC’s, known to all,” 
Skorov proclaimed that “the conceptions of the social sciences and Marxist ideology accepted in 
socialist countries” faced rejection “not only in the Department of Social Sciences but also in all 
of the administrative apparatuses of all UNESCO member states, including the weakly-
developed countries.” All of this compelled him to have qualms over the necessity of his 
continued service in the secretariat. “Experience shows,” he repined, “that 90 to 95 percent of my 
working time is spent on goals that do not have anything to do with the interests of the Soviet 
Union, which naturally raises the question of how desirable it is for me to remain in this 
position.”600 In a riposte to this jeremiad, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reminded Skorov that 
only his superiors had the right to determine political strategy in UNESCO and question the 
value of his service to the international organization. Meanwhile, his job remained confined to 
                                                     
599 Unlike the Americans, he described the majority of the French in UNESCO as “reactionary, often dirty, and 
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following orders and passing “considerations and proposals” back to his commanding officers 
that did not contradict but affirmed the prevailing presumptions of these organs.601  
Although Soviet international civil servants spotted a few political friends among the 
hundreds of foreigners in the UNESCO Secretariat, the ubiquity of Westerners in the secretariat 
made the culture of the organization a hostile setting for these isolated Soviet nationals. The 
power of the West in the international organization thus derived not only from their monopoly of 
official positions of authority, but also from the psychological effects their strength in numbers 
had on employees from the communist bloc. The real or imagined antagonism Soviet UNESCO 
staff members encountered made their ambitions to influence the policies of the international 
organization in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union exceedingly difficult and put the USSR 
at a clear disadvantage in the arena of international organizations. 
*                 *                 * 
While Soviet UNESCO employees acquired a unique grasp of the situation in UNESCO 
and how to improve on Soviet participation in the organization, their insight fell on deaf ears if it 
contradicted the general assessment prevailing in the Soviet UNESCO Commission or 
Delegation. Of course, all states formulate foreign policy through a hierarchical, centralized 
process in which foreign ministries draw selectively from the intelligence of their diplomatic 
missions. But unlike members of foreign services who answer only to the governments they 
                                                     
601 The Soviet UNESCO Delegation “could not agree” with Skorov’s assumption that the West and communist 
countries shared common values in education, science, and culture. It also disagreed with his assertion that Western 
domination in the Department of Social Sciences meant that the department had “no value.” With respect to the 
skepticism Skorov expressed concerning the allure of Marxism-Leninism in UNESCO and its member states, the 
delegation sarcastically retorted that, “first of all, among ‘all UNESCO member states’ is a group of socialist 
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intelligentsia in the weakly-developed and even capitalist countries.” It also stressed its disagreement with the notion 
that weakly-developed countries had no interest in Marxism by placing a typed question mark and exclamation point 
in parentheses “(?!)” after their reference to this comment. The delegation added that it considered it “wrong” to 
“raise the question of whether comrade Skorov should further work in this position.” Ibid., ll. 22-23.  
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represent, Soviet international civil servants had to appease two authorities with starkly different 
expectations. Notwithstanding the presumption of Soviet officials in the embassy and back in 
Moscow that they alone could speak as the authoritative arbiters of the general policies of the 
Soviet Union with regard to UNESCO, Soviet professionals working in the secretariat regularly 
expressed frustration with Soviet behavior toward the international organization while asserting 
that they––and not those who represented the Soviet state from a distance––possessed a better 
understanding of how the USSR should approach UNESCO due to their intimate, immediate, 
and lengthy exposure to its inner workings. Because of this superior knowledge of UNESCO, 
Soviet secretariat members articulated in their reports back to the commission bold and sweeping 
suggestions for improving Soviet relations with the international organization. Instead of 
following the official Soviet line of placing the blame for their country’s difficulties on the 
Western biases of UNESCO, they began to echo the critiques of Soviet involvement in the UN 
agency voiced by their foreign counterparts in the organization.  
In the year following the decision to enroll its specialists in the UNESCO Secretariat, the 
first cohort of Soviet secretariat jobholders sent to UNESCO gained the impression that the 
Soviet state had sent them to an international organization with which it had little desire to 
cooperate or even fulfill its basic duties as a UNESCO member state. Reflecting at the end of 
1957 on his inaugural year working in the Division of Public Relations of the Department of 
Information, Biriukov criticized Soviet agencies for their hermitic reticence toward the outside 
world, imploring them to take a more active part in the give-and-take the international 
organization expected from member states. “In the area of activities [of the division],” Biriukov 
complained in his report to the commission, “the Soviet Union is one of the least active 
countries. Correspondence with the USSR is basically limited to the Soviet UNESCO 
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Commission. Answers from the commission are of an episodic character and do not show any 
initiative.” Biriukov lamented that the Soviet Association for the Promotion of the UN (ASOON) 
and the UN Information Center in Moscow had “completely ceased” to respond to UNESCO 
requests. Other Soviet organizations, “as a rule,” did not respond to the approximately 2,000 
letters from his division. “As a result,” Biriukov disapprovingly lectured the commission, “[the 
division] has developed the impression that the Soviet Union does not want, in reality, to 
participate in UNESCO work.” Because UNESCO “determined the activity of a country . . . on 
the basis of the number of letters” it received and had a propensity to formulate policies 
propitious to the most proactive member states, he argued for the necessity of “strengthening 
correspondence with UNESCO” through an increase in information supplied. He also stressed 
that the “negative attitude on the part of Soviet organizations” in this respect adversely affected 
the ability of other communist states to receive the perks UNESCO had to offer, warning that his 
boss had told him “directly” that the secretariat “would wait until the Soviet Union determines its 
relationship” with programs before allowing the “peoples’ democracies” to sign up for them.602  
Nearly all annual reports submitted by Soviet secretariat personnel over the first decade 
of Soviet participation in UNESCO chided Soviet domestic institutions for their 
unresponsiveness to UNESCO requests and the dereliction of their duty to prove the competency 
of the Soviet Union by coming across as reliable partners. The lone socialist employee in the 
Department of Natural Sciences in 1958 opined that Soviet authorities abdicated their 
responsibility for communicating with the department. “It should be noted,” he divulged to the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission, “that our organizations are constantly violating the deadlines for 
work and delaying responses on the participation of our specialists in meetings, which rightly 
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draws complaints from UNESCO and other organizations participating in the preparation of 
meetings.”603 As director of the same department four years later, Kovda rattled off a plethora of 
instances of “unacceptable holdups, interruptions, and even stagnation in movement and the 
resolution of issues” as well as “nonarrivals, delays, instance of tardiness, and silences” on the 
part of Soviet officials. The mistakes of Soviet domestic entities, Kovda stressed, undermined the 
prestige and efficacy of the Soviet Union on the international stage as well as, vicariously, his 
own reputation and clout in the international organization. “I, as a Soviet director,” Kovda 
remonstrated, “am put in a difficult situation by this. It is very hard for the USSR to receive a 
vacancy in UNESCO, the right to participate in meetings, or membership in international 
committees. We cannot allow that on account of slowness we miss these real opportunities for 
information and propaganda.” More fundamentally, “the amount of work in science and 
technology through UNESCO,” Kovda wrote in 1962, “has grown rapidly over the past years. 
Our commitment and participation in international life has taken on a permanent nature. 
Meanwhile, the tempo and form of the organization of work in Moscow remains such as it was 
four to five years ago.”604 Since the Soviet UNESCO Commission had no means to coerce Soviet 
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organs to readjust to the demands of international transaction, the protestations from Soviet 
UNESCO employees over their country’s handling of UNESCO interaction did little to alter the 
internal workings of the Soviet system and drew only rote assurances that the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and MID would “take under consideration” their concerns.  
The desire to enhance Soviet involvement in UNESCO emanated from a general 
consensus among Soviet secretariat workers that the 1954 enrollment of the USSR in the 
organization represented a positive step in their country’s relations with the international 
community. Even if some Soviet specialists posted in the secretariat disdained their own narrow 
lines of work or the politics of their respective departments, they pushed back against 
conservative elements at home who used the perceived shortcomings of UNESCO as a pretext 
for a retreat from participation in international organizations. “In hindsight,” Dubinin recalled in 
his memoirs, “the step taken at the time by our country to take part in UNESCO may seem 
simple and self-evident. But that was not the case then.”  As he remembered nearly forty years 
later, Dubinin and the rest of the Soviet UNESCO collective circled the wagons after reading the 
November 1958 article in Pravda (“Wither UNESCO?”) by the chairman of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission, Zhukov.605 The article’s depiction of UNESCO, in Dubinin’s words, as 
“not only useless, but harmful to our country,” and its posing of “the question of the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Union” from the international organization, sparked a small-scale revolt among 
Soviet citizens working in the secretariat. Understanding that Chairman Zhukov “himself had 
weight” in Soviet politics and that “behind him stood a powerful trend” of backlash against the 
new policies of the Khrushchev era, Soviet secretariat personnel discussed the article and “were 
unanimous in the necessity of fighting to preserve the participation of the Soviet Union in 
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UNESCO.” Appealing to Moscow, they launched a letter-writing campaign that helped to 
convince the Soviet leadership to give UNESCO a chance.606  When Soviet Permanent Delegate 
Pavlov raised the possibility of a Soviet exit from UNESCO again four years later, Deputy 
Director-General Ershov shrugged off the issue as already settled. “It is time,” he avowed, “to 
remove this question from the agenda.” By urging the Soviet UNESCO Commission no longer to 
“speak of participating or not participating” in the organization, Ershov joined his fellow Soviet 
professionals in UNESCO to lobby successfully for the normalization of the Soviet presence in 
UNESCO and multilateral diplomacy in general. Soviet abdication of its influential place as the 
second largest contributor to the UNESCO budget, Ershov contended, “would be a significant 
concession to the Westerners in this field of the battle between the two systems, untie the hands 
of the colonialists,” and “facilitate their activity in the weakly-developed countries.” While 
acknowledging that bilateral relations often served Soviet objectives abroad better than the 
multilateral diplomacy of UNESCO, Ershov noted that many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America had yet to secure bilateral agreements with the USSR and would hesitate to do so when 
faced with American pressure. “It follows,” he reckoned, “that we must use . . . international 
organizations for the introduction and spread of our influence in these countries.”607 
Some Soviet UNESCO workers even lobbied for broader changes in the ways the Soviet 
Union did business with the outside world, advocating proposals emblematic of the UNESCO 
ethos of international integration without discarding, and largely as a product of, their allegiance 
to the Soviet Union. For example, in a spate of writings to the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
from 1960 to 1962, Tarabaev, as a member of the bureau facilitating relations between UNESCO 
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and the communist bloc, not only aptly summarized the collective befuddlement and dismay of 
Soviet secretariat staff members at the bumbling of their comrades in the USSR, but also drew 
on the bureau’s dealings with Western countries to suggest normative avenues for reform that 
would more closely align the practices of the Soviet bureaucracy with those of the international 
organization. Listing the missteps his fellow Soviet colleagues in UNESCO had enumerated in 
previous messages, Tarabaev confessed his view that the UNESCO leadership was “not entirely 
pleased with the approach the USSR and other democratic countries have taken toward 
UNESCO.” This “very unpleasant impression” in the secretariat of the “silence” of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission, he cautioned, had “created a definitely undesirable relationship” that 
informed the secretariat when considering Soviet proposals for further collaboration. “It seems to 
me that many states and their national commissions,” Tarabaev underlined in his report, “having 
paid attention to their UNESCO relationship and sometimes giving the appearance of interest or 
proactivity in UNESCO, are very successful in getting secretariat posts and funds, sending 
experts, increasing their countries’ authority and prestige in the international arena.”608  
Tarabaev went beyond regurgitating the frequently articulated sources of vexation for 
Soviet secretariat workers, questioning the attributes of Soviet participation in UNESCO that 
made the USSR an outlier among the international organization’s member states. When he first 
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joined the international organization in 1959, Tarabaev revealed his bemusement with Soviet 
subversion of the ethics of the international civil service. Although all Soviet citizens hired by 
UNESCO understood that their loyalty lay with the Soviet Union, Tarabaev felt a degree of 
perplexity over his dual role in the international organization after taking the oath of the 
international civil service. In his first letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in February 
1960, he betrayed a reluctance to violate this oath when approached by delegates from the 
communist states eager to elicit unauthorized “advice” and “clarification” from him. “How can I 
remain in such a case both an official of the secretariat and a representative of the USSR?”609 
Furthermore, Tarabaev made clear his irritation with the frequent displays of open hostility 
toward the international organization sanctioned by the Soviet state. Resolving to “share” with 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission “the reaction in the UNESCO Secretariat” to an article highly 
critical of the international organization published in Novoe vremia and written by V. V. 
Zagladin (a future member of the Central Committee and contributor to Gorbachev’s “new 
thinking” in the late 1980s), Tarabaev rebuked the commission for allowing this article to throw 
into jeopardy the fragile relationships that Soviet UNESCO employees had cultivated in 
UNESCO. “Some UNESCO activities,” he admitted, “naturally cause and will cause complaints 
and criticism from us. But when writing such articles and criticism of UNESCO activities one 
must do so . . . with knowledge of the specifics of all UNESCO work and do so thoroughly, 
justifiably, concretely and consistent with a certain diplomatic tact.” To prove his point, 
Tarabaev noted that Zagladin’s “absolutely correct” statements suffered from a lack of “any 
convincing example” or “concrete evidence” and came across in the eyes of the UNESCO 
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directorship as “propaganda and pressure on UNESCO without any justification.”610 Tarabaev 
asserted that these uncorroborated attacks threatened to undo the alliances that his Soviet 
colleagues in Paris had fostered in UNESCO. “It is necessary,” he counseled, “to keep in mind 
UNESCO practice, the composition of its personnel, and especially the relationships between the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission, our delegation and individual Soviet employees of the secretariat 
on the one hand, and the secretariat and its employees on the other.”611 
A few months after this polite panning, Tarabaev laid out for Soviet authorities the 
deficiencies in the initiative led by Soviet foreign-policy organs to showcase the USSR as a 
beacon of hospitality. In an August 1960 conversation, Roger Caillois, a French employee of the 
Department of Culture and renowned sociocultural theorist, related to Tarabaev a series of 
complications he had experienced while traveling that month to attend the International Congress 
of Orientalists in Moscow.612 According to Tarabaev, no one came to pick up Caillois at 
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author went on to suggest that UNESCO put too much of an emphasis on the study of religion as a result of this 
Catholic influence. It is likely that this attack on the director-general inspired Tarabaev to write his complaint even 
though he could not defend Catholicism or Veronese openly lest he appear too confrontational. V. Zagladin, “V 
IuNESKO,” Novoe vremia, June 3, 1960, 25–27. 
 
612 Caillois is another example of a highly respected academic or cultural figure working at UNESCO in the late 
1950s and 1960s. A disciple of surrealism and then a close collaborator with Georges Bataille in the 1930s, Caillois 
lived out the Second World War in Argentina and after returning to France introduced the work of Argentinian 
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Sheremet’evo International Airport after a twelve-hour flight delay prevented him from arriving. 
Fed up with receiving no answer when telephoning the AN SSSR Institute of Oriental Studies 
and the Hotel Ukraina, the distinguished guest and editor of the influential UNESCO journal 
Diogenes took a taxi to the hotel and booked a room without the help of his Soviet hosts. The 
next day, he found his own way to the Institute of Oriental Studies and “was shown basically no 
attention from anyone” throughout the first session of the congress, waiting for almost five hours 
to register as a speaker and meet with the coordinator of the congress. “The Soviet UNESCO 
Commission,” Tarabaev concluded after telling this story, “should pay attention to or assist and 
support all UNESCO representatives visiting the USSR (of which, by the way, there are not a 
lot), which would greatly contribute to strengthening cooperation with UNESCO and facilitate 
the work of our delegation to UNESCO in Paris.”613  
The next spring, after witnessing the efficient and relatively open bureaucratic 
mechanisms for travel in Western countries, he criticized the intentionally labyrinthine defenses 
the Soviet state erected against foreign visitors. Comparing the wall of bureaucratic tape that 
closed off the USSR from the outside world to the relatively free international mobility existing 
in the West, he sent a thorough outline of the hurdles impeding the smooth entry of UNESCO 
emissaries into the USSR for official gatherings considered by UNESCO a required component 
of sustaining a functioning relationship between member states and the international 
organization. The Soviet administrator pointed out that the organization of the trips of secretariat 
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members to the “majority” of UNESCO member states did not, “as a rule, pose any kind of 
difficulties” because of the laxity of immigration rules for making visits to other countries 
outside of the communist bloc. In such cases, Tarabaev elaborated, a “letter is sent to the country 
where an employee is going stating the objectives and tasks of the mission, the country responds, 
and the employee, having a so-called UN Passport (Laissez-Passer) is sent on the mission. Cases 
of refusal are very rare.” The painlessness of this procedure, he assessed, derived from the fact 
that “secretariat employees, being from Western countries, as a rule, do not need visas for entry 
to the majority of Western countries, and they organize trips very simply and often.”  
In his quest to obtain clearance for UNESCO officials to go the Soviet Union, Tarabaev 
had to wander through an opaque maze of nonresponses, waiting periods, unexplained 
deferments or rejections, and blame shifting––all of which the international organization “often 
construed as a clear obstacle to the expansion of contacts and relations between the East and 
West, between UNESCO and countries of the socialist camp.” The bureau typically sent the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission an official letter one-and-a-half to two months before the 
proposed trip that contained details on the reason for travel, the length of stay, date of entry, 
methods of transportations, and biographical information. “I am aware of things and can report,” 
he scolded the commission, “that practically none of these official letters in this respect have 
received any kind of answer from the commission, which is clearly at odds with the practice of 
UNESCO activities.” With no clue as to whether the commission assented to their arrival in the 
Soviet Union, non-Soviet secretariat employees had to mail their visa application to MID in 
Moscow at least one month before their planned departure. Since the consulate in the Soviet 
embassy in Paris doled out visas only once MID got around to evaluating applications and 
approving them, UNESCO Secretariat representatives routinely obtained their visas, if at all, just 
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“a few days” before their departure. “It should be noted,” Tarabaev remarked to drive the 
message home, “that receiving visas for entry into other countries of the socialist camp (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and others) is much better and easier. These 
countries, as a rule, issue their visas to UNESCO workers after 10-15 days. Cases of refusal 
basically do not exist.” He therefore felt it imperative to “honestly and openly say” to the 
commission “that the question of the organization of such trips of secretariat employees to the 
USSR” required “radical changes and improvement” because it was “the most difficult while 
causing the most talk among UNESCO figures. The thoughts expressed by me,” he concluded, 
“are not expressions of any kind of rebuke of our commission, but only the pursuance of the goal 
of helping it in its work and its dealing with issues in the organization of trips of employees of 
the UNESCO Secretariat to the USSR in the near future.”614  
In other words, when the Soviet state could not live up to UNESCO’s norms and created 
obstacles in the work lives of Soviet international civil servants, these specialists nursed a 
mounting dissatisfaction with their own government’s practices and became aware of the 
weaknesses of the Soviet system in its approach to UNESCO. In contrast to their Soviet higher-
ups who demanded UNESCO adjust to the Soviet system in its approach to recruitment and other 
areas of cooperation, Biriukov and other Soviet UNESCO workers came to take it as self-evident 
that the USSR should take measures to reciprocate the overtures from UNESCO and integrate 
into the international organizational system by setting up mechanisms for a more reliable 
exchange with the international organization. Soviet international civil servants relied on the due 
diligence of the Soviet UNESCO Commission to act as a willing partner and considered it an 
annoying hindrance in their public lives if the commission did not meet its end of the bargain.  
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Moreover, when the Soviet state compounded this failure to live up to UNESCO’s norms 
of smooth international cooperation with aspirations for total control and supervision of their 
public work lives, these citizens developed an even greater frustration with their own 
government that bred discontent among Soviet UNESCO employees against such Soviet 
meddling in their public roles as international civil servants. The Soviet UNESCO Commission 
and Delegation moved to suppress what they referred to as instances of “autonomy” among 
Soviet workers “in relation to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission.”615 In January 1964, the commission passed a resolution that forced each Soviet 
secretariat staff member to abide by six-month “individual work plans” that listed a variety of 
tasks for each Soviet worker to fulfill and strict deadlines for their completion. Writing up these 
work plans without any input from Soviet UNESCO employees on the ground, the commission 
devised each plan and added directions based on their assessment in Moscow of what the Soviet 
Union wanted from the international organization.616 The unfeasibility and impracticality of this 
caused disgruntlement from its inception. “This transition,” the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
wrote in its annual 1964 report about the introduction of these plans, “did not take place without 
the resistance of certain Soviet secretariat employees unhappy with the increase of supervision 
on the part of the delegation over their work in UNESCO.” But the delegation assured the 
commission that the “attempts of individual Soviet secretariat employees to speak against the 
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delegation’s planning of their work and the supervision of this work as well as [their] 
correspondence with the center was not met with support from the collective,” receiving “a firm 
rebuke by the leadership . . . of the social organizations (on the level of the UNESCO collective 
as well as the general professional organization of the colony).”617  
In short, Soviet specialists in the secretariat unfavorably compared how the Soviet Union 
related to UNESCO to the smooth and voluntary involvement of other member states, indicating 
that the international organization compelled Soviet citizens working in its bureaucracy to urge 
their government to conform to its practices. While Soviet personnel understood the UNESCO 
Secretariat as a reproduction of the dynamics of the international community in miniature in 
which the West shaped its rules, they also realized that the USSR had to play by these rules if it 
wanted to benefit from membership in the international organization. Additionally, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission and Delegation could meddle outside the private sphere of the Soviet 
colony and in the public duties of Soviet international civil servants only to a certain point. 
Although the state sought to regulate the niceties of their jobs through “planning,” Soviet 
UNESCO employees tended to search for a degree of independence because of the need to act 
spontaneously to meet the requirements of the international organization. The next section of this 
chapter will demonstrate how Soviet UNESCO specialists skirted the regulations imposed on 
them by their Soviet bosses.  
*                 *                 * 
For Soviet UNESCO employees, the foreign work culture and inflexible demands of their 
Soviet higher-ups combined to make their secretariat jobs burdensomely complex. These 
contradictory and fluid responsibilities and milieus depressed morale within the Soviet UNESCO 
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collective. Moreover, this situation led to a normalization of small acts of disobedience among 
Soviet UNESCO staff members as well as rare but drastic instances of outright rebellion. While 
the former did not suggest disillusionment with communism or resistance to the Soviet state, the 
latter laid bare anxieties widely shared by the entire UNESCO cohort that were seldom addressed 
and never completely resolved.     
From 1956 to 1967, nearly every Soviet professional hired by UNESCO voiced feelings 
of homesickness and a desire to return to the USSR, couching these requests as dissatisfaction 
with the deprivations of living abroad for an extended period. “In conversations,” a MID official 
reported in 1964, “one hears many times, ‘I would rather leave here.’”618 Soviet international 
civil servants grew weary of life in Paris because of their own personal or professional 
circumstances as well as a feeling of superfluity in their administrative jobs in the secretariat. 
“One of the important tasks of educational work in the collective,” the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation advised in 1963, “should be the final overcoming of the still present sentiment among 
Soviet UNESCO employees to leave UNESCO.”619  Unable to locate candidates to replace them, 
however, the Soviet UNESCO Commission forced those Soviet citizens eager to return to their 
regular lives for professional, health-related, or familiar reasons to stay at UNESCO against their 
own will. Tangian, for example, ended up spending almost six years at UNESCO even though 
his Soviet managers had initially promised him he would work at the international organization 
for only two years. Several times during his tenure at UNESCO between 1956 and 1962, 
Tangian beseeched the Soviet UNESCO Commission to relieve him of his position upon the 
expiration of his two-year contracts. “Having been abroad for a long time, I cannot with all good 
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intentions be fully informed of everything that happens in my profession,” he wrote in 1960. 
Apart from emphasizing the benefits he could bring to education in the USSR, Tangian 
commented that his wife, who had tagged along with him to Paris, also could not “work in her 
specialty” abroad. To make matters worse, his son had suffered from chronic sickness since they 
had left Moscow.620 Similarly, Zhegalova cited familial reasons for wanting to go home, insisting 
in 1958 that further time alone in Paris and without her family would “be very difficult” for 
her.621 Rejecting her rationale and these entreaties from Tangian, the commission instructed the 
two secretariat workers to “understand that the Soviet UNESCO Commission cannot accept 
being deprived of positions in the UNESCO apparatus that were acquired with great effort.”622 In 
1960, A. B. Letnev, a translator in the secretariat, attempted to convince the commission to let 
him go back to the AN SSSR Institute of Africa and Asia. Grumbling that his “repeated requests 
to leave UNESCO have come to nothing,” he advertised his skills as a specialist in the study of 
the West African “national bourgeoisie” in addition to a proficiency in African languages 
(Mandingo and Swahili). “Being aware of the great importance of work in international 
organizations,” he assessed, “I am also aware that I am not working where, given the great 
urgency of the problems of Africa, Africanists are in the greatest need now.”623 Martynovskii 
also exhibited, in the words of the commission, an “escapist mood,” preferring to rejoin the more 
exciting explorations of the laboratory for refrigeration technology in Odessa (where he had 
originally worked and continued to advise several graduate students from afar) rather than retain 
his “clerical” position in UNESCO. In response, the commission reminded the Soviet scientist 
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that “you, obviously, underestimate the important work you are called to complete. We ask you 
to understand that, in light of the decisions of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, the 
work that you are now doing is not at all less significant than teaching and research.”624 
In spite of these pangs of homesickness, almost all of the Soviet international civil 
servants at UNESCO bided their time until they received a summons back home. For one Soviet 
UNESCO employee, however, the onerous demands the Soviet state placed on him became so 
unbearable that he defected.    
In late October 1964, Iu. A. Poliakov, a worker in the Public Relations Division of the 
Department of Information, stopped by the bar on the first floor of UNESCO headquarters. As he 
sipped on a cup of a tea, a man sitting nearby with a beer got up and approached him. The 
stranger, as Poliakov later meticulously recollected in his report to Soviet authorities, was “a 
large and slightly hunched-over” figure of “approximately 1.75-1.80 meters height” who looked 
between forty and forty-five years of age; had “an oblong, tanned face with wrinkles”; and 
sported an outdated pair of brown horn-rimmed glasses, “slicked back” dark hair that was 
greying, as well as a rose-colored mustache “in the Hitlerian style.”625 In his “large” mouth, 
Poliakov observed, were “yellowing, dirty teeth––all of irregular shapes and pointing every 
which way, especially the two upper front ones.” Overall, his face struck Poliakov as “typical” 
but, “as they say,” one that he had “seen somewhere before.” Wearing a taupe suit, grey vest, a 
“stale white shirt with a crumpled collar,” this “odd-ball,” as Poliakov called him, pointed his 
stubbly fingers at the package of recent editions of Soviet newspapers Poliakov had brought with 
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him for evening reading and inquired in French as to whether the Soviet secretariat worker read 
Russian. Upon hearing Poliakov’s citizenship and that he served in the secretariat, the man asked 
if Poliakov knew the whereabouts of V. I. Ponomarev, a Soviet employee of the Administrative 
Division of the UNESCO Bureau for Administrative Planning and the Budget. In reply to 
Poliakov’s response that he was traveling on business to one of the Scandinavian countries, the 
man sardonically remarked that “Soviet people” were “ill-informed” and that, “according to his 
information,” Ponomarev was in London and said “‘hi’ to his comrades.” To what he dismissed 
as Poliakov’s “naïve” question as to whether UNESCO had sent Ponomarev to London, the 
mysterious “chap” (diadia) retorted “with a smirk” that Ponomarev’s “business trip had finished 
back in Stockholm” and that he had “‘chosen freedom’” by going to London and “resigning” 
from his UNESCO post. 
Poliakov queried his interlocutor about the reasons for Ponomarev’s presence in London, 
if the man had seen Ponomarev in London with his own eyes, and whether he knew of 
Ponomarev’s visit to the British capital because he belonged to the English delegation to the 
thirteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference, which was to take place in the coming 
weeks. The man quipped that Ponomarev was in London to “look around and get used to a new 
life”; he admitted that he had not met Ponomarev but had come to Paris with this message from a 
“friend”; and he rejoined that no, he did not belong to any delegation and was just “passing 
through.” After Poliakov asked if he came to UNESCO with the express purpose of “passing 
along a ‘hello’” from Ponomarev to Soviet UNESCO employees, the man “chuckled” and 
responded: “‘And do you know why Ponomarev ‘stayed’? He expressed dissatisfaction with this 
here (he pointed at the newspapers with information from Moscow of the resignation of N. 
Khrushchev) and that the Soviet authorities take half the salary received from UNESCO by you 
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Soviets. Is this true? Is this fair?’” Poliakov barked back that he had “never heard” of such a 
procedure for seizing portions of the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees and that Ponomarev, 
“in zeal for his new masters,” evidently had consumed all kinds of “anti-Soviet tall tales.” The 
conversation went on in this circular fashion for a while longer until the man held out his hand 
and requested permission to “pass along” a “hello” from the Soviet UNESCO collective back to 
Ponomarev. Refusing to shake hands with “a traveling salesman for a traitor,” the stunned Soviet 
bureaucrat stormed out of the bar only to realize after a “few minutes” that he had forgotten his 
newspapers. But when Poliakov returned to collect his items, the man had disappeared. 
Throughout this tense dialogue, Poliakov remembered, the unknown visitor to UNESCO spoke 
French “clearly,” but also began his statements twice in English. “I believe that all of the above,” 
Poliakov suggestively concluded, “is not an accidental event and that the chap could appear (he 
or another) among other comrades.”626 
Ponomarev’s apparent defection came after a long and uneventful five-year tenure at 
UNESCO. Beginning work at the international organization in August 1959, he spent his days 
roaming the halls of UNESCO, conversing with directors and deputy directors in order to 
compile surveys “with the goal of changes in the program and preparing recommendations for 
the director-general on staff structure.” These recommendations entailed the devising of plans for 
the reclassification of ranks, the freezing of hiring, and the elimination of “excess” positions in 
the secretariat. For the Soviet UNESCO Commission, Ponomarev used his bailiwick to level the 
playing field between the West and communist countries in UNESCO recruitment while also 
cultivating a “broad circle of acquaintances” from which he could extract intelligence on 
UNESCO deliberations that informed the commission as they devised strategies on how to 
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approach the UNESCO program and budget. On the whole, the UNESCO bureaucrat earned 
favorable marks from his Soviet taskmasters but suffered repeated chidings from them for his 
hesitance to vigorously agitate the Soviet cause in the secretariat and behaving “too ‘modestly,’” 
or without the “initiative” and “persistence” incumbent on him.627  
In hindsight, this unwillingness to push the Soviet line may have betrayed a festering 
disenchantment with the intrusiveness of his Soviet masters rather than merely a personality 
quirk. In the spring of 1964, six months before his defection, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
twice requested that the Soviet UNESCO Commission call Ponomarev home as soon as possible 
after hearing that Ponomarev had done “poor” work in his new position in the Department of 
Education, where he had been transferred earlier that year. Apparently, the delegation also 
worried that Ponomarev’s discipline was “decaying” because he had repeatedly embarked on 
business trips without alerting them. Much to the chagrin of the delegation, the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission, keen to avoid depleting the UNESCO collective in the run up to the general 
conference that fall, refused to summon Ponomarev, ordering him in September to return to the 
USSR on October 23, or seven months before his UNESCO contract expired in May 1965.628  
Hoarding three-months of dues he owed to the Soviet state from his UNESCO salary for 
future use during his escape, Ponomarev prepared for his journey into the unknown.629 But “to 
the last minute,” one of his fellow Soviet UNESCO employees remembered, Ponomarev 
pretended to return to the Soviet Union, “registering for an apartment and buying furniture” in 
Moscow. Although his conference in Stockholm lasted from September 20 to September 26, 
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Ponomarev, the Soviet permanent delegate claimed, “covered his tracks” by reporting to Soviet 
officials that he also intended to travel to Copenhagen until October 5. Instead of going to the 
Danish capital, he was last seen at the conference in Sweden on September 26. At a UNESCO 
reception on the day of his expected return to Paris, an American in the secretariat told a Soviet 
colleague that Ponomarev had failed to show up to work. The next day, the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation, unsure as to whether the Soviet bureaucrat had definitively defected, informed 
Moscow of these rumors. On October 9, Ponomarev’s wife came to the delegation to “express 
concern about her husband.” Realizing their worst fears had come to fruition, the delegation 
quickly escorted her to Moscow and began a long campaign to press the UNESCO leadership, 
who they suspected knew of Ponomarev’s whereabouts, to reveal where he had fled.630 
On October 19, Director-General Maheu found on his desk a letter written in English in 
which Ponomarev explained his defection by citing his gripes with the control the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation wielded over his life in Paris. Just as Leff had forsaken the capitalist world 
because of the American government’s demand that he return to his native country, Ponomarev 
divulged to Maheu how the decisions of his Soviet handlers to call him home had impacted his 
decision-making. “[The Soviet UNESCO Delegation] (Vakroushev [sic], with Pavlov’s eyes 
shut),” he clarified, “succeeded in putting me in a bad light in the eyes of my superiors in 
Moscow and made me ‘persona non-grata.’ They then caused me to write first of all to the 
chairman of . . . [the Soviet UNESCO Commission] and then to the chief of PER [Bureau of 
Personnel], asking to resign my post.” Portraying himself as a loyal international civil servant 
calling out his country for violating the norms of the international civil service, Ponomarev 
alerted Maheu that Soviet officials had overruled his personal resolve to stay on at UNESCO. “I 
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must state emphatically,” he continued, “that at no time did I wish to resign. I loved my work at 
UNESCO and wished to continue in it. For a long time,” Ponomarev revealed to Maheu, “I had 
been becoming more and more disillusioned with the conduct of affairs in the USSR, but this 
action of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation brought matters to a head. I know that the only safe 
thing for me to do was to remain in the West where I knew I should be free.” Ponomarev then 
exhaustively explained his primary reason for forfeiting his Soviet citizenship––the extraction of 
levies from his UNESCO salary by MID. Informing Maheu of the system each Soviet secretariat 
worker dealt with when surrendering part of their pay to the Soviet embassy, he attached a table 
demonstrating how much money his government had taken from him during his employment 
with UNESCO. Requesting that UNESCO consider this a “tax” on his payments when the 
UNESCO financial office calculated remaining funds owed to him, he asked UNESCO to 
transfer this sum to the Chemical Bank, New York Trust Company at UN headquarters in New 
York.631 
On November 3, ten days after Poliakov’s bizarre run-in at the UNESCO bar, the attaché 
of the Soviet embassy paid a visit to Maheu to discuss the Ponomarev affair. As in other 
documented defections, the Soviet official sought to shame its prodigal subject and those 
suspected of playing a part in his escape, passing along to Maheu a letter supposedly written by 
Ponomarev’s wife asking after the “fate of her husband.” As the attaché subsequently reported, 
the director-general claimed that as the executive of an international organization “he could not 
and does not have the right to keep track of and interfere in the personal lives of UNESCO 
bureaucrats.” But after rereading the letter, Maheu admitted to the attaché that he had 
unsuccessfully sought to learn where Ponomarev had gone by sending a letter to the Swedish 
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ambassador to France. Additionally, Maheu disclosed that he had not only received a letter from 
Ponomarev two weeks earlier, but had also done some sleuthing and learned from UNESCO 
personnel who worked with Ponomarev that he was a “withdrawn,” quiet man who “several 
times” had mentioned “he would like to work permanently at UNESCO.” Maheu then composed 
a letter to Ponomarev’s wife expressing regret that he did not know what had happened to her 
husband. The Soviet embassy forwarded a copy of this letter, along with the attaché’s record of 
the conversation, to the KGB.632 Later on, employees from the Soviet consulate went to the 
apartment of the Ponomarev couple in Paris; inspected the eight boxes containing their 
household items (clothing, shoes, books, etc.); confiscated those items that clearly belonged 
exclusively to Ponomarev as compensation for the money he owed to the Soviet state from his 
UNESCO salary; and shipped what remained to his wife in Moscow.633 
On November 11, Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador to France, summoned all members 
of the UNESCO collective to the embassy for a reflection on the causes of Ponomarev’s 
defection. “This treacherous act,” Vinogradov declared to those assembled, “is a stain on our 
entire organization in France. It is even more unpleasant that we have never had such instances. 
Today, we must determine the reasons for such an action and draw conclusions so that in the 
future this will not be permitted.”634 Many Soviet UNESCO employees, who learned of the 
defection through press reports, made clear their outrage at the delegation and embassy for 
keeping them in the dark about the recent events.635 Diplomatic personnel used their time with 
Soviet UNESCO staff to instruct them on how to deal with what they described as an 
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embarrassing moment for both the Soviet contingent in Paris and the Soviet Union in the 
international arena. The flight of Ponomarev came in the weeks before what Soviet UNESCO 
intermediaries expected to be a high point in their relations with UNESCO. Recently, the Soviet 
UNESCO detachment had rejoiced over the decision of the international organization to select N. 
M. Sisakian, a Soviet Armenian biochemist at AN SSSR, to serve as president of the UNESCO 
General Conference, which began fifteen days after Ponomarev failed to surface in Paris. “It is 
too bad,” one UNESCO worker observed, “that this betrayal took place right now when we are 
having great successes in UNESCO. Our scholar was chosen as president of the general 
conference. Our influence has increased in some parts of UNESCO.”636 Because Ponomarev did 
not have access to “encrypted correspondence” or “state secrets” (i.e., he was not an official 
agent of a Soviet intelligence organization working under the cover of the international civil 
service), Soviet authorities focused their worries on how his absconsion would undermine the 
reputation of the USSR.637 Vinogradov identified the process equalizing UNESCO salaries with 
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the Western alliance for Iacobescu and the Romanian government. The DST had also arrested a member of the 
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those of Soviet diplomats as the most damaging piece of intelligence Westerners would obtain 
from Ponomarev given his disgruntlement over this arrangement. “This is not that bad,” he 
reassured his audience, since, “in the end,” the surrendering of payments by Soviet secretariat 
staff to the Soviet embassy was “their business” and not that of the secretariat. With respect to 
the repercussions of the event on the image of the USSR on the world stage, Vinogradov 
reasoned, “the press will not write much about Ponomarev. He is minor and the harm to our 
government is small. He is being used mainly as propaganda.”638 
Nevertheless, since the British Home Office had announced the day before the meeting at 
the embassy that it would grant Ponomarev asylum, the ambassador and the Soviet permanent 
delegate warned the UNESCO crew that they would have to weather “questions of a provocative 
nature” from the press and probing by members of foreign intelligence services such as the 
individual who had accosted Poliakov.639 To prepare them for this onslaught, Pavlov and 
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Vinogradov gave the UNESCO cohort four directives on how to comport themselves when 
foreigners “inquire about this traitor”: first, “do not make a tragedy of this”; second, “do not 
make any contacts with Ponomarev and rebuff attempts by Western intelligence to mediate in the 
establishment of such contacts”; third, “say to those who will begin sympathetic conversations 
about Ponomarev, that ‘it serves him right,’ that we have no business with traitors or betrayers 
and do not want to have any”; and fourth, “do not answer questions about the system of 
deductions” from the salaries of Soviet UNESCO employees.640  
In terms of the longer lasting implications, however, the comments made by Soviet 
UNESCO employees and diplomatic officials in the course of this meeting reveal an unspoken 
concern that the motivations driving Ponomarev to take his drastic leap into the unknown were 
not the symptoms of one anomalous Soviet “traitor,” but anxieties widely shared among all 
Soviet UNESCO personnel who lived and worked under the dual power structures and ethical 
regimes imposed on them by the Soviet state and the international organization. Rather than 
focusing on how to adjust the rules governing Soviet citizens abroad to lessen such 
apprehensions, the gathering became a ritual designed to reaffirm, through a collective 
condemnation of the defection, the necessity of these rules. Those assembled isolated the causes 
of this defection to the person of Ponomarev (by combing through his past to unearth overlooked 
misbehavior) and deflected blame onto others for the incident without altering the status quo.  
Soviet UNESCO workers wracked their brains for evidence that would prove Ponomarev 
represented an anomaly among an otherwise tightly knit fraternity. As the person entrusted to 
shore up this collective, Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov set the tone and laid out the key 
premise of the meeting––namely, that Ponomarev must have been an impostor all along and that 
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his crime derived from a carefully concealed but deep-seated pathology rather than a spur-of-the-
moment decision. “In reality, [Ponomarev] was a stranger to us, a hostile man, skillfully wearing 
the mask of a Soviet man and communist.” Despite this mask, Pavlov argued that he could 
discern in hindsight some clues of Ponomarev’s true personality, including his “greed” for 
money.641 Furthermore, he disputed the claim of the stranger in the UNESCO bar that 
Ponomarev had resolved to abandon the USSR because of the recent “change in leadership,” 
noting that the ouster of Khrushchev had occurred on October 14 while Ponomarev had left for 
Great Britain by the end of September.642 Others distanced themselves from their former 
comrade by stressing that they “did not like him,” highlighting his penchant for “money 
grubbing” in the form of withholding cash from the embassy cashier; his grumblings about a lack 
of access to a car, travel restrictions and the premature departure imposed on him; his aloofness 
or status as an “unusual man” who “rarely” took part in the social activities of the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation and always went “somewhere alone”; as well as his bad reputation among 
non-Soviet members of the secretariat as a “loafer” who performed his functions in UNESCO 
“poorly.” Kovda suggested that Soviet workers should have listened to their Western colleagues 
in the secretariat when they had called Ponomarev “lazy.” Perhaps, he mused, the Soviet side had 
reacted in a self-defeating manner by shrugging such criticism off as anti-Soviet hostility. “This 
was construed,” he recalled, “as ill-will toward our employee. I share responsibility with those 
who knew about this.” 643   
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At the same time, multiple attendees expressed surprise at the absence of any omens of 
Ponomarev’s apostasy. “Ponomarev always seemed outwardly observant and loved to teach 
others,” Kovda admitted in spite of this criticism. “He created the impression of a keen observer. 
I cannot remember an instance that would cause a feeling of suspicion with respect to him.”644 
Alarmingly, the question arose as to whether most of the Soviet secretariat detachment had 
exhibited the conduct that supposedly set Ponomarev apart. A. S. Kisel’, an adviser to the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation, listed the sins shared by others in the room:  
1) He never paid deductions on time. . . . But others do this. It is insufficient to make 
political conclusions. 2) He never paid his trade-union dues on time, but others also do 
this. 3) His [travel] routes were chosen arbitrarily . . . but among us there are others who 
do this. This means that this is not enough to suspect him. 4) His trips abroad were 
incorrectly registered in the record book. But this happens with us sometimes.645 
 
The top diplomatic officers participating in the review feared that the habitual 
transgression of the codes regulating their subordinates signified their deeper transformation 
from Soviet subjects into international civil servants.  “We are Soviet people in UNESCO––
representatives of our country first and foremost, and then international civil servants,” 
Ambassador Vinogradov impressed on those present. “This is a fundamental matter of principle, 
it is bad if a Soviet person thinks of himself as only an international civil servant.”646 
Romanovskii, the chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission who had traveled to Paris for 
the conference, assured the Soviet secretariat group that their government valued their service 
precisely because it carried a risk of contamination by foreign ideologies. “Sometimes,” he 
judged of the morale of his underlings, “an underestimation of comrades’ work slips into your 
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statements. All you do is extremely necessary and important for state affairs. You work in 
difficult conditions and are surrounded by enemies, thus your work is all the more important and 
serious.” Romanovskii also piled on to the critique put forward by Vinogradov, worrying that 
Soviet secretariat specialists had begun unconsciously to assimilate to the culture of the 
international organization surrounding them. “There are among you comrades,” he detected, 
“who consider themselves international civil servants. But from the minute that they begin to 
think of you as only bureaucrats and not communists, there is nothing for you to do in UNESCO. 
We must think of you as Soviet people and communists. If you are only bureaucrats, you do not 
suit us.” Rather than prioritizing their Soviet missions, these Soviet professionals, in the opinion 
of Romanovskii, had slowly begun to view their Soviet superiors and the marching orders they 
received from them as bothersome distractions from their jobs at UNESCO. In short: “There is a 
kind of sickness in our employees in the UNESCO Secretariat,” he continued. “They think of 
themselves as international civil servants and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation as something like 
an overseer (nadziratel’) of these secretariat employees. This is not right.” Because of a need to 
negotiate their daily lives in the secretariat, they had allowed the ethical regime and values of the 
international civil service to shape their actions, dilute their senses of Soviet selfhood, and instill 
in them an unhealthy and even dangerous “individualism” or “autonomy” antithetical to the 
Soviet notion of an obedient and unified Soviet collective. “Our secretariat employees go to 
work in UNESCO, getting assignments from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation,” Romanovskii 
further commented. “That’s how it should be, but it’s not. . . . Some of our secretariat employees 
don’t want to maintain regular contact with the delegation. Perhaps I’m mistaken. In any case, 
our people working here are good but they still don’t have the needed unity and discipline.”647  
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Several Soviet secretariat workers pushed back against these accusations. “This case is 
exceptional,” one piped in. “We secretariat employees are members of a union and only in a 
technical sense international civil servants.”648 Another stated that no division existed between 
those in the UNESCO bureaucracy and the delegation but undermined this assertion by 
castigating the delegation for not alerting them of the defection.649 Vinogradov overruled these 
dissensions. “We need UNESCO more than UNESCO needs us,” he stressed. “We do not need, 
of course, to complicate our relations, but the main thing is that we defend our interests working 
in UNESCO. Why do we send our people to UNESCO if they turn into bureaucrats there?”650  
No one among those assembled could come up with a solution to this problem. While a 
few contributors reiterated the requirement that each Soviet UNESCO employee comply with the 
frequently broken regulations for Soviet citizens abroad (prior approval and registration of travel; 
the maintenance of contact with the Soviet embassy in the country visited; the timely 
relinquishment of outstanding arrears, etc.), others contested the appropriateness of intensifying 
punishment for breaking these rules. A diplomat in attendance disagreed with the “necessity of 
imposing penalties in the trade-union procedure on comrades who have committed a violation,” 
proposing instead more “comradely criticism” through education and friendly “prompting” 
whenever someone witnessed misbehavior among their fellow countrymen. A handful of others 
echoed this vague remedy, calling for one-on-one talks with those showing “insufficiencies” as 
well as increased “solidarity” and “friendship” in the collective.651 “Work in UNESCO is 
peculiar,” a Soviet secretariat specialist emphasized. “Often, we are surrounded by foreigners, 
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we sit alone at work. Our people, working in such an environment, should be checked up on, but 
they should be trusted.”652 Adjourning the meeting, Ambassador Vinogradov endorsed this 
antidote. Underscoring that the Soviet state did “trust” its people in the secretariat, he encouraged 
them to “rally the collective” and “better know and help each other” so that the “collective is 
cohesive and united.”653 These appeals for more “comradely criticism” and “prompting” carried 
not so subtle hints of an escalation in what historian Anne Gorsuch describes in her study of 
Soviet tourists as pervasive “mutual surveillance” indicative of a prioritization of “discipline 
over independence” in Soviet travel to the capitalist West. Yet the pleas for having “trust” in 
Soviet UNESCO staff members indicates that Soviet citizens in the secretariat expected their 
state to grant them a degree of responsibility for their own ideological maintenance very different 
from the constant minding Soviet tourists were subject to during their briefer stays abroad.654    
In spite of these calls, a blame game erupted in a series of letters over the next two 
months over whether loose supervision by the delegation or inadequate political preparation in 
Moscow by the Soviet UNESCO Commission had precipitated the whole debacle. The 
delegation chastised the commission for ignoring its entreaties that Ponomarev resign from 
UNESCO before the general conference. Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov also accused the 
secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Commission of purposefully declining these pleas because of 
an alleged “close, friendly relationship” between his family and that of Ponomarev, proposing a 
review of how the commission vetted candidates for UNESCO positions. Retorting that they 
knew of the “shortcomings and mistakes in the selection of cadres,” the commission argued for a 
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“careful and comprehensive study of recommended candidates” in order to make sure that “all of 
those without exception” sent to UNESCO had accrued experience in “life and practical activity–
–in party organs, the state apparatus, foreign institutions and organizations.” At the same time, 
the commission faulted the delegation for “major insufficiencies in political-educational work, . . 
. a conciliatory attitude toward violations of discipline, an absence of a real struggle to strengthen 
discipline, and insufficient attention to comrades at work in UNESCO.”655  
Notwithstanding intangible moves toward more “vigilance” and “solidarity,” Soviet 
authorities could do little to solve the dilemma in their campaign to populate the secretariats of 
international organizations with unflinching devotees––the conflict between the foreign culture 
of international organizations into which they had pushed their people headfirst and the 
antiforeign cloistered collective they sought to preserve. 
*                 *                 * 
The Soviet state defined foreign and antiforeign behavior for its international civil 
servants, delineating the border between an imagined Soviet community in the heart of Paris and 
a hostile, outside “other” existing only as a product of their own conception of how their citizens 
should comport themselves. Good behavior consisted of abiding by the rules for conduct abroad; 
attending the social and cultural events of the Soviet colony; and following the impractical orders 
that Soviet officials composed in Moscow with little attention to the complex social relations of 
the UNESCO Secretariat. This conception of propriety and impropriety determined the outer 
limits of the “Soviet colony” on the basis of individual conduct rather than geographical or 
spatial boundaries. Put differently, these Soviet UNESCO employees experienced the bipolarity 
of the Cold War not only as an abstract battle between capitalist and communist countries, but 
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also as a bifurcation of their lives into the permissible and forbidden. Like the Iron Curtain, 
however, the partition separating anti-Soviet and Soviet ways of being turned out to be quite 
permeable. If foreign products, ideologies, and lifestyles made their way from West to East in the 
broader Cold War of cultures, Soviet international civil servants could step back-and-forth over 
the fluid line demarcating East and West in their own lives (by not registering their travel; 
withholding funds owed to the Soviet state to purchase illicit goods on what could be called the 
“black market” of Paris; and displaying “autonomy” by ignoring the directives of Soviet 
authorities) as long as those policing this line either remained unaware of these transgressions or 
refrained from punishing them for it. Soviet international civil servants lived in an inverted world 
in which the Soviet culture dominant at home functioned as a subculture under siege from the 
surrounding foreignness of the West and an international organization that competed with the 
Soviet colony to monopolize their lives. As Gorsuch notes of Soviet travel to the West in the 
1950s and 1960s, the experience of Soviet nationals abroad reflects the broader paradoxical 
nature of the “Thaw” as characterized by “optimistic opening” but also “anxiously authoritarian” 
impulses––as a time during which the Soviet Union began to approach their people as 
“responsible and reliable” enough to witness the foreign world while still worrying that “these 
very changes permitted . . . behaviors and beliefs which threatened to outrun a sometimes 
apprehensive regime.”656  
Rather than insulating Soviet international civil servants from the threat of corruption by 
non-Soviet elements, the “authoritarian” aspects of the Soviet disciplinary regime did not operate 
as consistently or constantly as the Soviet UNESCO Delegation claimed in its reports. The 
enforcement of the coercive features of Soviet governance abroad took place haphazardly and 
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annoyed these employees because of its arbitrariness. To survive under the dual ethical regimes 
and power structures of UNESCO and the Soviet state-party apparatus, Soviet professionals had 
no choice but to break the rules made up in Moscow and commit small acts of disobedience on a 
daily basis because these rules did not reflect the routine dilemmas, ambiguities, and 
contingencies inherent in their lives as Soviet international civil servants. In other words, Soviet 
standards of behavior engendered noncompliance in every action they sought to regulate. So long 
as their Soviet superiors resisted adjusting their expectations and definition of communist purity 
to the daily realities their subjects had to negotiate, they risked incurring a spectrum of 
delinquency, the severity of which depended on the extent of success Soviet international civil 
servants achieved in playing the contradictory parts UNESCO and the USSR demanded of them. 
Minute misbehaviors did not mean an outright rebellion against the communist cause. 
While many of their fellow comrades back home dressed in Western fashion, traded in Western 
material items, and pondered Western ideas while still participating as active citizens in Soviet 
social and political life, most Soviet UNESCO employees ventured outside the permissible 
without ever exhibiting signs of an outright rejection of the underlying ideology or legitimacy of 
their native land.657 With a few exceptions, all Soviet professionals dispatched to UNESCO from 
1956 to 1967 returned to their permanent career trajectories as scholars, teachers, or diplomats 
once their time at the international organization had come to an end. A few went on to bigger and 
better things in the international arena, drawing on their lessons learned at UNESCO in the 1950s 
and 1960s as they took on more powerful positions in the UN system. Before moving on to 
Washington and his more famous role as ambassador to the United States in 1986, Dubinin 
briefly served as the Soviet ambassador to the UN. Tangian ended up repeatedly returning to 
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UNESCO over the subsequent decades. The Soviet UNESCO Commission recruited him to 
assist in shaping Soviet policy toward UNESCO in Moscow following the expiration of his 
contract in 1962. After 1964, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he went back to UNESCO for 
a higher spot in the Department of Education; ascended to the post of UNESCO deputy director-
general; published a book on UNESCO; and drew on his time at the organization to contribute to 
a Soviet encyclopedia on Africa.658 Other former Soviet UNESCO employees faded into 
obscurity. Having hob knobbed with the elite diplomats of the world and contributed to the 
drafting of international treaties for three years, Zhegalova retired in late 1959 to a tiny, cramped 
sixteen-square-meter apartment on the Sukharevskaia stretch of Moscow’s Garden Ring, where 
she lived with her daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. In January 1960, she took advantage 
of her international résumé, writing to the Soviet UNESCO Commission a request for help in 
finding a better living space. Finally, in September 1961, the deputy chair of the commission 
appealed to the Council of Worker’s Deputies of the Dzerzhinskii District to aid in her relocation 
on account of her age, ill health, and “extensive and useful work” in the international 
organization. This request originated in the personal intervention of Ambassador Vinogradov in 
the matter. In a letter to the commission, the envoy vouched for her as someone who proved to 
be an “exceptionally capable and dedicated worker” in “such a difficult organization as 
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UNESCO.”659 Evidently, the ambiguous status of Soviet international civil servant had some 
long-lasting perks.  
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In 1959, A. A. Zvorykin, a former deputy editor of Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia 
(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, or BSE), wrote a lengthy and impassioned letter to the editor of 
the French newspaper Le Monde. Responding to a series of articles spotlighting the USSR by a 
French writer who had recently traveled to the communist country, the Soviet academician 
rebutted the author’s characterization of the Soviet Union as an empty, careerist society by 
recalling an encounter he had with a Tatar man on a train from Moscow to Kuibyshev. In the 
course of their discussion, the man had asked Zvorykin to define the meaning of “culture” 
because his wife had accused him of lacking it. “Tell me, what is culture?” The Tatar queried. “Is 
it correct pronunciation, knowing how to dress, how to behave? I think that culture is the inner 
world of a man, his dignity, his worthiness of being called a man.” In his letter, Zvorykin 
expressed agreement with the stranger on the train and admonished the French writer for 
portraying the Soviet people as “spiritual monstrosities” devoid of inner worlds. Because of their 
humility, Soviet citizens who enthusiastically joined communist brigades in the Virgin Lands 
Campaign, or who “gave all their strength, knowledge, and life” to defeat the Nazis, had not 
disclosed their “intimate thoughts and experiences” to the French visitor. But his compatriots, 
Zvorykin maintained, were “a people of big ideas,” sacrificing everything to build a communist 
society. “Soviet people wear coats that are not as short as those in Paris,” he continued, “they 
wear shoes with heels different from those worn by Parisians, but can one really assign the 
Soviet world to prehistory, and the European countries to history on the basis of this?”660 
Zvorykin’s riposte, which he sent to the Soviet UNESCO Commission unsolicited, 
evinced a raw emotion and originality quite unlike the diatribes in official Soviet journals 
directed at Western intellectuals. The letter clearly manifested his desire to convince Westerners 
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of the positive qualities of the Soviet citizenry. “If the author of the articles and the editorship 
had the goal of helping readers understand the ‘Soviet enigma,’ then my comments could be 
useful to the author and to readers,” Zvorykin submitted. “If the author deliberately distorted 
Soviet reality, then I, using the rules of Le Monde, would like to speak out against these 
distortions, especially since Le Monde editors should be interested in helping French readers 
understand Soviet reality.”661  
But Zvorykin would have never read the Le Monde articles if he had not traveled to Paris 
that year for a meeting of the international commission of UNESCO’s “Project for a History of 
the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind,” a collaborative project that brought 
together historians from different countries to write a single, unified narrative of world history 
from the ancient civilizations through the first half of the twentieth century. Incorporating 
Zvorykin and other Soviet citizens into global discussions inspired by UNESCO’s Western 
internationalist ethos, such UNESCO collaborative projects, as well as the organization’s 
conferences and publications, opened up opportunities for Soviet nationals to engage the foreign 
world, experiment with its intellectual products, and serve an internationalist ideal in ways 
unimaginable during the late Stalinist era.  
The final section of this dissertation explores Soviet participation in this array of eclectic 
activities put on by the UNESCO Secretariat, which determined not only the themes of these 
events but also the settings and rules governing them. I show that these activities constituted 
international publics in which Soviet citizens from a variety of professions conversed in-person 
or through UNESCO publications on a range of international topics as well as on issues 
pertaining to their fields of specialization. At UNESCO events and through UNESCO 
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publications, Soviet citizens joined what I call an international public sphere and an international 
reading public respectively. In these publics, Soviet citizens spoke from their own subjective 
perspectives when confronted with new ideas or contingencies, thereby asserting their right to 
membership in these publics as individuals possessing their own opinions. Given their reliance 
on government support and the participation of illiberal states, UNESCO’s spaces for 
international interaction and Soviet comportment in them do not represent a mirror image of the 
prescriptive models of a “transnational public sphere” or “global civil society” envisioned by 
social theorists as critical oppositions to national or global governing entities in the age of 
globalization.662 But I maintain that UNESCO publics provided Soviet citizens a space in which 
they could become public intellectuals representing the interests of their country while critically 
reappraising the Soviet state and society. Adding diversity to the voices heard in these 
international publics, Soviet participants in UNESCO events contributed to international 
discourses in education, science, and culture.  
If Soviet bilateral exchanges underscored Soviet friendship with specific countries, 
UNESCO activities offered Soviet citizens a means of being internationally minded, 
incorporating them into a community encompassing all nations. These initiatives included them 
in collective efforts to improve the world in a variety of ways and in the spirit of an 
internationalism sharing the same ideals with the proletarian solidarity at the heart of the USSR’s 
worldview but using different means to attain them. Soviet citizens found in UNESCO’s 
multilateral program a way of acting simultaneously on behalf of the USSR and a broader 
internationalist notion of a common world good. In other words, they became both Soviet 
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citizens and citizens of the world. In order to succeed in these activities, however, the USSR had 
to align its practices with the standards of UNESCO and thus further conform to UNESCO 
norms for international intellectual cooperation. Taken together, these diverse UNESCO ventures 
involved Soviet nationals in the intensifying transnational flow of knowledge in the second half 
of the twentieth century. 
Although Western bureaucrats continued to define the culture and practices fashioning 
these publics through the end of the 1960s, the USSR, by the early 1960s, rivaled Western 
member states in the number of UNESCO conferences it hosted, the amount of written materials 
it submitted to UNESCO publications, and the size of its contingent of experts sent to weakly-
developed countries through UNESCO.663 Once it had resolved to stay in the international 
organization after the debates in the 1950s over the value of UNESCO (discussed in chapter 2), 
the communist country attained a stronger position in the organization than in any other UN 
specialized agency thanks to the tireless work of the Soviet UNESCO Commission and 
Delegation as well as the Soviet international civil servants profiled in section 2. But the ability 
of the West to dictate the terms of the international organizational system attenuated the impact 
of these gains on international affairs. As soon as the Soviet Union had a degree of influence in 
UNESCO, the United States sought to diminish the significance of the UN specialized agency by 
creating or reinvigorating international organizations still dominated by the West. These 
organizations either challenged UNESCO’s monopoly over international educational cooperation 
or coopted the UN organ for their own purposes. In the 1960s, the US also launched intensive 
bilateral programs to compete with UNESCO in the increasingly important sphere of educational 
technical assistance as decolonization gathered pace. Despite their criticisms of the international 
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organization, Soviet officials therefore defended UNESCO against these new competitors, 
viewing it as their best chance to shape multilateral educational, scientific, and cultural 
diplomacy.  
Chapter 7 contains both a detailed case study and an overview of the Soviet experience of 
the emerging international public sphere promoted by UNESCO. The first half of the chapter 
tells the story of Zvorykin’s part in the writing of the History of Mankind. In the second half of 
the chapter, I analyze how the USSR sought to relocate a portion of the events constituting the 
international public sphere outside the West. Chapter 8 shifts focus to the international reading 
public engendered by UNESCO through the books, popular magazines, specialized journals, and 
other materials it disseminated worldwide. Finally, chapter 9 assesses Soviet performance in 
UNESCO’s educational technical assistance programs in the context of decolonization and as the 
international organization evolved in the 1960s to reflect a pluralizing world order.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE UNESCO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Despite Spender’s depiction of the 1956 Venice conference as an exercise in futility, the 
conferences, collaborative projects, and other events organized by UNESCO served as unique 
venues in which the opposing sides of the Cold War came together to present their opinions on a 
given subject, cultivate international contacts in their professional fields, and work with foreign 
colleagues on shared issues and problems. These gatherings compelled Soviet professionals, 
academicians, and other citizens to put human faces on the one-dimensional caricatures of 
bourgeois intellectuals pervading Soviet publications, complicating their understandings of the 
outside world and how the Soviet Union should go about cajoling “progressive forces” in the 
West to their side. Soviet specialists also carried back to the USSR and implemented in their 
fields elements of the Western internationalist ethos, further integrating their country into the 
international discourses promoted by the international organizational system.  
Of the so-called collaborative “major projects” initiated by UNESCO in the 1950s and 
1960s (the “East-West” project, the Arid Zones Program to study agriculture in desert climates, 
the Latin American Education Project to assist schools in South America, etc.), the History of 
Mankind stands out for its immersion of Soviet scholars in the Western internationalist ideology 
of UNESCO because of its expectation that historians from divergent ideological and national 
backgrounds come to a consensus on world history from the Bronze Age to the 1950s. Unlike 
other projects that invited many specialists from a variety of fields to participate in separate 
conferences or other social events, the History of Mankind required its writers to cooperate for
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years at a time and therefore develop a rapport in order to ensure success. In 1947, Director-
General Huxley, inspired and aided by British sinologist and biologist Joseph Needham, kick 
started the planning for this mammoth undertaking with an eye toward aligning the History’s 
narrative with Huxley’s “Scientific World Humanism” and its evolutionary conception of the 
past and future. But before the USSR joined the project, a number of highly influential historians 
altered and amended this initial vision. In 1949, Lucian Febvre, the founder of the famed Annales 
school of history, began to assist in mapping out the six-volume work, emphasizing the necessity 
of moving away from both the eurocentrism pervading contemporaneous scholarship and the 
“evolutionist” stance advocated by Huxley. In 1952, Febvre became the editor of the project’s 
journal, Cahiers d’Histoire Mondiale (Journal of World History), which functioned as both a 
workshop for the History of Mankind and one of the first laboratories for exploring world history 
from a noneurocentric perspective. After the creation in 1950 of an international commission to 
oversee the venture and the selection of Paulo Carneiro, a Brazilian who had donned a number of 
hats in UNESCO, to lead it, the American historian Ralph Turner added his own twist to these 
debates by echoing Huxley’s focus on linear evolution while casting the United States as the 
crowning achievement of this process. From the project’s inception until its conclusion in 1969, 
several dozen scholars from a range of UNESCO member states sat on the international 
commission or served as author-editors and “corresponding members” for one of the six volumes 
of the History.664  
This collective of historians, who practiced disparate methodologies, contributed to the 
content of the commission’s final product. Yet a common thread connected these diverse voices–
–a consensus on the need to highlight the importance of exchange between different cultures 
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from the beginning of human history. Thus, the History of Mankind, in its overarching scope and 
thematic contours, mirrored the broader mission of UNESCO to raise awareness of the positive 
role of communication between peoples hitherto walled off from each other. By bringing 
together historians representing the international community, the founders of the History project 
envisioned the venture as an international public sphere of debate that would construct a 
narrative legitimizing UNESCO’s internationalism in a way similar to histories designed to 
bolster nationalist identity through the elaboration of a shared cultural and scientific heritage. In 
other words, the effort represented an “invented tradition” of international intellectual exchange, 
articulating a “usable past” for UNESCO’s internationalist project that would portray the 
organization as the continuation of a long-running practice of international communication rather 
than a novel creation of the internationalist trend of the postwar era.665    
One of the most publicized of UNESCO’s ventures in the mid-1950s, the History of 
Mankind attracted the attention of the Soviet Union a year before the country had set up the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation in the beginning of 1956. In January 1955, Guy 
Métraux, the secretary-general of the project’s international commission, asked the chief 
academic-secretary of AN SSSR, M. N. Tikhomirov, to charge Soviet specialists with writing 
five articles on specific topics in Russian history for publication in Cahiers.666 Although 
Tikhomirov and the president of AN SSSR described the journal as containing pieces with 
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666 The five topics were: the origins of the Kievan state; the peculiarities and interrelations between Byzantine and 
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“Atlantic” or “pro-American” biases, the AN SSSR Presidium found it “desirable” not only to 
send the five articles, but also to enlist Soviet scholars for the larger History project.667 
Following talks with Soviet diplomats in Paris, Carneiro mailed outlines of each of the six 
volumes to AN SSSR for comment. He also invited the Soviet Union to select a preeminent 
scholar to sit on the executive bureau of the international commission and identify five other 
experts to contribute to the writing of the volumes.668 In June, the Bureau of the AN SSSR 
Division of Historical Sciences chose five of its academicians to become corresponding 
members.669 In September, AN SSSR nominated Zvorykin as a member of the international 
commission.670   
The considerable influence of the USSR on the final version of the History resulted from 
Zvorykin’s dogged and well-orchestrated campaign to corral Soviet historians to write and revise 
the drafts of the work during his tenure as a member and, after September 1956, vice president of 
the international commission.671 His deft navigation of the politics of both a Soviet academic 
world undergoing drastic changes after the end of Stalinism and an international commission 
leery of communist dogma enabled him to impress on his Soviet colleagues the importance of 
the project while convincing members of the UNESCO initiative to take Soviet positions 
seriously. Zvorykin’s story illustrates how UNESCO’s international public sphere provided a 
space in which those members of the intelligentsia belonging to the first generation to benefit 
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from Soviet policies (the so-called vydvizhentsy who ascended from working-class backgrounds 
to commanding positions in Soviet society during the 1930s) could debate, learn from, and 
collaborate with their non-Soviet peers after weathering the tumult of the purges, war, and 
isolationism.672 
Born in the provincial town of Murom in 1901 to an engineer, Zvorykin enlisted in the 
Red Army and joined the Communist Party in 1919.673 While in the army, he divided his time 
between serving as a political worker (politrabotnik) among his fellow soldiers and attaining an 
education at one of the rabfaki (rabochie fakul’tety) preparing the lower classes for higher 
education as part of the social revolution implemented by the Bolsheviks to upend the old order. 
As a result, Zvorykin obtained a degree from the Moscow State University Department of Social 
Sciences in 1925. After leaving the army in 1926, he traveled to the Donbass to help build 
socialism. He then studied in Moscow at the technical and economic institutes of the Institute of 
Red Professors (IKP) and the Communist Academy, where he trained in the history of 
technology, edited the journal Tekhniki, and defended his dissertation on “Reconstruction of the 
Coal Industry” in 1934. Upon graduation, he became the director of the Section for the History 
of Technology at the Communist Academy and the deputy chairman of the Commission for the 
History of Technology of the All-Union Committee for Higher Technical Education (VK VTO), 
two prestigious positions at the height of his field.674 
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While his rapid rise from an uneducated soldier to the top of Soviet academia speaks to 
the success of Soviet policies of social mobility for loyal communists, it also made Zvorykin a 
major player in the darker side of the Stalin revolution. In 1932, AN SSSR opened the Institute 
for the History of Science and Technology (IINiT) in Leningrad under the direction of N. I. 
Bukharin, the former member of the politburo who would become a central figure of the Stalinist 
purges in the late 1930s. To a certain extent, Bukharin’s vision for international cooperation in 
the investigation of the history of technology on a worldwide scale represents in spirit a 
predecessor to the aspirations Zvorykin would hold in regard to the History of Mankind project. 
A year before the creation of IINiT, Bukharin led a Soviet delegation to the International 
Congress for the History of Science and Technology in London, at which he got the idea from an 
“English scholar” of founding a Soviet equivalent of the Nobel Prize in order to attract foreign 
scientists to the USSR. The first report of IINiT also proposed that a collective of Soviet experts 
produce a “history of the technology of all times and peoples” similar in content to the future 
UNESCO project.675  
In the 1930s, however, Zvorykin ended up on the opposite side of a bitter contest 
between scholars located in Moscow and those employed by Bukharin’s IINiT in Leningrad for 
control over an area of expertise central to Marxist-Leninist theory. As one Russian historian 
explains, “the Moscow-based specialists-vydvizhentsy, headed by A. A. Zvorykin and E. F. 
Radulov, were naturally alien to both specialists of the old school and the unorthodox Marxists 
of the 1920s who fell under the influence of Bukharin.”676 In the spring of 1936, the Soviet state 
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exploited the temporary absence of Bukharin to dissolve IINiT, arresting or firing the entire staff 
and gifting the title of the institute to the Muscovite group and AN SSSR. The decision to 
transfer the institute to Moscow enraged Bukharin. In June 1936, as the historian Iu. I. 
Krivonosov shows, Bukharin excoriated the Academy of Sciences for closing the institute and 
for handing over its “inheritance to Comrade Zvorykin, head of the Moscow historians who 
blasted the work of the institute from the position of the school of [historian] M. N. Pokrovskii, 
condemned by the party.”677 But the pervasive culture of denunciation soon brought down 
Zvorykin as well. In October 1937, the editors for technical-theoretical literature of the Division 
of Scientific-Technical Information (GRTTL-ONTI) denounced Zvorykin for “replacing a 
political line with emotionality” and lacking “self-criticism” in one of his recriminations of IINiT 
and its “Trotsykite-Bukharinist sabotage on the front of the history of technology.” Around the 
same time, the academy fired him from his post. Although Zvorykin got his job back in January 
1938, the AN SSSR Presidium voted to dissolve the institute that March.678  
Nevertheless, Zvorykin managed to escape imprisonment and execution, continuing his 
studies and teaching at the Moscow Mining Institute until the outbreak of the Second World 
War. The upheaval of the war years opened up an opportunity for Zvorykin to relaunch his 
career. In 1943, the People’s Commissariat for the Coal Industry (NKUP) recruited Zvorykin 
after he received a “serious injury” fighting in Stalingrad and on the Central Front. In 1946, he 
became the editor of the science and technology section of Pravda but resigned in 1948 to 
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assume the deputy editorship of the BSE––a post he would stay in until he stepped down from 
his duties to concentrate on the History of Mankind project in May 1956.679  
Once he signed up for the History project in 1955, Zvorykin set out to recruit not only 
Soviet specialists from a diverse array of institutions, but also representatives from other 
countries in the communist world willing to coproduce with noncommunist scholars. In addition 
to Soviet historians in the AN SSSR Division of Historical Sciences, he eventually corralled AN 
SSSR scholars specializing in oriental studies, natural sciences and technology, transportation 
problems, sinology, and ethnography, as well as employees of an assortment of Soviet journals 
and universities, to review drafts of chapters.680 Keen to rebut Eastern European émigrés writing 
for Cahiers and the History, Zvorykin found academics from Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia to address issues related to their countries. Although he also courted five 
scholars from mainland China to work as corresponding members, the PRC declined to allow 
them to attend meetings of the international commission due to the presence of Taiwan in 
UNESCO.681 
Zvorykin acknowledged that the late arrival of the socialist camp to the project meant that 
the author-editors of the volumes might ignore its input. As he wrote to the Central Committee in 
1955, the international commission had already labored for almost five years, publishing in 
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Cahiers “a significant amount of work that would determine the content of the volumes.”682 Yet 
Zvorykin quickly became enmeshed in a twentieth-century version of the “Republic of Letters,” 
engaging with Western scholars on the widest range of topics spanning world history. From 1956 
to 1962, the regular circulation of the outlines and drafts of the volumes forged a network for the 
transmission of ideas across the geopolitical divide of the Cold War. By June 1956, Soviet 
scholars had sent comments and alternative outlines for the first four volumes through the 
eighteenth century.683 Copies of these voluminous materials would then go to the author-editors, 
who would send their own musings on Soviet ideas back to Zvorykin. At the more than ten 
meetings of the international commission’s bureau from 1955 to 1962, discussions revolved 
around these Soviet criticisms, which touched on the periodization of the volumes, whether the 
“material” or “spiritual” should have primacy in the texts, and the descriptions of stages of 
civilizational development in each volume (e. g., whether the Roman Empire had a slave-based 
society).684 Soviet perspectives on world history also reached a wider academic audience when 
the editors of Cahiers published a special issue of their journal devoted exclusively to Soviet 
authors in 1958.685   
Buoyed by the initially open-minded reception Soviet opinions received from his 
noncommunist collaborators on the History project, Zvorykin rallied his fellow Soviet 
academicians to present the Soviet perspective in the international public sphere with the same 
fervor with which he had battled the “Trotsykite-Bukharinist sabotage” in the 1930s. In a letter to 
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Central Committee Secretary D. T. Shepilov in May 1956, Zvorykin referenced his first two trips 
to Paris to have talks with participants in the UNESCO project to underscore “the necessity of 
overcoming the fear and unwillingness” of some members of the Soviet intelligentsia to “expand 
scholarly relations with bourgeois scholars.” Denouncing the “sectarian sentiments” he 
encountered when enlisting Soviet historians to take part in the initiative, Zvorykin cited a 
number of the “typical remarks” he heard from Soviet scholars resisting his implorations that 
they contribute to the History and Cahiers: 
‘Why would I ruin my list of works with a reference to ones published in bourgeois 
publications’?; ‘Soviet scholars and scholarship can have no common language with 
bourgeois scholars and scholarship’; ‘an examination of the outlines of the volumes [of 
the History] reveals reactionary and idealistic conceptions, Soviet scholars will not be 
able to cover issues from their position, so there is no sense in working with bourgeois 
scholars’; ‘we must limit our work to critical comments about the author-editors of the 
volumes and not give any positive material, since it will only lead to attacks on us’; ‘it is 
hardly advisable to participate in work prepared by bourgeois scholars since they use our 
observations of factual errors in their work but do not consider our principled comments, 
our participation will only improve bourgeois works.’ 
 
Characterizing such opinions as “harmful remnants [vrednye perezhitki] of the isolation 
of Soviet scholarship in previous stages,” Zvorykin argued against writing off Western scholars 
as uniformly adversarial to the USSR. The receptiveness of the author-editors of the History 
volumes to Soviet changes to their texts, he maintained, proved that only the obstinacy of Soviet 
historians prevented them from “widely showing the achievements of Soviet scholarship, 
propagating their ideology, and establishing contact with progressive scholars.”686 Because 
Zvorykin believed that this reclusiveness and animosity toward Western academics derived from 
the fact that Soviet academicians met their foreign counterparts “in isolation from each other” 
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and without knowing anything about these strangers, he proposed collecting a corpus of 
knowledge on the political and intellectual proclivities of Western thinkers, suggesting to 
Shepilov the assembling of a card index with “detailed information about the sociopolitical 
views and scholarly tendencies of foreign scholars” in order to rectify the “indiscriminate 
approach” to them.687 Zvorykin presented his interactions on trips to Paris as fieldwork on the 
nature of the bourgeois scholar, developing his own taxonomy of what he understood as an 
understudied species. For Zvorkyin, a few “reactionary” author-editors and corresponding 
members, buoyed by American “hegemony” over the commission, sought to block any Soviet 
influence on the volumes. But the French contingent displayed “a desire to more deeply and fully 
know the work of Soviet scholars” that went beyond a curiosity for the “new data” of Soviet 
scholarship and into the realm of “theory and methodology.”  
In the hours of unofficial and official rendezvous with these French historians in their 
apartments and at the commission, Zvorykin, who spoke French, forged congenial relationships 
based on a shared appreciation for historical inquiry. At the apartment of Charles Morazé, the 
author-editor of Volume V on the nineteenth century who specialized in historical population 
movement and belonged to the Annales school, the Soviet envoy spent four hours not only 
debating the History, but also discussing whether economics or demographics explained 
historical developments and events as diverse as the revolutions of 1848 and postwar 
reconstruction in the USSR. The Russo-French Historian Vadim Eliseev, one of the author-
editors of Volume III on the Middle Ages and the exiled son of the former owner of the 
Eliseevskii grocery store in Moscow, eagerly showed Zvorykin his personal library of Russian 
books and praised the new trend of the post-Stalinist Soviet intelligentsia toward “reproducing 
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the founding tenets of Marxism” in their work. In reports on meetings of the international 
commission in 1956, the Soviet sojourner stressed the responsiveness of most author-editors to 
Soviet critiques of their volumes.688      
Inspired by these commendations of Soviet intellectual production, Zvorykin devised a 
set of rules for how to live up to the sociability required in an international public sphere 
dominated by bourgeois scholars who bristled at Soviet invective aimed at their scholarship.689 
Because the international public sphere aimed to engender “mutual understanding” through 
cooperation, Soviet diatribes undermined Soviet aspirations to win over Western scholars to their 
cause.   
“It is necessary,” Zvorykin wrote to the Central Committee in January 1956, “to have a 
different approach to the work of scholars who, although methodologically alien to Marxism, 
have a great interest in Soviet scholarship.” Calling for “flexible tactics with these scholars,” he 
advised that Soviet specialists should “note the positive in their research” but at the same time 
“laboriously and with tact explain the incorrectness of their methodological positions.”690 
Zvorykin’s relationships with some of the Western historians demonized by the Soviet press 
shaped his advice for how to win over the “progressive” intellectuals of the West to communism. 
“We often paint all bourgeois scholars the same dark color,” he observed. “This is a mistake.” 
Rather, Zvorykin contended, “each has his own political, social, and scholarly persona.” For 
instance, the January 1956 issue of Voprosy istorii (Problems of History) urged “Soviet 
historians to unmask contemporary reactionary historiography,” conflating the burgeoning 
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American school of business history with the “geohistory” of the Annales pioneers Fernand 
Braudel, Febvre, and Zvorykin’s friend, Morazé. “After meeting these historians,” Zvorykin 
concluded, “it seems to me wrong to confuse them with those developing a ‘history of 
business.’” Evaluations of the geohistorians should instead begin with articles written in “calmly 
restrained tones,” noting “the positive these historians offer while at the same time showing the 
futility of the demographic criteria for explaining history.”691 As another example, Zvorykin 
referred to a piece published in the sixth issue of the 1955 volume of Voprosy filosofii (Problems 
of Philosophy) that labelled Morazé, “on the basis of one book . . . an apologist for the Cold 
War.” “Morazé’s book,” Zvorykin pointed out, “was brought into the USSR as a single copy 
located in the AN SSSR special fond [spetzfond]. Kon, the author of the article, uses this work to 
critique Morazé. But how does he use it? The book is reduced to . . . . . only the preface.” A 
perusal of Morazé’s monograph “demonstrates that there was no basis for the author’s 
accusations of aggressive propaganda,” Zvorykin continued. “In personal conversations, Morazé 
noted to me that, to the contrary, the book underscores that the Soviet Union has so many 
internal tasks to develop its country that it has no interest in military conflict.”692 
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This kneejerk hostility complicated Zvorykin’s own goal of demonstrating Soviet 
willingness to engage in international cooperation during his second visit to Paris for a meeting 
of the international commission in May 1956. After listening to Sir Charles Leonard Woolley, a 
giant in the field of archeology and one of the author-editors of Volume I on ancient history, go 
on a defensive rant lambasting the criticisms written by the Soviet historian V. V. Struve of 
Woolley’s draft of Volume I, Zvorykin discovered that Struve had formulated his objections 
from a mistranslation of Woolley’s work. Although Struve had composed, in Zvorykin’s words, 
“an excellent review” with a “large number of specific criticisms” exhibiting “the high level” of 
Soviet historical research, he had also included “harsh epithets and accusations of racism against 
Woolley based on an incorrect interpretation of English words.”693 
On top of his suggestions for how to woo bourgeois scholars more politely, Zvorykin 
discerned that Soviet academicians could more effectively influence their Western peers if they 
accentuated the nonpolitical aspects of their work and illustrated through “serious, well-reasoned 
articles” that “scholarship can only develop based on Marxism.” Providing anecdotal evidence of 
Western historians’ prioritization of objectivity, Zvorykin recollected a conversation with 
Eliseev about the latter’s involvement in the Resistance during the Second World War. “‘Morazé 
here and I took part,’” Zvorykin quoted Elissev. “‘We have medals, but we do not wear them 
now. We did it for France.’” For Zvorykin, this humble boast indicated that Eliseev wanted to 
convince him that “scholars . . . should be engaged purely with scholarship.”694 As Zvorykin in 
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1959 put it in a letter to Central Committee Secretary M. A. Suslov, to attract Western academics 
to communism, the Soviet intelligentsia had to target Western intellectuals with literature that 
spoke the detached “language of scholarship on issues of history, economics, sociology, 
philosophy, etc.” instead of brandishing political propaganda “‘on the forehead.’”  
Zvorykin also supported the normalization of scholarly exchange between the capitalist 
and communist blocs. On the one hand, he urged Suslov to direct Soviet scholars to submit their 
work to Western academic periodicals, citing several instances when Soviet scholars, by ignoring 
calls for articles from Western editorships, had allowed “secondhand” knowledge from Russian 
experts in the West to misrepresent Soviet scholarship. “In general, we need to appear not only in 
publications prepared by us, but most of all in foreign journals and collections,” Zvorykin 
advised. “The appearance of our articles in foreign journals and our participation in discussions 
on the pages of these journals could be greatly significant for the propagation through specific 
media of our ideas among bourgeois scholars,” he predicted. “The opportunities in this respect 
are truly enormous.”695 
On the other hand, Zvorykin oversaw the incorporation, on a small scale, of the Western 
internationalist framework shaping the History project into the Soviet practice of world history 
and the history of culture. Using his control over the UNESCO venture as justification for 
experimentation, he founded a printed “forum” for exploring world history that would help to 
internationalize the Soviet historical profession after the isolationist years of Stalin’s rule. In 
January 1957, he pulled together an editorial board to publish Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul’tury 
(Herald of the History of World Culture), an academic journal intended to function as the Soviet 
equivalent of Cahiers. Conceived of as a space to fill in the “blank spots” (belye piatnа) in 
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Soviet knowledge about the history of cross-cultural contact while fostering dialogue between 
foreigners involved in the History and the Soviet team working on the enterprise, Vestnik 
represents a landmark in the de-Stalinization of Soviet historical writing because of its treatment 
of formerly taboo scholarship as worthy of serious consideration. “Even with the existence of 
ideological difference among historians and, especially, historians of culture,” the editorship 
wrote in its introduction to the first issue, “principled and progressive scholars will always find a 
chance to work together. . . . Our cooperation with Western scholars in the preparation of [the 
History] illustrates this convincingly.”696  
To showcase this new approach to foreign intellectual production, Vestnik editors 
included articles from Cahiers, the outlines of the volumes of the History with Soviet 
commentary attached at the end, and notes about recent international historical conferences 
outside of the province of the UNESCO initiative. While other Soviet periodicals (e. g., the 
compendium Vsemirnaia istoriia: V desiati tomakh, or World History: In Ten Volumes, which 
AN SSSR launched in 1956 and completed in 1965) featured traditional universal histories 
through a Marxist-Leninist lens, Vestnik showcased landmark articles from Cahiers that would 
shape the bourgeoning field of world history as practiced in North America and Western Europe, 
including historian Marshall Hodgson’s “Hemispheric Interregional History as an Approach to 
World History,” which paved the way for historical research deemphasizing the West as a 
superior civilization.697 Whenever a Western historian connected to the History died, Zvorykin 
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made sure to provide appreciative obituaries celebrating their life-long contributions to the 
field.698  
Most importantly in terms of the internationalization of Soviet historical work, Zvorykin 
made Vesntik accessible to scholars in the West, leading the way in translating Soviet research 
for a foreign audience. During his trips to Paris in 1956, the head of the Soviet History operation 
took note of the disappointment of his new acquaintances over the fact that the USSR had ceased 
publication of translations of Soviet articles in Western languages under Stalin. In response to 
these complaints, Zvorykin petitioned the Central Committee to reintroduce this practice into 
Soviet publications and ensured that Vestnik contained in each of its issues multiple contributions 
in English, French, and German.699 While “the journal is designed to acquaint Soviet scholars 
with the works of foreign scholars, to critically shed light on these works, and to host scholarly 
discussions of specific problems,” Zvorykin clarified in his letter to Suslov in 1959, it also “is 
designed for foreign scholars. There is a special section in which the major works from the 
USSR appear in foreign languages.”700  
With a fluctuating circulation that ranged from 2,300 to 3,000, Vestnik ended up in the 
collections of libraries, universities, and individual subscribers across the Soviet Union and 
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 378 
reached over twenty-five countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.701 The journal also 
facilitated correspondence between foreign scholars and Soviet contributors outside the History 
project. For example, Zvorykin received a letter from the editor of an American journal asking 
for permission to republish an article from Vestnik.702 But due to a conspicuous absence of an 
advertising campaign to raise awareness of the periodical among the Soviet population, Vestnik 
never earned a wide readership outside the walls of Soviet academic institutions. “Until now,” 
Zvorykin complained in a 1961 report, “there has been some kind of strange ‘conspiracy of 
silence’: there have been no reviews of our journal.” Zvorykin attributed this to its publication of 
foreign literature at odds with official Soviet ideological positions. “The journal is unique,” he 
continued, “we publish foreign authors who sometimes criticize Marxist scholars on issues and 
do not agree with them, which led to the fact that the mass press has approached our journal 
somewhat warily.”703 
In January 1961, Vestnik finally received a review in the first issue of the journal 
Kommunist.704 That same month, when the AN SSSR Bureau of the Division of Historical 
Sciences deliberated over the status of the journal, bureau members attacked what they perceived 
as its superficial eclecticism and publication of random articles, its ambiguous place among the 
AN SSSR network of institutions, as well as its loss of purpose in light of the fact that the 
History project had begun to wind down. As historian A. A. Guber put it in the course of the 
conversation, the question arose of whether they should merely “consider it as a specific 
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auxiliary of the organ of the international organization” or give it “the task of covering from all 
points of view all areas of culture.”705  
But what began during this meeting as a disparaging appraisal of the lack of thematic and 
ideological direction in the content of Vestnik turned into a broader discussion of the need for a 
systematic development of the study of the history of culture as a substantive interdisciplinary 
field rather than merely a byproduct of other social and economic processes. “The existence of 
such a journal,” historian I. V. Belza remarked, “seems to me extremely significant since this 
kind of journal allows for the opportunity to develop such an important discipline as, from my 
point of view, the history of culture.” Belza argued that the history of culture, as a new category 
in Soviet historical studies, could encompass recent topics in Western scholarship, including 
Western “Humanism” and the “important ideological question” of cultural exchange between 
different countries. Other members of the bureau agreed that AN SSSR had ignored the history 
of culture as a valuable lens onto the past during the Stalinist era and after the lapse in 
publication of the multivolume History of Russian Culture initiated in 1939 by the Institute for 
the History of Material Culture (IIMK).706 “In relation to this,” AN SSSR Corresponding 
Member V. M. Khvostov asserted, “the journal is needed. It is the first, and thus far the only, and 
as yet small cell (it has a tiny contingent) for the organization of this work.”707 
The ambitious aims of Vestnik, along with its lack of personnel necessary to fulfill these 
aims, spurred the bureau to investigate culture from an interdisciplinary angle. The bureau 
requested that the AN SSSR Presidium approve the creation of an interdivisional “scientific 
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council” (nauchnyi sovet) to focus exclusively on the history of culture through Vestnik and the 
UNESCO project.708 Historian Roger D. Markwick describes these scientific councils as 
enjoying a “relative autonomy” from the “party-state” that “made them important rudiments of 
civil society” in the decade following the death of Stalin and the transformation of the Soviet 
historical profession enabled by Khrushchev’s reforms.709 Thus, Soviet participation in the 
History not only introduced Soviet historians to the nascent Western genre of world history, but 
also opened up new spaces in which historians could test “revisionist” methodologies within the 
relatively relaxed ideological parameters prevailing as a result of de-Stalinization.  But this 
propensity to break with tradition, along with its financial insolvency, won Vestnik few 
supporters within AN SSSR or the party bureaucracy. Consequently, the journal ceased 
publication eleven months after the founding of the scientific council, ending a four-year run. 
The decision to shut down the journal in 1961 took place amid a deterioration of relations 
between Soviet scholars and the international commission for the History of Mankind. Although 
Zvorykin expressed satisfaction that some of the volumes on premodern history incorporated 
Soviet suggestions, the content of Volume VI on the twentieth century produced sharp debates 
between its author-editors and Soviet scholars. In the words of Zvorykin, the author-editors––one 
of whom was Caroline Ware, an American professor of history at Yale University––had 
composed Volume VI “in the spirit of the American way of life” and had infused it with 
“slanderous attacks” on the communist bloc.710 In 1959, Zvorykin had inundated the author-
editors of this volume with over 500 pages of comments and proposals for revisions. Over the 
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next three years, Zvorykin and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation threatened several times to reject 
the volume.711 Among other aspects, Soviet academicians took umbrage with what Zvorykin 
described as the text’s characterization of the Cold War as a battle between “the world of 
democratic states headed by the USA” and “the world of totalitarian states”; its emphasis on the 
cultural and scientific achievements of the capitalist West at the expense of a thorough 
appreciation of socialist successes; as well as its cursory treatment of cultural and scientific life 
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.712 From Zvorykin’s perspective, the negative caricaturing of 
the USSR in the text reflected the ideological biases of his Western colleagues and contradicted 
the norms of sociability by which the Soviet academician had advised his Soviet colleagues to 
abide. The author-editors’ acceptance of this anti-Soviet language revealed the Western tilt of the 
project and the power dynamics governing UNESCO’s supposedly neutral bid to write a 
universal history through international cooperation. 
Over the next three years, Soviet officials conducted extensive negotiations over the 
themes and fine points of the volume, making inroads into the controversial stretches related to 
the Soviet Union.713 Yet the History of Mankind project fell victim to irreconcilable differences 
between the author-editors and Soviet historians. In 1960, the author-editors placed Soviet 
objections as endnotes to the main text but refused to rethink their “basic approach” at such a late 
stage, noting that the number of comments they had received from the USSR and other countries 
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amounted to (and actually far exceeded) the same length as that of the volume.714 In early 1962, 
the international commission and Zvorykin agreed to begin an alternative Volume VI that would 
display Soviet and other non-Western interpretations of the recent history of science and 
culture.715 As Zvorykin and his team composed a draft of this dissenting historical worldview, 
the international commission published Volume VI replete with copious Soviet endnotes in 
1966. When the commission formally dissolved in 1969, its final report to UNESCO stated that 
it had resolved to set up a committee of historians whose responsibilities would include realizing 
the Soviet version of the history of the twentieth century (“Volume VI-2”).716 In the end, 
however, this attempt to accommodate the Soviet side never came to fruition.  
The History of Mankind went out with a whimper rather than the bang originally intended 
when it began in the late 1940s. Because the field of world history had changed and expanded 
substantially in the 1950s and 1960s, the six published volumes had an outdated methodological 
framework and thus had almost no substantial impact on Western historiography. But for Soviet 
scholars, it served as an experiment in how to negotiate the international public sphere of the 
postwar era and relate to foreign scholars as colleagues. In the course of his travels to Paris for 
deliberations with foreign historians, Zvorykin discovered that UNESCO’s international public 
sphere expected its participants to perform sociability when engaging each other. Realizing that 
the brash, uncompromising stance Soviet academicians took toward their bourgeois counterparts 
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ran counter to this etiquette, Zvorykin advocated for a softer, nuanced approach to non-Soviet 
scholars reminiscent of the tact he took in his letter to Le Monde. He proposed that the Soviet 
intelligentsia abide by the behavioral norms of this public sphere in order to advance its own 
interests within the international organizational system. Although the final product received little 
attention in the West and was never published in the communist bloc, the experiment of writing 
the History of Mankind contributed to the de-Stalinization of the Soviet historical profession, 
opening up new methodological avenues for historical inquiry. In the words of historian Poul 
Duedahl, the History of Mankind had significance “not so much in the form of a concrete 
achievement but as a process. It was the first coordinated attempt to involve experts from around 
the world to reach agreement on a common understanding of history and thus the first truly 
international account of the history of mankind.”717   
*                 *                 * 
Apart from the History of Mankind and other “major projects,” UNESCO and its 
associated NGOs oversaw hundreds of annual conferences, seminars, and symposia as well as 
permanent committees that constituted an international network of venues in which experts 
debated the myriad subjects falling under the international organization’s broad mandate of 
education, science, and culture (seismology, oceanography, political science, elementary 
education, polytechnic training, textbook writing, museum curation, architecture, television 
broadcasting, library science, and so on). This network served as an international public sphere 
in which scholars, artists, technicians, and others identified common problems, exchanged 
knowledge, and cultivated relationships that transcended the nation state. For the Soviet foreign-
policy establishment, these events also presented opportunities to showcase the achievements of 
                                                     
717 Duedahl points out that terms used in the History, such as “civilization” and “mankind,” had already fallen out of 
fashion by the late 1960s. Duedahl, “Selling Mankind,” 129–30. 
 384 
the USSR to a diverse selection of the intellectual elite of both the West and the weakly-
developed countries. 
 In the 1950s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation struggled to achieve this 
objective because of the West’s ability to dictate the settings and terms of these events. For the 
first four years of Soviet participation in UNESCO, Spender’s depiction of Soviet citizens 
dispatched to UNESCO conferences as silent mountains with little to contribute resembles how 
at least some of these experts comported themselves. Indeed, Soviet specialists at times behaved 
as anything but communist militants. Before the decision to stay in UNESCO in 1959, they 
received little instruction on what the Soviet state wanted them to accomplish at these meetings 
apart from directives to “observe” and to “see.” Referencing the case of a 1958 conference of 
“utmost importance” on “electronic computing” to which twenty-five Soviet scientists went 
without specific instructions, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, in its annual report for 1960, 
stressed that the “preparation for these meetings should be serious. We should know what we 
want to achieve in each particular instance.”718  
The Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation realized that the cultural milieus and 
settings of UNESCO activities held outside the USSR worked against the attempts of Soviet 
participants to showcase their strengths and talents on the world stage. The linguistic hegemony 
of the French and “Anglo-Saxon” countries in the international organization made Soviet 
conference attendees bystanders to the proceedings. “Many who go to meetings,” three Soviet 
UNESCO intermediaries noted in a letter to MID in 1961, “do not speak English, which curtails 
their ability to participate. Some sit silently at the conferences because they don’t know the 
language.” This silence “can be used in the ‘bourgeois press’ to hurt the ‘prestige’ of the Soviet 
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Union.”719 Because of the red tape around the process for obtaining exit visas, mistakes made by 
both Soviet and UNESCO bureaucrats, as well as the slow flow of mail through the “Iron 
Curtain,” other Soviet specialists tapped to go to UNESCO events showed up late, failed to 
register, or never made it at all. One Soviet pedagogue turned up at UNESCO headquarters for a 
1963 meeting on textbook publishing after it had already concluded.720 
Since the adversaries of the Soviet Union not only outnumbered socialist delegates at 
UNESCO functions but also controlled the settings and mechanics of this international public 
sphere, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation became determined to wrest control of 
some of these sites of international contact from their enemies by merging UNESCO’s 
internationalist network with the socialist internationalist events put on inside the USSR. 
Beginning in 1957, the commission and delegation lobbied UNESCO to dole out money for 
events in the Soviet Union. From 1957 to 1959, the delegation navigated the labyrinthine 
UNESCO bureaucracy in pursuit of three grants for a seminar on “Youth and Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy,” an “International Youth Tourist Camp,” and an “International Work Camp.”721  
Soviet officials failed to get UNESCO funding for these meetings in the 1950s because of 
their inexperience in dealing with the arcane bureaucratic system governing these grants. On the 
occasions that the USSR managed to apply to the right UNESCO department, the 
competitiveness and strict timeline of the application process for UNESCO support made it 
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difficult for the USSR to win funds for events on its own territory. As a Soviet UNESCO 
employee explained in 1960, the UNESCO General Conference approved all allocations every 
two years and had a limited budget for proposals in the intervening period. If UNESCO agreed to 
review Soviet ones submitted outside of the framework of the general conference, the application 
“cycle” typically took six to eight months between the receipt of a request from the communist 
bloc and the signing of a contract. “Late submissions from the socialist camp,” the Soviet 
UNESCO worker advised, “are considered by some as ignoring the UNESCO program, as a 
form of pressure on UNESCO.” The vague language Soviet officials used to fill out UNESCO 
applications also evoked suspicion from the international organization. When the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission wrote “and others” in its listing of countries invited to send 
representatives to conferences, UNESCO worried that this phrase could allow representatives of 
pariah nations not belonging to UNESCO (the GDR, PRC, DPRK, etc.) to show up at these 
events in contravention of the international organization’s regulations.722 The refusal of 
UNESCO to appease Soviet supplications contributed to the Soviet desire to leave UNESCO 
when Commission Chairman Zhukov raised this prospect in the fall of 1958. Discussing the 
issue during the fallout from Zhukov’s article in Pravda, a member of the UNESCO Secretariat 
noted the anger of Soviet officials over UNESCO’s rejection of their requests for funding. “Mr. 
Jukov [sic] repeated several times and in very grave terms,” the UNESCO employee recalled in a 
report, “that he considers this situation as being extremely serious, that he is fighting for 
UNESCO in Moscow but for the moment without much success, since he has no ammunition to 
fight with.”723  
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Once it had decided to remain in UNESCO in 1959, however, the USSR redoubled its 
efforts to send representatives to as many of these activities as possible. As the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation wrote in 1960, they believed “that Soviet representatives must be at all meetings and 
conferences.”724 As a result, the number of these international events at which Soviet 
professionals showed up grew exponentially in the first half of the 1960s. In 1958, Soviet 
specialists traveled to only twenty-eight events organized by UNESCO or UNESCO-affiliated 
NGOs.725 In 1961, the sum of Soviet nationals appearing at UNESCO meetings increased to 
eighty.726 In 1965, the UNESCO Department of Education alone hosted Soviet educators at 
fourteen conferences while other departments and NGOs brought in dozens of others.727  
In addition, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation renewed its push for 
UNESCO to abandon its aloofness to “the most pressing” debates of the time as well as its “one-
sided orientation” toward the West and take on more “political” issues, including racial 
prejudice, disarmament, and “peaceful coexistence.” This genuine concern that the organization 
avoided immediate political problems only intensified after October 1962 when UNESCO failed 
to respond to the prospect of imminent nuclear war created by the Cuban Missile Crisis. “The 
crisis in the Caribbean Sea,” the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reflected in its annual report for 
that year, “showed the weakness and imperfection of UNESCO (and the UN as well), its 
inability to seriously intervene in the development of conflicts leading to thermonuclear 
catastrophe, its inability to settle such conflicts, or to even decisively raise its voice in some way 
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against threats of war.” But the delegation expressed hope that the USSR provided an example in 
the organization for how to realize peace in the era of the Bomb. “It is important, however, to 
note that the circle of the intelligentsia of the West and neutral countries connected to 
UNESCO,” the report continued, “were able to see the value of peace and the ability of the 
Soviet Union, along with all peace-loving forces, to block the way to war [and] curb the most 
aggressive and adventurist imperialist circles.” The delegation argued that the crisis had given 
the Western and “neutral” intelligentsias involved in UNESCO a chance “to witness firsthand 
how the possibility of compromise between the USSR and US could be realized, and what this 
can achieve in relation to cooperation in the areas under UNESCO's mandate in general.”728  
In 1963, Soviet officials overseeing UNESCO affairs presented a program for the 
“reorientation” of the organization. As part of this push, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet 
L. I. Brezhnev and MID Minister Gromyko urged Director-General Maheu during a meeting in 
Moscow to overhaul the international organization in line with this platform. Owing to 
“resistance” to these reforms from the “pro-Western (and, to a significant extent, pro-French)” 
secretariat, however, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation dismissed the “first, very modest, 
insufficient steps” of the UNESCO Executive Board to realize these changes after a year of 
attempted implementation.729  
From 1960 to 1964, the commission and delegation repeatedly petitioned to increase the 
number of UNESCO conferences, seminars, and other convocations occurring within the USSR, 
flooding UNESCO with long lists of possible joint initiatives. The moves culminated in 
unsuccessful proposals submitted by the Soviet UNESCO Commission to MID from 1963 to 
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1966 that called for the creation of a UNESCO regional center for Eastern Europe in Moscow 
and one for “socioeconomic development” in Tashkent similar to those coordinating UNESCO 
ventures for other regions in Havana, Cuba; Accra, Ghana; Cairo, Egypt; Djakarta, Indonesia; 
and elsewhere.730 Notwithstanding the challenges of the application process, dozens of meetings 
bringing scholars, specialists, and youth to the Soviet Union became commonplace by 1962. In 
that year, for instance, the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences helped schedule at least 
five international scientific conferences in Moscow and Tashkent.731  
Since UNESCO accepted membership contributions only in the currencies of those 
countries most often receiving financing from the international organization for activities in their 
jurisdictions (American dollars, British sterling, and French francs), the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission believed that hosting UNESCO events in the USSR would convince the UNESCO 
leadership to receive Soviet membership contributions in rubles and therefore reverse course on 
their discriminatory policy of transacting solely in Western currencies. In other words, payment 
of membership dues by the USSR in its own currency would allow the country to retain its own 
foreign currency reserves instead of forking over millions of American dollars to UNESCO 
annually.732  
Attempts to reshape the venues of internationalism took on more urgency in the context 
of the Soviet crusade to lure the intellectual classes of decolonizing regions away from the West. 
As the commission warned in a 1963 memorandum, the Western countries exploited UNESCO 
events on their soil to win over figures of influence in the non-Western world without “the 
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expenditure of their own funds,” using “the attendance of representatives of the weakly 
developed countries at these events to propagate the ‘Western way of life.’” The “Westerners” 
did this by taking advantage of UNESCO events to not only display “‘the highly developed 
nature’ of education, science, and culture in imperialist countries,” but also to advertise “their 
countries as ‘centers for international association.’”733 The Soviet UNESCO Commission argued 
that if the USSR hosted international meetings sponsored by UNESCO, this would give “foreign 
specialists, including those from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the opportunity to directly get 
to know the life and achievements of the Soviet people.”734 As Commission Chairman Zhukov 
maintained, a “conference for workers from Asia and Africa on the implementation of education 
in native languages” slated to happen in Central Asia in the fall of 1960 would serve as both a 
means of defeating Western neoimperialism and a chance to impress on those traveling from 
twenty-five countries how Central Asia stood out as a model for blending indigenous culture and 
modern progress.735 
A few UNESCO-endorsed events played an important role in the evolution of Soviet 
cultural politics in the Khrushchev era. For example, the holding in Leningrad during the 
summer of 1963 of the International Writers’ Congress, which UNESCO and the Community of 
European Writers had planned, served as an opportunity for the Kremlin both to dispel fears in 
the West of the beginnings of an “ideological pogrom” in the Soviet Union and to reconcile 
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Khrushchev with I. G. Erenburg after the Soviet premier had attacked the Soviet writer and other 
members of the intelligentsia that March in a meeting at the Kremlin. Attended by Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and other literary luminaries of the Western and Soviet worlds, the 
International Writers’ Congress devolved into vicious quarreling between Western and Soviet 
writers over the value of modernist and existentialist literature (the works of Marcel Proust, 
Franz Kafka, James Joyce, and Samuel Beckett) until Erenberg cooled the tensions between the 
two warring camps.736 Having scorned the organization at the Wroclaw Congress in the context 
of the late 1940s antiforeign and anti-cosmopolitan campaigns, the Erenberg of the early 1960s 
embodied the overlapping values of Soviet socialist internationalism and the Western 
internationalism of UNESCO. The émigré cultural critics Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis recall 
how Erenberg’s life, as portrayed in the memoirs he published that decade (People, Years, Life), 
had impressed on the generation coming of age in the 1960s that “the USSR is not an island, 
isolated from the rest of mankind in time and space.” Erenberg’s journey through the twentieth 
century represented a vision of the integration of Soviet culture into world culture reminiscent of 
UNESCO’s aspiration to build an international community with a shared cultural heritage. 
“Everything in this grandiose panorama must serve the conception of one world, in which only 
talent and style distinguish people and ideas,” Vail’ and Genis observed of his memoirs. “The 
main character of the book is Erenberg himself. For him, a cosmopolitan making the globe his 
home, the earth is a brotherhood of artists, transforming the patchwork map into a single empire 
of art.”737  
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In the fall of the same year in which the conference in Leningrad took place, Erenberg 
again displayed this cosmopolitan worldview at a UNESCO roundtable in Paris commemorating 
the seventh centenary of the birth of Italian poet Dante Alighieri. “The greatness of Dante is 
evident,” Erenberg told the audience, “if only from the enthusiasm his work arouses in every part 
of our disunited world, whether among the inhabitants of inferno, real or imaginary, among those 
who do not regard themselves as living in purgatory, or among the illusory shades of paradise.” 
Citing Dante’s passion for politics to defend Soviet writers criticized by Western intellectuals for 
their political “commitment,” the aging writer seemed to use his speech to justify his own 
controversial relationship with the Soviet state and Stalin, arguing that art created by political 
passion transcended the specific historical context and battles giving rise to that passion. “What 
now remains of the feud between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the religious dogmas, and the 
doctrines of Aristotle or Plato? Dante’s Divine Comedy itself, the power and the music of his 
poetry––with all due deference to Cato of Utica and his like,” Erenberg remarked in praise of 
Dante’s epic poem written in political exile and in reference to the Roman statesman who 
appears in the poem in purgatory because of his suicide under the tyranny of Caesar.738 The last 
line of Dante’s Divine Comedy, “‘the love that moves the suns and the other stars,’” disproved 
the importance of the rightness or wrongness of a specific point of view shaped by the historical 
moment. “Every child now knows that Dante was wrong in thinking that the Sun and the other 
heavenly bodies revolve round the earth,” he concluded. “But every modern man with a spark of 
humanity in him knows in his heart that love indeed moves the Sun and the other heavenly 
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bodies, including this planet, not very large it is true, but important nonetheless, the one we call 
the Earth.”739    
Other UNESCO gatherings in the Soviet Union had less of an impact on the Soviet 
cultural literati and the high diplomacy of the Cold War but still laid bare the commonalities and 
differences between Soviet and Western internationalisms. One of the first activities inside the 
Soviet Union to receive UNESCO funds, the 1960 “International Summer Student Courses” at 
the International Youth Camp in the Crimean town of Gurzuf, highlights the points of 
convergence and dissimilarities between the competing internationalisms of UNESCO and the 
USSR. It also illustrates the difficulties Soviet officials faced when balancing the ideological 
messaging they intended for these events and the need to get UNESCO sponsorship. 
In March 1960, the Soviet UNESCO Commission applied for a UNESCO grant of $8,000 
for these courses, or what amounted to a short summer camp taking place from June 1 through 
June 17 and organized by the USSR Student Council and the Bureau of International Youth 
Tourism, “Sputnik.” Requesting this grant to help fund the travel of over 120 representatives of 
student organizations from all over the world, the commission argued that the theme of these 
courses, “Students, International Cooperation, and World Culture,” echoed UNESCO’s ideals 
and fell within the mandate of UNESCO’s “East-West” project due to the anticipated presence of 
youth from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.740 At first skeptical of the proposal, UNESCO 
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eventually elected to allot $4,000 to the courses since “it would be difficult to refuse” the 
application in light of the fact that it was the first such request from the Ukrainian SSR. At the 
same time, UNESCO conditioned its contribution on the stipulation that the program include a 
significant portion dedicated to UNESCO, requiring that 25 percent of the courses focus 
exclusively on the organization’s “East-West” project and its work to demonstrate the value and 
mutual influence of Asian and Western cultural traditions. The organization also required that an 
official from the UNESCO Department of Education attend the courses and use the time reserved 
for UNESCO to hold a discussion on the project.741  
Promoted in a colorful and chic brochure as a fun social gathering of youth representing 
different cultures, the summer courses sought to showcase the Soviet Union as a center not only 
of scientific and cultural progress but also of “international association” in the spirit of the 1957 
World Youth Festival. In the daytime, foreign students sat with Soviet peers in seminars 
translated simultaneously into Russian, French, English, and Spanish on short-wave radio 
receivers and led by experts covering a wide range of topics oriented toward reconciling world 
peace with the latest technological innovations and political developments. These included, 
among others, workshops on “Culture and National Independence,” “Science and the Twentieth 
Century,” “Students and Disarmament,” and “Cinema: A Means of Mutual Understanding 
Among Peoples.” At night, students socialized at film screenings, an “International Student 
Ball,” and informal meetings with Soviet celebrities. On the weekends and during the last three 
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days of the program, students toured along the coast of the Black Sea, visited Yalta, inspected a 
Soviet collective farm, and explored Moscow.742  
For UNESCO’s “25 percent” of the schedule, the international organization sent Anoush 
Khoshkish, a French employee of the Department of Education, to deliver opening remarks to 
the program, give a lecture on UNESCO’s work to promote mutual understanding through the 
“East-West” project, present a film on the project followed by a discussion, and hand out 
UNESCO informational materials to participants. Despite some planted questions about the 
absence of China in UNESCO and the excessive administrative costs of the international 
organization, Khoshkish portrayed the response of his audience in his report as critical but 
genuinely positive and stressed that the UNESCO film was “well received.” But the secretariat 
employee also took note of the polemical tenor of the discussions. To his surprise, those at the 
courses from the over forty countries outside the eastern bloc, and especially the youth hailing 
from decolonizing nations, outdid their Soviet hosts in their militant stances on international 
politics. “It was interesting to observe during the political discussions,” Khoshkish reflected, “the 
moderation of participants from the USSR and people’s democracies compared to the fanatic 
tone of the representatives of the extreme Left of the economically liberal countries or still yet 
the fervent nationalists of the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet participants at times held 
themselves back to calm the spirits.” The heated arguments dominating the courses coincided 
uneasily with UNESCO’s vision of pacifistic intellectual and social bonding across cultures. 
“The positive aspect [of the courses] was more apparent as soon as the presentation of UNESCO 
ideals and activities were grafted onto the program,” Khoshkish observed in a somewhat self-
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congratulatory manner. “In fact, from that moment on, one could see a shift in points of view, 
from the ‘East-West’ [Est-Ouest] political axis to the ‘East-West’ [Orient-Occident] cultural 
axis.”743   
These two “axes” shaping the discourse of the 1960 courses derived from the competing 
internationalisms of the Cold War. On the one hand, UNESCO and its representatives’ aversion 
to fractious political debate represented the institutionalization of a Western consensus centered 
on multilateral, “apolitical,” cultural cooperation while emphasizing congenial engagement as 
opposed to conflict. On the other hand, the students attending the courses formed a tenuous 
alliance between the socialist and anticolonial movements challenging this consensus. Thus the 
event in Crimea brought together and fostered a dialogue between a Western internationalism 
interested in gradually reforming the status quo and a revolutionary internationalism intent on 
remaking this world order. Moreover, the vocal and disruptive presence of youth from the 
Western Left and countries seeking independence from colonial domination reflected and 
presaged the upheaval that would unsettle the bipolar paradigm of the Cold War over the course 
of the 1960s. 
The politically charged atmosphere of the summer courses made UNESCO officials 
hesitant to support future Soviet ideas for UNESCO activities. When the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation appealed for assistance in the carrying out of the 1961 World Youth Forum in 
Moscow, one UNESCO official wondered whether “such a meeting called in the present period 
of international tension and mistrust [can] be effective in bringing about international 
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understanding and cooperation.”744 Regardless of these concerns and persistent protestations 
from the US over the political motivations behind Soviet solicitations of UNESCO funds, the 
international organization continued to allocate resources to Soviet events but enforced its 
contractual right to oversee a portion of their program. If Soviet officials failed to adequately 
incorporate UNESCO content into its functions, the organization demanded the USSR either 
return the money allocated for the activity or find other ways of disseminating UNESCO’s 
message. For instance, the Youth Section of the UNESCO Department of Education compelled 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission to send a photo exhibition to different cities in the USSR after 
the organizers of the 1961 World Youth Forum abruptly bumped the international organization’s 
presentation from the schedule.745 Keen to utilize UNESCO’s funds and the organization’s 
public-relations arm to draw “progressive” elements of the world’s educated classes to its 
internationalist meetings, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation had to ensure that at 
least part of these get-togethers contained UNESCO themes as interruptions to the otherwise 
Soviet-controlled internationalist programs. 
Soviet hosting organizations tended to fare better in the eyes of UNESCO observers 
when they put on conferences concerned with educational training or a specific scientific topic. 
In 1962, Ruth Lazarus, an expatriate South-African UNESCO official who worked with W. E. B. 
Dubois on education in Africa, spoke favorably of her time alongside four Soviet and African 
women on the steering committee of the “Seminar for African Women on Women’s Education,” 
which took place that September in Tashkent.746 Bringing to the capital of the “Soviet East” a 
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mixture of teachers, healthcare workers, and members of parliament from an Africa undergoing 
rapid changes due to decolonization, the committee conceived of the seminar as a site for African 
women to share their experiences in educating the populations of their respective countries while 
studying “the experiences of Asian Soviet republics in the field of irradication [sic] of illiteracy 
and further education of women.” Introduced by the female chairman of the Uzbek Supreme 
Soviet, Ia. S. Nasridinova, the seminar consisted of five sessions in which African women led 
talks about the state of education for women in their countries and Soviet pedagogues gave 
lectures exalting the progress in Soviet society of liberating women from the destitution of 
ignorance. Toward the end of the seminar, the African women went on field trips to Soviet 
educational institutions and traveled to the other Central Asian republics.747   
The high praise offered by Lazarus in her report on the seminar reveals how the civilizing 
missions of the USSR and the international organization converged in the shared goal of 
educating the world’s population through the tutelage of the more “advanced” countries. In a 
draft of the final report, Lazarus quoted a delegate from Togo who viewed Soviet Central Asia as 
a model for her own country’s development. The seminar, this representative extolled, was “a 
valuable experience not only because of its theme but because it was held in in a country which 
not so long ago had had the same problems as we have, and we are able to judge your results for 
ourselves. This experience will aid us in our own work.”748 The African women, Lazarus added 
in the final version of her assessment for UNESCO, “were able to see for themselves the 
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enormous changes that had taken place in the lives of women who only a few generations ago 
were veiled, and were for the most part illiterate, and lacked basic social and political rights.”749  
The eagerness with which the USSR pressed UNESCO to confer its seal of approval on 
Soviet international gatherings speaks to the centrality of such multilateral meetings to the 
geopolitical contest of the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
campaigned to erode the West’s ability to determine the culture and rules governing an emerging 
international public sphere run by UNESCO and other international organizations. Zvorykin and 
other Soviet specialists struggled both to adapt to and overturn Western power over this sphere at 
meetings, conferences, and other events happening mainly in Western Europe or North America. 
In the 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Commission also moved to chip away at Western hegemony 
by merging Soviet internationalist events with the UN’s institutionalization of internationalist 
solidarity.  
This effort proved mutually beneficial to both the USSR and UNESCO. Thanks to Soviet 
aspirations to exploit UNESCO as a sponsor of its cultural-diplomatic offensive, the international 
organization extended its influence into the communist world by conditioning sponsorship on the 
requirement that any event either incorporate the input of UNESCO or simply conform to a 
theme currently boosted by the international organization. Soviet petitioning for UNESCO 
support proved remarkably successful for the USSR given its late entrance into the world of 
organizing the international public sphere. In 1965, Director-General Maheu could deflect Soviet 
complaints about discrimination in this area of activity by noting that the organization’s general 
review of the matter had “led to the holding of more meetings in the USSR than in any other 
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member state” during that year.750 In response to a proposal put forward by the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation for a conference on human rights in the Soviet Union at the end of 1964, the director 
of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences worried that this would incur political trouble for 
the international organization since it had just finished a conference on the “Biological Aspects 
of Race” in Moscow. The director warned that approval of the human rights conference would 
mean that UNESCO had placed in the USSR “in a period of three years two out of three major 
meetings on human rights and eradication of racial prejudice,” which “might be 
objectionable.”751 
Regardless of their location, UNESCO meetings enabled Soviet professionals to act as 
public intellectuals engaged in a reciprocal exchange of knowledge across borders for a common 
global good during the Cold War. As the historian Maria Rogacheva illustrates in her study of 
Soviet scientists working in the “scientific town” of Chernogolovka near Moscow, in-person 
gatherings abroad were some of the only opportunities for Soviet scientists to “keep in touch 
with the progress of the international scientific community in their respective fields” following 
the isolationism of the Stalinist era.752 But this intellectual discourse between the capitalist and 
communist blocs did not take place in a void. Because the settings, terms, and etiquette of these 
events dictated the results of this discourse, the sites of interaction between the intelligentsias of 
the competing ideological systems became objects of contestation equal in significance to the 
substance of the debates. The USSR therefore sought to exploit the overlapping ideals of 
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UNESCO and the USSR to decenter the international organization’s activities from the West 
while accruing foreign currency from these gatherings and courting the educated classes of the 
weakly-developed countries. 
In the context of the midcentury spread of mass media across the globe, however, the 
international public spawned by UNESCO encompassed more than experts trekking from East to 
West and vice versa for in-person communication. In particular, the international organization 
seized on the increasing ease with which written materials traveled across borders to spread its 
internationalist message. The next chapter investigates how the reading public generated by 
UNESCO offered a bullhorn for Soviet propaganda while also affecting the lives of Soviet 
citizens who had no opportunity to travel abroad. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE UNESCO READING PUBLIC 
 
While a stratum of the Soviet intelligentsia had the privilege of attending UNESCO 
events or representing the USSR at meetings the communist country hosted at home, UNESCO 
publications introduced the organization’s activities to a broader segment of the Soviet 
population. Translated into multiple languages, these materials produced an international reading 
public unique in its inclusion of citizens from countries where authoritarian governments filtered 
information coming over the border.753 As an aggregator of data on education and a news source 
on global developments under its mandate, UNESCO manufactured a pre-internet global 
network that facilitated the internationalization of the flow of knowledge about education, 
science, and culture. Aware of the wide net of this reading public and the accessibility of 
UNESCO materials to readers sheltered from Soviet propaganda by their governments, the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation viewed UNESCO publications as one of the only 
channels through which they could disseminate positive coverage about the Soviet Union 
worldwide. 
“Anti-Soviet slander” in the articles, books, or other written work released by the 
international organization remained a constant source of consternation among Soviet officials
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from the early days of the country’s participation in UNESCO through the late 1960s. Beginning 
in 1957, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation regularly met with UNESCO bureaucrats to complain 
about any hint of bias, such as comparisons between Nazi Germany and Soviet communism or 
unflattering portraits of the PRC.754 Although other UNESCO member states voiced their 
dissatisfaction in this respect from time to time, the USSR stood out for its zero-tolerance of any 
reference considered detrimental to its reputation. On several occasions, the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation went so far as to call for the elimination of small advertisements in the back of 
UNESCO periodicals of books with content deemed hostile to the USSR even if the advertising 
blurb itself had no disagreeable phrases.755 In correspondence with Moscow, the delegation 
attributed these attacks to the personal political motivations of those who controlled the divisions 
overseeing UNESCO publishing.756  
While some of these accusations had merit given the domination of the UNESCO 
Secretariat by nationals from the capitalist world, the failure of Soviet domestic institutions to 
monitor UNESCO publications and present information for them undermined the delegation’s 
position. After a conversation in August 1957 with the UNESCO leadership about a book 
composed by a Western scholar that understated the number of Soviet citizens who knew a 
foreign language, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation learned that two Soviet academicians had 
                                                     
754 For examples, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 54-55; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, l. 147. 
 
755 Countries with histories of conflict with other UNESCO member states also protested to UNESCO about its 
publications. The Soviet permanent delegate referenced India’s gripes concerning literature about Pakistan in a 
conversation with Director-General Evans in the spring of 1957. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l.16; and GARF, f. 
9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 257. 
 
756 In 1957, Kemenov blamed the Polish émigré who headed the division responsible for UNESCO’s Currents of 
Sociology for the journal’s “harmful publications.” In 1960, a Soviet UNESCO employee pointed to the power of an 
American when explaining the “anti-Soviet tendencies” of the UNESCO Department of Information. One UNESCO 
executive threatened to resign over this badgering, telling the Soviet permanent delegate that they had made his job 
“impossible.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 55; 404; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 349.  
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initially approved this information and another had never responded to a final request for 
approval of the data. “These cases are, unfortunately, not unique,” an adviser to the delegation 
wrote to MID Deputy Minister A. V. Zakharov. To demonstrate this, the adviser cited a failure 
the previous week to respond to a request for comment on a UNESCO report on continental 
shelves. “If there are unsatisfactory provisions in this report,” the adviser maintained, “then it 
will be difficult to protest because of our silence.”757   
The Soviet UNESCO Commission realized that Soviet contributions to the international 
organization’s printed materials offered the best means of giving the international community a 
“correct” understanding of their country, since UNESCO publications reached broad swaths of 
the world’s population. In his memorandum to Soviet leaders from the late 1950s, Mozhaev 
stressed that the UNESCO imprimatur on Soviet scholarship would legitimize this information as 
reliable in the eyes of foreigners. “It is necessary,” Mozhaev wrote, “also to take into account 
that international organizations are one of the most important channels of foreign propaganda for 
governments, one of the strongest ways of shaping public opinion.” Because the publications of 
international organizations were “specialized, i.e. calculated in accordance with the profile of the 
organization for specific parts of the population or specific specialists,” they had a 
“purposefulness, credibility, clarity, and concreteness” governmental propaganda did not. The 
over 700 periodicals and more than 300 individual publications issued by international 
organizations annually, he added, “more easily and quickly penetrate borders and are rarely 
subject to confiscation.”758  
                                                     
757 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 103-04. 
 
758 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 200. 
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Each year, the international organization released millions of copies of its popular 
magazines and academic journals to its more than 70 member states as well as countries not 
belonging to the organization.759 The UNESCO Information Bulletin, an international newswire 
service, went out to 4,000 newspapers and 1,000 radio stations in 130 countries.760 The Soviet 
UNESCO Commission laid out in a 1957 memorandum how it should use such UNESCO 
conduits to funnel Soviet written material into four target areas otherwise largely untouched by 
Soviet propaganda campaigns: 1) countries with no diplomatic relations with the USSR; 2) 
countries with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic ties but in which it was “hard to get 
accurate information about the USSR (e.g., Switzerland, a number of Latin American 
countries)”; 3) countries lacking diplomatic relations with the USSR where “national liberation is 
taking place” (e.g., “the Belgian Congo, French West Africa”); and 4) countries with “provincial 
presses” which, unable to afford “expensive press agencies, . . . prefer the UNESCO Bulletin 
since it is distributed free of charge (e.g., the Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium, etc.).”761 
This strategy bore fruit in the first two years of its implementation. In 1958, Soviet articles 
appeared not only in UNESCO periodicals but also in at least forty-four national and local 
newspapers as syndicated reproductions.762  
                                                     
759 These numbers oscillated slightly over the years. For a summary of the circulation of some of these periodicals in 
1961, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 234-54. 
 
760 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 400. 
 
761 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 165-66. 
 
762 The Soviet UNESCO Commission kept tabs on how the US National Commission exploited UNESCO 
publications to disseminate information. In 1959, for example, Chairman Zhukov noted that Columbia University 
had responded to a request for books in the UNESCO Information Bulletin from a university in Ghana in 1957 by 
sending 686 books. He also cited the receipt of 2,000 books by a library in Nigeria from Columbia. GARF, f. 9519, 
op. 2, d. 13, ll. 47-48. Soviet articles likely surfaced in more than 44 newspapers since the report references just one 
article on Soviet museums, which was reproduced in 44 newspapers that year. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 189-91.  
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Toward the end of the 1960s, the Soviet foreign-policy apparatus shifted its focus to UN 
statistical publications. UN “statistical periodical directories and yearbooks,” the Soviet UN 
Ambassador N. T. Fedorenko wrote in November 1966 to the heads of all agencies dealing with 
the world body, “are widely distributed to all countries of the world and are considered the most 
serious sources of statistical data.” These documents, Fedorenko stressed, not only served as 
reliable starting points for research among “government and business circles, the intelligentsia, 
students, etc.,” but also formed the basis for the composition of reports around which sessions of 
the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Security Council, the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and other international organizations revolved. Thus, UN statistical compilations offered 
a means to shape perceptions of Soviet productivity by validating claims of success in a variety 
of areas, including industrial output, public health, employment, and education. If “individual 
statistical data published by Soviet publications,” Fedorenko maintained, “is met with distrust in 
the West and Western propaganda often tries to cast doubt on its veracity, the accuracy of such 
data is not contested when published in UN publications and those of specialized international 
organizations.” Scolding Soviet organs for having overlooked these documents, Fedorenko urged 
them to turn over more frequently to UN organizations the most recent statistics from the USSR 
Central Statistical Directorate (TsSU SSSR) and align this data with existing international 
standards instead of relying on outdated information. He singled out what he identified as an 
incorrect listing in The UNESCO Statistical Yearbook of the amount of spending on education in 
the USSR as “one of the lowest figures in the world” behind the Republic of Congo-
Léopoldville.763 In response, the Soviet UNESCO Commission acknowledged that the Yearbook 
contained “a number of instances of insufficient and incomplete information” and pledged to 
                                                     
763 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 33, ll. 206-12. 
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send more accurate data, but disputed the notion that the table on educational expenditures cast 
the Soviet Union as trailing behind the Congo.764 
From the mid-1950s onward, UNESCO directors expressed a willingness to include some 
Soviet content in publications put out by their departments.765 But the pervasive politics of the 
Cold War, along with the UNESCO Secretariat’s method of planning publications, complicated 
these intentions. In 1957, the appearance of Soviet publications and other media evoked 
condemnations from the US National Commission, which admonished UNESCO for facilitating 
“Soviet propaganda.”766 Inside UNESCO, many considered Soviet protestations as 
manifestations of a hubristic disregard for the rights of other member states to appear in the 
literature of the international organization. As the head of the “East-West” project observed in 
conversation with Soviet emissaries, “if every government sends two articles, the USSR sends 
ten.”767 The dismissal of Soviet dissatisfaction concealed a more fundamental reason for the 
organization’s rejections of Soviet submissions. In reaction to Soviet anger, UNESCO launched 
a review of how frequently Soviet materials appeared in UNESCO publications in the summer of 
1961. The UNESCO employee who completed the review blamed a tendency of the organization 
to rely on its own people in the secretariat instead of recruiting authors from member states, 
noting that “a very large part of our publications” came from either “the secretariat itself, or are 
given by contract to NGOs.” Since most of the UNESCO staff and affiliated NGOs hailed from 
                                                     
764 The commission suggested that the UN ambassador had “misread” the table. Ibid., ll. 215-17. 
 
765 The director of the UNESCO Department of Mass Information (which soon removed the “mass” from its name) 
made clear his excitement to receive Soviet materials in a conversation with the attaché of the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 7. 
 
766 For instance, the Americans lashed out at the UNESCO Department of Information when they realized that a 
catalogue of films for children listed more Soviet movies than American ones. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 7, l. 19. 
  
767 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 235-36. 
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Western Europe or North America, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation viewed this preference as 
advantageous to the West. Moreover, the long-term plans for publications cobbled together by 
UNESCO insiders from Western Europe and North America left little room to incorporate topics 
of interest to the Soviet Union.768 These built-in biases corroborated the many accusations from 
the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that Western bureaucrats had undue influence over the 
publication activities of the international organization.769 
Meanwhile, the Soviet UNESCO Commission met resistance from domestic institutions 
uninterested in making their specialists write for UNESCO. In September 1957, MID Deputy 
Minister Zakharov chided Soviet organizations for their inactivity. “A practice has been 
established in these organizations of only fulfilling UNESCO orders for writing specific articles 
and brochures on issues of interest to UNESCO or those that follow the tastes of the UNESCO 
bureaucrats and apparatus,” he wrote to the heads of Soviet agencies. “Instead,” the deputy 
minister urged these institutions to “take the initiative and send to UNESCO brochures and 
materials on specific issues of Soviet science and culture, the illumination of which we are 
interested in abroad.”770 This perceived underperformance of Soviet institutions continued into 
the 1960s. In 1966, the Soviet UNESCO Commission castigated the Soviet “News” Printing 
Agency (Agentstvo pechati “novosti,” or APN) for refusing to send articles to the international 
organization for free. Furthermore, Soviet academicians did not turn in to UNESCO manuscripts 
for books until years after their respective deadlines. To make matters worse, the commission 
bemoaned the “poor quality” and “crude” nature of work put forward by Soviet experts who did 
                                                     
768 Vladimir Stepanek, “BMS/3/Memo. 154: Participation of the USSR in UNESCO Publications,” September 27, 
1961, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1938, X07.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives. 
 
769 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 15, l. 349. 
 
770 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 117-18. 
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not “keep in mind the character of UNESCO publications and their reading public” of foreigners 
averse to Soviet polemics and more accustomed to engaging prose as well as high quality 
graphics or pictures aimed at laymen. All these shortcomings resulted in UNESCO returning 
final drafts to Moscow for “revision.”771 
In spite of Soviet disorganization and UNESCO’s predilection for keeping its publication 
activities “in house,” Soviet output for UNESCO increased in the 1960s to the point that it 
rivalled its American adversary in some departments. 772 This resulted from a reversal by 
UNESCO of its policy of not releasing its plan for future publications to member states as well 
as a Soviet commitment of more personnel to invigorate its work related to publications 
following the 1961 review by the international organization.773 To further bolster Soviet 
contributions to the publications of all UN specialized agencies in 1964, the USSR Central 
Committee and Council of Ministers also jointly ordered central ministries and institutes of 
higher education to complete three tasks to strengthen the Soviet position on publishing through 
the UN: 1) select every two months the “most easily translatable” works published in the USSR 
on questions of agriculture, industry, and the training of cadres; 2) prepare a “long-term plan for 
the publication of literature in foreign languages on issues of economics and planning”; and 3) 
                                                     
771 Examples of the commission and delegation complaining of the lateness and low quality of Soviet submissions 
are numerous, especially in the first three years of the Soviet push to get their authors published. For examples, see 
GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, ll. 268; 173; 334; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 95; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 50; and 
GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 212. 
 
772 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, l. 274.  
 
773 The Soviet UNESCO Delegation assigned each of its members as well as Soviet employees in the UNESCO 
Secretariat a specific publication to work on. At the same time, UNESCO gave the delegation a broad overview of 
its publication plans. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 61-62; and William Farr, “Mass Communication Publication 
Plans 1961/62,” July 13, 1961, 1–4, AG 8: Box 1938, X07.21(470) D, UNESCO Archives. 
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compose in foreign languages several series of brochures and books on “trade between the 
capitalist and socialist countries.”774 
As a consequence of these actions, the Soviet Union tripled the number of books, articles, 
and informational features published by UNESCO from 60 in 1958 to 187 in 1963. To the 
satisfaction of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, this upward trend continued in subsequent 
years through 1967. In the early 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation became so fixated on 
boosting Soviet publications that it kept track of the individual pages of UNESCO publications 
on which Soviet compositions appeared (304 in 1961, 362 in 1962, 1136 in 1963, etc.).775 The 
high demand among non-Soviet readers for insight into Soviet society spurred UNESCO to 
stockpile Soviet literature. Each year, the organization received so many visitors as well as letters 
requesting such material that UNESCO had to regularly reprint Soviet publications.776 Thus, 
readers from all over the world could find in UNESCO publications bibliographies of Soviet 
works; translations of classics from the Soviet republics; books on the teaching of different 
subjects in the USSR; commemorative reflections on literary, cultural or scientific figures from 
the Russian or other ethnic traditions making up the USSR; social-scientific analyses of 
contemporary issues such as disarmament and state planning, as well as others.777   
                                                     
774 RGANI, f. 3, op. 16, d. 456, ll. 9-13. 
 
775 After 1963, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation ceased counting the total number of publications, but noted each 
year through 1967 that the number “had increased significantly.” At the same time, it listed the amount of Soviet 
material placed in specific publications of interest. See: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 4; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, 
l. 263; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 53. 
 
776 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, l. 187; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 229. The Soviet UNESCO Commission and 
Delegation also received dozens of requests annually for literature from libraries in India and Indonesia, American 
and British academic journals, and UNESCO regional centers. For some examples, see: GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 4, 
l. 12; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 7, l. 37; GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 155-57; 175-77; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 
10, l. 100.  
 
777 For some examples of individual Soviet publications, see the “publications” sections of the annual reports of the 
Soviet UNESCO Delegation. In 1964, for instance, the delegation boasted of contributions on “the Social Sciences 
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In a sign of Soviet success in taking advantage of UNESCO as a bullhorn for its cultural-
diplomatic campaign to improve its image internationally, one Soviet book distributed by the 
international organization, The Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR, 
caused a furor throughout the United States and contributed to the realization in the US of the 
negative implications of American racial discrimination for US foreign policy. Begun as a Soviet 
rejoinder to a 1954 UNESCO publication written by an American that outlined the recent gains 
of the Civil Rights Movement, The Equality of Rights laid out the standard Soviet narrative of 
how the captive nationalities under the tsar had achieved liberation under socialism. It also 
contained attacks on the colonial domination and racial strife wrought by Western nations, 
including American segregation. Upon its release in 1962, the Kennedy administration protested 
that UNESCO had lent its credibility as a prestigious international organization to Soviet 
propaganda. As the world watched James Meredith, under federal escort, become the first 
African American to enroll at the University of Mississippi that fall, The Equality of Rights 
provoked a broader discussion in the US on what damage events in the South might do to the 
country’s reputation abroad. According to historian Anthony Hazard, at least eighty national and 
local American newspapers published articles dedicated to the book while editorial boards 
vented their anger that tax dollars went to a platform for the world communist movement. 
Meanwhile, Congress held a hearing on The Equality of Rights and reporters compelled President 
Kennedy to comment on the controversy at a press conference in early 1963.778  
                                                     
in the USSR,” translations of stories about the Armenian national legend David Sassoun, and an overview of 
polytechnic education in the Soviet Union. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 174. 
 
778 Hazard’s study of UNESCO’s impact on American understandings of “race” contains a detailed analysis of the 
fallout in the US from the publication of The Equality of Rights. My outline and contextualization here of the 
controversy in the US is an overview of his much more extensive research. Hazard, Postwar Anti-Racism, 132–39. 
For documents related to the prolonged process of producing The Equality of Rights and Soviet observations of the 
attacks from American “reactionary circles” on this book, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 6, l. 334; GARF, f. 9519, op. 
2, d. 20, l. 211; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 273; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 305. 
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As one of the leading vehicles for the internationalization of specialized knowledge in the 
postwar era, UNESCO thus became a key disseminator of information from the Soviet Union to 
regions of the world otherwise inaccessible to Soviet propaganda. The international organization 
legitimized Soviet information, giving it an air of objectivity or neutrality. But from the 
perspective of Soviet officials, the Western control of the secretariat responsible for publishing 
these materials meant that their adversaries defined what constituted “objective,” journalistic, 
academic, and statistical portrayals of social life. Far from viewing their publications as 
“propaganda” spoiling the neutrality of UNESCO, they believed Soviet writers had the right to 
speak as authorities on their country and counter the one-sided hegemony wielded by Western 
member states over an international organization presuming to act as a neutral mechanism for 
international intellectual cooperation.  
Yet the outward flow of Soviet information through UNESCO to an international 
audience came at a cost. If the USSR wanted to use UNESCO to export its ideas and demonstrate 
its expertise abroad, it also had to import UNESCO publications and disseminate them to the 
Soviet public. This implicit expectation influenced the deliberations of UNESCO employees who 
determined whether to publish an author from the Soviet Union. In July 1957, Soviet Permanent 
Delegate Kemenov warned Chairman Zhukov that UNESCO’s reception of a complaint from a 
librarian in Moscow that she did not receive certain UNESCO literature gave “grounds for 
accusations that Soviet citizens in the UNESCO Secretariat only seek to place our materials in 
UNESCO publications and that they do not want to support the publication in the Soviet press of 
at least short [pieces of] UNESCO information on the cultural life of other countries.”779  
                                                     
779 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 25-26. 
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This trade-off placed Soviet UNESCO intermediaries in the predicament of having to 
allow “undesirable” or “harmful” content into the Soviet Union. Most of this material came from 
the UNESCO Department of Information, which Soviet officials derided as a Western controlled 
“kind of ‘advertising agency’ promoting UNESCO activity and the director-general’s personal 
plans.”780 For each of these publications, the USSR signed a contract that barred Soviet censors 
from significantly altering any part of a text and committed the Soviet UNESCO Commission to 
disseminating UNESCO materials to the fullest extent of its abilities. In the contract for the 
UNESCO Bibliographical Newsletter, for example, the Soviet UNESCO Commission agreed to 
“distribute the Bulletin as widely as possible among the cultural and educational institutions of 
its country.” Article V of the contract also stated that “the presentation of the said Bulletin shall 
be subject to approval by UNESCO before publication; the form and substance of the text shall 
be respected and only such minor changes shall be made in translation as are necessary to 
produce a good literary text.” In addition, UNESCO reserved for itself two pages in every issue 
“to advertise certain UNESCO publications.”781 As the rest of the chapter will illustrate, the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission sometimes deleted a passage or omitted an article on their own or 
at the behest of the General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), 
but tended to honor the pledge to release UNESCO literature unedited. 
Of course, the USSR trailed far behind other UNESCO member states in terms of the 
number of periodicals and individual works it let flow across its borders. The country admitted 
only one-tenth of what its communist ally Poland took in annually and only moderately increased 
                                                     
780 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 179-80. 
 
781 “Agreement between the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the National 
Commission of the USSR for UNESCO,” December 30, 1959, 1–2, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO 
Archives. 
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the number of UNESCO publications it brought in each year, declining to participate in the 
UNESCO Coupon Program and other initiatives designed to facilitate the circulation of 
UNESCO materials.782 Aware of the lack of knowledge about UNESCO among Soviet 
academicians and professionals as well as a pervasive apathy toward the international 
organization among Soviet institutions, the Soviet UNESCO Commission prioritized UNESCO 
resources that educated the Soviet intelligentsia on the mission of the international organization 
as well as literature relating to what the chairman of the commission described in 1957 as “useful 
factual and reference material for specialists.” These included “brochures from the series 
‘Documentation through UNESCO,’ ‘What is UNESCO?,’ and ‘Technical Assistance and the 
Role of UNESCO,’” along with “reports of meetings of experts, results of UNESCO research, 
etc.” Likewise, the commission tried to exclude “undesirable material,” such as “UNESCO 
propaganda postcards, posters, and placards.”783 This selectivity puzzled scholars who had 
traveled to UNESCO conferences and learned about journals or monographs unavailable in the 
Soviet Union.784 
                                                     
782 The UNESCO Coupon Program allowed readers of UNESCO publications to buy these products of the 
international organization without dealing with the complications of currency conversion. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 
15, l. 202; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 183-84. 
 
783 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 9, l. 53. The commission also refused to take part in exchanges with organizations from 
Western member states through UNESCO if deemed harmful. For instance, the commission rejected an appeal from 
the Catholic Tape Recorders of America passed along by UNESCO to set up an exchange of tape recordings 
between citizens of the Soviet Union and its organization. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 39-42. As previous 
chapters have illustrated, few Soviet citizens had ever heard of UNESCO. Indeed, many Soviet citizens remained 
ignorant of its role in the Soviet Union. In 1965, for example, A. G. Mamedov from Baku wrote the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission asking for UNESCO’s help in improving his “living conditions” and housing situation. The 
commission replied that it had no role in providing welfare to Soviet citizens. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 65, ll. 96-97. 
 
784 Upon returning from a UNESCO conference in March 1960, the Soviet chemist, N. A. Figurovskii, complained 
to the Central Committee about the lack of translations in the Soviet Union of UNESCO research and urged it to 
permit the introduction into Soviet academic libraries of the UNESCO scientific journal Impact. Noting that the 
commission had, in fact, given Impact to a “very limited number” of libraries in the USSR, an employee of the 
commission rejected this request and reminded the Central Committee that their main goal was to put Soviet work in 
UNESCO publications, not UNESCO publications in the Soviet Union. RGANI, f. 5, op. 35, d. 128, ll. 50-59. Other 
individuals living in the USSR contacted the international organization directly for UNESCO paraphernalia. In 
addition to soliciting the Public Liaison Division in Paris for economic and educational literature, a professor with a 
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Notwithstanding the occasional suppression of a UNESCO publication, the influx of 
UNESCO popular magazines, bulletins, newsletters, academic periodicals, and books into the 
Soviet Union represented an unprecedented move to permit more unfiltered foreign information 
into the country than the limited amount of literature imported through bilateral cultural 
agreements. Soviet universities, artistic unions, press agencies, and cinematography organs 
regularly added to their libraries and catalogues UNESCO journals, news bulletins, films, and 
television programs.785 The international organization’s publications diversified and helped to 
make constant the trickle of foreign information, from novels to films to scholarship, seeping 
into the Soviet Union and broadening the outlooks of Soviet citizens in the 1950s and 1960s. As 
Vail’ and Genis remembered two decades later, the “Renaissance” of Soviet culture in the 1960s 
fed on this inward flow of foreign media. “The culture of the Stalin era existed in a stylistic 
vacuum. When its borders began to collapse, Western culture from different epochs and of 
different trends came tumbling down on bewildered spectators and readers,” the two émigrés 
recollected. “The mix of different Western styles had one quality––it was different from the 
norms of Soviet culture. Different [otlichnoi] means better. Or worse. But not equal. It had to be 
adjusted to Soviet society, to sink into the context of the correct ideology. Or uproot [it].”786 
Across the Soviet Union and its constituent republics, eight UNESCO “depository 
libraries,” or specially designated points of access for all UNESCO publications, sprang up in the 
                                                     
foreign sounding name at the Patrice Lumumba University of Friendship Among Peoples in Moscow asked 
UNESCO in 1964 to send him “twelve large photographs, together with captions, instructions for display and a 
guide for classroom discussion in English (UNESCO in Africa: A New Photo-Poster).” Mark M. P. Lyakurwa, 
August 3, 1964, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO Archives. 
 
785 For a list of Soviet institutions with UNESCO media in 1960, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 73-75. 
  
786 Vail’ and Genis, 60-e, 33-34. 
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1950s and 1960s.787 According to Chevalier, the UNESCO director who visited the USSR in the 
summer of 1957, the staff at these depository libraries stressed to him the “great demand” for 
UNESCO materials in general and described to him how these publications were “read with 
great interest” in their libraries. “I myself,” he wrote, “could ascertain this fact by the worn 
nature of some of these volumes, which shows that these books are frequently checked out.”788 
Individual organizations and citizens “mainly from the union republics” also “often” sent letters 
with requests for UNESCO publications to the Soviet UNESCO Commission or directly to the 
international organization.789  
One UNESCO periodical, the UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries (IuNESKO Biulleten’ dlia 
bibliotek in Russian), became the primary means through which Soviet librarians kept in touch 
with the latest developments in their specialization abroad. A bimonthly publication, the Bulletin 
contained articles on the work of librarians in different countries, statistics on holdings in 
libraries internationally, news on international conferences on library science, the addresses of 
national book-exchange centers, and bibliographies of new literature in the field. The first issue 
translated into Russian in January 1957 presented articles on “new methods and technology for 
the dissemination of scientific knowledge,” the photocopying services of the Japanese 
                                                     
787 Several of these libraries were in Moscow and Leningrad. The others were located at universities or academies of 
science in several of the capitals of Soviet republics and other major cities, including Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, and 
Vilnius. The book publisher Mezhdunarodnaia kniga also stocked UNESCO publications. The Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation often expressed eagerness to expand the number of these libraries. GARF. F. 9519, op. 
1, d. 14, l. 50; and Bibliography of Publications Issued by UNESCO or Under its Auspices: The First Twenty-Five 
Years, 1945 to 1971 (Paris: UNESCO, 1973), 381–85. 
 
788 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 115-16.  
 
789 Quoted from a letter from a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation who asked the commission to increase 
the number of depository libraries in 1961 based on the number of letters they received from individuals and Soviet 
institutions interested in UNESCO publications. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 14, l. 51. Requests from private citizens 
went through Glavlit for “kontrol’” before they made their way to the recipient. In 1961, for example, a citizen from 
Kazan received a letter telling him to pick up a book he had ordered from UNESCO in Moscow. The commission 
corresponded with Glavlit to ensure that they approved of the book. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 116-18. 
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Parliamentary Library, the microfilm collection of The Glasgow Herald, and a summary of the 
proceedings of a Brazilian Seminar on book exchanges, among others.790 When proposing the 
translation of the serial to the Central Committee in August 1956, Chairman Mikhailov 
expressed his hope that it would “help educate Soviet librarians on the technological and 
organizational achievements in library science abroad while also propagating the achievements 
of the USSR in library science.”791  
Using funds and equipment supplied by UNESCO, a team of librarians and editors under 
the leadership of Rudomino at VBGIL worked on a two-month deadline to put together the 
Russian translation of the Bulletin and send it out to libraries across the USSR.792 With a 
circulation of over 3,000 in its first decade, the Bulletin drew more than 2,000 Soviet subscribers 
in addition to the several hundred copies handed out free of charge to Soviet depository 
libraries.793 Chevalier reported in 1957 that “large national libraries” also used the journal as a 
reading assignment in library-science courses. Overall, Chevalier recalled seeing the Bulletin in 
“all the libraries” he visited in Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev, describing it as “well distributed” and 
“highly appreciated” in the Soviet Union. “But apart from praise, two critical observations were 
voiced,” he cautioned. These misgivings concerned the absence of Soviet statistics and a 
                                                     
790 “Novye metody i tekhnika rasprostraneniia nauchnykh znanii,” Biulleten’ IuNESKO dlia bibliotek 6, no. 1 
(January 1957): 5–7; “Fotokopiroval’naia sluzhba iaponskoi natsional’noi parlamentskoi biblioteki,” Biulleten’ 
IuNESKO dlia bibliotek 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 8–9; “Mikrofil’mirovana krupnaia shotlandskaia gazeta,” Biulleten’ 
IuNESKO dlia bibliotek 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 9; and “Brazil’skii seminar po voprosam knigoobmena,” Biulleten’ 
IuNESKO dlia bibliotek 6, no. 1 (January 1957): 20. 
 
791 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, l. 110. 
 
792 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 215; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 42. 
 
793 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 161-64. 
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reference to the people’s democracies as “satellite states” of the USSR in a recent article.794 In 
1958, the Soviet UNESCO Commission also instructed Rudomino to protest stories on Taiwan, 
threatening to cease publication if UNESCO spotlighted the country again. The commission 
never followed through on this ultimatum.795 In her memoirs, Rudomino, the founder and long-
time director of VGBIL after whom the library is now named, recalls that the introduction of 
UNESCO work into her life represented a transformative moment and a central part of her 
experience of the “Thaw” as well as the post-Stalin era generally.796  
UNESCO-printed publications reached far beyond narrow groups of Soviet professionals 
in fields under the international organization’s mandate. The UNESCO Courier, a popular 
magazine intended to foster international cooperation through the publicizing of UNESCO 
activities as well as the latest world news in the spheres of education, science, and culture, found 
its way to the far reaches of the communist world and into the hands of Soviet students, workers, 
pensioners, and underground artists. Cherished by its readers behind the Iron Curtain, the 
magazine involved Soviet citizens in an international reading public shaped by the Western 
internationalist ethos at the core of UNESCO. 
The background of the founding editor of The Courier, the American journalist Sandy 
Koffler, speaks to the overarching Western internationalist framework of the project as well as 
the tension within the publication between Western liberal-democratic ideals and its aspirations 
to operate as a universal, neutral medium for underscoring international cooperation as the root 
                                                     
794 UNESCO sent an amendment to this article. But Chevalier warned that the secretariat “should be more careful 
and avoid all stereotyping formulations, which could be evaluated as alien to the competence of UNESCO.” GARF, 
f. 9519, op. 1, d. 2, l. 109. 
 
795 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 12, l. 42. 
 
796 In the late 1960s, she also became the vice president of the International Federation of Library Associations 
(IFLA), which was essentially an appendage of UNESCO. M. I. Rudomino and A. V. Rudomino, Knigi moei sud'by: 
Vospominaniia XX veka (Moskva: Progress-Pleiada, 2005), 323–28. 
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of progress and peace. According to a 1959 profile of the editor composed by a Soviet UNESCO 
employee, Koffler had worked in the Psychological Warfare Division of the US military during 
the Second World War. In this division, he supervised the Spanish service of Voice of America 
and then edited the newspaper released by American occupation authorities in Italy before 
joining UNESCO in 1947. “His political beliefs are left/liberal,” the Soviet UNESCO bureaucrat 
assessed. “He condemns McCarthyism, the persecution of blacks, and the ‘firm’ policy of the 
State Department. . . . He considers himself a friend of the Soviet Union.”797   
First published in 1948 in newspaper format as a platform for publicizing the UNESCO 
program, The Courier had become by the mid-1950s a glossy magazine covering a hodgepodge 
of stories on education, science, culture, or any topic tangentially related to world peace. 
Packaged with a bright and colorful cover (see figure 3) and replete with black-and-white or 
sometimes color pictures clearly intended to catch the eye, the graphic design and accessible 
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Figure 3. Covers of The UNESCO Courier. Top Row: English and Russian translations of the 
January 1957 issue of The UNESCO Courier. This issue was the first to be published in the 
Soviet Union. Middle Row: A November 1960 Courier issue in English and Russian. Notice that 
a slight alteration is made between the English issue title, “A New Magna Carta for Children,” 
and the Russian issue title, “Declaration of the Rights of the Child,” to make it more accessible 
in the USSR. UNESCO approved of such alterations in wording for translation purposes if these 
corrections did not change the content. Bottom Row: The August-September 1966 double issue 
of The Courier celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the international organization in English 
and Russian. Sources: UNESDOC for English-language versions; the Russian State Library (in 
which I examined the full copies of the Russian translation of the magazine) and Ozon.ru for the 
Russian-language versions.  
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writing of The Courier resembled the appealing layout of the US State Department’s Amerika or 
the American magazine Life but with a global perspective and scope in accordance with the 
magazine’s motto, “a window open on the world,” which appeared on the upper-right corner of 
the cover.798  
Published in seven languages in addition to the Russian version, The Courier stood out 
for the eclecticism of its areas of focus. But the mishmash of themes investigated on the pages of 
the magazine all spoke to the broader internationalist purpose of UNESCO to create enlightened 
and culturally sensitive citizens of an international community. To fulfill this mission, The 
Courier published articles falling into three broad categories: 1) news features designed to stoke 
civic engagement on an international scale by exploring global problems and the actions taken by 
UNESCO or other organizations to solve these problems; 2) “trend stories” describing new 
directions in education, the arts, or the sciences and oriented toward piquing the interest of the 
“common man” in these supposedly universal realms of human endeavor; and 3) profiles 
intended to familiarize readers with other cultures by highlighting how a sphere of human 
activity (writing, music, painting, etc.) had benefited from the contribution of one or more 
cultures. Among many other topics, monthly issues explored the global production of books; the 
“food we eat” (which had articles on cultural differences in food etiquette, world hunger, airline 
cuisine, recipes from different countries, etc.); the indigenous art of Oceania, Africa, and pre-
Columbian America; amateur athletics; blind sculptors; “women in the new Asia”; safety tips for 
                                                     
798 As the rest of this chapter will show, The Courier played a role in providing uncensored information about the 
outside world to Soviet readers in a way similar to that of the magazine Amerika, which Soviet officials had banned 
in 1952 but began publishing again in 1956 following the Geneva Summit the previous year. Historian Walter 
Hixson describes the content and history of Amerika in his book on the American cultural offensive behind the Iron 
Curtain. Yet he does not investigate the Soviet reception of the magazine through archival sources, relying instead 
on American assessments of the magazine’s success. Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, 
and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 117–19. 
 422 
driving and other everyday activities; the “demographic crisis”; the “world’s highways”; and the 
UN-backed “world mobilization against malaria” in the early 1960s.  
Although averse to covering political events found in newspapers, the magazine also 
sometimes took on controversial questions dominating world headlines. For instance, it 
dedicated a special issue to the problem of racism in 1960 in reaction to a flurry of anti-Semitic 
crimes in Western Europe, the American Civil Rights Movement, and the Sharpeville Massacre 
in South Africa.799 The editors also reserved the last four to five pages for a “Letters-to-the-
Editor” section, brief updates on UNESCO undertakings, instructions on how to subscribe, 
advertisements of books for sale (UNESCO’s catalogues Study Abroad and Vacations Abroad; a 
historical work on The Jewish People; a study on Race Relations and Mental Health, etc.), and 
announcements of overstocked pamphlets from recent UNESCO exhibitions offered free to 
subscribers.800  
The content of The Courier therefore introduced its Soviet readers to new ways of 
thinking internationally as well as a kind of internationalist civic voluntarism that complicated 
the Soviet narrative of political action as reducible to a binary choice between progressive and 
reactionary forces. In September 1956, the Soviet UNESCO Commission asked the Central 
Committee for permission to publish The Courier in Russian for a Soviet audience.801 After the 
Central Committee approved the proposal and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation signed a two-year 
                                                     
799 See the covers and articles of issues two, four, five, and nine from 1957; issue six from 1959; issues four and 
eleven from 1960; issue four from 1961; issue one from 1964; and issue two from 1966. 
 
800 “Over 74,000 Fellowships and Scholarships Offered This Year,” The UNESCO Courier, 1957, 35, UNESDOC; 
“From the UNESCO Newsroom,” The UNESCO Courier, October 1960, 34, UNESDOC; “Just Published: 
Vacations Abroad,” The UNESCO Courier, 1961, 35, UNESDOC; and “Two New UNESCO Books on Race,” The 
UNESCO Courier, 1960, 35, UNESDOC. For more information on the “Letters to the Editor” section, see the rest of 
the chapter below. 
 
801 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 190-91. 
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contract, the Soviet Foreign Literature Publishing House (IIL, renamed “Mir” in the 1960s) got 
to work preparing the first edition for that January, hiring as editor-in-chief of the Russian 
version V. N. Machavariani, a translator and editor at IIL who had spent the late 1940s at the 
Soviet embassy in Washington, D. C. as head of press operations.802 IIL also organized a ten-
person team to assemble articles by Soviet authors to submit to the magazine.803 Despite initial 
problems finding the appropriate intaglio printing press in Moscow and a window of only four 
weeks between receipt of the final English version and the printing deadline, the editorship 
managed to regularly release The Courier to the Soviet public from 1957 through the 1980s.804 In 
an indication of the lack of awareness of the existence of UNESCO in the USSR, the Russian 
editors placed a short preface at the beginning of the third issue in March 1957 for those who 
bought The Courier but had no idea what the acronym in the title of the magazine meant. “A 
number of readers of the Russian edition of The UNESCO Courier,” the editors noted, “have 
                                                     
802 For reference to Machavariani’s time in the US, see N. V. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata: Zapiski, 1938-
1947 (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989), 386. 
 
803 GARF, f. 9614, op. 1, d. 172, l. 61. 
 
804 The technical problems of publishing the Russian version derived from the expensive production of the original 
Courier, which the Soviet editorship had to duplicate. For the English, French, and Spanish editions, UNESCO used 
the publishing house of the company Georges Lang in Paris. This company put out popular, flashy magazines of 
higher quality than those produced in the USSR, including Marie Claire, the weekly newspaper Paris Match, as 
well as the French circulations of Time Magazine and Life. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 32, l. 97. Regarding the short 
timetable for publishing the Russian edition, Gjesdal, the director of the UNESCO Department of Information, in a 
letter attached to the original draft contract guaranteed the Russian editorship four weeks to work on the project. 
While he promised that most materials would be sent long before the deadline, he warned that unexpected changes 
necessitated this quick turnaround. “Practice has shown that last-minute changes of captions, titles, and sometimes 
of photographs must be made; sometimes this can only be made on the ‘vandyke,’” Gjesdal wrote. “It is therefore 
difficult for the secretariat to bind itself contractually to giving you what will be absolutely the complete and final 
text before the ‘vandyke’ stage has been reached which is normally not latern [sic] than four weeks before the 
publication date.” Because of this demand for a quick turnaround, there continued to be “systematic breakdowns” in 
the process as late as 1965.  GARF, f. 9614, op. 1, d. 168, l. 47; GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 228-29; and Tor 
Gjesdal, “GC/ND/MC/53,” November 26, 1956, 1, AG 8: Box 1939, X07.21(470)NC/P, UNESCO Archives. 
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asked us to describe the work of UNESCO. We respond to this request of our readers on the next 
page.”805    
For the Soviet UNESCO Commission, launching the Russian Courier justified their 
argument that the magazine should incorporate more Soviet material into the magazine, which 
the USSR saw as a unique channel for spreading its ideology due to its large and diverse global 
readership.806 Writing in 1965, V. I. Goliachkov, a Soviet journalist who that year became the 
first citizen from the communist bloc to join the main Courier editorship in Paris, estimated that 
the 375,000 copies of The Courier sold internationally passed through the hands of “close to one 
and a half million people.” To substantiate this claim, Goliachkov pointed out that copies of the 
monthly in libraries went home with multiple readers. “This is a huge readership,” Goliachkov 
declared, “and its significance grows even more given that the magazine is distributed in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The publication is popular among student youth, the 
intelligentsia, and the elderly.” But the push to get more Soviet articles in the magazine ran into 
familiar challenges from the start. Like other offices in the UNESCO bureaucracy, the editorship 
of The Courier had established a way of doing business molded by its Western composition. 
After his arrival in 1965, Goliachkov explained to Moscow why contributing authors mostly 
came from “the European and American continents.” The Soviet employee detected that “Koffler 
has created a specific author ‘aktiv’ (of about fifteen to twenty people) formed over many years 
of work in the editorship. . . . These authors appear on the pages of the magazine from year to 
year.” Thus, “what happened before the appearance of a Soviet [citizen] in the editorship directly 
                                                     
805 “Chto takoe IuNESKO?,” Kur’er IuNESKO, March 1957, 33–34. 
 
806 Machavariani repeatedly urged the Soviet UNESCO Commission to propose an increase in the circulation of The 
Courier “to consolidate the results of negotiations at UNESCO” by showing “a spirit of cooperation.” Quoted from 
one of these pleas from 1960: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 182. 
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depended on the ‘mood’ of the editor-in-chief and the efforts of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
to put pressure on him.”807 This author “collective,” the Soviet permanent delegate elaborated in 
his annual report for 1964, had in the past “put forward seemingly ‘neutral’ popular science 
articles and only raised any ‘real’ problems from the position of the Western countries.”808  
Beginning in 1957, Soviet officials therefore launched an unrelenting drive to include 
Soviet articles in The Courier and convince the editorship to tackle “actual” problems that would 
cast the USSR in a favorable light. Aiming to get at least two Soviet articles into each issue, the 
Soviet UNESCO Delegation presented to UNESCO in 1957 fourteen possible topics for articles 
by Soviet authors (Arctic exploration, the elimination of illiteracy in Soviet Central Asia, the 
reading habits of Soviet citizens, Soviet archeology, a photomontage of a day in the life of a 
Soviet student, etc.).809 At first, this strategy of pressuring the editorship paid off. In 1958, eleven 
Soviet articles appeared in The Courier, informing the magazine’s readers of aspects of Soviet 
society as varied as nature reserves in the USSR, the Leningrad School for Choreography, Soviet 
book publishing, and the one-hundredth anniversary of the Russian stamp.810 If one overlooks 
the nationalities of authors from the secretariat, this number made the USSR the leader in 
accepted articles among UNESCO member states for that year.811 In December 1959, 
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808 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 29, l. 266. 
 
809 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 11-12. 
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Machavariani also persuaded Koffler to throw out plans for the January 1960 issue and dedicate 
it to the life and work of Russian writer A. P. Chekhov.812   
Yet The Courier editorship continued to frequently reject Soviet submissions even as it 
welcomed Soviet input, citing the polemical tenor of these pieces and their uncritical flouting of 
the successes of the USSR. In conversations with Machavariani and the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation, Koffler recommended that Soviet contributors to the magazine compose work “more 
interesting, engaging, and better done journalistically,” keeping “in mind foreign readers” instead 
of filling pages with “a dry recitation of different vague facts” while “piling on excessively 
voluminous numbers” too “serious” for the noncommunist layman. “It would be easier for 
[Koffler] to promote an article if it does not have an openly propagandistic nature and talks not 
only of what has been done, but also how it was done, what were the difficulties, what problems 
have yet to be solved,” Machavariani paraphrased Koffler’s suggestions to him. “Such material 
would be more effective propaganda than simple self-congratulation.” Soviet writers, Koffler 
suggested, should “let readers draw their own conclusions.”813 In meetings with Koffler, an 
official from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation retorted that this advice revealed the implicit 
Western bias of the international organization: “UNESCO employees disdain the word 
‘propaganda,’ they prefer to speak of how they stand outside politics, are impartial and objective 
                                                     
812 While pleased that The Courier had the portrait of a famous Russian writer on its cover, the commission, which 
wanted only Soviet Chekhov experts to write for the issue, made known its displeasure that foreign authors would 
also contribute. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 169-71; 222-23; 517-18; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 182. For 
the actual issue, see issue one for 1960 in UNESDOC. 
 
813 Underlined passages in original text. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 416; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 180. 
Unlike non-Soviet authors who investigated events in regions outside their native land, Soviet journalists insisted on 
writing about their own society. When the Soviet UNESCO Delegation or Machavariani did supply articles about an 
international question, they tended to contain comments that would offend other members of the UNESCO 
community. For example, an employee involved in the production of The Courier refused to consider one of the rare 
Soviet articles with an international outlook because it attacked the ILO. The UNESCO bureaucrat warned a 
member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation that this article would start a “‘little war’” between the two UN 
specialized agencies. GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 518. 
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employees. But all this . . . is only words, UNESCO, in reality, openly conducts a specific policy 
and propaganda.”814 Koffler also ridiculed the photos attached to Soviet articles as “lifeless,” 
“uninteresting,” “staged,” “inartistic,” and “unimaginative.” In their internal correspondence, 
Soviet officials admitted that their articles lacked the aesthetic appeal of the materials originating 
in the West. Worryingly, this sorry state of Soviet printing took on “a political significance,” 
Machavariani wrote to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in 1960. “The level of our technology,” 
he wrote, “is judged not only by our achievements in space exploration, but also by other 
indicators,” including the shoddiness of the country’s publications sent abroad. “The reasons for 
the poor quality of the inserts are the poor quality of colors, paper, equipment, and typeface, as 
well as insufficient training of personnel.”815 
Koffler also faced mounting pressure, from both inside UNESCO and from Western 
member states, either to stop publishing Soviet pieces altogether or reduce their frequency 
following the surge in Soviet pieces in The Courier in 1957 and 1958. According to Soviet 
UNESCO envoys, Gjesdal, as head of the UNESCO Department of Information, “repeatedly” 
reproached Koffler in 1959 for “taking a liberal attitude toward the Soviet Union,” demanding 
that “The Courier cease printing Soviet materials at the same levels as 1957-1958.”816 This 
reprimand grew out of a flood of complaints from the capitalist West about Soviet dominance of 
the pages of The Courier. While the West Germans disparaged an article on an exhibition in 
Moscow of Czech glass for its sugarcoating of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, American 
officials chastised Koffler for accepting a Soviet biography of the novelist L. N. Tolstoi, 
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815 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 14, l. 180; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 12, l. 138.  
 
816 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 403. 
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labelling the editor a “‘Leftist’” and a “‘Red American.’” One reader from the US declared in a 
letter to Koffler that he would unsubscribe from The Courier because it afforded too much space 
to “Soviet propaganda.”817 
Under the strain caused by unyielding attacks from both sides of the Cold War, Koffler 
came to a breaking point in 1960. In a series of meetings with Machavariani and the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation that year, the editor displayed a clear annoyance with the persistent 
criticisms directed at him by Soviet officials and, at one meeting, stormed out of the room visibly 
“upset.” As Machavariani wrote after a conversation with Koffler in October of that year, “the 
situation has changed for the worse. Talk has now become quite difficult with the editor Koffler, 
who very kindly received me last year and with whom it was quite easy to agree on questions of 
interest to our editorship.”818 Koffler defended his performance at a subsequent meeting with the 
first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, begging the diplomat to understand his 
unenviable position. “‘I understand you, but understand my position. You are offering me 
materials that could produce an explosion like dynamite,’” he pleaded. “My situation is very 
delicate and difficult. One member of the [US] congress said directly that the US should leave 
UNESCO because The UNESCO Courier is involved in Soviet propaganda. I am in low standing 
with my colleagues and the American UNESCO Delegation considers me unreliable.’”819 
During this fallout in 1960 and 1961, Koffler drastically reduced the number of pages 
allotted to the USSR. To retaliate, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation sought, without success, to 
remove Koffler from the editorship. Blaming Koffler’s hostile attitude on the collapse of talks at 
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the May 1960 Paris Summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower after the shooting down of 
Gary Powers’s U-2 spy plane over the USSR, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation regretted that the 
editorship had also postponed the release of a special issue entirely devoted to the Soviet Union 
even though it had reached the final stages of planning.820 Over the next two years, however, the 
number of Soviet entries went up again. In November 1963, the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
and Delegation celebrated the decision of the editorship in Paris to put theater director K. S. 
Stanislavskii on the cover.821 They also rejoiced when the whole November 1963 issue covered 
the 1963 Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty and half of the June 1964 installment of the magazine 
told the story of Ukrainian poet T. H. Shevchenko. From 1965 to 1967, The Courier highlighted 
other subjects endorsed by the USSR (apartheid, outer space, teaching popular science, etc.).822 
Nevertheless, Machavariani and the Soviet UNESCO Delegation persisted in their badgering of 
the editorship for its “bourgeois cultural-theoretical traditions.”823 
Yet Soviet officials worried more about what Koffler and his coworkers put in The 
Courier than what they left out. Because the Russian editorship had to faithfully reproduce and 
distribute the magazine “as widely as possible” in accordance with the contract, the most heated 
clashes between Soviet representatives and the editorship in Paris concerned the magazine’s 
treatment of topics anathema to official Soviet ideology. In violation of the contract, 
Machavariani and his contingent in Moscow sporadically made changes to the Russian version 
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821 See the cover and content of issue ten from 1963. For Soviet discussions of this issue, see GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, 
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822 See issues six and eleven from 1964, issue two from 1965, issue five from 1966, and issue three from 1967 in 
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823 Ibid., ll. 266; 269; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 25, l. 100. See also the cover and content of issues six and eleven 
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of the magazine, replacing an article or advertisement with the work of a Soviet author or an 
announcement about a Soviet event. In the late 1950s, Koffler, likely hoping to preserve good 
relations with the Soviet editors, let these revisions slide. When the Soviet iteration of the 
magazine substituted an article on Islam by Marshall Hodgson with a Soviet overview of the 
Khorezm Oasis in Uzbekistan in February 1958, Director-General Evans and his deputy 
advocated for making a “strong protest” to the Soviet UNESCO Delegation and threatened to 
stop financing the Russian version if such changes happened again.824 In contrast, Koffler, 
according to the attaché of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, “personally regretted that there was 
an attempt to exaggerate” the action and noted that the Russian editorship had on other occasions 
made modifications with his “verbal agreement.”825 But in the aftermath of the fallout between 
Koffler and his Soviet counterparts over Soviet contributions to The Courier in the early 1960s, 
the editorship in Paris began to enforce strict Soviet adherence to the contract. In an hour-long 
argument between Koffler and the first secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation over an 
article on a series of FAO reports on world hunger slated for publication in 1962, the American 
editor, who came across as “annoyed,” disputed the first secretary’s characterization of the FAO 
findings as “Malthusian” and “misanthropic,” ruling out the possibility of “withdrawing or 
revising the article” in the Russian replica and reminding the first secretary that “The Courier in 
all languages must be identical.”826 In such cases when Koffler ignored Soviet complaints, the 
Russian editorship took the risk of removing some of the most sensitive parts of the original. 
“These protests,” Soviet Permanent Delegate Pavlov fretted in 1963, “have had no influence on 
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February 1958, 18–20, UNESDOC; and Sergei Tolstoi, “Taina peskov Khorezma,” Kur’er IuNESKO, February 
1958, 16–21. 
 
825 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 1, l. 153. 
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the content of foreign publications of the magazine and we are forced to make unilateral 
decisions to change the content of the Russian edition. All this leads to a situation fraught with 
complications.”827  
Tensions over Soviet censorship came to a head in the fall of 1963 when Koffler 
approved for the November issue an exposé of UNESCO’s educational assistance to the Congo 
(discussed in the next chapter) by UNESCO employee Garry Fullerton. In a conversation with 
the editor-in-chief, the second secretary of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation stated that his 
government opposed the “one-sided” depiction of the Congolese conflict in the article. In 
response, Koffler accused the USSR of “‘doing everything in its power to ruin The UNESCO 
Courier,’” remarking that the Soviet Union incorrectly assumed he worked for the US even 
though he had served UNESCO for seventeen years. “If the Russian editorship did not put the 
Fullerton article in the November issue of The UNESCO Courier,” the second secretary recorded 
Koffler advising, “then the Soviet side for a second time will have flagrantly violated the 
contract concluded with the UNESCO Secretariat concerning the identical publication of The 
UNESCO Courier in all languages.”828 Although the Russian editorship only cut out some 
controversial passages, Director-General Maheu unsuccessfully attempted to put on the agenda 
of the next session of the UNESCO Executive Board this and other instances of Soviet 
bowdlerization of the magazine.829  
                                                     
827 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 24, l. 396. 
 
828 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 28, ll. 215-18; Garry Fullerton, “UNESCO in the Congo,” The UNESCO Courier, 
November 1963, 4–11, UNESDOC; and Garri Fullerton, “Deiatel’nost’ IuNESKO v Kongo,” The UNESCO 
Courier, November 1963, 4–11. 
 
829 With relief, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation reported that the issue was dropped from the agenda of the executive 
board “after energetic intervention by the delegation in consultation with the Center.” GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 26, l. 
190. 
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Feuds over the content of The Courier flared up intermittently for the rest of the decade. 
In a 1965 letter to “Match” (a nickname given to Machavariani by Koffler), for example, the 
American editor ruled out the elimination, at the request of the USSR, of an article written by the 
chairman of the coordinating committee of UNESCO’s international voluntary work camps that 
contained references to the American Peace Corps.830 Viewing the Peace Corps as an adversary 
in the battle for the “weakly-developed” countries and fearful of the prospect of UNESCO 
setting up its own “international peace corps” inspired by the American program, the Russian 
editorship translated the essay, but deleted all mentions of the Peace Corps, thereby drawing a 
written complaint from the article’s author.831  
Despite these scattered omissions, The UNESCO Courier, as “a window open on the 
world,” gave its Soviet readers a unique look at how the noncommunist world sought to improve 
global welfare through international collective action. Archival sources paint a picture of a 
sizeable and enthusiastic readership of The Courier in the USSR. Initially, the Russian Courier, 
which cost two rubles and fifty kopecks, had a circulation of 20,000 in the Soviet Union. Nine 
months after its debut, the editorship raised its output by 3,000 and, by 1962, distributed 25,000 
copies. While the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation intermittently petitioned the 
Central Committee for an increase of the magazine’s dissemination to 50,000 beginning in 1958, 
its level stayed at 25,000 through the late 1960s.832 On the one hand, the production of the 
Russian translation fell far behind the 50,000 English-language printings of the magazine and 
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paled to the bestselling French translation, which had a circulation of 150,000 in the early 1960s. 
On the other hand, the number of Russian copies of The Courier surpassed the 10,000 copies put 
out in German, Arabic, and Japanese.833 
 Observers from the UNESCO Secretariat who traveled to the Soviet Union testified to 
the popularity of the magazine. During his tour of the country in the summer of 1957, Chevalier 
asked the attendants at a kiosk in Minsk if they had heard of The Courier. “They told me that 
they received five copies, which were immediately sold out,” Chevalier recalled.834 By 1959, The 
Courier had drawn such a large following that its readers grumbled over the scarcity of the 
magazine. As Machavariani imparted to his Soviet superiors, “UNESCO received a letter from 
the Soviet Union with a complaint about the impossibility of subscribing to or obtaining it in 
kiosks. UNESCO workers who visited the USSR saw how The Courier, in one day, was bought 
up in the kiosks and then resold in secondhand bookstores.” Thus, the Soviet editor asserted, “the 
demand for the periodical in the USSR exceeds by far its circulation (23,000).”835  
The magazine ended up in the hands of citizens with no opportunity to travel abroad. In 
1958, for example, E. S. Kuznetsov, a future activist in the dissident movement, enlisted in the 
army in the hope of getting “to see some other country” and, as he asserted in retrospect, “maybe 
manage to flee” the Soviet Union. But when his superior officers declined to station him outside 
the USSR because of his unreliable record, Kuznetsov spent his time at a military base in the 
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Saratov province reading The Courier, which he had not “heard of” beforehand, along with the 
Soviet journal Inostrannaia literatura. While not a direct cause of his dissent, the UNESCO 
magazine and Inostrannaia literatura gave Kuznetsov an idea of what was “really going on in 
the West” and therefore extended to him new ideas contradicting the official line of the Soviet 
state. After he received his discharge papers in 1960, Kuznetsov participated in the famous 
unauthorized readings of poetry on Mayakovskii square in Moscow and later played an active 
role in the underground organization that unsuccessfully plotted to assassinate Khrushchev in the 
early 1960s.836      
For other Soviet citizens, The Courier did more than simply enlighten passive readers on 
global issues, foreign ways of life, and collective international movements revolving around the 
UN. Through its “Letters-to-the-Editor” section, the magazine also empowered Soviet readers to 
take part in global conversations unlike any other in which they had participated. Thanks to its 
broad internationalist framework, The Courier remade Soviet readers into active participants in 
an international reading public comprising curious citizens representing a diversity of cultural 
outlooks and worldviews.  
It did so by exploiting on an international scale the simultaneous experience of events 
through print that had enabled the emergence of national consciousness. Historian Benedict 
Anderson describes how the development of nationalism depended on this cognizance of 
“simultaneity,” or a world in which “an American,” who “will never meet or even know the 
names” of his fellow citizens, will nevertheless have “complete confidence in their steady, 
                                                     
836 Quoted from an interview he gave in 1995 to L. V. Polikovskaia, who, following the dissolution of the USSR and 
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anonymous, simultaneous activity.” The advent of nationalism as a category of identity also 
relied on the formation of a mass-produced “print-capitalism,” and the subsequent 
homogenization of a variety of regional vernaculars into “print-languages.” For Anderson, the 
nation came into existence when isolated populations speaking a range of vernaculars “became 
capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became 
aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language field, 
and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged.”837  
The Courier built on this already established consciousness of worldwide simultaneity to 
inculcate its readers with an internationalist identity, transcending the exclusivity of nationalism 
by making language differences irrelevant through multilingual translation. Because of 
UNESCO’s insistence that The Courier stay unaltered in translation, the magazine forged an 
imaginary international community inspired by Western internationalism and based on a 
discourse surrounding global topics and problems. By accepting letters written by citizens in 
their many native languages, and then publishing them in a magazine translated back into those 
languages, The Courier created a common readership spanning the world and conversing 
through the same medium. This readership could wrestle with the same subjects in the same 
articles and contribute opinions that would, in turn, address a global audience comprehending the 
letter writers’ references. The magazine therefore forged an international reading public in which 
citizens living in cities as varied as New York, Cairo, Paris, Tokyo, or Moscow thought about 
                                                     
837 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso Books, 2006), 26-44. As mentioned in the introduction, Glenda Sluga draws on Anderson’s work to suggest 
that a similar phenomenon occurred among Western internationalists, but she does not provide analysis on a specific 
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global issues with an awareness of their connection with an international community 
transcending narrow national interests.  
In their letters to The Courier, Soviet nationals presented themselves as concerned 
citizens of this international community. Their desire to communicate with foreign readers in 
order to realize world peace resembled the ways in which some of their fellow citizens used 
letter writing to Soviet “thick” literary journals to practice citizenship domestically during the 
Thaw.838 Many Courier readers made clear that they coveted the periodical as a means of 
reaching beyond Soviet borders. Victor Kassianenko, a “village schoolmaster” in Nagoriani, 
Moldova, bought a copy of The Courier during a visit to Kishinev because he had “been 
attracted by its striking appearance.” According to his letter, published in the September 1958 
issue, the schoolmaster “found its contents to be just as interesting and attractive as its cover and 
its presentation.” He envisioned using the magazine as a global classifieds section to forge 
contacts abroad for the sake of international understanding and peace: “We are very keen,” he 
wrote, “to contact schools in other lands, to exchange knowledge and ideas with them, to get to 
know our foreign colleagues really well and to develop mutual confidence, hoping that wisdom 
throughout the world will bar the road to collective suicide.”839  
The Courier also served as a tool for Ibrahim S. Aitov, an amateur horticulturalist and 
pensioner from Rostov-on-Don, to imagine himself as part of a global network of citizens 
passionate about spreading scientific knowledge as a means of realizing peace. “In your 
                                                     
838 In his analysis of readers’ responses to the major novels published in the Soviet journal Novyi mir during the 
Thaw, Kozlov shows how Soviet citizens demonstrated citizenship through letter writing to the editors of the 
journal. He does so by drawing on Sheila Fitzpatrick’s study of letter writing under Stalin in which she differentiates 
between “supplicants” and “citizens.” See Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants 
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839 For this segment, I spell the names of the letter writers as they are in the letters. Victor Kassianenko, “Letters to 
the Editor,” The UNESCO Courier, September 1958, 33, UNESDOC. 
 437 
magazine,” Aitov began a letter published in the June 1959 edition, “I found a signpost showing 
me how an ordinary person can help to spread fundamental knowledge and also become an 
intermediary for the exchange of information on successful applications of science.” Getting an 
“idea from a story you published about someone who excavated some animal fossils and decided 
to share these precious relics among museums in several countries,” he wanted likewise to 
acquaint readers with the research he had conducted on his “small plot” in the Don Region 
cultivating grape vines capable of surviving freezing temperatures. Aitov assured the editors that 
he had “three of these vines and have already had grapes from them.” He had also traded his 
specimens with a Chinese professor for “Chinese cherry,” a “Chinese lemon tree,” and “wild 
vines of the Amur region which are especially resistant to frost.” To expand on his research, he 
wanted the magazine to help him shift this exchange westward. “Now,” Aitov proclaimed, “I 
would like to share my modest stocks with some amateur horticulturists in Western countries and 
thus, in some small way, perhaps contribute to the maintenance of peace in the world.” He 
concluded that this exchange should begin in the Nordic countries and felt that “perhaps through 
your magazine I could make contact with these countries.”840      
Like Aitov, other Soviet letter writers to The Courier wanted to both share knowledge 
originating in the Soviet Union and learn of the efforts of other countries on subjects of interest. 
After reading “with great interest” an article in the magazine about the Canadian town of 
Aklavik in the Arctic Circle, Sh. Akbulatov from Krasnoyarsk wrote a letter published in the 
July-August 1961 issue that drew attention to the Soviet experience of improving life in cold 
climes through the building of habitable dwellings in the Siberian town of Norilsk.841 Similarly, 
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the self-described “regular reader, ”A. Chetverikov from the village of Gory, wrote in a letter 
published in November 1960 that he was “especially interested” in the magazine’s articles “that 
deal with health services,” including “issues that dealt with the fight being waged to preserve 
animal and vegetable life, the purification of the atmosphere and achievements in the field of 
medicine.” Emphasizing that the “preservation of health” remained an important topic “in our 
day, when all of mankind is making a tremendous effort for peace and progress,” Chetverikov 
stressed that he “should like to see The UNESCO Courier print the opinions of authoritative 
scientists on yoga,” which he characterized as “one of the miracles of human invention” and “an 
unusual science that preserves health and lengthens life, a science based on thousands of years’ 
experience.” But “unfortunately,” he continued in what could be interpreted as a swipe at Soviet 
policy, “the articles that I have been able to get hold of express different opinions on the 
subject.”842  
An unpublished 1963 letter from V. Pimenov, a resident of Dnepropetrovsk, suggests that 
Soviet citizens knew when the Russian editorship censored the magazine and sought to 
circumvent Soviet censorship by contacting the editorship in Paris directly. Reacting to a debate 
among UNESCO readers that took place across multiple issues of The Courier about the 
universal language Esperanto, Pimenov articulated to the UNESCO editorship his 
disappointment that one letter, in which the General-Secretary of the Universal Esperanto 
Association Ivo Lapenna defended Esperanto, had appeared in all editions of an issue of The 
Courier except the Russian translation.843 “Since the periodical ‘K. Iu.’ [Kur’er IuNESKO 
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843 In line with its internationalist ambition of fostering a common identity transcending the nation state, UNESCO 
had supported since its creation an examination of the feasibility of the universal language as a viable antidote to 
cultural isolationism. At the 1954 session of the general conference, the international organization adopted a 
resolution praising “the results attained by Esperanto in the field of international intellectual relations and the 
rapprochement of the peoples of the world” as consistent with “the aims and ideals of UNESCO.” In light of this 
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abbreviated] publishes identical content in each of its editions,” Pimenov reasoned, “I anxiously 
awaited the appearance here in the Russian version of the sixth issue of ‘K. Iu.’ Unfortunately, 
Dr. Lapenna’s article was not in it.” Because he “(as well as all readers of the [Russian] edition), 
did not have the chance to read the response of Dr. Lapenna,” Pimenov asked the editorship in 
Paris to send him the French edition of the issue.844 
One Soviet Courier reader looked to the magazine as a venue to get research published 
outside the strictures of the Soviet press. In the spring of 1959, the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
intercepted a letter to Koffler from a Muscovite who described himself as “an ordinary citizen of 
the USSR,” a mechanical engineer, and “a nonparty member” who did “not run or preside over 
anything.” The Muscovite enclosed an article for publication that discussed the development of 
agricultural techniques capable of feeding large populations. After complaining that 
Komsomolskaia pravda had published a “corrupted” version of his article, he claimed that his 
scholarship and a Courier article on the importance of water in sustaining human life held 
remarkable similarities. Basing this affinity on an internationalist supposition that he and the 
UNESCO community both “proceed from the moral worldview of the future of humanity,” he 
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underscored the need to secure the “life and happiness” not only of men, but also of nature, 
aligning his views with the push for nature conservation prevalent in UNESCO publications.845  
As curators of a “window open on the world,” the editors of The Courier received many 
other Soviet requests for knowledge about other cultures and places. For A. Kilunov, a “constant 
reader” from Sverdlovsk, the publication had value “from the point of view of humanism” 
because it “tells its readers about the life of other peoples, the problems which face them, about 
little-known civilizations and the latest achievements in science and technology.” By giving this 
“fresh knowledge,” Kilunov clarified that The Courier “sometimes helps me to see things with 
new eyes.” He commended its support of “ideals of peace, humanism and friendship among 
peoples,” while also urging the editors to “increase the size of the magazine” and “introduce a 
regular page of humour, to pay more attention to the everyday life and cultures of peoples and 
their traditions.” In the same issue, a “group of students” who identified as “regular readers” 
from Moldova professed their wish that The Courier give “a detailed description of the Sorbonne 
University in Paris,” specifically “its sections for the humanities, the university library, and the 
assembly hall.” 846 V. S. Marin, a Muscovite who cast himself in a letter in the March 1959 issue 
as “a subscriber to your excellent magazine since January 1957 when it first appeared in 
Russian,” requested a focus less on the past and more on the “world of tomorrow,” as well as 
“special issues” covering topics as varied as cinema, jazz, painting, cybernetics, and “current 
trends in philosophical, political and religious thinking.”847 The theme of the striking and 
aesthetically pleasing appearance of The Courier surfaced in many of the letters. For example, in 
                                                     
845 GARF, f. 9519, op. 1, d. 8, ll.14-15. 
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847 V. S. Marin, “Letters to the Editor,” The UNESCO Courier, March 1959, 34, UNESDOC. 
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a letter published in November 1957, Askold Kourkine, a “young reader” from Krasnoyarsk who 
found the articles “extremely interesting” and liked “the appearance of the magazine,” petitioned 
the editors to produce “direct translations into Russian of the classical works of the Orient and 
Asian countries” because “the Russian reader who does not know French or English has no 
chance of getting to know these masterpieces of world literature.”848 In asking for the inclusion 
of translations of world literature in the magazine, Kourkine displayed his view of the 
publication as a vehicle for learning about the common heritage of humanity.  
Perhaps because they perceived The Courier as one of the few unique publications 
available in the Soviet Union focusing on events around the world, Soviet citizens often 
demanded a dramatic expansion of the Courier “window” and the role it played in international 
affairs. Writing that, for him, “the day the current issue of The UNESCO Courier arrives is a 
holiday,” Titas Milashius from Minsk viewed “The Courier as the encyclopaedic [sic] chronicle 
of the cultural and scientific life of our planet.” However, he maintained in his 1964 letter that 
because “the window open on the world is small,” the publication “should long since have been 
enlarged and polished up” so that it could “react immediately” to news of rocketry in the USA 
and the USSR, the Olympic Games, and other current events. The editors inserted a short 
response under his letter: “please, please, please, we have only thirty-two pages a month and we 
are not a news magazine.”849 In an instance of concrete, albeit brief, dialogue between citizens of 
the West and the USSR, the British citizen Charlotte Chalmers also responded to Milashius’s 
letter six months later.850  
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Another Soviet letter writer, Muscovite David Eisenberg, viewed the magazine as an 
avenue for lobbying the UN to help unite the world under common policies and practices. In a 
June 1961 letter, Eisenberg expressed the conviction that the “foolish and harmful habits such as 
smoking, drinking of alcohol, and addiction to drugs are prevalent in all countries and show no 
signs of abating and are causing great injury to mankind.” Because national policies (such as “the 
prohibition fiasco in the USA”) had failed, he asserted that “it seems high time to give serious 
thought to raising the question on a world scale through the United Nations,” proposing further 
that “the smoking hero,” who made the noxious habit attractive on film, could “only be forced 
off the cinema, and consequently, off the TV screen if measures are adopted on an international 
scale.” Eisenberg also called for an “international convention” against “drug-taking” due to the 
ability of smugglers to “circumvent the regulations of individual countries.” Regarding the 
periodical as an international public forum in which specialists should inform the reading public 
on the matter, he implored the editorship to devote multiple issues of the magazine to the 
topic.851 
Like any readership consisting of a plurality of perspectives, some Soviet letter writers 
objected to the aesthetic trends exhibited in The Courier. Ravil Vakhidov, from the city of 
Chimkent in the Kazakh SSR, wrote a letter published in November 1959 that criticized the 
artwork chosen to adorn the newly built UNESCO headquarters, which had been the subject of 
the November 1958 special edition of the magazine. Although his “favorite issues are those that 
deal with a special theme,” Vakhidov questioned the choice of artists commissioned to decorate 
UNESCO’s building, asking why only “abstractionists, surrealists, cubists, and not a single 
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realist” had been chosen when “the flags of eighty-one nations wave over the UNESCO 
building.” He urged the editors of “our international journal” to consider giving “publicity” to 
“artists, prominent people in literature and art, who have not severed all connexion [sic] with real 
life.” Yet he did not reject the necessity of including abstract imagery in the magazine. Rather, 
he requested that the organization and its periodical cater to his predilections and the preferences 
of others. “If UNESCO is an impartial organization,” he reasoned, “it should have considered the 
tastes and interests of all people and not only the lovers of abstract art.”852 Other Soviet readers 
expressed bafflement and even disgust with the artistic styles described in the articles of the 
magazine. For instance, M. Cherkasova, a secondary school teacher in Moscow, asked the 
editors in 1961 to “explain the point of view of those people (I know there are many of them)” 
who think of abstract painting as works of art and who “allow” them to be reproduced on the 
UNESCO building. “What benefit,” she asked, “do [Picasso’s] drawings, published in your 
journal, bring to people and what pleasure do they give?”853  
Soviet citizens criticizing or questioning the validity of the content of the magazine were 
participating in a global debate as critically engaged members of a wider readership. These 
Soviet readers evinced a skeptical and open-minded inquisitiveness about foreign concepts of art. 
Several Soviet letter writers wanted the periodical to inform them of non-Soviet opinions on the 
subject by fostering international dialogue in its pages. In the November 1959 issue, Dr. D. 
Romanov, a self-described “keen student of artistic questions” from Gorky, emphasized his 
frustration with Soviet aesthetic norms. “Since Soviet art critics deny the value of abstract art,” 
Romanov regretted that he had “no opportunity to become acquainted with the arguments of the 
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followers of this artistic trend.” He therefore requested that the editors “devote an issue of The 
UNESCO Courier to the question of abstract art, including articles by the great theorists of this 
school accompanied, of course, by photos of the best works.” In his words, he looked forward to 
the inclusion of these photos because “the illustrations in your magazine are beyond all 
praise.”854  
Rurik Povileiko, a university student studying technology in Baku, shared this view of 
the publication as an international forum that did not have to conform to the aesthetic standards 
of the Soviet state. While he “was brought up to appreciate the works of painters like Nesterov, 
Repine [sic], and Vrubel,” Povileiko presented himself as open to the foreign cultural trends that 
were given a “most convincing presentation” in the issue on the new UNESCO building. 
Stressing that his upbringing “does not mean that I think any less of paintings by Picasso or 
Matisse, and in no way do I rate Western painting as a falsification of art,” he praised an article 
in The Courier, “The Language of Abstract Art,” but maintained that “nothing that was said 
offered proof of the main thing: the aesthetic value of abstract art.” He recommended that the 
periodical use its platform to put on an art show in which the contrasting artistic modes of 
communist and noncommunist art would be appraised. “I should like one of your future issues to 
be devoted to the subject of modern art, including conclusive arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ 
abstract art,” Povileiko requested. “It would also be useful to publish reproductions by modern 
painters, the realists, including Soviet artists. These reproductions could even be judged and 
commented on by Western critics; the results would be interesting.”855 
For Soviet functionaries representing the USSR, these statements of preference from 
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readers undercut the fight to keep the content of The Courier within the parameters condoned by 
Soviet censors. In the fall of 1962, B. M. Galeev, the founder of the “Prometheus” art collective 
known for its experimental integration of light and other optic effects into musical performances, 
sent a letter to The Courier editorship in Paris in which he asked the editor to provide more 
information on Western aesthetic movements centered around fusing auditory and visual 
experiences.856 “I know your periodical as a keen and intelligent judge of real art,” the resident of 
Kazan commended. “Many issues of The Courier were a revelation for me.” Alerting the 
editorship to the plans of his art collective to organize the “first performance” in the USSR of 
Russian composer A. N. Scriabin’s Prometheus: The Poem of Fire, Galeev went on to pose a 
series of questions on the status of work on “the creation of a ‘color’ of music” in the West and 
what the Phillips Records Company had done “in this direction.” He also made known his 
interest in learning more from The Courier about the “‘visible music’ of the kind in Fantasia by 
the American filmmaker and artist Walt Disney or that by the German [Walther] Ruttmann,” 
who directed the Weimar-era avant-garde film, Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis.  “I have some 
thoughts on the aesthetic views of the new art and wanted to verify them,” Galeev explained. 
“Our group, ‘Prometheus,’ and all music devotees would be thankful if you put in your magazine 
an article on the attitude of artists of the world to the introduction of colors and forms to music as 
an independent component.”857 
In an extraordinary attempt to comply with Galeev’s wishes, the UNESCO editorship 
made an article by the French art historian Frank Popper, “Movement and Light in Today’s Art: 
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New Dimensions in Painting and Sculpture,” the cover story of its September 1963 issue.858 
Released amid the ongoing disputes between Koffler and Soviet officials over censorship of the 
Russian translation, this piece evoked a furious reaction from the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
and Delegation, both of which “took energetic measures” to keep Popper’s analysis off the pages 
of the Russian edition because of its “clearly unacceptable” subject matter and efforts to “defend 
proponents of abstract art.”859 When Koffler shrugged off these charges by erroneously claiming 
the Russian editorship had requested an article on the topic, flabbergasted members of the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation attributed this response to Koffler’s hostility toward their country. Only 
later did the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation realize that Koffler had misconstrued 
Galeev’s letter as an official supplication. “Koffler generally cannot understand that the letter of 
a Soviet reader cannot be considered a proposal by the Russian editorship of a topic,” one Soviet 
UNESCO envoy admonished in an internal memorandum.860    
Other Soviet readers of The Courier interpreted its articles as internationalist calls to 
action. In 1959, UNESCO kicked off a largescale campaign to relocate the monuments of the 
ancient Nubian region of Egypt (the temples of Abu Simbel, Philae, and others) in order to 
protect them from flooding precipitated by the construction of the Aswan Dam. During the 
campaign’s early phases, the Soviet UNESCO Commission dispatched several archeologists to 
join fact-finding expeditions for the UNESCO project.861 But because the USSR financed and 
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took on a leading role in the building of the Aswan Dam, Soviet officials gave mixed signals 
about their view of the conservation enterprise and later refused to fully commit resources to the 
moving of the monuments. “The campaign, in the final analysis,” the Soviet permanent delegate 
wrote in 1961, “had an anti-Soviet tendency since the preservation of monuments has been 
juxtaposed to the construction of the Aswan Dam, which, as is known, will be erected with the 
participation of Soviet specialists.” The campaign therefore amounted to “an attempt to use the 
organization to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the weakly-developed 
countries.”862  
To the chagrin of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the editorship of The Courier 
assembled two special issues in February 1960 and October 1961 on the Nubia campaign.863 The 
first issue published a statement by Director-General Veronese intended to rally the world’s 
population to endorse the venture.864 Consequently, the Soviet UNESCO Commission received 
letters from Soviet citizens eager to take part in the campaign. “In your journal . . . there is an 
appeal from the UNESCO Secretary-General [sic] to save the monuments of the ancient Nubia,” 
two architects employed by the Voronezh Regional Planning Office (oblproekt) told the 
commission. Curious as to what the USSR had done to assist in the moving of the monuments, 
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the architects asked if they could put their architectural expertise to use in the campaign.865 In 
another letter, two workers, Druzhinin and Malev from the “Cheliabinsk metallurgical factory” 
wrote that they had “read the call . . . to save the monuments of ancient Egyptian culture which 
might be flooded due to the construction of the Aswan Dam.” The two laborers added that they 
“hoped the Soviet government will not stand aside.” Beseeching the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission to forward their letter to the “relevant organization,” Druzhinin and Malev 
volunteered for the campaign. “We very much want to directly participate in the work of this 
expedition and, not knowing where to write, are addressing you with the request to include us in 
this work,” the two appealed to the Soviet UNESCO Commission.866 In terse responses, the 
commission declined the offers of these workers to volunteer for the campaign.867  
In May 1965, a select group of Soviet readers of The Courier aired their opinions on the 
magazine in person when the UNESCO editorship held its annual meeting that year in Moscow. 
Convened at the headquarters of the Soviet UNESCO Commission at the GKSS building on 
Kalinin Avenue (later renamed Novyi Arbat) in the Soviet capital, the 1965 meeting marked the 
first time the editorship had gathered outside of Paris.868 Apart from sessions dealing with the 
magazine’s two-year plan, circulation, and technical questions, the staff overseeing all 
translations of The Courier presided over the first Courier “readers’ conference” at the Lenin 
State Library. Attended by 120 Soviet Courier readers, the conference gave these citizens a 
chance to ask the editors questions and discuss the future of the periodical. While the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission handpicked these attendees from central Soviet institutions and ensured 
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that at least several of them raised questions echoing Soviet criticisms of the magazine, the 
UNESCO editors applauded the conference and resolved to replicate it in other countries.869 “I 
was particularly struck by the accounts given to me of the special meetings arranged for the 
editors with readers of The Courier in Moscow,” Director-General Maheu wrote to the chair of 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission. “I was pleased to learn of the interest and enthusiasm by 
readers and writers alike,” he imparted. “I am encouraged by this to believe that The Courier can 
make an important contribution to the public’s understanding of the organization’s role in the 
development of international cooperation in education, science, and culture in the service of 
peace.”870 
The meeting in Moscow eased the tensions between the Soviet UNESCO apparatus and 
the main editorship in Paris. “This meeting approved our proposals on the need for the magazine 
to pay more attention to significant and pressing problems in UNESCO activity, better represent 
the positions of the socialist and weakly-developed countries, and recruit authors from these 
countries,” Machavariani reflected at the end of 1965. “Our proposals were included in the 
thematic plan for 1966-67 and makes up its foundation.”871 To complement Soviet celebrations 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1967, the UNESCO editorship 
published the special issue on the USSR that it had abandoned during the political battles of the 
early 1960s between Koffler and Soviet envoys. Filled with acclamations by Soviet authors of 
the advances of the USSR in education, science, and culture, the November issue temporarily 
realized the Soviet dream of turning The Courier into an arm of Soviet cultural diplomacy.872 
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Still, Machavariani and his colleagues had no illusions as to the fundamental Western worldview 
shaping the magazine for the foreseeable future and persisted in their drive to force the editorship 
to stop “avoiding a deep, multiperspective analysis” of “politically sensitive problems.”873  
But for Soviet readers, this non-Soviet angle on global developments gave the magazine 
its value. Because the Soviet state sanctioned its dissemination but could not dictate its content, 
The Courier offered both a more acceptable means for Soviet citizens to learn about the outside 
world than the taboo radio programs of Voice of America (VOA) or the BBC and a less sanitized 
version of the content featured in other Soviet media spotlighting events abroad. More 
importantly, UNESCO’s reading public extended to readers deep inside the Soviet Union a 
means of communicating with foreign readers of UNESCO publications as part of an 
international “imagined” community. The ideals of peace, international exchange, and the 
improvement of the welfare of the world’s population pervading UNESCO publications 
overlapped with the socialist internationalist ideals preached by the Soviet state, allowing 
Courier readers to experiment with foreign ways of thinking internationally without 
contradicting the communist ideology of their homeland.   
The Soviet UNESCO Commission agreed to print The Courier and other UNESCO 
materials inside the Soviet Union with the expectation that the international organization allot 
more space for Soviet writings in its publications. While the USSR succeeded in rivaling the 
West in the number of pages reserved for Soviet authors, they remained dissatisfied with the 
ability of Western UNESCO officials to determine whose work made it onto these pages. As 
Soviet officials bumped heads with Koffler and other employees of the UNESCO Secretariat, 
however, changes in the composition of UNESCO as a result of decolonization had begun to 
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slowly chip away at Western hegemony in the international organization as a whole. The next 
chapter turns to how this revolution in UNESCO intertwined the fates of the USSR and 
UNESCO in the international organizational system.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
“MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD”: SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
 
By the early 1960s, the content of UNESCO publications and the themes of its 
conferences began to reflect a changing world order in which new nations with undetermined 
allegiances in the bipolar conflict of the Cold War demanded a seat at the table of the 
international organizational system. While the USSR’s enlistment in UNESCO brought the 
number of the organization’s member states to 70 in 1954, 124 member states sent delegations to 
the fifteenth session of the general conference in 1968.874 The vast majority of these states had 
come into existence as a result of decolonization dating back to the Second World War but 
accelerating in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As leaders of these new countries took on the task 
of governing populations recently subjugated by their European masters, they looked to the UN 
and its specialized agencies to make amends for the historical injustices of colonialism through 
various forms of technical assistance, regarding these institutions as instruments for leveling the 
“playing field” between “rich” and “poor” nations.875  
Outside of its well-established role as a hub for the international exchange of information 
and knowledge through the convening of conferences and the dissemination of publications, 
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UNESCO had sought since its inception in 1946 to lay the foundation for peace by building up 
educational systems in the non-Western world. Like its other activities, UNESCO’s early 
technical-assistance programs inherited their ideological underpinnings and personnel from 
Western intellectuals and statesmen. According to Sluga, UNESCO’s Fundamental Education 
Program, launched in 1946, made the organization “the first of the new UN institutions to 
appoint natural and social sciences and economic experts to help emancipate colonial and 
postcolonial societies from their ‘backwardness,’ newly defined relative to their technological 
and economic rather than biological or ‘civilizational’ status.” Director-General Huxley 
appointed a British colonial official to steer this program while using his own contacts and 
background in the British Empire to target its work. For example, Sluga describes how UNESCO 
teamed up with the British colonial apparatus in Tanganyika to train indigenous farmers in the 
growing of groundnuts. The venture, labelled by historians the “British groundnut fiasco” or the 
“East African groundnut scheme,” stands out as one of the more prominent failures of the late 
colonial campaign to “modernize” African farming.876  
More problematically for the Soviet Union, the United States, believing that economic 
prosperity offered the best antidote to the spread of communism internationally, voiced its 
support for the idea of UN technical assistance in the late 1940s. The first broad UN aid 
initiative, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA), which President Truman 
trumpeted in his 1949 “Four Points” inaugural address, evolved in part out of Cold War concerns 
over communism finding fertile ground in the impoverished decolonizing regions. Thus UN 
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technical assistance marked a global extension of the Marshall Plan.877 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
Paul Hoffman, the former administrator of the Marshall Plan and an executive at the American 
Studebaker automobile company, directed the UN Special Fund (an offshoot of the EPTA that in 
1966 merged into the UN Development Program, or UNDP), which approved and supervised the 
allocation of the bulk of educational aid through UNESCO.878 
Owing to Stalin’s disdain for the UN’s endeavors in nonsecurity related matters, the 
USSR declined to participate in any of these undertakings to provide technical assistance before 
1953. Three months after Stalin’s death, however, the Soviet delegation to the sixteenth session 
of ECOSOC announced that the USSR had reversed course and would pledge over four million 
rubles ($1 million) to the EPTA annually.879 But after a meeting in the summer of 1954 at MID 
headquarters in Moscow on the subject, UN envoys relayed to the UN secretary-general the 
Soviet foreign ministry’s complete ignorance of how UN assistance programs worked, remarking 
on Soviet officials’ unusual requests for detailed information on which countries would receive 
Soviet aid and into which sectors of the given country’s economy this aid would go. At the same 
time, the UN representatives expressed their appreciation for the generosity of the Soviet state. 
“We had also been struck by the conviction that since January 1954 it had become firm Soviet 
policy to participate in TA on an extremely large scale (perhaps within well-defined limits of 
geography and fields of activity),” they observed.880 To follow through on this policy, the Soviet 
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state deposited the eight million rubles it pledged for 1954 and 1955 into an account opened 
under the name of the UN secretary-general in the USSR State Bank (Gosbank) and ordered the 
USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade (MVT) to oversee the export of equipment through the UN to 
other countries. By 1955, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon had submitted requests for a portion of 
these funds.881 MVT also nominated twenty-two Soviet experts for the UN Technical Assistance 
Administration (TAA, which managed industrial assistance) as well as the programs of the 
specialized agencies to later only complain that UNESCO and the WHO had rejected these 
names “without valid reason.”882  
In the 1950s, the USSR had several small successes in using UN technical assistance as a 
means of showcasing Soviet achievements. For instance, the work of Soviet academicians as 
UNESCO experts in the construction and running of the Bombay Technological Institute 
complemented Soviet bilateral aid to India and received a high level of publicity both in the 
former British colony and internationally. But apart from the Bombay institute, the number of 
experts from Western states involved in UN technical assistance dwarfed the number of Soviet 
citizens employed for this purpose. While the number of Soviet UN experts ticked up annually 
from 1956 to 1960, Soviet nationals made up just 1 percent of the total number of experts 
enlisted in the UN Regular Program and EPTA before 1961. Meanwhile, 16 percent of these 
experts hailed from the UK, almost 13 percent from the United States, more than 9 percent from 
France, and 3.5 percent from the FRG (see Table 1). The USSR performed slightly better in its 
efforts to bring students from weakly-developed countries to study at its universities through UN 
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fellowships, procuring almost 3 percent of the total number of such fellowships handed out by 
the UN in the late 1950s. For comparison, the UK, the US, France, and the FRG obtained 
approximately 10, 8.5, 8, and 5 percent of UN fellowships respectively (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 1: Number and Percentage of UN Experts from the USSR and Major Western Countries, 
1956-1960 
Year Total Number 
of Specialists 
in UN 
Regular 
Program and 
EPTA 
British 
Specialists 
American 
Specialists 
 French 
Specialists  
West 
German 
Specialists 
Soviet 
Specialists 
1956 2,895 496 427 263 77 16 
1957 3,183 515 423 296 100 28 
1958 3,144 529 386 291 111 40 
1959 3,215 499 382 310 129 43 
1960 3,225 477 396 302 118 49 
Total 15,662 2,516 2,014 1462 535 176 
Total 
Percent 
100% 16.06% 12.86% 9.33% 3.41% 1.11% 
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Table 2: Number and Percentage of UN Fellowships Sponsored by the USSR and Major 
Western Countries, 1956-1960 
Year Total 
Number of  
UN 
Fellowships 
Fellowships 
Sponsored 
by Great 
Britain 
Fellowships  
Sponsored 
by US 
Fellowships 
Sponsored 
by France 
Fellowships 
Sponsored 
by West 
Germany 
Fellowships 
Sponsored 
by USSR 
1956 4,312 396 373 372 205 104 
1957 4,940 499 473 389 285 95 
1958 5,090 546 431 426 269 125 
1959 5,677 575 517 385 287 127 
1960 6,747 634 513 565 289 308 
Total 26,766 2,650 2,307 2,137 1,335 759 
Total 
Percent 
100% 9.90% 8.61% 7.98% 4.99% 2.84% 
Source of data for Table 1 and Table 2: GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 21, ll. 73-83. 
 
After 1960, the rendering of aid to weakly-developed countries began to supersede in 
importance all other multilateral activity for the UN, UNESCO, and the Soviet Union alike. In 
that year, the wave of decolonization crested when French West Africa broke up into 
independent states, Belgian rule collapsed in the Congo, and a handful of former British 
territories joined the community of nations. In anticipation of the entry of more than a dozen new 
African countries into the UN, Ralph Bunche, the African American UN under secretary-general 
for special political affairs, declared 1960 the “Year of Africa.”883 Later that year, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples,” which endorsed the “right to self-determination” of “all peoples,” 
thereby formalizing the international community’s endorsement of the end of imperial control 
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over countries fighting for liberation.884 Originally instigated by the Soviet Union, the 
declaration became a victory for the communist country in the context of the Cold War after the 
US abstained from voting on it.885 In response, President Kennedy put aid to weakly-developed 
countries at the center of American policy in the UN and further heightened the Cold War 
struggle to win over the “Third World” when he urged the general assembly to officially 
designate the 1960s the “Decade of Development” in 1961.886  
Falling in line with its parent organization, UNESCO responded to this transforming 
world order by concentrating its spending on technical assistance to weakly-developed countries 
in the areas of education, science and, to a lesser extent, culture. This reorientation from a focus 
on “major projects” sponsoring academic exchange to material aid for the weakly-developed 
countries accelerated due to a massive influx of new member states into UNESCO that would 
constitute a powerful voting bloc in the international organization. In 1960 alone, the specialized 
agency inducted seventeen African nations into its ranks. In November, the eleventh session of 
the UNESCO General Conference elected the Ethiopian ambassador to France as the first ever 
African chairman of the general conference.887 Because Africa had almost no representation in 
UNESCO before 1960, the continent’s educational, scientific, and cultural needs received 
relatively little attention until these countries began sending delegations to the organization.888 
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To make up for this neglect of the world’s second largest continent, UNESCO organized in the 
early 1960s a separate African Technical Assistance Program and stepped up its technical-
assistance “operational activities” across the board. For these enterprises, UNESCO applied for 
financing from the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB, the organ responsible for EPTA 
assistance through specialized agencies), the UN Special Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Development Association 
(IDA).889   
Buoyed by the rapid increase of UNESCO member states hostile to Western European 
nations or frustrated with the ambiguous stance of the US on their right to self-determination, the 
Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation set out in 1960 to win over new allies in the 
decolonizing world by presenting the communist bloc as an alternative to the former Western 
colonizers. To demonstrate the communist bloc’s desire to assist these countries with the process 
of building postcolonial societies, the USSR, BSSR, and Ukrainian SSR doubled their collective 
annual voluntary allotments to UN technical assistance from the 900,000 rubles ($225,000) they 
gave annually between 1956 and 1960 to almost two million rubles ($2.2 million) in 1961.890 At 
a meeting of socialist representatives to prepare for the upcoming session of the UNESCO 
General Conference in the fall of 1960, attendees rejoiced over the fact that the US would not 
have a “clean majority” at the conference for the first time and agreed that the socialist countries 
should exploit the “indignation” of other member states brought on by American policy.891 
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During the general conference, Soviet delegates conducted private conversations with emissaries 
from the new African states. With the blessing of African and Asian countries, they secured the 
unanimous approval of a resolution denouncing colonialism similar to the one passed by the UN 
earlier that year and in spite of the pleas to the conference from the English delegation to “forget 
the past.” Additionally, non-Western countries backed the Soviet detachment’s proposals to 
improve the geographical distribution of the UNESCO Secretariat and divert funds freed up from 
disarmament to educational, scientific, and cultural aid. The Soviet contingent at the conference 
also wrote admiringly of the unsuccessful efforts of the Cuban delegation, which spoke for the 
new government led by Fidel Castro, to pass resolutions condemning–somewhat contradictorily–
the “interference of states in the internal affairs of others states” and American discrimination 
against African Americans.892   
These successes at the 1960 general conference and the confidence of its Soviet attendees 
in an imminent post-Western UNESCO only strengthened the broader faith inside the Soviet 
Union at the beginning of the 1960s in an inevitable communist future both at home and abroad. 
In the summer of 1961, the Third Party Program of the CPSU not only proclaimed that the USSR 
would surpass the US in economic production by 1970, but also promised to Soviet citizens the 
realization of communism by 1980, or during the lifetime of the “present generation.” In spite of 
the mismatch between the realities of Soviet life and this bold promise of a coming utopia, “these 
words,” Vail’ and Genis argue, “embellished the daily life of the people. ‘The present 
generation’––this was clear to each person. This is when your grandson grows up. When the son 
marries. When you become an adult.”893 Beyond Soviet borders, Castro’s declaration of the 
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Cuban Revolution as “socialist” that year seemed to affirm the USSR’s role as a vanguard nation 
in the teleological development of world history toward communism. In the eyes of many Soviet 
citizens, the Cuban Revolution reenacted the October Revolution in the non-Western world, 
further rekindling the socialist internationalist spirit inside the Soviet Union and offering a living 
example of the possibilities opened up by the collapse of Western empires for the universalist 
project of the USSR.894 In the context of this global upheaval, UNESCO would serve as an 
international public square on which the Soviet Union would cajole the “national-liberation 
movements” of the decolonizing world to its side through aid and by making stinging rebukes in 
response to Western delegates excusing imperialism. 
But the Soviet Union valued technical assistance through UNESCO and other 
international organizations less for its tangible impact on the economies of weakly-developed 
countries than for its symbolic demonstration of the communist recognition of these states as 
legitimate members of the international community. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet 
money, equipment, and personnel delivered abroad through bilateral agreements with Burma, 
Iraq, Yemen, Ghana, and others exceeded by far the size of Soviet contributions to UN-funded 
enterprises.895 Just as the US conducted most of its technical assistance bilaterally but used the 
UN as a means of penetrating countries with which it did not have close relations, Soviet 
diplomats judged bilateral work to be “more effective” but saw the UN as a vehicle for 
infiltrating less friendly nations.896  
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The heightened interest of the Soviet Union after 1960 in UN development was also a 
reaction to the high level of importance that the United States under the Kennedy administration 
attached to it. During the first year of his presidency, Kennedy reinvigorated American 
participation in UNESCO as part of a multipronged aid program based on the modernization 
theories of social scientist Walt Rostow and other intellectual heavyweights of the American 
foreign-policy establishment.897 As a sign of goodwill toward the international organization, 
Kennedy welcomed Director-General Maheu for a one-on-one meeting in his first year in office, 
making him, as Hazard points out, “the first American president to invite and host a UNESCO 
director-general at the White House.”898 Soviet international civil servants sensed this uptick in 
American attention to UNESCO in their daily lives in the secretariat. “In every way, US 
representatives boast among secretariat employees and especially member states that the USA 
contributes 30 percent of the budget, is the main financer of the Special Fund and technical 
assistance, and is always prepared to increase its contributions,” Director Kovda, who regularly 
dealt with assistance projects in his capacity as head of the UNESCO Department of Natural 
Sciences, fretted in a 1962 report to the commission. “This is especially done to convince 
African, Asian, and Latin American governments that without the USA this kind of international 
work would somehow not exist.”899  
                                                     
of multilateral relations through international organizations” to “introduce and spread” their “influence” in countries 
lacking official relations with the communist world. As the Soviet experience with the UNESCO Africa program 
illustrated, however, this was easier said than done. GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, l. 308; and GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 
21, l. 136. 
 
897 For a history of the influence of modernization theory on American foreign policy during this period of the Cold 
War, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 155–202. 
 
898 Hazard, Postwar Anti-Racism, 112. 
 
899 GARF, f. 9519, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 309-10. 
 463 
Unsettled by the renewed commitment to internationalism and multilateral diplomacy of 
the American president, Soviet officials anticipated with despair that UNESCO would become 
an instrument for achieving the American foreign-policy objective of containment through 
economic development. “Over the last five to seven months,” Kovda reported in 1962, “there has 
begun to circulate from different UNESCO circles but essentially from a single source–
Washington–the American slogan: ‘We need a new Marshall Plan.’” The Soviet UNESCO 
director argued that the US hoped to gain control of multilateral technical assistance in order to 
buttress its bilateral aid and thus prevent the spread of communist movements in the weakly-
developed countries. “‘The Marshall Plan, in its time, stopped revolution in Europe,’” Kovda 
quoted the head of the UN Special Fund, Hoffman, as declaring. “‘If we do not want a repeat of 
China, Cuba, the Congo, etc., we must invest significant funds and implement a broad new 
Marshall Plan in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, to keep them in the sphere of influence of the 
free world and neutralize possible revolutionary explosion.’” In Kovda’s estimation, the 
UNESCO leadership echoed “this sentiment” but “in different ways.” The Soviet UNESCO 
director also predicted that the US would seek “a depoliticization of UNESCO,” or the removal 
of questions of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, race, etc. from its program, “and a 
transformation of its organs to fulfill the mission of this ‘new Marshall Plan,’ i.e. the suffocation 
of the revolutionary-liberation movement in African and Asian countries.”900 
To highlight the centrality of UNESCO to the competition between the capitalist and 
communist blocs for the decolonizing world, Kovda further claimed that President Kennedy was 
“personally involved with UNESCO” through his science advisers (Chairman of the President’s 
Science Advisory Committee Jerome Wiesner and President of the American Association for the 
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Advancement of Science Roger Revelle), who plotted to sway the UN and UNESCO “toward 
executing the ‘orders’ and ‘instructions’ of the Special Fund and the World Bank to create 
schools, colleges, scientific institutions, and universities under the control of the Atlantic bloc 
and first and foremost the USA.”901 In proposals to the Central Committee for improving the 
rendering of aid to weakly-developed countries through the UN and UNESCO, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission pointed to the amount of resources the US State Department devoted to 
international organizations as reason to take multilateral channels to decolonizing nations 
seriously.902 This reactive posture of the USSR demonstrates how the US shaped the agenda of 
international organizations. 
UNESCO’s performance as an intermediary between donor and recipient governments 
evoked regular attacks from the Soviet UNESCO Delegation for the disparity between the 
number of Soviet and Western specialists traveling to weakly-developed countries through the 
international organization. From the perspective of the delegation, UNESCO bureaucrats rejected 
Soviet candidates with the “excuse” that they submitted incomplete applications “with not 
enough information on their qualifications and work experience.” Furthermore, the UN 
representatives-in-residence in the weakly-developed countries, who acted as liaisons overseeing 
UN operations on the ground, all came from Western countries and directed states examining 
prospective experts away from Soviet citizens with informal “‘advice’ or ‘opinions.’” These 
misgivings led the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to argue in 1961 for the relocation of the process 
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of selecting experts from the unelected UNESCO Secretariat to a “Committee of Nine” 
composed of member states on the UNESCO Executive Board.903  
Yet UNESCO’s justifications for turning down Soviet nominees reflected the wishes of 
the recipient governments, many of which often insisted experts speak English or French 
fluently. The inheritance of English and French as national languages in former colonies made it 
much more difficult for Soviet citizens to meet the criteria of these states, revealing how the 
legacy of colonialism gave the US, France, and Great Britain a head start in the race to build the 
national economies and, in the case of UNESCO, educational systems of the non-Western world 
in their own image. UNESCO developed an assumption that Soviet nationals did not have the 
necessary language training and found ways to vet them for linguistic proficiency. When Soviet 
experts visited Paris for routine premission briefings, UNESCO Secretariat staff closely 
evaluated their language skills. Sitting in on one of these meetings in 1961, the first secretary of 
the Soviet UNESCO Delegation derided the tactics these UNESCO officials used to ascertain 
language ability. “It got to the point that the Head of the UNESCO Bureau of Relations with 
Member States Correa deliberately forced . . . [the Soviet experts] to speak in English, which put 
them in an uncomfortable position,” he related to the Soviet UNESCO Commission.904 In one 
instance reported by the Soviet permanent delegate in 1966, a Soviet botanist applying for a 
teaching position in Africa “could not name the simplest constituent parts of a flower in English” 
during an interview at UNESCO headquarters.905 In order to level the playing field, the Soviet 
All-Union Technical and Industrial Export Organization (Tekhnopromeksport) agreed to pay for 
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interpreters to accompany all Soviet UN experts in their day-to-day activities.906 But “the vast 
majority of governments of the weakly-developed countries categorically refuse to take experts 
with interpreters,” the Soviet permanent delegate reported in 1964. “They prefer candidates who 
know the language from colonial powers, even the former metropoles.”907  
The politics and preexisting economic dependencies of a recipient government also 
played into the deliberations of weakly-developed countries over whether to let Soviet UNESCO 
personnel into their schools, universities, and other institutions prone to ideological contestation. 
As historian Oscar Sanchez-Sibony argues, “countries in the emerging Third World were already 
enmeshed in an intricate web of economic relations with their former colonial masters, and the 
calculus the leaders of these young countries had to make in seeking new relations was as 
frequently economic as it was political.”908 Although the governments of weakly-developed 
nations prioritized such economic ties, political calculations had as much of a bearing on their 
willingness to welcome Soviet experts through multilateral organizations. Because most 
recipient countries fell under what the Soviet UNESCO Delegation described as “the influence 
of strong imperialist powers,” the USSR failed to insert its people into countries with which it 
did not already have budding bilateral ties. In response to Soviet criticisms of the lack of Soviet 
social scientists commissioned by UNESCO to serve in weakly-developed countries, the deputy 
director of the UNESCO Department of Social Sciences divulged to the Soviet permanent 
delegate that these “countries, as a rule, prefer to invite experts from the Western states for 
‘ideological reasons.’” Like other donor countries, the USSR also had to take into account the 
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cultural sensitivities of non-Western nations. In 1959, for example, Afghanistan declined to 
employ a female Soviet specialist since, in the words of the second secretary of the Soviet 
UNESCO Delegation, “the presenting of a woman for this post violates the traditions and 
customs of the country, where women are not allowed to be engaged in active political, 
scientific, or cultural activities.”909  
In the case of Africa, these political and cultural considerations made it all but impossible 
for the USSR to expand its soft power on the continent. MID tapped the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation to act as one of its major outreach agents for cultivating relations with francophone 
African countries because of its location in Paris (the former metropole) and the avenues for 
unofficial overtures provided by the international organization. In March 1961, Soviet Permanent 
Delegate Kulazhenkov traveled to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Cameroon, and Nigeria to begin 
the process of establishing contacts and to probe the possibility of sending Soviet specialists to 
these countries. With the exception of Nigerian officials, all of the heads of state and ministers 
with whom the Soviet delegate met demurred when he broached the question of Soviet aid. 
Emphasizing their neutrality in the Cold War, the African leaders informed their Soviet guest 
that they would foster cultural and economic exchanges only after setting up formal diplomatic 
relations with the USSR at some undetermined point in the future. In what Kulazhenkov 
perceived as a sign of the lingering control of the French, they also opted to appeal to Paris 
before seeking help from other powers.910  
While UNESCO afforded the USSR ways to reach these countries through publications 
and conferences, the right of African states to turn down specialists from UN specialized 
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agencies thus prevented Soviet UNESCO functionaries from utilizing the international 
organization as an indirect channel for dispatching its experts to nations wary of having Soviet 
citizens in their institutions. Although the Soviet UNESCO Commission compiled a list of 185 
specialists to nominate as experts for the UNESCO Africa program, only a fraction of the names 
put forward ever made it to the continent because recipient governments not only required 
experts to have attained fluency in English or French, but also insisted that the chief of any 
mission be of French or English nationality.911 Relaying these facts to the Soviet UNESCO 
Delegation, UNESCO incurred accusations that it conspired in a neo-imperialist plot to plant 
French and British advisers in their former colonies while facilitating American influence in the 
region.912 “The secretariat leadership is also trying to bar the USSR from the Africa aid program, 
delaying a decision on the use of our contribution,” a member of the Soviet UNESCO Delegation 
wrote in 1962. “UNESCO leaders try to present the matter as if the Africans do not want Soviet 
aid, that they supposedly prefer the British and French as experts.” In contrast, UNESCO quickly 
spent the millions of American dollars from the IDA, the World Bank, and private funds (the 
Ford and Carnegie foundations) donated to its Africa program. “The secretariat leadership,” the 
delegation asserted, “is ready to serve US interests in this regard.”913 Further curbing the ability 
of the USSR to exert influence on the African continent, Soviet educational institutions hesitated 
to welcome African students through UN technical-assistance programs. Because the 
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international organization chose these students, the Soviet Union had no opportunity to weed out 
individuals with anti-Soviet political views.914   
The eruption of a proxy conflict between the capitalist and communist blocs in the 
neighboring Congo made West African states even more hesitant to appear as falling into the 
orbit of the Soviet Union. To comply with the UN’s plea in July 1960 for its specialized agencies 
to provide the Congo with expertise in their areas of specialization, the UNESCO Executive 
Board took steps to rebuild the nation’s secondary schools following a mass exodus of Belgian 
teachers from the country during the crisis. In November, Director-General Veronese sent out a 
call for French-speaking male teachers capable of “withstanding the Congo climate.”915 The 
international organization also began planning the construction of the National Institute of 
Education, which produced indigenous replacements for fleeing Belgian teachers.916 In reply to 
Veronese’s letter, the Soviet UNESCO Commission consented to furnishing a list of Soviet 
teachers for the Congo mission if UNESCO met certain conditions that ran counter to the UN’s 
policy in the country. In particular, the commission demanded that the international organization 
collaborate with the Stanleyville government of Antoine Gizenga and avoid all contact with 
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Joseph Kasavubu’s regime, which had come to power following the overthrow of Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba by Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in the fall of 1960.917  
 After the assassination of Lumumba in January 1961, UNESCO’s continued 
supplementation of the UN military intervention in the Congo with educational assistance 
outraged the Soviet Union and strengthened the resolve among Soviet diplomats to forego 
multilateral aid efforts in Africa in favor of bilateral agreements with individual countries. Soviet 
UNESCO officials wrote off UNESCO’s Congo initiative as a tool of Western imperialism, 
echoing Soviet recriminations of the UN as an accomplice in the murder of the Congolese 
politician. For the Soviet UNESCO Delegation, the international organization had “completely 
discredited itself in the eyes of the people of the Congo and other African states” by not only 
conducting “secret” negotiations with the Kasavubu government and the secessionist state of 
Katanga (which had orchestrated the execution of Lumumba), but also by pleading with Belgian 
teachers to return to the Congo. “The responsibility for sabotaging real educational aid to the 
Congo lies first of all with the UNESCO Secretariat, which carries out the policies of the 
colonialists,” the delegation reported in March to Moscow.918 Ignoring these vigorous objections, 
UNESCO’s emergency operations in the Congo stretched into the mid-1960s and, as one 
historian concludes, “became an early testing ground for UNESCO’s subsequent activities all 
over the Sub-Saharan continent.”919  
Shut out of African territories reluctant to alienate their Western European and American 
benefactors, Soviet UNESCO experts went primarily to African countries already aligned with 
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the Soviet Union (Mali, Guinea). Despite apprehensions over drawing African students to the 
Soviet Union through the UN, the USSR also agreed to offer through the UNESCO Africa 
program fifty grants for three-year periods of study at Soviet pedagogical institutes beginning in 
1961 and 1962. Narrowing the pool of possible applicants, the Soviet UNESCO Commission 
discussed ways to ensure the selection of persons with “the most desirable origin and social 
status” (i.e., those not “coming from rich families, the colonial administration, etc.”). Other 
applicants from anti-Soviet states had to withdraw their candidacies at the behest of their 
governments. Out of the fifty grants advertised, UNESCO received fifteen grant applications for 
study in the USSR. Of these, eight students actually enrolled in a Soviet university.920     
*                 *                * 
 The USSR fared far better in getting its people hired by UNESCO to work as experts in 
weakly-developed countries beyond the scramble for Africa. In fact, the Soviet Union enjoyed a 
stronger position in UNESCO’s technical-assistance program than in any other organ of the UN 
system. Similar to its efforts to place Soviet professionals in the UNESCO Secretariat, however, 
the USSR struggled to navigate the UN bureaucracy and align its methods for mobilizing its 
citizens to travel abroad with the byzantine procedures of the international organizational system.  
Before recipient governments decided on start dates, the process for approving UNESCO 
technical-assistance projects fell to TAB and the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) in New 
York. Much to the regret of the Soviet UNESCO Commission, the window between the green 
light from New York for a project and the start date often stretched no longer than two 
months.921 To deal with these sudden solicitations, the Soviet state assigned the responsibility for 
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recruiting Soviet citizens for technical-assistance jobs to the USSR Council of Ministers State 
Committee for Economic Relations (GKES).922 Working in coordination with the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission and other organizations, GKES had the onerous duty of finding on short 
notice Soviet specialists with the linguistic and professional knowhow matching the obscure 
positions laid out in UNESCO job announcements. In January 1958, the Council of Ministers 
ordered all “relevant” Soviet institutions (i.e., those involved in pedagogy, scientific research, 
polytechnic education, and other fields) to form “reserves” of specialists on call for summons to 
serve as UNESCO experts. To prepare these cadres, the council exempted them from their 
normal work to attend language instruction two days a week. In preparation for the rare instances 
when recipient governments agreed to host an expert who relied on an interpreter, these 
institutions also received orders to find linguists working in their organizations to put in these 
reserves.923  
The creation of reserves yielded a positive impact on the readiness of the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission to promptly answer calls for applications from the international 
organization. While the commission presented to UNESCO only three names in all of 1957, it 
handed over fifty in 1958.924 But by the early 1960s, several of the key Soviet agencies in fields 
related to UNESCO had either produced pitiably small lists of Soviet employees for possible 
UNESCO missions or neglected to generate reserves at all. For example, the RSFSR Ministry of 
Education had just begun to constitute a reserve in 1960.  Likewise, MINVUZ claimed that it had 
never received the resolution issued by the Council of Ministers instructing it to have a reserve. 
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In 1961, AN SSSR had managed to “register” only three of its academicians for a reserve 
expected to contain forty names. One of the better performing Soviet organs, the State 
Committee for Polytechnic Education, hit half its quota (thirty out of sixty). As noted in chapter 
4, many of these entities employed a single person to handle bilateral and multilateral requests 
for personnel.925  
In the context of UNESCO’s new preoccupation with Africa after 1960, the Council of 
Ministers redoubled its efforts to sustain reliable sources of expertise, issuing a flurry of orders 
between 1960 and 1964 that founded a constellation of reserves scattered throughout the Soviet 
Union. In May 1960, seven Soviet republics received orders to open reserves in their ministries 
and committees with spots for 270 specialists.926 Five months later, this target increased to 500. 
The council also passed down individual orders in response to UNESCO’s needs at a given time. 
In December 1962, for example, it devised a plan for reserves of thirty-six researchers 
categorized by specialization (mechanical engineering, oil drilling, construction, hydrology, 
etc.).927 In 1964, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers also passed a resolution 
ordering the widespread creation of reserves for posts in UN agencies engaged in economic and 
technical assistance. The resolution included a directive to MVT to open a special department 
dedicated to preparing “economist-internationalists” for work in UN organs. Accepting each year 
fifty persons with “advanced economic or technical education” and “experience in the national 
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economy,” the department administered a three-year course to applicants approved by the 
Central Committee.928 
But these edicts did little to overcome the shortage in foreign-language speakers who also 
happened to have the requisite scientific or educational backgrounds. The inability of the Soviet 
state to build repositories responsive to UNESCO’s needs arose out of the inefficiencies of 
Soviet planning. Similar to how the disconnect between UNESCO’s recruiting methods for 
secretariat employees and the centralized system put in place for this purpose by the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission put the USSR at a disadvantage in challenging Western domination of 
the UNESCO bureaucracy, the mismatch between the rolling appeals from the international 
organization for experts and the Soviet command system meant that UNESCO job openings 
caught Soviet officials by surprise. The top-down approach of picking specialists in advance for 
jobs could not keep up with the fluid and rapidly changing demands for experts.  
Thus, of the forty-three individuals in Moscow reserves in 1963, only sixteen had an 
“active command” of English or French, ten had enrolled in English courses at MGPIIa, eight 
received language instruction from a teacher at their workplaces, and nine did not study or know 
a language for “various reasons.” The deputy head of the Division of Foreign Relations of 
MINVUZ attributed the lack of foreign-language aptitude to an absence of “supervision” from 
responsible organs and the fact that many of those on the reserve, burdened with the same 
workload as their nonreserve colleagues, simply did not have the time to master a language.929 
Furthermore, the days spent by Soviet specialists in expensive language classes drained the 
Soviet economy of funds and labor. “The language preparation of experts torn away from 
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production,” the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet UNESCO Commission A. A. Petrov deplored, 
“is extremely complicated––the huge expenditure of money for this preparation makes sense 
only if there is a strong belief in the possibility of effective use of the expert prepared through 
language courses.”930 The teaching of foreign languages to Soviet specialists remained a 
challenge into the late 1960s. While MGPIIa began offering ten-month courses for potential 
UNESCO experts in 1964, only 37 of the 130 Soviet citizens in its reserves signed up for these 
courses. “The situation is still difficult,” a GKES official commented on language training in a 
letter to the Soviet UNESCO Commission in July 1966. “And, evidently, a noticeable 
improvement in this respect will not take place in the near future.”931 
Instead of decentralizing the procedure for finding Soviet specialists, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission asked the Soviet UNESCO Delegation to come up with a plan that 
predicted the kinds of experts the organization would need in the future. “Without such a plan,” 
Petrov wrote in October 1963, “Soviet institutions involved in selecting and preparing specialists 
for weakly-developed countries through UNESCO are forced to begin the search for specialists 
only after receiving relevant job descriptions.” This led “to tardiness and the selection of 
specialists who do not always meet the professional and particularly the language qualifications 
listed.” The “absence of a prospective plan,” Petrov griped, “means that the reserve of experts is 
filled blindly and only to a minimal degree meets the needs of countries.” The specializations to 
include in the reserves “(mechanical, electro-technical, chemical etc.),” he went on, were also 
“too general.”932 In 1965, GKES had yet to reform the bureaucratic practices that had made the 
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reserves stagnate. That same year, Petrov decried, Soviet agencies still divided their reserves into 
the categories of specialization delineated in the decrees from the late 1950s and early 1960s.933 
Notwithstanding Soviet frustrations over the disorganization reigning in their reserves, 
the Soviet UNESCO Commission and GKES gradually excelled in getting their people into 
UNESCO gigs as experts in comparison to the USSR’s overall performance in UN technical 
assistance, which continued to lag behind its Western adversaries in the 1960s. At the end of 
1958, the USSR had just eighteen citizens working in India and Afghanistan.934 In 1960, twenty-
four Soviet experts had taken up residence in weakly-developed countries––a number far greater 
than the size of Soviet contingents enlisted by any other UN specialized agency. The Soviet 
detachment that year rivalled the twenty-five Americans, twenty-five French, and twenty-three 
British specialists stationed by UNESCO in the weakly-developed countries.935 By 1966, Soviet 
UNESCO experts accounted for 74 of the 110 Soviet professionals hired by all UN specialized 
agencies.936 The position of Kovda as director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences 
also endowed the communist bloc with the power to shape the missions of 130 experts in over 
forty countries as well as the programs of over ten institutes of higher education receiving UN 
Special Fund and EPTA aid through the department.937  
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Some Soviet nationals transported south and east by UNESCO impressed colleagues at 
their host institutions with their knowledge, productivity, and comportment. S. F. Mirkotan, who 
spent four years in the Department of Physics at the Higher Industrial Institute in Baghdad, 
earned effusive praise from the institute’s rector. From 1959 to 1963, Mirkotan wrote and 
published several physics textbooks used in the laboratories of the institute. These books, the 
rector declared, “will be useful as long as the institute itself exists and will remain as an 
unforgettable reminder of him among colleagues and students.” Mirkotan also created four 
laboratories for physics, mechanics, electromagnetism, and optics; trained researchers; designed 
curricula for physics, mathematics, and chemistry; and grew the department from two to eleven 
faculty members. “Apart from his scientific achievements,” the rector added, “his colleagues in 
the department, in other departments, and also myself, will feel the absence of our colleague, 
whose conscientiousness cannot be forgotten.”938  
Other Soviet UNESCO experts evoked ridicule not for their Sovietness but for their own 
difficult or odd personalities. According to the administrative assistant of the UN mission in 
Syria, the colleagues of Soviet academician Vosanchuk, whom UNESCO had assigned to the 
Department of Geology at the University of Damascus, spoke about his “eccentric character” 
with “a smile” and went out of their way to avoid him. “One gets the impression that ‘during the 
Second World War, Vosanchuk suffered a very strong shock at the front that continues to this 
day,’” the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Syria quoted the UN envoy as speculating. 
“‘Vosanchuk has a unique philosophy and his own preconceived view that he is trying to impose 
on others,’” the UN functionary assessed. At one point during Vosanchuk’s stay in Syria, the UN 
official “angrily” recounted to the first secretary, the Soviet professor drew the ire of the dean of 
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his department when he expressed a desire to travel to Beirut without the permission of the 
Soviet embassy and asked the dean to “not tell anyone” about his wish.939 
 Whatever their individual performances, the relatively high number of Soviet 
professionals drafted by UNESCO to serve in the weakly-developed countries paints a 
misleading picture of the geographical diffusion of Soviet UNESCO experts. While the USSR 
maintained a scattering of its personnel across the Middle East, it found itself almost completely 
shut out of Latin America and Francophone Africa, both of which fell into the spheres of 
influence of Western powers. In the 1960s, the Soviet UNESCO presence in Africa amounted to 
one or two experts at any given time in a handful of countries and the building of two 
educational institutions in Mali and Tunisia. The communist bloc as a whole had its weakest 
showing in the UNESCO missions posted to Latin America. In 1963, for example, a Cuban in 
Venezuela and a Hungarian in Argentina were the lone UNESCO experts from the socialist 
countries placed in South America.940  
A heavy concentration of Soviet specialists participating in UNESCO technical assistance 
worked at the Bombay Technology Institute (later renamed the Indian Institute of Technology, 
Bombay, or IIT Bombay), which became the landmark achievement of Soviet aid to the weakly-
developed countries through the UN in the 1950s and 1960s. As a Soviet memorandum 
summarizing Soviet contributions to all UN aid projects observed at the beginning of the 1960s, 
“the largest number of Soviet experts work in India, mainly through UNESCO (professors and 
teachers at the Bombay Technological Institute).”941 The Bombay project proved a success for 
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the USSR precisely because the country’s experts did not have to compete for the project in the 
normal application contest of UN aid. Indeed, UNESCO purposely set the initiative aside for the 
Soviet Union, giving a bilateral enterprise a façade of multilateral cooperation. 
A bulwark of the nonaligned movement rejecting the bipolar alliances of the Cold War, 
India cultivated diplomatic ties with the post-Stalinist leadership as an alternative ally to the 
former imperial countries of the West. In the winter of 1955, Khrushchev, as part of his 
repudiation of Stalin’s foreign policy of isolationism and neglect of countries outside of the 
socialist camp, visited India after receiving Prime Minister Nehru in the Soviet capital in the 
summer of that year. Over the next decade, the Soviet “friendship” with India strengthened due 
to a shared hostility toward the PRC kindled as a result of the fallout between Khrushchev and 
Mao beginning in 1958 and the 1962 conflict along the Indian-Chinese border.942 The 
widespread showings of Indian films in Soviet movie theaters during the post-Stalin era 
manifested the mutual cultural exchange concomitant with this alliance. In her ethnographic 
study of Soviet perceptions of Indian cinema, historian Sudha Rajagopalan shows that these 
Indian films became one of the few foreign staples popular among Soviet moviegoers because 
they interrupted the “grey Soviet reality’” of daily life and “the monochromatic nature of Soviet 
imagescapes,” offering an “‘apolitical’” means of “‘escape’” into melodrama until the 
dissolution of the USSR in 1991.943 
From 1954 onward, India also enjoyed a sustained flow of bilateral economic as well as 
military aid from the Soviet Union in support of the fulfillment of its five-year plans. As 
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Sanchez-Sibony concludes, however, this state-centric approach to modernization did not reveal 
a drift toward communist ideology but a policy of “import substitution” common to many 
weakly-developed countries in the non-Western world. “The World Bank and the consortium 
countries of the West,” Sanchez-Sibony argues, “would continue as the main providers of 
economic development aid even as India persisted in framing this development within an import 
substitution strategy that relegated the Soviet Union to an important but secondary role, and 
moreover, one useful for mediating the liberal world.”944   
Nevertheless, the Indian government considered the USSR as a valuable source of 
expertise about planning as it struggled to raise the number of indigenous professional personnel 
necessary for rapid development. In the 1940s and 1950s, India suffered from a severe deficit of 
individuals with sufficient technical education to orchestrate its push for industrialization 
through its first and second five-year plans.945 After 1945, its government therefore set into 
motion the founding of four technical institutes modelled “on the lines of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in the USA” and located in the east, west, south, and north of the 
country.946 To build the fourth institute in the west, the Indian minister of scientific research and 
cultural affairs petitioned the Soviet delegation to the 1954 session of the UNESCO General 
Conference to ask the Soviet state to supply funds, equipment, and experts through UNESCO for 
the purpose of creating the Bombay institute, which would train indigenous engineers, scientists, 
and other professionals. In November 1955, the Central Committee agreed to supplement the 
$8.5 million the Indian government allotted for the construction of the institute’s buildings with 
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an aid package consisting of fifteen Soviet experts, twenty fellowships for Indian students to 
study in the USSR, and 10 million rubles ($2.5 million) of equipment. 947 
Although UNESCO supported the venture as a starting point for Soviet involvement in 
UNESCO activities in the early months after the country joined the organization, the enterprise 
immediately ran up against a roadblock when it came under consideration by TAB. Because the 
deal resembled a bilateral accord between India and the USSR, the chief body responsible for 
UN aid through specialized agencies hesitated to approve it. Citing an ECOSOC resolution 
requiring all UN technical assistance to “‘be made without limitation as to use by a specific 
agency or a specific country or for a specific project,’” the director of the UNESCO Technical 
Assistance Department also concluded in the spring of 1956 that it was “out of the question for a 
country contributing to the expanded program to be able to earmark its contribution or any part 
of it for the financing of a designated project” in the way that the Soviet and Indian governments 
had proposed. To satisfy these guidelines, TAB barred the two countries from directly 
communicating without using UNESCO as an intermediary and subjected the project to annual 
review instead of giving it a block grant in accordance with established practice. It also exacted 
promises from UNESCO that the organization would divert a small amount of money and 
experts from non-Soviet member states to the Bombay undertaking.948  
In December 1956, a Soviet team of professors arrived on the shores of Powai Lake to 
the north of Bombay where they inspected the jungled terrain of the future site of the Bombay 
institute. In July 1958, the institute welcomed its first class of students to its temporary location 
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in the southern outskirts of the city in the Worli district.949 Led by Martynovskii, whom we met 
in chapter six in his later role as the deputy director for technical education in the UNESCO 
Secretariat, the Soviet UNESCO mission earned praise from the international organization for 
the results of its first two years of labor. “It is most gratifying to note that, in spite of 
exceptionally difficult conditions, considerable preparatory work has been carried out by the 
team in planning laboratories and classrooms for the western higher technological institute,” the 
director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences who preceded Kovda wrote in April 
1958. This work included “evaluating equipment and staff requirements, preparing syllabi, 
curricula and even textbooks, as well as research projects suitable for training specialists.”950  
The institute did not open its doors until 1960 following a ceremony installing the 
foundation stone of the campus presided over by Prime Minister Nehru.951 In 1962, the year in 
which the first class of undergraduate students received their diplomas, IIT Bombay, in the 
words of one official, had “developed into one of the biggest teaching and research institutes in 
India.”952 The student body had ballooned from 140 in 1958 to 1,189 (973 undergraduate and 
216 graduate students) with 148 professors and 670 researchers of Indian origin serving on the 
faculty.953 By the time UNESCO ended its assistance in 1966, nine departments (specializing in 
aeronautical, electrical, mechanical, metallurgical, and civil engineering as well as chemistry, 
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physics, and the humanities) trained more than 2,000 students and collaborated closely with 
Indian industries.954 To overcome the language barrier, Soviet professors set up the Department 
of Russian Language, which they anticipated would make the institute “a center for the study of 
Russian for all engineering colleges in India.”955 In addition to publishing a textbook, a reader, 
and a dictionary, the Russian-language department organized a national conference on “problems 
of teaching Russian in India” and released a bimonthly newsletter. Sent to “all teachers of the 
Russian language in India,” the newsletter sought to spur the “exchange of information and 
experience on the teaching of Russian in India” and contained articles written by the faculty of 
the department.956 
The level of importance the USSR attached to the Russian-language department 
demonstrates the significance of the Bombay institute as a Soviet base for cultivating ties with 
Indian society and projecting its influence on the newly independent country’s educational 
system. During the ten years Soviet nationals traveled through UNESCO to the institute, a Cold 
War in miniature played out between the Soviet-run Bombay institute and the American-funded 
Kharagpur Institute of Technology in the east of the country. In everything from its graduation 
ceremonies, language of instruction, and sports, to the deeper structure of its curriculum, the 
Kharagpur institute reproduced the milieu and core elements of the American format of higher 
education. “The Indian Ministry of Education and the leadership of the institute” in Kharagpur, a 
Soviet geophysicist who briefly served among the Americans at the institute observed, 
“consciously supports the Anglo-American influence” on the institute.957 In contrast, IIT 
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Bombay replicated many of the attributes of the Soviet educational model, including the Soviet 
“open defense” of theses, which took place in public and made one of the graduate students who 
produced some of the best written work “break down under cross questioning” in front of  the 
UN resident representative.958 But because a majority of teachers trained at the Bombay institute 
went for additional education abroad in the capitalist countries, the head of the collective of 
Soviet specialists assigned to Bombay felt that the hegemony of Western technical education in 
the outside world took the shine off some of the institute’s accomplishments.959  
Viewed in isolation, however, IIT Bombay was one of the most significant contributions 
of the USSR to international development in the 1950s and 1960s. Over the course of a decade, 
fifty-five Soviet experts contributed to getting the institute on its feet while four other academics 
(from the US, FRG, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) served as token multilateral hires. After 
the termination of UNESCO aid, the USSR continued to dispatch its experts to Bombay through 
bilateral channels into the 1970s. Conversely, Soviet universities took in twenty-nine students 
from the institute as fellows between 1958 and 1964. On top of delivering the books and 
laboratory equipment used by the Bombay institute, the USSR also supplied the institute’s first 
digital transistorized computer, the Minsk II, in 1966.960 According to journalist Dinesh Sharma, 
the Minsk II, along with another Soviet computer (the EC-1030), helped spark the growth of 
computer science as an academic discipline in India. “The two Soviet computers,” Sharma 
writes, “gave the computer faculty as well as students a very strong technical foundation in 
computer science and technology.” Consequently, the Bombay institute became known for 
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educating personnel “proficient in both hardware and software, resulting in their ready 
acceptance in American universities for higher studies despite having been trained on Soviet 
machines.”961 IIT Bombay remains one of India’s premier scientific and technical institutions in 
the twenty-first century.962  
*                 *                 * 
 Because of these advances in the international organization, the Soviet Union went from 
doubting the value of staying in UNESCO in the late 1950s to realizing in the early 1960s their 
interest in preserving the UN specialized agency’s place as a preeminent venue for multilateral 
diplomacy and technical assistance. But with the rapidly changing and increasingly pluralist 
world order, the rise of alternative international institutions would dilute the power and decrease 
the relevance of both UNESCO and the USSR in the sphere of multilateral technical assistance 
during the 1960s and beyond.  
After President Kennedy’s inauguration in the winter of 1961, the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation grew progressively worried that the US would undercut Soviet 
power in UNESCO by diverting its resources to new international organizations with mandates 
similar to UNESCO but dominated by Western member states. In essence, Soviet UNESCO 
envoys, while predicting that the US would continue to “strengthen” its presence in UNESCO, 
also heard clear enunciations from US officials about the need to circumvent the Soviet Union by 
diversifying the international organizational system. Returning from a trip to the United States in 
April 1961, Roderick, the American deputy director in the UNESCO Department of Natural 
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Sciences, set off these alarm bells when he stated bluntly to Director Kovda that the US State 
Department intended to sap the power accrued by the Soviet director over international scientific 
cooperation and development. “‘UNESCO in its present form does not fulfill the interests of the 
development of international scientific cooperation,’” the Soviet director recalled his deputy 
saying. “‘If the situation does not improve,’” Roderick added, “‘the US government will raise the 
question of the withdrawal of science from UNESCO and the creation of a new international 
organization for science. This new organization should be independent of UNESCO, which has 
been turned into a political organization.’”  
Kovda speculated that the Americans resented their inability to have “unchecked control” 
over “international scientific life.” More specifically, he discerned that the Americans fretted 
over his management of UNESCO’s seismological missions in the Pacific Ocean, Latin America, 
and the Mediterranean. “‘We suspect that the USSR, through these missions, aims to collect 
information on the network of seismic stations in relation to nuclear tests,’” Kovda recited an 
American document he had obtained. “‘The USA seeks to create its own network of such 
stations around the globe (100 stations) and fears Russian interference.’”963 The Soviet UNESCO 
director came to the defense of UNESCO in order to fend off these attempts by the US to 
undermine his own position. His response to Roderick shows how far the Soviet Union had come 
from dismissing UNESCO to appreciating it as one of their only outposts in the world of 
international organizations: “My Deputy Roderick told me one day: many in the US think it 
better for science to have its own international organization; in the sciences, there is little 
opportunity for UNESCO,’” Kovda remembered. “I replied to Roderick: ‘UNESCO could ensure 
success in peaceful cooperation of scientists from different countries if the UNESCO director-
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general changes his negative attitude toward science and provides the appropriate budget.’”964 In 
short, as soon as Soviet officials felt that their country had gained a stake in the international 
organizational system, the US wanted to take it away. 
Further stoking these anxieties within the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation, 
the Kennedy administration, with the compliance of the UNESCO leadership, began to use 
Western-aligned international organizations to coopt UNESCO and make it complicit in 
programs designed to woo the weakly-developed countries away from the communist bloc. 
“Along with measures to strengthen its influence in UNESCO and transform its organs to 
execute the objectives of the ‘new Marshall Plan’ in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,” Kovda 
warned in January 1962, “the State Department is increasingly reorganizing, strengthening, and 
financing parallel regional international organizations, entirely dependent on the USA and ready 
to replace the UN and UNESCO if the USA loses its influence in them.” Kovda cited the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the EEC, and the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in Asia as 
the main “regional international organizations” muscling their way into UNESCO’s 
jurisdiction.965 The OECD, Kovda concluded, “is essentially an organ of NATO” whose “plans 
in the areas of science fully replicate the plans of the [UNESCO] departments of natural sciences 
and education, including the giving of ‘aid’ to African countries and ‘subsidies’ to scientific 
unions.” Likewise, the OAS “openly duplicates the UNESCO program for Latin America.” By 
the spring of 1962, UNESCO and these organizations had cultivated “‘working relations’” to 
“‘exchange experience’” between their departments and legal bureaus on a number of matters 
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pertaining to economic development. “All this is done under the pretext of a need to agree on 
programs and avoid work redundancy,” Soviet Deputy Director-General Ershov assessed. “In 
reality, this peculiar distribution of obligations among various organizations is intended to use 
one, or all of them together, to perform American political tasks in those countries and regions 
where the US encounters significant difficulties bilaterally.”  
Such collaboration eventually took the form of official agreements signed by UNESCO 
and each of these organizations. In the summer of 1961, for example, UNESCO and the OAS 
assembled a joint committee for the educational portion of the “Alliance for Progress,” the 
American-sponsored anticommunist economic initiative in Latin America. Director-General 
Maheu, Ershov reported in 1962, had folded under “pressure” from the OAS and sidelined the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) from this joint 
venture. “The goal of this ‘correction,’” the Soviet deputy director-general asserted, “was in 
every way to limit or even exclude Cuban participation in the educational development program 
for Latin America, which will be implemented with UNESCO and OAS funds.” 966 Approved by 
the UNESCO Executive Board with either the abstention or endorsement of the majority of 
weakly-developed countries, the UNESCO-OAS committee alternated between using OAS and 
UNESCO secretariats in order to give the impression of “‘equality.’” In spite of this appearance 
of a partnership between the two organizations, the Soviet permanent delegate stressed that the 
OAS leadership wanted to “subordinate all UNESCO activity in the areas of science and 
education in Latin American countries to their plans, program and, particularly, the American 
program––the ‘Decade of Development.’”  
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UNESCO signed analogous agreements with the EEC in October 1962 and the OECD in 
May 1963. “Thus, the US, its NATO allies, and others of the war bloc,” the Soviet permanent 
delegate warned, “have begun to wrap their programs for weakly-developed countries, as well as 
the ‘activities’ of some openly pro-NATO and closed organizations such as the OAS, EEC, and 
OECD, in the flag and prestige of UNESCO, the FAO, the ILO, and some other UN specialized 
agencies.”967 On the one hand, Soviet UNESCO employees resisted carrying out orders to assist 
these organizations. Kovda, for instance, “evoked the malicious wrath of Maheu” when he 
refused to convene a meeting with the OECD in December 1961. On the other hand, the Soviet 
permanent delegate discerned a silver lining around UNESCO’s decision to work with these 
institutions. “The maintenance of unofficial contacts with the workers in the secretariats of these 
organizations would help us obtain interesting information,” he quipped in 1963.968 
In another bid to coopt UNESCO for anticommunist development, the Kennedy 
administration conducted prolonged negotiations with the international organization to employ 
Americans enlisted in the State Department’s new Peace Corps Program as an army of 
volunteers for educational development in the weakly-developed countries. Founded in the first 
nine months of Kennedy’s presidency, the Peace Corps, along with the recently formed United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), originated in efforts to contain 
communist expansion in the wake of decolonization. In the November 1960 speech in which he 
first publicly raised the idea of young Americans spanning out into the decolonizing world to 
win its populations over to the “free world,” Kennedy cited the threat of Soviet professionals 
indoctrinating the new nations as grounds for mobilizing US citizens for service abroad in this 
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fashion. “For the fact of the matter is,” he told a crowd in San Francisco, “that out of Moscow 
and Peiping and Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany are hundreds of men and women, 
scientists, physicists, teachers, engineers doctors, nurses, studying in those institutes, prepared to 
spend their lives abroad in the service of world communism.”969 
In August 1961, the deputy director of the Peace Corps, the African American diplomat 
Franklin Williams, met with the leadership of all UNESCO departments to discuss how to 
incorporate Peace Corps volunteers into UNESCO’s technical-assistance program. “Williams 
tried to present the matter as if the ‘Peace Corps’ is an organization of ‘young idealists,’ mainly 
high-school and college graduates who voluntarily decided to devote themselves to assisting 
weakly-developed countries,” the Soviet UNESCO Employee K. N. Fedorov reported. “In the 
words of Williams,” Fedorov quoted the African American diplomat, “the goal of this activity is 
to give an opportunity to the local populations of weakly-developed countries to better know 
Americans, and for the Americans ‘to better know other peoples.’” In one of these meetings, 
Fedorov detailed how Roderick, in an attempt to undermine the Soviet position in UNESCO, 
“suggested to those attending to evaluate, without concern for political questions, the feasability 
of using members of the ‘Peace Corps’ in technical-assistance work done by the UNESCO 
Department of Natural Sciences,”––i.e. Kovda’s department. In response to Williams, Fedorov 
“expressed doubt as to whether UNESCO could use this unquestionably ideological organization 
without the agreement of all UNESCO member states.”970 
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Unsurprisingly, the Soviet UNESCO Delegation went to great lengths to thwart any 
agreement between the international organization and the American program. During subsequent 
deliberations in the secretariat and executive board, Soviet UNESCO staff members and 
delegates argued that the UN General Assembly should decide the question and stressed 
UNESCO’s responsibility to maintain its neutrality. “Because the American ‘Peace Corps’ is of 
an anticommunist and colonialist nature and intended to propagate the ‘American way of life’ 
while strengthening the ideological influence of the West in Afro-Asian countries,” the chairman 
of the Soviet UNESCO Commission wrote to the Soviet permanent delegate in August 1961, 
“the Soviet delegation should not allow the adoption by the executive board of a positive 
decision on the issue. In this respect, highlight the inappropriateness of using the funds, 
apparatus, and the flag of the United Nations for a national program like the ‘Peace Corps.’” The 
chairman recommended that the delegation counter the American proposition with their own 
proposal to direct funds toward training indigenous cadres in the weakly-developed countries.971  
While UNESCO commissioned only an “experimental” program that never sent a single 
Peace Corps volunteer to the weakly-developed countries, the US government secured more 
profitable agreements with other UN specialized agencies. In the fall of 1961, the Peace Corps 
finalized an agreement with the FAO to deploy these Americans as part of the agency’s 
agricultural aid to weakly-developed countries.972 For the Soviet Union, the whole ordeal spelled 
out how the biases baked into the UN made multilateral diplomacy an uneven playing field. 
Their disadvantages derived from the ability of their adversary to dictate the rules of the game. If 
the international organizational system ceased to work in favor of the US in the context of the 
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Cold War, the Americans could simply change the terrain on which the two superpowers battled 
for control over international organizations in ways the USSR could not. 
The panic set off among Soviet officials by the advent of new international organizations 
competing with UNESCO in its province of educational technical assistance demonstrates the 
extent to which the USSR had become invested in the UN specialized agency as its best bet to 
challenge the West in the international organizational system. After 1960, the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission and Delegation worked hard to fulfill Khrushchev’s foreign-policy by catching up 
to the Western powers in the number of experts it sent to the weakly-developed countries 
through UNESCO. Coming late to the game of multilateral technical assistance, the USSR 
struggled to reach parity with the West in this sphere of UN activity, which had its ideological 
origins in the anticommunist American policy of containment through economic development. 
Recognizing the West’s advantage in the Cold War competition to give UN aid to the weakly-
developed countries, the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation made their campaign to 
send Soviet experts to weakly-developed countries the central objective of the USSR’s 
involvement in UNESCO as the process of decolonization quickened after 1960. 
While the US plotted to take back control of multilateral diplomacy from the communist 
bloc and the weakly-developed countries through the creation of other international 
organizations and bilateral programs, the entry of new nations into the UN in the 1960s seemed 
to upset the balance of power in the world body to the USSR’s benefit. In the second half of the 
decade, as the atrocities of the Vietnam War dominated international headlines, the Soviet 
UNESCO Commission and Delegation felt emboldened by what the delegate to a 1965 session 
of the UNESCO Executive Board characterized as “the loss of prestige of the United States” in 
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the international organization.973 Exploiting the brutality of Western military escapades in their 
speeches at UNESCO, Soviet delegations to the organization’s representative bodies harped on 
the “aggression” in Vietnam, the intervention of the OAS in the Dominican Civil War, and the 
admission of Portugal into UNESCO in 1965 in spite of the objections of African states over the 
war in Angola. The delegation to the fourteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference in 
December 1966 noted with satisfaction that the condemnation of American abuses in Vietnam by 
Premier A. N. Kosygin in a written “welcome message” to the general conference “evoked a 
wide response among the delegates and not a single representative, even from the West, spoke in 
defense of US policy.”974  
Yet the divergence of the core priorities of the USSR and the weakly-developed countries 
in UNESCO produced a rift between the two non-Western blocs that became increasingly 
apparent in the 1960s. For much of the decade, the USSR and US banded together in UNESCO 
to curb the dramatic increases in the budget supported by new member states eager to receive 
reparations from the superpowers and angered that “the USSR, USA, and others ‘do not, and do 
not want to, meet the needs and interests of the weakly-developed countries’ in UNESCO.”975 
Troubled by the prospect that they would suffer “political damage” and find themselves “in 
isolation,” Soviet emissaries scrambled to compromise with these countries but expressed 
annoyance in internal correspondence with their voracious appetites for more and more aid.976 As 
both the capitalist and communist blocs found their power diminished in the representative 
bodies of UNESCO with the continued inflow of new member states, the US and USSR 
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therefore formed an alliance to counter the growing power of these countries during the major 
administrative and budgetary debates of the general conference. Thus, as the decade came to an 
end, the weight of the West as a force in UNESCO had declined, but the USSR’s standing in the 
international organizational system did not improve as a result.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In January 1966, a delegation from MID traveled to Prague to brainstorm with their 
Czechoslovak counterparts over ways to stimulate the participation of the eastern bloc in the 
activities of international organizations. In the course of four days of talks in the Czernin Palace, 
Czechoslovakian diplomats described to the Soviet deputy foreign minister and the rest of the 
delegation how the stagnation of the Czechoslovakian economy had spurred them to implement a 
set of reforms designed to better use international organizations to gather intelligence on Western 
economies and bring in more foreign currency by getting their employees into secretariats and 
convening more conferences sponsored by these institutions on Czechoslovakian soil.  
To accomplish this, the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had centralized its 
apparatus overseeing the country’s involvement in all international organizations in its newly 
created Division for International Economic Organizations, a replication of MID USSR’s 
Division for International Economic Organizations (OMEO). The Czechoslovakians had also 
assembled within this division an interagency committee for UN specialized agencies. By the 
end of the series of meetings, the Soviet and Czechoslovakian functionaries agreed to enhance 
collaboration between the countries of the communist bloc in the planning of their actions in 
these organizations. In addition, the Czechoslovakian hosts implored their Soviet visitors to 
abandon the policy of criticizing the ILO only as a “reformist” bourgeois labor organization, 
suggesting instead that they take advantage of its immense collection of knowledge about the 
labor experience of other countries (methods to increase labor productivity, revamp
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management, better organize labor, etc.) to improve the dire state of the economy of the 
communist bloc.977  
Returning to the USSR, the delegation submitted a memorandum urging MID to follow 
the Czechoslovakian model by clustering all of the coordinating entities responsible for 
international organizations into MID’s OMEO, which had overseen the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission only from a distance to that point. Noting the “positive results” of its ally’s reforms, 
the delegation recommended that MID take over “long-term planning” in this area of 
international relations. “The delegation,” the report concluded, “believes that the intensification 
of political leadership on the part of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in work related to 
international organizations requires a greater concentration of this work within the ministry.” A 
year later, the Council of Ministers dissolved GKKS and transferred the Soviet UNESCO 
Commission to OMEO, where it would stay until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.978 
With the coming of détente between the capitalist and communist worlds after 1969, the 
incorporation of the Soviet UNESCO Commission into MID in 1967 marked the final step in the 
normalization of Soviet participation in the international organizational system. While the 
location of the Soviet UNESCO Commission during the 1950s and much of the 1960s in GKKS–
a “social organization” independent from the Soviet Foreign Ministry–reflected the experimental 
phase of Soviet participation in international organizations under Khrushchev and during de-
Stalinization, the merging of the commission into MID testified to the fact that multilateral 
diplomacy through such international organizations had become a core and permanent 
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component of Soviet foreign policy. In so many words, the decision to move the commission to 
MID answered the question posed by Chairman Zhukov in his 1958 Pravda article of whether 
the USSR should maintain its membership in the organization with a resounding “yes,” fulfilling 
Mozhaev’s desire to see Soviet activity in international organizations “raised to the highest level 
of state policy.” 979 
Just thirteen years before MID took over the commission as an established component of 
its foreign-policy apparatus, the Soviet state under Stalin had rejected UNESCO as a threat to the 
reconsolidation of its hegemony over Soviet culture and scholarship after the Second World War. 
Inspired by the movement for “world governance” in the West during the late 1940s, UNESCO 
embodied the “rootless cosmopolitanism” used by the Soviet state to label its internal enemies as 
traitors to the motherland. The Soviet boycott of the organization from 1946 to 1953 made 
UNESCO a de facto Western organization in which Western European and North Americans 
staffed its bureaucracy and defined its culture. As cascading crises fractured the world into 
capitalist and communist blocs after 1947, the international organization waded into the bipolar 
conflict, conducting projects in ex-enemy countries in coordination with the reconstruction 
efforts of the United States and instinctually advocating for liberal values throughout the world. 
When Khrushchev ended the Soviet boycott of UNESCO in 1954, he foisted Soviet 
citizens into an organization deemed anathema to Soviet ideology by his predecessor and 
implicitly acknowledged noncommunist international organizations as an unavoidable dimension 
of international affairs. But from 1954 to 1959, Soviet officials quickly grew disillusioned with 
UNESCO and their failure to score immediate results. This initial struggle derived from the 
country’s inexperience with multilateral diplomacy in institutions dominated by the West. Once 
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the USSR decided to stay in UNESCO in 1959, however, it made significant progress in 
influencing UNESCO activity, increasing the number of conferences it hosted, the frequency of 
appearances of its authors on the pages of UNESCO publications, and the size of its contingent 
of technical experts sent through UNESCO to weakly-developed countries.  
Between 1954 and 1967, Soviet professionals, scholars, diplomats, and other citizens 
dismissed, explored, or embraced the internationalist project of UNESCO, which differed from 
the socialist internationalism of which their homeland acted as the primary wellspring. 
Moreover, these Soviet citizens became integral members of international publics that sought to 
transcend the bipolar conflict of the Cold War and bring the world closer together. Through 
working as international civil servants or technical experts, engaging in debate at conferences, 
and interacting with international publications, Soviet citizens became acquainted with alternate 
visions of how to attain world peace through international cooperation that both stood in 
opposition to and overlapped with the Soviet brand of internationalism. 
While most of those who experienced the world of UNESCO rejected the Western 
domination of the international organizational system, they nevertheless argued that the USSR 
should adhere to the Western-written rules of the game of this system and adjust to its Western 
culture in order to bolster Soviet standing in the international community. Soviet international 
civil servants repeatedly complained about their country’s neglect of UNESCO’s norms for 
smooth-functioning international cooperation and chafed under the overbearing 
micromanagement of their overseers in the Soviet UNESCO Delegation. Zvorykin argued 
against Soviet attacks on bourgeois scholars and advised the Soviet academic community to 
comport themselves in accordance with the “sociability” and etiquette incumbent on those 
entering the international public sphere. To better converse with the foreign scholars involved in 
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the History of Mankind, he also promoted the use of Western languages in Soviet journals and 
appropriated elements of the Western genre of world history into Soviet historical scholarship. 
Similarly, the founder of Prometheus wanted his government to allow him to actively 
communicate with the UNESCO reading public while Soviet librarians jumped at the chance to 
keep abreast of the latest developments in their profession. With the exception of Ponomarev and 
several others, Soviet UNESCO participants did not express a conscious preference for Western 
internationalism over Soviet internationalism and retained their loyalty to their homeland and its 
cause. But many of them did begin to practice Western internationalism precisely because the 
Soviet state ordered them to excel in its institutionalized form. 
Although militarily a superpower, the USSR would never make up for the time it lost 
under Stalin in the world of international organizations. By calling for an integration of the 
USSR into this system in order to overturn it, the faithful Soviet emissaries to this organization 
laid bare the tension between imitation and differentiation at the heart of Khrushchev’s famous 
declaration that the Soviet Union would “catch up and overtake” the United States and the 
capitalist world. “Khrushchev’s repeated assertion of the goal ‘to catch up and overtake 
America,’” Reid observes, “was contradictory and risky, calling into question claims for the 
distinctiveness of socialist modernity and locking the USSR into constant disadvantageous 
competition on the territory and standards set by the United States.”980 The competition of 
internationalisms investigated in this dissertation exemplifies this contradiction and the 
consequent disadvantages underscored by Reid. Western and socialist internationalisms shared 
ideals (friendship among peoples, scientific progress, a celebration of cultures, world peace, 
                                                     
980 Susan Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 
1959,” in Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. György Péteri (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 224. 
 500 
etc.). But only one had become institutionalized in a way that made it recognized as the sole 
universal mechanism for realizing an international community. By joining UNESCO, the USSR 
legitimized this presumption to universality and provincialized its own internationalism as a 
particularistic ideology plotting to overturn the Western-based world order from within it. 
Although it attained a degree of success in UNESCO after 1960, the decision to join the UN 
specialized agency relegated Soviet internationalism to the position of acting as one of multiple 
voting blocs within an international organizational system whose pretensions of neutrality 
masked the power of the West to articulate its rules and man its bureaucracies in the first two 
decades of its existence. Soviet UNESCO intermediaries saw in the secretariat, or the heart of 
UNESCO shaping all of the organization’s activities, systemic biases and discrimination where 
their Western counterparts saw the neutral workings of an administration.  
On the one hand, these recriminations of the “bourgeois” tendencies of UNESCO and 
Soviet suspicions of the existence of Western conspiracies behind every decision made by the 
organization allowed the Soviet UNESCO Commission and Delegation to ignore the failure of 
their highly centralized, top-down methods for recruiting Soviet citizens to partake in UNESCO 
projects. If the Soviet Union wanted to succeed in UNESCO, it had either to launch a 
mobilization of its populace and put them on alert for sudden UNESCO requests or reform its 
system of creating empty reserves by decree in order to respond to the spontaneously arising 
needs of the international organization. The intense curiosity evinced by readers of The UNESCO 
Courier suggests that Soviet citizens might have volunteered for service in the international 
organization if the commission had done more to educate Soviet nationals on the opportunities it 
extended. Of course, this half-hearted embrace of UNESCO reflected the cautious, inconsistent, 
and partial opening up to the world indicative of the Khrushchev era in general.  
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On the other hand, these Soviet criticisms of UNESCO as a “bourgeois” organization 
were right. In the institutionalized form of UNESCO, “Western internationalism” lost its 
adjectival qualifier, becoming the “internationalism” shaping the structure of UNESCO and 
guiding the implementation of its program even as, in the 1950s and 1960s, non-Western 
countries started to enter the organization’s ranks and alter the focus of its program. But this 
gradual process of de-Westernization of an organization founded in the West and shaped by its 
ideals angered American politicians as well as some Western Europeans who abhorred the fact 
that UNESCO had in fact become a universal organization less and less acquiescent to the 
wishes of Western governments. With the increasingly pluralist composition of UNESCO after 
decolonization accelerated in the 1960s, the ideological battle of the Cold War took a back seat 
to meeting the demands of weakly-developed countries for technical assistance. The US 
responded to this de-Westernization of UNESCO by turning to international institutions in which 
the West still enjoyed hegemony (the OAS, the OECD, EEC, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, etc.) and founding the Peace Corps as a robust bilateral program conducting 
assistance similar to the aid delivered by the UN specialized agency. Meanwhile, the USSR 
clung to UNESCO as one of the only noncommunist international organizations in which it had a 
semblance of influence.   
Indeed, UNESCO soon became a bastion of anti-Western sentiment. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the organization underwent a rapid transformation that made it more closely resemble an 
alliance of nonaligned nations than a tool of Western states. In the early 1970s, the PRC and the 
GDR both joined UNESCO in the context of the easing of Cold War friction brought on by 
détente and the West German policy of Ostpolitik. After Maheu retired from the director-
generalship in 1974, the UNESCO General Conference voted to elect Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, a 
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Senegalese national, as the first person from the Third World to hold the position of director-
general. Under M’Bow, the international organization regularly endorsed viewpoints that ran 
counter to American interests. The dissatisfaction in Washington with UNESCO boiled over in 
the early 1980s when the international organization published Many Voices, One World: 
Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order. 
Composed by Seán MacBride, the chairman of UNESCO’s International Commission for the 
Study of Communication Problems and an Irish Nobel laureate who had played instrumental 
roles in a number of international organizations, the report called for a “new world information 
and communication order” to end the concentration of mass media in the West and the reliance 
of the weakly-developed countries on Western information and means of communication.981 
From the perspective of the new American presidential administration of Ronald Reagan, the so-
called “MacBride Report” amounted to little more than an attack on “freedom of the press” by 
the dictators of the communist bloc and the Third World who had turned the UN into a 
dysfunctional and corrupt abettor of tyranny. Citing the MacBride Report among other reasons, 
the US withdrew from UNESCO in 1984.982  
UNESCO too suffered from a decline of its importance due to the proliferation of 
different actors crowding the international arena. In the 1970s, a multitude of new international 
organizations burst onto the scene eager to solve global issues ranging from public health to 
environmental degradation. From the beginning of the decade through the first half of the 1980s, 
the number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs more than quadrupled, ballooning 
                                                     
981 For a summary of the report, see Vir Bala Aggarwal and V. S. Gupta, Handbook of Journalism and Mass 
Communication (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2001), 59–61. For the entire report, see The MacBride 
Commission, Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and 
Communication Order (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980). 
 
982 For an overview of events leading to American withdrawal from UNESCO, see Meisler, United Nations, 228-31. 
 503 
from 3,075 in the early 1970s to 14,216 in the mid-1980s.983 The USSR also widened its 
participation in the international organizational system, enrolling in more than forty NGOs by 
1977. Two years earlier, it had signed the Helsinki Accords. Formulated by the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), these accords remain one of the most famous 
multilateral agreements of the era of détente and a landmark achievement of the human rights 
movement of the second half of the twentieth century.984  
Yet UNESCO continued to symbolize international intellectual cooperation for many 
Soviet citizens until the dissolution of the USSR. At the height of M. S. Gorbachev’s glasnost’ 
and his “new thinking” about international relations, the director of the Tajik SSR Academy of 
Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, A. Tursunov, wrote an article in the February 1989 issue 
of Kommunist, “The New Thinking: What Can UNESCO Do?” Explaining that he had worked 
the previous summer at UNESCO headquarters, Tursunov rattled off the ways in which the 
organization helped build “a general cultural foundation under the system of comprehensive 
security.” But many UNESCO publications, he regretted, were “to this day not being made 
available to the Soviet creative intelligentsia.” For instance, “it is particularly annoying,” he 
chided, “that the History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, written by a 
highly skilled international group of authors and considered by the international community as a 
noticeable phenomenon in world science, has not been translated into Russian.”985 In the same 
issue of Kommunist, another Soviet academician, Vice-President of AN SSSR V. N. 
Kudriavtsev, proposed in an article on “political reform and social science” that Soviet 
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academicians follow UNESCO guidelines when setting out to realize glasnost’ and cultivate “an 
atmosphere of openness, respect for the ideas and suggestions made by others and the existence 
of a variety of scientific schools and trends” in their workplaces. “In this case,” he suggested, “it 
would also be useful to rely on global experience and, particularly, to take into consideration the 
recommendations of UNESCO on the status of the scientific worker and his role in contemporary 
society.”986  
For members of the Soviet intelligentsia who had come into contact with UNESCO, the 
organization therefore offered an alternative internationalist program of action once the Soviet 
brand of internationalism had grown hollow in the late 1980s. When the post-Stalinist leadership 
had decided to join UNESCO in 1954, it extended to a select number of influential Soviet 
professionals–such as the future ambassador, Dubinin–a chance to experiment with this 
alternative internationalism and adapt elements of it to Soviet society, introducing them to ideas 
that would become of use when Soviet ideology began to lose its grip under Gorbachev. The 
continued enthusiasm of Soviet readers for The UNESCO Courier into the 1980s demonstrates 
how UNESCO publications played this role. In 1990, Moscow-based Progress Publishers 
released an anthology of the best articles from The Courier over the years. In an overview of the 
history of the Russian translation, the editors of the anthology noted that the “large increase in 
the circulation of the Russian edition can serve as a testimony to the growth in popularity of the 
magazine among Soviet readers.” The editors also characterized The Courier as an intellectual 
predecessor to Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and the end of the Cold War.987  
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Thus, this dissertation has shown that the UN and its specialized agencies, despite their 
obvious failures, created an institutionalized network of events, publications, and workplaces 
through which the opposing sides of the Cold War remained in continual contact and got to know 
each other intimately and from a distance, whether they liked it or not and for better or worse. 
Long derided by its Western critics for its dysfunctional handling of security crises, concessions 
to authoritarian governments, bloated and corrupt bureaucracies, as well as liberal expenditures 
on conferences or other initiatives with little tangible impact on international affairs, the UN 
system and UNESCO in particular nevertheless served as a vital vehicle for binding the two 
sides of the Cold War to a spirit of internationalism and the pursuit of peace, integrating the 
USSR into an international architecture set up for these purposes.988 As the arguments of those 
Soviet officials who opposed Zhukov’s proposal from 1958 to leave UNESCO demonstrate, a 
withdrawal of the USSR from the international organization would have caused significant 
damage to the country’s reputation abroad and undermined its renewed emphasis on the 
internationalist mission at the core of the founding ideology of the Soviet project. In the long run, 
the UN’s commitment to international cooperation, of which UNESCO represented a maximalist 
version, preserved the internationalist ethos of the immediate postwar years through the bipolar 
and nationalist crises of the second half of the twentieth century, presaging and laying the 
diplomatic groundwork for the new iterations of internationalism exemplified in discussions of 
“globalization” and “global governance” that became popular in response to the collapse of 
communism in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the countries that emerged from the communist bloc after 
1989 have continued to take an active part in UNESCO. In 2009, the general conference chose 
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Irina Bokova, a former official in the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who received her 
education in the Soviet Union, as the first UNESCO director-general from Eastern Europe.989 In 
the fall of 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education gave UNESCO $5.6 million for the 
relaunching of The UNESCO Courier, which the organization had stopped publishing in 2011 
after experiencing a budgetary shortfall caused by the US cutting off its annual contribution to 
the organization. Once the exclusive domain of an American editor, the new Courier features 
Mandarin prominently in its marketing and relies on the funding of one of the only nominally 
communist regimes to survive the revolutions of the late twentieth century. In a subtle 
endorsement of China’s hostility toward Western notions of freedom of the press, the new motto 
of The Courier, “Many Voices, One World,” is identical to the title of the 1980 MacBride 
Report.990 
The Russian Federation has also stood out as a prominent UNESCO member state. In 
2018, for example, it announced that it would lend the international organization the assistance 
of one of its ships from the Baltic Fleet for an oceanographic expedition to the Indian Ocean.991 
In contrast, the US has replaced the USSR as one of the most vocal critics of UNESCO. After 
leaving the organization in 1984, it reentered UNESCO in 2001 only to leave again in 2017 
under the presidency of Donald J. Trump because of the organization’s recognition of Palestine 
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as a member state.992 In an inversion of their past attitudes toward UNESCO, the Russian 
Federation has therefore spent more time as a member state than the US has since 1991. Perhaps, 
this new, non-Western face of UNESCO is the real legacy of those silent, mountain-like Soviet 
observers whom Spender mocked in his novel but who realized better than he did the importance 
of that conference in Vienna on a spring day in 1956. 
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